(PS) Serris v. Chastaine ( 2022 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 BILL JOSEPH SERRIS, No. 2:22-cv-0434-JAM-CKD PS 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER AND FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 SHAUNA CHASTAINE, et al., (ECF Nos. 2, 3, 4) 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff Bill Joseph Serris1 proceeds pro se with a complaint 18 asserting nine causes of action including multiple claims under the 19 Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), civil rights conspiracy under 20 21 42 U.S.C. § 1985, claims for declaratory relief, and state-law claims. 22 This matter was referred to the undersigned pursuant to Local Rule 23 302(c)(21) and the district court’s order of referral (ECF No. 5). See 28 24 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 25 26 //// 27 1 At plaintiff’s request, the court uses a 16-point font to assist plaintiff to better read 28 this document. 1 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the court must screen every in 2 forma pauperis proceeding and must order dismissal of the case if it is 3 “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be 4 granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune 5 6 from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Plaintiff’s complaint will 7 be screened in due course. Presently, plaintiff’s motion to proceed in 8 forma pauperis (ECF No. 2), motion for temporary restraining order 9 (ECF No. 3), and request to file case documents electronically (ECF No. 10 11 4) are before the court. 12 I. In Forma Pauperis 13 Plaintiff filed an application in support of his request to proceed in 14 forma pauperis. (ECF No. 2.) Plaintiff’s application makes the showing 15 16 required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915. The motion to proceed in forma pauperis 17 will be granted. 18 II. Motion for Temporary Restraining Order 19 Plaintiff has filed a motion for a temporary restraining order 20 21 (“TRO”) to enjoin court proceedings in the Solano County Superior 22 Court case number FFL145060. (ECF No. 3.) Plaintiff moves the court to 23 enjoin an imminent hearing in that case so the ADA accommodations he 24 seeks through this litigation can be sorted out prior to the hearing to 25 26 allow him to participate fully and fairly in that case. (Id. at 1.) 27 //// 28 1 A. Background (Allegations in the Complaint) 2 Plaintiff is 79 years old and disabled. (ECF No. 1 at 6-7.) He is a 3 party in a divorce case pending in the Solano County Superior Court 4 since 2015. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff presumed that case would be over quickly 5 6 because it should have been “a simple asset matter” with no issue 7 pertaining to children from the marriage. (Id.) However, the case is still 8 on going and plaintiff has filed this complaint asserting various claims 9 against the judge, the judge’s clerk, the Solano County ADA coordinator, 10 11 a court appointed realtor, plaintiff’s former divorce attorney, plaintiff’s 12 ex-wife, and the attorney representing his ex-wife. (Id. at 6.) 13 During one or more prior hearings in the divorce case, plaintiff 14 could not understand or hear what was going on because he does not hear 15 16 well. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) Throughout the case, plaintiff has not been given 17 adequate options for ADA accommodations and his former attorney 18 failed to ensure he would be able to actively participate in hearings and 19 make informed decisions relating to the case. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff alleges 20 21 that, despite his physical limitations, the court ordered him to personally 22 perform physical labor to prepare his property for sale, without any 23 objection by his former attorney. (Id. at 3.) Eventually, plaintiff either 24 fired his attorney or the attorney was relieved, and plaintiff obtained 25 26 ADA advocates to assist him. (Id. at 4.) However, plaintiff still has not 27 28 1 received all the accommodations he needs to properly participate in the 2 case. (Id. at 5.) 3 B. Legal Standard 4 The purpose of a TRO is to preserve the status quo pending the 5 6 complete briefing and thorough consideration contemplated by full 7 preliminary injunction proceedings. See Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. 8 Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 438-39 (1974) (holding TROs “should be 9 restricted to serving their underlying purpose of preserving the status quo 10 11 and preventing irreparable harm just so long as is necessary to hold a 12 hearing, and no longer”). In general, the showing required for a TRO and 13 a preliminary injunction are the same. Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co., Inc. v. 14 John D. Brush & Co., Inc., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). The 15 16 party requesting preliminary injunctive relief must show that “he is likely 17 to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the 18 absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his 19 favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Natural 20 21 Res. Defense Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 22 586 F.3d 1109, 1127 (9th Cir. 2009). A TRO is an extraordinary remedy, 23 and plaintiff has the burden of proving the propriety of such a remedy. 24 See Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997). 25 26 //// 27 //// 28 1 C. Discussion 2 Under the Anti-Injunction Act, “[a] court of the United States may 3 not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except [1] as 4 expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or [2] where necessary in aid of 5 6 its jurisdiction, or [3] to protect or effectuate its judgments.” 28 U.S.C. § 7 2283. The Anti-Injunction Act “is an absolute prohibition against 8 enjoining state court proceedings, unless the injunction falls within one 9 of three specifically defined exceptions.” Negrete v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. 10 11 of N. Am., 523 F.3d 1091, 1100 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Atl. Coast Line 12 R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 286 (1970)). 13 Courts construe the three exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act 14 narrowly. See Montana v. BNSF Ry. Co., 623 F.3d 1312, 1315 (9th Cir. 15 16 2010) (“Any doubts as to the propriety of a federal injunction against 17 state court proceedings should be resolved in favor of permitting the state 18 court action to proceed.”) (quoting Blalock Eddy Ranch v. MCI 19 Telecommunications Corp., 982 F.2d 371, 375 (9th Cir. 1992)). 20 21 Moreover, even when the Anti-Injunction Act does not prohibit an 22 injunction, “[t]he decision to issue an injunction that does not violate the 23 Anti-Injunction Act... is committed to the discretion of the district court.” 24 Blalock, 982 F.2d at 375. 25 26 Plaintiff has not demonstrated the first exception for an injunction 27 authorized by an Act of Congress applies to any claims for which he is 28 1 likely to succeed on the merits. See 28 U.S.C. § 2283. As relevant to the 2 first exception, plaintiff alleges defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1985 3 (fourth cause of action) and the ADA (first, second and sixth causes of 4 action). 5 6 Some civil rights actions fall within the first exception. For 7 example, claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are exempt from 8 the Anti-Injunction Act’s prohibitions because “[t]he very purpose of § 9 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between the States and the 10 11 people, ... to protect the people from unconstitutional action under color 12 of state law[.]” Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972); see also 13 Goldie’s Bookstore, Inc. v. Superior Court of State of Cal., 739 F.2d 466, 14 468 (9th Cir. 1984). However, the first exception comes into play only 15 16 when a statute “clearly creating a federal right or remedy enforceable in a 17 federal court of equity” could “be given its intended scope only by the 18 stay of a state court proceeding.” Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 239. 19 Here, plaintiff alleges the judge, court-appointed realtor, his former 20 21 attorney, and his ex-wife violated 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) through an 22 ongoing scheme to force him to perform physical labor on a house 23 through a court order, despite having knowledge that his disabilities 24 would prevent him from being able to carry out this duty. (ECF No. 1 at 25 26 22.) However, plaintiff has not explained how he will prevail on this 27 28 1 claim, and the allegations in the complaint in support of the claimed 2 conspiracy are both insufficient and conclusory. 3 “A plaintiff alleging a conspiracy under [42 U.S.C.] § 1985(3) 4 must establish: [1] the existence of a conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff 5 6 of the equal protection of the laws; [2] an act in furtherance of the 7 conspiracy; [3] and a resulting injury.” Scott v. Ross, 140 F.3d 1275, 8 1284 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). Regarding the first element, the 9 plaintiff must establish some racial or otherwise class-based invidious 10 11 discriminatory animus for the conspiracy. Bray v. Alexandria Women’s 12 Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 267-68 (1993). 