Segismundo v. Rancho Murieta Country Club ( 2022 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MARIA SEGISMUNDO, No. 2:21-cv-02271-DAD-JDP 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND FOR LACK OF SUBJECT 14 RANCHO MURIETA COUNTRY CLUB, MATTER JURISDICTION 15 Defendant. (Doc. No. 9) 16 17 This matter is before the court on plaintiff’s motion to remand this action to the 18 Sacramento County Superior Court. (Doc. No. 9.) On February 23, 2022, plaintiff’s motion was 19 taken under submission by the previously assigned district judge on the papers. (Doc. No. 16.) 20 On August 25, 2022, the case was reassigned to the undersigned. (Doc. No. 19.) For the reasons 21 set forth below, the court will grant plaintiff’s motion to remand. 22 BACKGROUND 23 Plaintiff Maria Segismundo filed two separate lawsuits in the Sacramento County 24 Superior Court against defendant Rancho Murieta Country Club. In the first action, plaintiff had 25 filed a complaint on September 23, 2021, alleging that defendant violated various provisions of 26 the California Labor Code. See Segismundo v. Rancho Murieta Country Club, No. 2:21-cv- 27 02272-DAD-JDP, Notice, Doc. No. 1-1 at 4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2021) (“Segismundo I”). On the 28 same day, Plaintiff filed a complaint in a separate action, alleging a single state law cause of 1 action under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, California Labor Code 2 §§ 2698–2699 (“PAGA”). (Doc. Nos. 1 at ¶ 1; 1-1 at ¶ 5.) Plaintiff’s PAGA claim is predicated 3 on the same alleged labor code violations that appear in Segismundo I. (Doc. No. 1-1; 4 Segismundo I, Compl., Doc. No. 1-1 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2021).) 5 On December 9, 2021, defendant filed a notice of removal in both cases. (Doc. No. 1; 6 Segismundo I, Notice, Doc. No. 1 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2021).) Defendant removed this case here 7 on the same grounds as it did in Segismundo I, that is, that plaintiff’s wage and hour claims 8 require interpretation of two collective bargaining agreements (the “CBAs”) and are preempted 9 under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”). (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 5 n.2.) On 10 December 22, 2021, the previously assigned district judge issued a related case order, relating the 11 Segismundo I action to the present one. (Doc. No. 8.) Plaintiff’s pending motion to remand in 12 the present action was filed on January 6, 2022. (Doc. No. 9.) Defendant filed its opposition to 13 the pending motion on February 15, 2022, and plaintiff filed her reply thereto on February 22, 14 2022. (Doc. Nos. 13, 15.) On August 25, 2022, this case was reassigned to the undersigned. On 15 October 17, 2022, this court granted plaintiff’s motion to remand in the related Segismundo I 16 case. Segismundo I, Order, Doc. No. 21 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2022). 17 LEGAL STANDARD 18 A suit filed in state court may be removed to federal court if the federal court would have 19 had original jurisdiction over the suit. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Removal is proper when a case 20 originally filed in state court presents a federal question or where there is diversity of citizenship 21 among the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 22 1332(a). 23 The defendant seeking removal of an action from state court bears the burden of 24 establishing grounds for federal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Geographic 25 Expeditions, Inc. v. Est. of Lhotka ex rel. Lhotka, 599 F.3d 1102, 1106–07 (9th Cir. 2010); Hunter 26 v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009); Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 27 566–67 (9th Cir. 1992). “If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court 28 lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). If there is 1 any doubt as to the right of removal, a federal court must reject jurisdiction and remand the case 2 to state court. Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003); 3 see also Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 1115, 1118 (9th Cir. 2004). 4 A party’s notice of removal must contain “a short and plain statement of the grounds for 5 removal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a). “By design, § 1446(a) tracks the general pleading requirement 6 stated in Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” and a “statement ‘short and plain’ 7 need not contain evidentiary submissions.