Campbell v. Huffmaster Management, Inc ( 2022 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 KEYHONA CAMPBELL, individually No. 2:21-CV-00815-JAM-JDP and on behalf of all others 12 similarly situated, 13 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS AND 14 v. DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE 15 HUFFMASTER MANAGEMENT INC., a Michigan corporation, et al., 16 Defendants. 17 18 Keyhona Campbell (“Plaintiff” or “Campbell”) sued Huffmaster 19 Management Inc. (“Defendant” or “Huffmaster”), a Michigan 20 corporation, alleging violations of the California Labor Code and 21 Unfair Competition Law (UCL). See First Amended Compl. (“FAC”), 22 ECF No. 13. 23 Defendant moves to strike portions of Plaintiff’s First 24 Amended Complaint and to dismiss three of Plaintiff’s eight 25 claims. See Mot. to Strike and/or Dismiss (“Mot.”), ECF No. 17. 26 Plaintiff opposes the motion. See Opp’n, ECF No. 20. Defendant 27 replied. See Reply, ECF No. 22. For the reasons set forth 28 below, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss and DENIES 1 Defendant’s motion to strike.1 2 I. BACKGROUND 3 Campbell worked as emergency relief staff for Defendant on 4 three occasions from October 22, 2018 to November 26, 2018, 5 March 19, 2019 to November 13, 2019, and March 4, 2020 to May 2, 6 2020. FAC ¶ 3. Defendant is a corporation that provides 7 healthcare staffing to hospitals and other healthcare facilities 8 in need of short-term, temporary workers. Id. On the three 9 occasions Campbell worked for Defendant, she was stationed at 10 healthcare facilities in California, including the “University of 11 California Hospital at Davis, California”. Id. ¶¶ 3, 10. 12 Campbell alleges that Defendants did not provide statutorily 13 mandated meal or rest breaks, depriving her and others of 14 “uninterrupted, thirty-minute meal periods during which they 15 [were] completely relieved of duty, and . . . rest breaks of at 16 least ten minutes by the end of every fourth hour of work.” Id. 17 ¶ 4. Defendant also allegedly failed to pay her for time worked, 18 because it “automatically deducted 30-minutes from Ms. Campbell’s 19 pay every shift.” Id. ¶¶ 1, 4. 20 Campbell further alleges that Defendant failed “to provide 21 sufficient PPE [personal protective equipment] for its 22 employees.” Id. ¶ 23. While Campbell admits she was “provided a 23 handful of masks and hand sanitizer,” she alleges that her work 24 in proximity with hospital patients required “N95 masks or 25 sanitizing products, necessary to protect herself and the public 26 27 1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 28 scheduled for December 7, 2021. 1 from [COVID-19] in the workplace.” Id. Having failed to receive 2 these items, Campbell alleges she “spent at least one-and-a-half 3 to two hours per week shopping” for “masks, gloves, cleaning and 4 sanitizing products, and hand sanitizer.” Id. ¶¶ 24-26. 5 Campbell alleges she was neither reimbursed for her expenses nor 6 paid for her time spent shopping. Id. 7 On March 2, 2021, Campbell provided notice of Defendant’s 8 allegedly unlawful practices to Defendant and the California 9 Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”). Id. ¶ 29. Five 10 months later, Campbell filed this suit. See FAC. 11 II. OPINION 12 A. Judicial Notice 13 Federal Rule of Evidence 201 allows the Court to notice a 14 fact if it is “not subject to reasonable dispute,” such that it 15 is “generally known” or “can be accurately and readily 16 determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 17 questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). The Court may take judicial 18 notice of court records, including “opinions, complaints, 19 briefs, and evidence filed in other actions.” BP W. Coast Prod. 20 LLC v. Greene, 318 F.Supp.2d 987, 994 (E.D. Cal. 2004). 21 Plaintiff asks the Court to take judicial notice of court 22 filings in other cases. See Pl.’s Req. for Judicial Notice 23 (“RJN”) at 1, ECF No. 21. Specifically, Plaintiff asks the 24 court to take judicial notice of (Ex. 1) an order granting in 25 part and denying in part defendant’s motion to dismiss in Lee 26 Sprewell v. Federal Express Corporation et al., 2:20-cv-11612- 27 SVW-AGR in the United States District Court for the Central 28 District of California and (Ex. 2) an order sustaining in part 1 and overruling in part defendant’s demurrer in Andrew Gummow v. 2 General Logistics Systems U.S., Inc., MSC20-02038 in the Costa 3 County Superior Court. Id. Both exhibits are documents that 4 are part of a court record and therefore appropriate documents 5 for judicial notice. BP W. Coast Prod. LLC, 318 F.Supp.2d at 6 994. However, a court “may not take judicial notice of 7 proceedings or records in another case so as to supply, without 8 formal introduction of evidence, facts essential to support a 9 contention in the cause then before it.” See M/V Am. Queen v. 10 San Diego Marine Constr. Corp., 708 F.2d 1483, 1491 (9th Cir. 11 1983). Accordingly, in resolving this motion, the Court will 12 consider these exhibits only for the arguments raised and not 13 for the truth of any facts asserted. 