Martin v. Field Asset Services, Inc. ( 2023 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ----oo0oo---- 11 12 JOSEPH MARTIN, an individual, No. 2:23-cv-01119 WBS AC 13 Plaintiff, 14 v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND 15 FIELD ASSET SERVICES, INC.; FIELD ASSET SERVICES, LLC; XOME 16 FIELD SERVICES LLC; CYPREXX SERVICES, LLC; and DOES 1-10, 17 Defendants. 18 19 ----oo0oo---- 20 Plaintiff Joseph Martin initiated this individual 21 action against defendants Field Asset Services, Inc.; Xome Field 22 Asset Services LLC; Cyprexx Services, LLC; and DOES 1-10 23 (collectively “defendants”) alleging various violations of the 24 California Labor, Wages, and Business and Profession Codes. (See 25 generally Compl. (Docket No. 1-2).) Defendants removed this 26 action from Yuba County Superior Court pursuant to the Class 27 Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). (See Notice of Removal 28 at 2 (Docket No. 1).) Plaintiff moves to remand, arguing that 1 defendants lack any basis for removal. (Docket No. 17.) 2 Defendants move to dismiss. (Docket No. 5.) 3 I. Procedural and Factual Background 4 Defendant Field Asset Services, Inc. (“FAS”)1 was a 5 property preservation company, headquartered in Austin, Texas. 6 (Compl. ¶¶ 5, 19.) FAS contracted with its clients to perform 7 janitorial and maintenance work on foreclosed homes through the 8 United States until the properties were resold. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 19.) 9 FAS used “vendors,” who FAS classified as independent 10 contractors, to carry out these contracts. (Id.) 11 In 2013, Fred and Julia Bowerman brought a putative 12 class action in the Northern District of California, alleging 13 defendants willfully misclassified Fred Bowerman and members of 14 the putative class as independent contractors. See Bowerman v. 15 Field Asset Servs., Inc., No. 13-cv-00057 WHO (N.D. Cal.). In 16 2015, the district court certified the class. See id., 2015 WL 17 1321883 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2015).2 18 In 2022, the Ninth Circuit decertified the Bowerman 19 class. See Bowerman, 39 F.4th 652 (9th Cir. 2022), amended by 20 1 Defendant Field Asset Services LLC is a successor in 21 interest to FAS. (Compl. ¶ 7.) Field Asset Services LLC was 22 acquired by Xome Holdings, LLC, which changed its named to Xome Field Services LLC. (Id. ¶ 8.) Xome Field Services LLC was 23 acquired by and now operates as Cyprexx Services LLC (“Cyprexx”). (Id. ¶ 10.) Cyprexx is a Delaware limited liability company, 24 headquartered in Brandon, Florida. (Id. 11.) Because of FAS’s recent corporate changes, this order will refer to FAS and 25 defendants interchangeably. 26 2 The district court also granted partial summary judgment to the class members as to liability and issued an 27 interim attorney fee award of more than five million dollars. See Bowerman, 242 F. Supp. 3d 910 (N.D. Cal. 2017); id., 2018 WL 28 5982436 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2018). 1 60 F.4th 459 (9th Cir. 2023). After the Ninth Circuit issued the 2 formal mandate returning jurisdiction to the district court, the 3 district court, upon plaintiffs’ request, tolled the statute of 4 limitations for 60 days to give former class members the 5 opportunity to bring individual cases. (See Order Tolling 6 Statute of Limitations at 2, Hulteng Decl., Ex. 2 (Docket No. 21- 7 3).) Over 75 former members of the Bowerman class have since 8 filed individual cases in the Northern District of California, 9 all of which have been related to the Bowerman litigation. (See 10 Notices Relating Cases, Hulteng Decl., Exs. 3, 4 (Docket Nos. 21- 11 4, 21-5).) 12 Plaintiff in the present case, Joseph Martin, was an 13 unnamed member of the Bowerman class.3 Rather than file his 14 individual case in federal court, plaintiff filed his case in 15 Yuba County Superior Court. Plaintiff’s four claims are 16 identical to four of the claims in the Bowerman litigation: (1) 17 failure to pay overtime wages; (2) failure to indemnify plaintiff 18 for expenses; (3) waiting time penalties; and (4) violation of 19 California’s Unfair Competition Law. (See generally Compl.) 20 Defendants removed this action from Yuba County Superior Court 21 pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. § 22 1332(d), because of the relationship between plaintiff’s claims 23 and the original Bowerman litigation. (See Notice of Removal at 24 2.) 25 3 In 2008, plaintiff began working for FAS. (Compl. ¶ 55.) He continued working for FAS intermittently until roughly 26 2015. (Id.) During this time, plaintiff was a resident of 27 California. (Id. ¶ 4.) He primarily performed work in Yuba, Nevada, Butte, and Colusa Counties. (Id. ¶ 58.) Plaintiff now 28 resides in Watagua, Texas. (Id. ¶ 4.) 1 Two similar matters were remanded to state court after 2 briefing on plaintiff’s motion to remand was complete. (See 3 Docket Nos. 23, 26.) Carranza v. Field Asset Services, Inc., No. 4 3:23-cv-02874 WHO (N.D. Cal.), was remanded to the San Francisco 5 Superior Court by Judge Orrick in the Northern District of 6 California on August 11, 2023. (See Docket No. 23.) Valdez v. 7 Field Asset Services, Inc., No. 3:23-cv-01085 W KSC (S.D. Cal.), 8 was remanded to the San Diego Superior Court by Judge Whelan in 9 the Southern District of California on August 17, 2023. (See 10 Docket No. 26.) 