(PC) Gray v. Khoo ( 2022 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DANA GRAY, ) Case No.: 1:20-cv-01047-DAD-SAB (PC) ) 12 Plaintiff, ) ) ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 13 v. ) FOR CLARIFICATION 14 A. KHOO, et al., ) (ECF No. 66) ) 15 Defendants. ) ) 16 ) ) 17 ) 18 Plaintiff Dana Gray is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action 19 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 20 Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for clarification, filed March 3, 2022. This 21 action is proceeding against Defendants R. Mitchell, I. Singh, and G. Song for denial of Plaintiff’s 22 revision surgery; against Defendant Mitchell for directing that her Gabapentin be terminated in 23 violation of the Eighth Amendment; against Defendant Mitchell for denial of pain medication in 24 violation of the Eighth Amendment; and against Defendants Mitchell, Singh, and Song for medical 25 malpractice for denial of her revision surgery. (ECF No. 30.) 26 In the present motion, Plaintiff asks the Court to clarify whether Defendants Mitchell and Song 27 are being sued in their official capacities because she has been told that Defendant Mitchell left 28 Central California Women’s Facility. (ECF No. 66.) 1 When a plaintiff sues a state actor in her official capacity, the suit “represent[s] … another way 2 of pleading an action against an entity of which [the] officer is an agent.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 3 U.S. 159, 165 (1985) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Suits against state officials in 4 their official capacity therefore should be treated as suits against the State.” Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 5 21, 25 (1991). “The Eleventh Amendment erects a general bar against federal lawsuits brought 6 against a state.” Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 491 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). The doctrine of 7 Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), however, provides an exception to this general bar. Under the 8 doctrine, “suits against an official for prospective relief are generally cognizable.” Porter, 319 F.3d at 9 483; see also Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Maryland, 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002) 10 (to decide whether “Ex parte Young avoids an Eleventh Amendment bar to suit, a court need only” 11 find “whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks … prospective” 12 relief) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Furthermore, “[w]hen sued for prospective 13 injunctive relief, a state official in his official capacity is considered a ‘person’ for § 1983 purposes.” 14 Flint v. Dennison, 488 F.3d 816, 825 (9th Cir. 2007). 15 To the extent Plaintiff is seeking prospective, injunctive relief in this action, any official- 16 capacity claims are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and Defendants in their official capacities 17 are “persons” for purposes of section 1983. However, to impose official-capacity liability against a 18 state official, a plaintiff must allege that the government “entity’s ‘policy or custom’ … played a part 19 in the violation of federal law.” Hafer, 502 U.S. at 25 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 20 In the operative complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the decision to deny her revision surgery were 21 made or considered on appeal by Defendants Mitchell, Song, Singh and Showalter. Plaintiff had two 22 consultations with neurosurgeons who recommended that Plaintiff should receive a revision surgery 23 due to the hardware failure and Plaintiff’s symptoms. Plaintiff also alleges Defendant Mitchell 24 discontinued Gabapentin with no systemic replacement and only topicals to address the pain from her 25 broken hardware and increasing neuropathy. Plaintiff contends that Defendant Mitchell made no 26 effort to find a suitable replacement for her pain management and that she was told that Defendant 27 Mitchell had denied all pain management. Plaintiff contends that Defendant Mitchell made the 28 decision that her long term Gabapentin be discontinued and he was involved in the pain committee eee eee EOE IID 1 || that denied her requests to be continued on the medication. Plaintiff further alleges between January at 2 || December 2019, she required opioid medication for “breakthrough pain” but on December 27, 2019 was 3 || denied opioids by Defendant Mitchell and was not given any reason for that decision. Plaintiff claims 4 || Defendant Mitchell was deliberately indifferent by denying her what she characterized as “effective” 5 || medication for her breakthrough pain episodes. Thus, it is clear that Plaintiff challenges the individual 6 || medical determinations of Defendants. She does not challenge a state law or regulation, or a CDCR 7 || policy or procedure. Accordingly, Plaintiff is not and cannot proceed on her Eighth Amendment 8 || claims against Defendants in their official capacities, and this action therefore proceeds against 9 || Defendants in their individual capacities. 10 11 ||IT IS SO ORDERED. Al (re 12 || Dated: _ March 4, 2022 OF 13 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28