13 Here, plaintiff does not allege there was a class-based invidious 14 discriminatory animus for the conspiracy. Disabled individuals do not 15 16 constitute a “class” within the meaning of section 1985(3). See, e.g., 17 D’Amato v. Wis. Gas Co., 760 F.2d 1474, 1486 (7th Cir. 1985) (“The 18 legislative history of Section 1985(3) does not suggest a concern for the 19 handicapped.”); Wilhelm v. Cont’l Title Co., 720 F.2d 1173, 1176-77 20 21 (10th Cir. 1983) (“We must conclude that a class of ‘handicapped 22 persons’ …was not included as a class in what is now § 1985(3).”); see 23 also Story v. Green, 978 F.2d 60, 64 (2nd Cir. 1992) (“We note in 24 passing that most authorities have not considered disability to be a 25 26 suspect or quasi-suspect classification.”). 27 28 1 Similarly, even if equitable relief under the ADA falls within the 2 first exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, plaintiff has not demonstrated 3 his likelihood of success on any of those claims. Plaintiff names as 4 defendants only individuals, but individuals cannot be sued directly 5 6 under the ADA. See Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145, 1156 (9th Cir. 7 2002). 8 In short, even if the first exception to the Anti-Injunction Act 9 applies, plaintiff has not demonstrated he is likely to prevail on his 10 11 claims and thus has not shown he is entitled to the extraordinary remedy 12 of a temporary restraining order. See Mazurek, 520 U.S. at 972. 13 The remaining two exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act are 14 inapplicable here. While a federal court may enjoin a state proceeding 15 16 “to protect or effectuate the court’s judgment,” 28 U.S.C. § 2283, there is 17 no such judgment to protect in this matter. The third exception applies 18 when an injunction is “necessary in aid of a court’s jurisdiction.” 28 19 U.S.C. § 2283. This exception “is generally applied to in rem 20 21 proceedings where subsequent state court proceedings might interfere 22 with previously filed federal court jurisdiction over a res, in cases of 23 advanced federal in personam litigation, or where a case is removed 24 from state court.” Le v. 1st Nat. Lending Servs., No. 13–CV–01344– 25 26 LHK, 2013 WL 2555556, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 7, 2013) (citing Negrete, 27 523 F.3d at 1101). 28 1 Interfering with a state court proceeding is an extraordinary remedy 2 that this court applies only when necessary. Plaintiff has not 3 demonstrated such action is warranted here. Thus, the undersigned will 4 recommend the motion for temporary restraining order be denied without 5 6 prejudice. 7 III. Request to File Documents Electronically 8 Plaintiff has requested to file case documents electronically. (ECF 9 No. 4.) Generally, “[a]ny person appearing pro se may not utilize 10 11 electronic filing except with the permission of the assigned Judge or 12 Magistrate Judge.” See E.D. Cal. L.R. 133(b)(2) (emphasis in original). 13 Although plaintiff is disabled and his request to file case documents 14 electronically states he has a support person who helps him read email 15 16 correspondence, plaintiff does not otherwise set forth “an explanation of 17 reasons for the [requested] exception.” The court does not find good 18 cause for deviance from the general rule at this time. At the current stage 19 of this case, the motion will be denied. 20 21 IV. Conclusion 22 In accordance with the above, it is HEREBY ORDERED: 23 1. Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is 24 GRANTED. 25 26 2. Plaintiff’s request to file documents electronically (ECF No. 4) 27 is DENIED. 28 1 In addition, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that plaintiff's * | motion for a temporary restraining order (ECF No. 3) be denied without 3 prejudice. 4 5 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United 6 | States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 7! 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen days after being served with these 8 findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections 9 19 | with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be 11 | captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and !2 | Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time 13 may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. YIst, 14 15 | 251 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 16 | Dated: March 10, 2022 A gs fie _MA'd fu LCA pa, CAROLYN K. DELANEY P 18 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 19 20 8.serr0434.tro 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 10