(PC) Lloyd v. Castillo ( 2023 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ADRIAN JUAN LLOYD, Case No.: 1:20-cv-00683-JLT-CDB (PC) 12 Plaintiff, THIRD SCREENING ORDER 13 v. (Doc. 42) 14 D. CASTILLO, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff Adrian Juan Lloyd is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights 18 action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 19 I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT 20 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 21 governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 22 The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the complaint is frivolous or malicious, 23 fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant 24 who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). The Court should dismiss a complaint if 25 it lacks a cognizable legal theory or fails to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal 26 theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 27 // // 1 II. PLEADING REQUIREMENTS 2 A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) 3 “Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited 4 exceptions.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002). A complaint must contain 5 “a short and plain statement of the claims showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. 6 Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the 7 plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512 (internal 8 quotation marks & citation omitted). 9 Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a 10 cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 11 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must 12 set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” 13 Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Factual allegations are accepted as true, but legal 14 conclusions are not. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 15 The Court construes pleadings of pro se prisoners liberally and affords them the benefit of 16 any doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). However, “the 17 liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations,” not his legal 18 theories. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). Furthermore, “a liberal interpretation 19 of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially 20 pled,” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal 21 quotation marks & citation omitted), and courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted 22 inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation 23 marks & citation omitted). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not 24 sufficient to state a cognizable claim, and “facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s 25 liability” fall short. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks & citation omitted). 26 B. Linkage and Causation 27 Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of constitutional or other federal 1 section 1983, a plaintiff must show a causal connection or link between the actions of the 2 defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by the plaintiff. See Rizzo v. Goode, 3 423 U.S. 362, 373-75 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the 4 deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative 5 act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legal required 6 to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 7 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (citation omitted). 8 C. Supervisory Liability 9 Liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel for the actions or omissions of 10 their subordinates under the theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; see e.g., 11 Simmons v. Navajo Cty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010) (plaintiff required to 12 adduce evidence the named supervisory defendants “themselves acted or failed to act 13 unconstitutionally, not merely that subordinate did”), overruled on other grounds by Castro v. 14 C’nty of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1070 (9th Cir. 2016); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 15 (9th Cir. 2002) (“In order for a person acting under color of state law to be liable under section 16 1983 there must be a showing of personal participation in the alleged rights deprivation: there is 17 no respondeat superior liability under section 1983”). 18 Supervisors may be held liable only if they “participated in or directed the violations, or 19 knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th 20 Cir. 1989). “The requisite causal connection may be established when an official sets in motion a 21 ‘series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to 22 inflict’ constitutional harms.” Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir. 2009). Accord 23 Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-06 (9th Cir. 2011) (supervisory liability may be based on 24 inaction in the training and supervision of subordinates). 25 Supervisory liability may also exist without any personal participation if the official 26 implemented “a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of the constitutional 27 rights and is the moving force of the constitutional violation.” Redman v. Cty. of San Diego, 942 1 grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1970). 