(PC) Stanford v. Stashyn ( 2023 )


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  • 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 TERRELL CORDARRYL STANDORD, Case No. 2:23-cv-02125-JDP (PC) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER SCREENING PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT AND GIVING HIM THE 13 v. OPPORTUNITY TO EITHER FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT OR A HABEAS 14 DONNA STASHYN, et al., CORPUS PETITION 15 Defendants. ECF No. 1 16 17 Plaintiff Terrell Cordarryl Stanford, a state inmate, brings this § 1983 action against Judge 18 Donna Stashyn, defense attorney Peter Firpo, and deputy district attorney Melissa Marshall. ECF 19 No. 1. The allegations in the complaint are insufficient to proceed. I will give plaintiff an 20 opportunity to file either an amended complaint or a habeas corpus petition before recommending 21 that this action be dismissed. I will defer ruling on plaintiff’s in forma pauperis application until 22 after he decides what type of action he seeks to pursue. 23 Screening and Pleading Requirements 24 A federal court must screen the complaint of any claimant seeking permission to proceed 25 in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The court must identify any cognizable claims and 26 dismiss any portion of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon 27 28 1 which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 2 relief. Id. 3 A complaint must contain a short and plain statement that plaintiff is entitled to relief, 4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and provide “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 5 face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plausibility standard does not 6 require detailed allegations, but legal conclusions do not suffice. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 7 662, 678 (2009). If the allegations “do not permit the court to infer more than the mere 8 possibility of misconduct,” the complaint states no claim. Id. at 679. The complaint need not 9 identify “a precise legal theory.” Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg’l Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024, 10 1038 (9th Cir. 2016). Instead, what plaintiff must state is a “claim”—a set of “allegations that 11 give rise to an enforceable right to relief.” Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1264 12 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (citations omitted). 13 The court must construe a pro se litigant’s complaint liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 14 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). The court may dismiss a pro se litigant’s complaint “if it 15 appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which 16 would entitle him to relief.” Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2017). 17 However, “‘a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements 18 of the claim that were not initially pled.’” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 19 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)). 20 Analysis 21 The complaint alleges that, during a state criminal proceeding, plaintiff’s counsel, 22 defendant Peter Firpo, manipulated plaintiff into signing what plaintiff understood to be a “joint 23 suspension,” but which was in reality a plea deal for a fifteen-and-a-half-year sentence. ECF No. 24 1 at 2-3. Plaintiff claims that he made defendant Judge Donna Stashyn aware during the 25 proceeding that he believed he was signing a joint suspension. Id. at 3. Judge Stashyn, according 26 to the complaint, never asked plaintiff whether he understood what he was signing or whether he 27 had been pressured to take a plea deal. Id. The complaint states that defendant district attorney 28 Melissa Marshall was present and witnessed plaintiff unknowingly sign the plea deal. Id. 1 To the extent that plaintiff alleges that defendants violated his constitutional rights in 2 connection with his plea deal, his claim sounds in habeas corpus. See Badea v. Cox, 931 F.2d 3 573, 574 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that a habeas corpus petition is the proper vehicle for 4 challenging the “legality or duration” of confinement). In any event, no claim for civil damages 5 is cognizable unless and until plaintiff’s criminal conviction is invalidated. See Heck v. 6 Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). 7 Moreover, defendants are immune to plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff’s claims against Judge 8 Stashyn, a superior court judge, are foreclosed by judicial immunity. “[J]udges are absolutely 9 immune from civil liability for damages for their judicial acts.” Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Crt. for 10 Dist. of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987). And criminal defense lawyers, like 11 defendant Firpo, are not subject to liability under § 1983 for their handling of criminal cases. See 12 Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1982) (public defenders do not act under color of law 13 for purposes of § 1983 liability); Briley v. California, 564 F.2d 849, 855 (9th Cir. 1977) (privately 14 retained attorneys do not act under color of law for purposes of § 1983 liability). Finally, 15 defendant Marshall is immune as a prosecutor. A prosecutor is protected by absolute immunity 16 from liability in a civil rights suit for damages “when performing the traditional functions of an 17 advocate.” Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 131 (1997) (citing Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 18 259, 273 (1993); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)). 19 Since plaintiff’s claims may sound in habeas corpus, I will allow him to file either an 20 amended complaint or a habeas corpus petition. I will defer ruling on plaintiff’s application to 21 proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 2, until he decides which type of action to pursue. 22 Accordingly, it is ORDERED that: 23 1. The court will defer ruling on plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis until 24 plaintiff decides if he wishes to bring either a § 1983 or habeas corpus action. 25 2. Within thirty days from the service of this order, plaintiff may file an amended 26 complaint or habeas corpus petition. If he does not, I will recommend that this action be 27 dismissed. 28 3. Failure to comply with this order may result in the dismissal of this action. 1 4. The Clerk of Court is directed to send plaintiff both a § 1983 complaint form and 2 | a habeas corpus form. 3 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: _ November 20, 2023 Q_——_. 6 JEREMY D. PETERSON 7 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

Document Info

Docket Number: 2:23-cv-02125

Filed Date: 11/21/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 6/20/2024