14 B. Motion to Dismiss 15 1. Legal Standard 16 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires “a short 17 and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 18 entitled to relief.” When a plaintiff fails to “state a claim 19 upon which relief can be granted,” the Court must dismiss the 20 suit. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To defeat a motion to dismiss, 21 a plaintiff must “plead enough facts to state a claim to relief 22 that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 23 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Plausibility under Twombly requires 24 “factual content that allows the Court to draw a reasonable 25 inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 26 alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 27 “At this stage, the Court ‘must accept as true all of the 28 allegations contained in a complaint.’” Id. But it need not 1 “accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual 2 allegation.” Id. Additionally, the Court should grant leave to 3 amend, unless the “pleading could not possibly be cured by the 4 allegation of other facts.” Cooks, Perkiss, & Leiche, Inc. v. 5 N. Cal. Collection Serv., Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 246-47 (9th Cir. 6 1990). 7 2. Analysis 8 a. Claim Four: Failure to Furnish Accurate Wage 9 Statements 10 Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s fourth claim for 11 failure to furnish accurate wage statements under California 12 Labor Code § 226. Mot. at 5. To establish liability under this 13 statute, a plaintiff must demonstrate: "(1) a failure to include 14 in the wage statement one or more of the required items from 15 Section 226(a); (2) that failure was knowing and intentional; 16 and (3) a resulting injury." Brewer v. General Nutrition 17 Corporation, No. 11-cv-03587-YGR, 2015 WL 5072039, at *5 (N.D. 18 Cal. Aug. 27, 2015) (internal citations omitted). Federal 19 district courts are divided as to whether a failure to provide 20 meal and rest periods under § 226.7 supports an action to 21 recover penalties for inaccurate wage statements under § 226. 22 Mot. at 5; Opp’n at 14. Having reviewed the cases brought forth 23 by both parties, the Court finds that the weight of the 24 authority in the Eastern District of California leans in favor 25 of Defendant’s position that a failure to pay meal and rest 26 period premiums does not support a claim for failure to provide 27 an accurate wage statement. 28 California Labor Code § 226 requires that employers include 1 “an accurate itemized statement” showing among other things 2 “gross wages earned.” Cal. Lab. Code § 226(a). The payments an 3 employee may recover for the employer’s failure to provide meal 4 or rest periods are “not wages owed to the employee for time 5 worked, but rather are penalties paid by the employer.” Garybo 6 v. Leonardo Bros., No. 1:15-cv-01487-DAD-JLT, 2020 WL 2765661, 7 at *7 (E.D. Cal. May 28, 2020) (rejected in part on other 8 grounds by Garybo v. Leonardo Bros., No. 1:15-cv-01487-DAD-JLT 9 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2021)). As such, the failure to include 10 § 226.7 premiums in wage statements does not support a cause of 11 action under § 226. Naranjo v. Spectrum Security Services, 12 Inc., 40 Cal. App. 5th 444, 474 (2019) (holding “section 226.7 13 actions do not entitle employees to pursue the derivative 14 penalties in sections 203 and 226”). 15 Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff’s claim for inaccurate 16 wage statements is premised on meal and break violations under 17 § 226.7, this claim is dismissed with prejudice. Deveraturda v. 18 Globe Aviation Sec. Servs., 454 F.3d 1043, 1049 (9th Cir. 2006) 19 (finding dismissal with prejudice appropriate when amendment is 20 futile). 21 b. Claim Six: Failure to Reimburse Necessary 22 Business Expenses 23 California Labor Code § 2802 requires that an “employer 24 shall indemnify his or her employee for all necessary 25 expenditures or losses incurred by the employee in direct 26 consequence of the discharge of his or her duties.” Cal. Lab. 27 Code § 2802(a). “The elements of a claim under Section 2802 28 are: (i) the employee made expenditures or incurred losses; 1 (ii) the expenditures or losses were incurred in direct 2 consequence of the employee's discharge of his or her duties, or 3 obedience to the directions of the employer; and (iii) the 4 expenditures or losses were reasonable and necessary.” Aguilar 5 v. Zep Inc., No. 13-cv-00563-WHO, 2014 WL 4245988, at *16 (N.D. 6 Cal. Aug. 27, 2014). “[T]he employer must either know or have 7 reason to know that the employee has incurred [the] expense.” 8 Id. (internal quotation omitted). 9 Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not alleged facts 10 sufficient to satisfy the elements required for a claim under 11 § 2802. Mot. at 6. Specifically, Defendant argues that the 12 Plaintiff “fails to allege that [Defendant] knew or had reason 13 to know that Plaintiff incurred these expenses.” Reply at 2. 