2 To prove liability for an action or policy, the plaintiff “must ... demonstrate that his 3 deprivation resulted from an official policy or custom established by a ... policymaker possessed 4 with final authority to establish that policy.” Waggy v. Spokane County Washington, 594 F.3d 5 707, 713 (9th Cir.2010). When a defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between 6 such defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. 7 Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the 8 involvement of supervisory personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. 9 Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 10 III. DISCUSSION 11 A. Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint 12 Plaintiff’s second amended complaint names Kern Valley State Prison Correctional 13 Officers D. Castillo and J. Anderson, and Chaplain M. Howard, as defendants. (Doc. 42 at 1-2.) 14 He asserts First Amendment religious exercise claims and Religious Land Use and 15 Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) claims. (Id. at 3-4.) Plaintiff seeks compensatory and 16 punitive damages, as well as injunctive relief. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff supports his second amended 17 complaint with a document titled “Declaration in Support of Royal and Divine Colors. Notice of 18 Administrative Obstruction” (id. at 8-12) and several exhibits (id. at 13-30). 19 B. Factual Allegations 20 Plaintiff contends that on May 9, 2019, Defendant Castillo, under the supervision of 21 Defendant Anderson, confiscated his red, gold and green crown. (Doc. 42 at 3.) Plaintiff alleges 22 he informed Castillo that he was violating Plaintiff’s constitutional rights and Anderson 23 responded, “’No he’s not.’” (Id.) Plaintiff asserts Castillo and Anderson also violated California 24 Code of Regulations sections 3006(d) and 3213(e)(1)(2) regarding religious items. (Id.) 25 Additionally, Plaintiff contends Castillo and Anderson refused to allow Plaintiff to cover his 26 dreadlocks with a grey watch cap as a ready alternative and have consistently refused to do so for 27 nearly three years. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts Castillo and Anderson continue to deprive Plaintiff of his 1 continue to deprive Plaintiff of his right to wear a grey watch cap. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff sues Castillo 2 and Anderson in their individual and official capacities. (Id.) As a result of Castillo and 3 Anderson’s actions, Plaintiff has suffered, and continues to suffer, harm. (Id. at 3, 7.) 4 Next, Plaintiff states that as a follower of Rastafari, he does not consume any meat, fish, 5 chicken, or eggs, but does partake in a limited amount of dairy products. (Doc. 42 at 4.) Plaintiff 6 contends he informed Defendant Howard, but Howard directed Plaintiff to contact Health 7 Services. (Id.) Health Services then advised Plaintiff “they do not deal with such issues. That 8 issue, diet, is assigned to the chaplain.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges Howard’s refusal to assign him a 9 “corresponding diet” caused Plaintiff to lose a significant amount of weight. (Id.) He maintains 10 that Howard’s neglect deprived him, and continues to deprive him, of a diet that accords with his 11 religion. Plaintiff sues Defendant Howard in his individual and official capacities. (Id.) Plaintiff 12 asserts his injury is ongoing as he continues to be served food that in “not in accordance with 13 one’s religious dietary tenets of which one does not eat.” (Id.) 14 In the supporting declaration, Plaintiff provides additional information concerning his 15 right to possess the confiscated crown, descriptions and copies of photographs of two crowns 16 Plaintiff received and purchased from an approved vendor while housed at California State 17 Prison, Folsom in July 2018, a California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 18 (“CDCR”) 1083 property form dated August 15, 2019, and a grievance submitted September 27, 19 2018. (Doc. 42 at 8-9, 13-25.) Plaintiff also provides copies of portions of the CDCR’s 20 Operations Manual and KVSP’s Inmate Orientation Handbook. (Id. at 26-30.) 21 C. Plaintiff’s Claims and Analysis 22 Claim One: Claims Against Defendants Castillo and Anderson 23 First Amendment Free Exercise Clause 24 To state a claim under the Free Exercise Clause, an inmate must plausibly allege that a 25 prison official’s actions: (a) “substantially burden[ed]” the inmate’s exercise of a sincerely-held 26 religious belief; and (b) did so in an unreasonable manner -- i.e., the official’s actions were not 27 “rationally related to legitimate penological interests.” See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 1 Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884-85 (9th Cir. 2008). A substantial burden places more than an 2 inconvenience on religious exercise; it must tend to coerce individuals into acting contrary to 3 their religious beliefs or exert substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to 4 violate his beliefs. Jones, 791 F.3d at 1031-32. Plaintiff must demonstrate that prison officials 5 prevented him from engaging in conduct which he sincerely believes is required by his faith. 6 Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884-85. The underlying religious belief must be “sincerely held.” Malik v. 7 Brown, 16 F.3d 330, 333 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884-85 (noting that the 8 “sincerity test,” not the “centrality test,” applies to a free exercise analysis). 