11 II. Motion to Remand 12 A. Legal Standard 13 “[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which 14 the district courts of the United States have original 15 jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, 16 to the district court of the United States for the district . . . 17 where such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). If “it 18 appears that the district court lacks subject matter 19 jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 20 Federal courts have original jurisdiction over cases 21 where complete diversity exists between the parties and the 22 amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and 23 costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). The Class Action Fairness Act 24 (“CAFA”) “gives federal district courts original jurisdiction 25 over class actions in which the class members number at least 26 100, at least one plaintiff is diverse in citizenship from any 27 defendant, and the aggregate amount in controversy exceeds $5 28 million, exclusive of interest and costs.” Ibarra v. Manheim 1 Invs., Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1195 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing 28 2 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)). 3 B. Discussion 4 Defendants removed this action from Yuba County 5 Superior Court pursuant to CAFA, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). (See 6 Notice of Removal at 2.) In their Notice of Removal, defendants 7 explain that the Northern District of California retained CAFA 8 jurisdiction over the Bowerman litigation. (See Notice of 9 Removal at 3.) Defendants argue that CAFA jurisdiction therefore 10 exists as to plaintiff’s individual action because plaintiff was 11 a member of the now decertified Bowerman class and brings four of 12 the exact same claims that the Bowerman action sought to certify. 13 Defendants additionally argue that Judge Orrick’s tolling of the 14 former class members’ claims in the Bowerman case was in effect a 15 determination that there was federal jurisdiction over all of 16 their claims, even those brought in state court by individuals 17 who were not named in the Bowerman complaint. 18 There is no dispute that the Northern District of 19 California retains jurisdiction over the named plaintiffs’ claims 20 in the Bowerman litigation after the class was decertified. In 21 United Steel v. Shell Oil Company, 602 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2010), 22 the Ninth Circuit held that the “denial of Rule 23 class 23 certification does not divest the district court of jurisdiction” 24 where “the putative class action was properly removed to begin 25 with.” Id. at 1089. 26 However, neither United Steel nor any case cited by 27 defendants stand for the proposition that CAFA jurisdiction 28 exists over an unnamed plaintiff’s individual claims filed in 1 state court after class decertification. For example, in Cooper 2 v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1312 (M.D. Fla. 3 2008), former class members of a decertified class brought 4 multiple state court actions, each of which encompassed 5 approximately 200 individuals. Id. at 1314. The district court 6 concluded that CAFA jurisdiction existed over these actions 7 because the fact that each action was brought on behalf of 200 8 individuals created “class actions in disguise.” Id. at 1322. 9 In Louisiana v. American National Property and Casualty 10 Co., 746 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 2014), the Fifth Circuit held that 11 CAFA continued to provide jurisdiction over the individual 12 claims, even though the class claims had been severed, because 13 CAFA jurisdiction existed at the time of removal. Id. at 635, 14 640. Similarly, in Helm v. Alderwood Group, Inc., No. C 08-01184 15 SI, 2011 WL 2837411 (N.D. Cal. July 18, 2011), the class was 16 decertified and the class claims were severed. Id. at *3. 17 Nevertheless, the district court concluded that it retained CAFA 18 jurisdiction over the individual claims of the 86 named 19 plaintiffs because “it had an independent basis for subject 20 matter jurisdiction over those claims when they were joined 21 together in the original suit.” Id. at *3 n.4.4 22 4 Defendants also cite Taragan v. Nissan North America, 23 No. C 09-03660 SBA, 2011 WL 941132 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2011), for the proposition that, because the CAFA based claims in the 24 Bowerman litigation are still pending, CAFA jurisdiction exists over plaintiffs claims. In Taragan, the district court held 25 that, because the CAFA based claims had been dismissed, the court could not exercise CAFA jurisdiction with respect to the still- 26 pending individual state law claims. Id. at *4. However, that 27 the CAFA based claims in the Bowerman litigation remain pending, does not mean that this court has jurisdiction over plaintiff’s 28 separately filed individual claims. 1 Here, by contrast, CAFA jurisdiction has never existed 2 as to plaintiff’s individual claims. Plaintiff was not a named 3 plaintiff in the original Bowerman litigation and plaintiff never 4 filed his claims in federal court. Rather, as explained above, 5 plaintiff filed his individual state law claims for the first 6 time in state court following the decertification of the Bowerman 7 class. The cases cited by defendants in no way suggest that CAFA 8 jurisdiction can be exercised over individual claims filed for 9 the first time by an unnamed plaintiff after decertification. 10 Indeed, Judge Orrick found to the contrary when he remanded 11 plaintiff’s claims in Carranza v. Field Asset Services, Inc., No. 12 3:23-cv-02874 WHO (N.D. Cal.). 