14 Reviewing the operative complaint, the Court finds that the 15 complaint lacks any allegations that her employer knew or had 16 reason to know of her expenses, a prerequisite to recovery under 17 California law. See FAC; Aguilar v. Zep Inc., 2014 WL 4245988, 18 at *16. Finding dismissal appropriate on this ground, the Court 19 declines to address Defendant’s other arguments for Plaintiff’s 20 failure to state a claim under § 2802. 21 Accordingly, this claim is dismissed with leave to amend. 22 Cooks, Perkiss, & Leiche, Inc., 911 F.2d at 246-47. 23 c. Claim Seven: Unfair Competition Law 24 “It is a basic doctrine of equity jurisprudence that courts 25 of equity should not act . . . when the moving party has an 26 adequate remedy at law.” Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 27 504 U.S. 374, 381 (1992). The Ninth Circuit applied this 28 longstanding doctrine of equity in Sonner, when it held that a 1 plaintiff “must establish that she lacks an adequate remedy at 2 law before securing equitable restitution for past harm under 3 the UCL.” Sonner v. Premier Nutrition Corp., 971 F.3d 834, 844 4 (9th Cir. 2020). When “the operative complaint does not allege 5 that [the plaintiff] lacks an adequate legal remedy,” it is 6 proper to dismiss the plaintiff’s claims for equitable relief. 7 Id. Although Plaintiff attempts to distinguish Sonner by its 8 procedural posture, arguing that “Sonner addressed a plaintiff’s 9 attempt, late in litigation . . . to avoid a jury trial” by 10 filing a second amended complaint, district courts have held 11 that “[n]othing in Sonner limits its precedential value to such 12 circumstances.” Opp’n at 11; Zaback v. Kellogg Sales, Co., No. 13 3:20-cv-00268-BEN-MSB, 2020 WL 6381987, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 14 29, 2020). Here, as in Sonner, it is proper for the Court to 15 determine whether Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged inadequate 16 remedies at law to survive dismissal of her equity claims under 17 the UCL. 18 Having carefully reviewed the operative complaint, the 19 Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege inadequate 20 remedies at law. See FAC. Plaintiff alleges no facts to show 21 that money damages would be inadequate to address her claims. 22 Id. As such, the Court finds it proper to dismiss Plaintiff’s 23 claim for restitution under the UCL. 24 As to Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief under the 25 UCL, Plaintiff has failed to allege future harm requiring 26 injunctive relief. Id. Plaintiff argues in opposition that she 27 “could be subjected to the illegal policies and practiced [sic] 28 complained of in her FAC again,” because she has not “formally 1 resigned or expressed an intent not to accept another placement 2 for Defendants in California in the future.” Opp’n at 13. The 3 Court, however, declines to rely on Plaintiff’s argument in 4 opposition when it asserts allegations absent in the operative 5 complaint. As the Ninth Circuit held: “[I]n determining the 6 propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a court may not look 7 beyond the complaint to a plaintiff's moving papers, such as a 8 memorandum in opposition to a defendant's motion to dismiss.” 9 Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1026 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal 10 citations omitted). Looking at the operative complaint, 11 Plaintiff alleges only that she “worked for Defendants” in the 12 past tense and gave her most recent dates of employment as 13 “between March 4, 2020 and May 2, 2020.” FAC ¶ 3. As such, 14 there are no allegations to support a finding of future harm. 15 Accordingly, the Court dismisses the Plaintiff’s seventh 16 claim for equitable remedies under the UCL for failure to allege 17 an inadequate remedy at law as required by Sonner. Sonner, 971 18 F.3d at 844. Finding further amendment to be futile, this claim 19 is dismissed with prejudice. Deveraturda, 454 F.3d at 1049. 20 C. Motion to Strike 21 Defendant moves to strike portions of Plaintiff’s fourth 22 and seventh claims. Mot. at 5, 7. Because the Court has 23 granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss, Defendant’s motion to 24 strike is denied as moot. 25 III. ORDER 26 For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS 27 Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourth and Seventh 28 claims WITH PREJUDICE; GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss em REI IEE OS NORIO III REE NI ERE I IID eee eee 1 Plaintiff’s Sixth claim without prejudice; and DENIES Defendant’s 2} Motion to Strike as MOOT. If Plaintiff elects to amend her 3 complaint with respect to the Sixth claim, she must do so within 4 twenty (20) days of this Order. Defendant’s responsive pleading 5 is due twenty (20) days thereafter. 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 Dated: March 8, 2022 kA Geren aaa pebrsacr 00k 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 10