9 Liberally construing the second amended complaint, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged a 10 claim under the Free Exercise Clause against Defendants Castillo and Anderson. Plaintiff makes 11 an initial showing of a sincerely held religious belief and states the religious and spiritual 12 significance of the three colors in the Rastafarian crown as “royal and divine.” He contends 13 Castillo and Anderson continue to refuse to permit him to wear an allowable Rastafarian crown in 14 those colors. Further, Plaintiff alleges Castillo and Anderson also refuse to allow Plaintiff to wear 15 an approved grey watch cap as an alternative to the crown. 16 RUILPA 17 RLUIPA holds prison officials to a stricter standard than under the First Amendment. 18 Green v. Solano Cty. Jail, 513 F.3d 992, 986, 989 (9th Cir. 2008). The act provides: 19 No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution . . . even 20 if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that 21 person– (1) is in furtherance of a compelling government interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 22 government interest. 23 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). The RLUIPA protects “any exercise of religion, whether or not 24 compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A). The Court 25 must construe this provision “in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise, to the extent 26 permitted by the terms of this chapter and the Constitution.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g). “A 27 prisoner’s request for an accommodation must be sincerely based on a religious belief and not 1 Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 717, n.28 (2014)). After the Court has identified the “religious 2 exercise” allegedly impinged upon, it must determine whether the prison regulation or action at 3 issue “substantially burdens” that religious exercise. Greene, 513 F.3d at 987. The plaintiff must 4 allege facts demonstrating that defendant substantially burdened the exercise of his religious 5 beliefs. Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 994-95 (9th Cir. 2005). Though the statute does 6 not define “substantial burden,” the Ninth Circuit has held that “a substantial burden on religious 7 exercise must impose a significantly great restriction or onus upon such exercise.” Hartmann v. 8 Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab, 707 F.3d 1114, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing San Jose Christian 9 Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2004)). A substantial burden occurs 10 when the state’s denial of accommodation places “substantial pressure on an adherent to modify 11 his behavior and to violate his beliefs.” Hartmann., 707 F.3 at 1124-25 (citing Warsoldier, 418 12 F.3d at 995). If the plaintiff demonstrates a substantial burden on his free exercise, the burden 13 shifts to the defendants to show that the burden imposed is (1) in furtherance of a compelling 14 governmental interest, and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. RLUIPA 15 does not waive a state’s sovereign immunity from suits for money damages, nor does it 16 “authorize suits for damages against state officials in their individual capacities.” Jones v. 17 Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1031 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 284-85 18 (2011); Wood v. Yordy, 753 F.3d 899, 903-04 (9th Cir. 2014)). 19 Here, liberally construing the second amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges cognizable 20 RUILPA claims against Defendants Castillo and Anderson. He does so by asserting that Castillo 21 and Andersons’ ongoing refusal to permit him to wear a crown or a gray watch cap substantially 22 burdens the exercise of his Rastafarian beliefs. 23 Claim Two: Claims Against Defendant Howard 24 Without repeating the legal standards above, and liberally construing the second amended 25 complaint, Plaintiff alleges cognizable Free Exercise Clause/Religious Diet1 and RUILPA claims 26 11 Inmates “have the right to be provided with food sufficient to sustain them in good health that satisfies 27 the dietary laws of their religion.” McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 198 (9th Cir. 1987). As Plaintiff was advised in the second screening order, concerning his requests for particular menu items, “the Court lacks jurisdiction over the CDCR and cannot impose a particular menu on the institution.” (See Doc. 29 at 9, 1 against Defendant Howard. Plaintiff asserts Howard, as chaplain at SATF, refused to 2 | accommodate his dietary needs as a practicing Rastafarian. Those needs include the exclusion of 3 | fish and eggs and limitations concerning dairy consumption. Although Howard oversees the 4 | Religious Diet Program, Howard directed Plaintiff to file a health care grievance regarding the 5 | issue; in resolving that grievance, prison officials advised Plaintiff the issue of his dietary needs 6 | must be resolved by the chaplain. As a result of Howard’s actions, Plaintiff alleges he has lost a 7 | significant amount of weight. 8 IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 9 For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s second amended complaint states cognizable First 10 | Amendment claims and RLUIPA claims against Defendants Castillo, Anderson and Howard. The 11 | Court will issue a separate order directing service of the second amended complaint. 12 | SO ORDERED. 13 | } Ko Dated: _ November 20, 2023 14 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28