2023 WL 5170298, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 13 Aug. 11, 2023) (“Nothing about the subsequent decertification of 14 the class caused federal subject matter jurisdiction to attach to 15 [plaintiff’s] state law claims and force him to litigate in 16 federal court.”). 17 Further, plaintiff’s state law claims are not brought 18 on behalf of anyone else, including any other unnamed members of 19 the decertified Bowerman class. Nothing in the Complaint 20 suggests that plaintiff seeks any type of representative action 21 nor does plaintiff propose a joint trial. Compare Visendi v. 22 Bank of Am., 733 F.3d 863, 866-68 (9th Cir. 2013) (CAFA 23 jurisdiction exists where plaintiffs’ initial complaint sought a 24 joint trial for 137 named plaintiffs), with Belton v. Hertz Local 25 Edition Transporting, Inc., No. 19-cv-00854 WHO, 2019 WL 2085825, 26 at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 13, 2019) (CAFA jurisdiction does not exist 27 where plaintiff “does not seek class status, plead the existence 28 of a class, define the limits of a class, or even reference the 1 word class in his complaint”). 2 In their Opposition, defendants argue that removal is 3 in the interest of judicial efficiency. (See Opp’n at 2.) 4 Specifically, defendants contend that because over 75 former 5 class members have filed individual lawsuit in the Northern 6 District of California, all of which have been related to the 7 original Bowerman litigation, that it is inefficient to have 8 duplicative litigation proceeding in state court. (See id. at 2- 9 3.) While parallel state and federal litigation may not be the 10 most efficient use of judicial resources, efficiency is not a 11 basis for federal jurisdiction. 12 For the foregoing reasons, there is no basis for CAFA 13 jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims.5 Accordingly, the court 14 will grant plaintiff’s motion to remand the case to the Yuba 15 County Superior Court. (Docket No. 17.) Because the case will 16 be remanded to Yuba County Superior Court, the court declines to 17 address defendant’s motion to dismiss. (Docket No. 5.) 18 III. Attorneys’ Fees 19 Plaintiff requests that the court award him attorneys’ 20 fees and costs incurred in filing this motion pursuant to 28 21 U.S.C. § 1447(c). (Mot. at 5.) Section 1447(c) provides that 22 “[a]n order remanding the case may require payment of just costs 23 and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a 24 result of the removal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). “Absent unusual 25 circumstances, a court may award costs and attorney’s fees under 26 5 Likewise, there is no other basis for federal 27 jurisdiction. Plaintiff does not bring any federal claims, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and the parties are not completely diverse, see 28 id. § 1332. 1 § 1447(c) only where the removing party lacked an objectively 2 reasonable basis for seeking removal.” Grancare, LLC v. Thrower, 3 889 F.3d 543, 552 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Martin v. Franklin Cap. 4 Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005)). Here, defendants failed to 5 cite any relevant evidence or legal authority that supported 6 removal. Accordingly, the court concludes that defendants lacked 7 an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal and will 8 grant plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees.6 9 Plaintiff requests $2,250 in attorneys’ fees and costs. 10 (See Yamasaki Decl. at 1 (Docket No. 17-1).) This figure results 11 from 6 attorney hours billed at a rate of $375. (Id.) 12 Defendants do not dispute that the number of hours or rate 13 requested are reasonable. 14 Based on the court’s experience, the amount requested 15 appears reasonable. See Oth Ingram v. Oroudjian, 647 F.3d 925, 16 928 (9th Cir. 2011) (in determining what constitutes a reasonable 17 attorneys’ fee, district courts may rely on “their own knowledge 18 of customary rates and their experience concerning reasonable and 19 proper fees”). See also, e.g., Siafarikas v. Mercedes-Benz USA, 20 LLC, No. 2:20-cv-01784 JAM AC, 2022 WL 16926265, at *3 (E.D. Cal. 21 Nov. 14, 2022) (approving hourly rates ranging from $250 to 22 $500). 23 24 6 Defendants argue that plaintiff is not entitled to fees because decertification of the Bowerman class and the subsequent 25 filing of over 75 related individual lawsuits in federal court constitutes “highly unusual circumstances.” (Opp’n at 6.) 26 Defendants do not cite any case where removal of an individual 27 action filed in state court after decertification was found to be proper, nor has the court located any case standing for that 28 proposition. eee ee mnee OIE mE EO EIEIO ED ee e 1 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion to 2 remand and for attorneys’ fees (Docket No. 17) be, and the same 3 hereby is, GRANTED. This case is hereby REMANDED to the Superior 4 Court of the State of California, in and for the County of Yuba. 5 Plaintiff is awarded $2,250 in attorneys’ fees and costs. 6 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants’ motion to 7 dismiss (Docket No. 5) be, and the same hereby is, DENIED AS 8 | MOOT.’ . 9 Dated: September 6, 2023 oh hem A ah WILLIAM B. SHUBB 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 I] 7 This denial is without prejudice to any motion to 28 | dismiss being filed in state court upon remand. 10