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 8 574 U.S. 81, 84, 87 (2014); see also Ramirez-Duenas v. VF Outdoor, LLC, No. 1:17-cv-0161- 9 AWI-SAB, 2017 WL 1437595, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 41, 2017) (“The notice of removal may rely 10 on the allegations of the complaint and need not be accompanied by any extrinsic evidence.”). 11 “The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded 12 complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is 13 presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 14 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987); Hansen v. Grp. Health Coop., 902 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2018) 15 (“Removal based on federal-question jurisdiction is reviewed under the longstanding well- 16 pleaded complaint rule.”). “[T]he presence of a federal question . . . in a defensive argument does 17 not overcome the paramount policies embodied in the well-pleaded complaint rule—that the 18 plaintiff is the master of the complaint, that a federal question must appear on the face of the 19 complaint, and that the plaintiff may, by eschewing claims based on federal law, choose to have 20 the cause heard in state court.” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 398–99. 21 Section 301 of the LMRA, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), provides federal courts with 22 original jurisdiction, regardless of the amount in controversy or citizenship of the parties, over 23 any lawsuits “for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization 24 representing employees in an industry affecting commerce.” 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). In the specific 25 context of preemption under § 301 of the LMRA, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that 26 preemption “has such ‘extraordinary pre-emptive power’ that it ‘converts an ordinary state 27 common law complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded 28 complaint rule.’” Curtis v. Irwin Indus., Inc., 913 F.3d 1146, 1152 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting 1 Metro. Life Ins. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65 (1987)). Section 301 “authoriz[es] federal courts to 2 create a uniform body of federal common law to adjudicate disputes that arise out of labor 3 contracts.” Id. at 1151 (citing Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 210 (1985) and 4 Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103–04 (1962)). As the Ninth Circuit has explained, 5 federal preemption under § 301 “is an essential component of federal labor policy” for three reasons. Alaska Airlines Inc. v. Schurke, 898 6 F.3d 904, 917–18 (9th Cir. 2018) (en banc). First, “a collective bargaining agreement is more than just a contract; it is an effort to 7 erect a system of industrial self-government.” Id. at 918 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, a CBA is part of the 8 “continuous collective bargaining process.” United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp. (Steelworkers III), 363 U.S. 593, 596 9 (1960). Second, because the CBA is designed to govern the entire employment relationship, including disputes which the drafters may 10 not have anticipated, it “calls into being a new common law—the common law of a particular industry or of a particular plant.” United 11 Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. (Steelworkers II), 363 U.S. 574, 579 (1960). Accordingly, the labor arbitrator is 12 usually the appropriate adjudicator for CBA disputes because he was chosen due to the “‘parties’ confidence in his knowledge of the 13 common law of the shop and their trust in his personal judgment to bring to bear considerations which are not expressed in the contract 14 as criteria for judgment.” Id. at 582. Third, grievance and arbitration procedures “provide certain procedural benefits, including a more 15 prompt and orderly settlement of CBA disputes than that offered by the ordinary judicial process.” Schurke, 898 F.3d at 918 (internal 16 quotation marks and citation omitted). 17 Id. at 1152. 18 The determination of whether a claim is preempted by § 301 is made by way of a two-step 19 inquiry. The first question is “whether the asserted cause of action involves a right conferred 20 upon an employee by virtue of state law,” or if instead the right is conferred by a CBA. Burnside 21 v. Kiewit Pac. Corp., 491 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2007). This step requires the court to 22 consider “the legal character of a claim, as ‘independent’ of rights under the collective-bargaining 23 agreement [and] not whether a grievance arising from ‘precisely the same set of facts’ could be 24 pursued.” Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 123 (1994) (citation omitted). If the asserted 25 cause of action is conferred solely by the CBA, the claim is preempted. Burnside, 491 F.3d at 26 1059. If not, the court must still decide whether the claim is “‘substantially dependent’ on the 27 terms of a CBA” by determining “whether the claim can be resolved by ‘looking to’ versus 28 interpreting the CBA.” Id. at 1059–60 (citations omitted). “The term ‘interpret’ is defined 1 narrowly—it means something more than ‘consider,’ ‘refer to,’ or ‘apply.’” Balcorta v. 2 Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 208 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2000). If the claim requires 3 interpretation of the CBA, the claim is preempted; if the claim merely requires “looking to” the 4 CBA, it is not preempted. Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1060. Once preempted, “any claim purportedly 5 based on that pre-empted state law is considered, from its inception, a federal claim, and therefore 6 arises under federal law.” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393. 7 ANALYSIS 8 In its notice of removal, defendant asserts that this court has federal question jurisdiction 9 over this action because adjudication of plaintiff’s PAGA claim requires interpretation of the 10 terms of the CBAs between itself and certain unions, and, therefore, plaintiff’s claims are 11 preempted by § 301 of the LMRA. (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 5.) In the pending motion to remand, 12 plaintiff argues that the predicate California Labor Code violation claims are not preempted 13 because those claims do not rely on the CBAs or depend on interpretation of the CBAs’ 14 provisions. (Doc. No. 9-1 at 6.) 15 It is the underlying character of a claim that determines whether the claim is preempted 16 under the LMRA. Radcliff v. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 519 F. Supp. 3d 743, 748 (S.D. Cal. 17 2021). PAGA does not create any substantive rights nor impose any legal obligations. 18 Amalgamated Transit Union, Loc. 1756, AFL-CIO v. Superior Ct., 46 Cal. 4th 993, 1003 (2009). 19 Rather, it is “simply a procedural statute allowing an aggrieved employee to recover civil 20 penalties—for Labor Code violations—that otherwise would be sought by state labor law 21 enforcement agencies.” Id. Thus, here, whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction over the 22 derivative PAGA claim depends on whether the court has jurisdiction over the underlying 23 predicate California Labor Code violations. See Curtis v. Irwin Indus., Inc., 913 F.3d 1146, 1150 24 n.3 (9th Cir. 2019) (noting that the PAGA claim depended on the predicate California Labor Code 25 violation); Franco v. E-3 Sys., Nos. 19-cv-01453-HSG, 19-cv-02854-HSG, 2019 WL 6358947, at 26 *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2019) (“PAGA claims are derivative of the predicate California Labor 27 Code violations, and therefore rise and fall with those underlying claims.”); Radcliff, 519 F. Supp. 28 3d at 748 (“[I]f [the court] has original jurisdiction over these predicate claims, it also has original 1 || jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s PAGA claim.”). 2 In the related Segismundo I case, this court concluded that plaintiff's California Labor 3 || Code violation claims were not preempted, and, thus, that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction 4 || over that action. Segismundo I, Order, Doc. No. 21 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2022). To avoid delay 5 || and repetition, the court incorporates by reference its analysis in Segismundo I granting remand, 6 || and it concludes that neither the complaint, notice of removal, motion to remand, opposition, or 7 | reply in the instant case give rise to a different result. Because defendant has failed to show by a 8 || preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff's wage and hour claims triggered preemption under 9 || the LMRA in Segismundo I, the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the derivative 10 | PAGA claim. See id.; see also Alexander v. Republic Servs., Inc., No. 2:17-cv-0644-WBS-AC, 11 | 2017 WL 2189770, at *6 (E.D. Cal. May 18, 2017) (remanding the plaintiff's PAGA action after 12 | finding that none of the underlying California Labor Code violation claims were preempted by § 13 || 301 of the LMRA); cf Franco, 2019 WL 6358947, at *4 (concluding that the court had 14 || jurisdiction over PAGA claims because it had jurisdiction over the predicate California Labor 15 | Code violation claims); Radcliff, 519 F. Supp. 3d at 752 (concluding that the plaintiff's PAGA 16 || action, which was, in part, predicated on the meal period claim, was preempted by § 301 of the 17 || LMRA because the meal period claim was preempted). 18 CONCLUSION 19 For the reasons explained above: 20 1. Plaintiff's motion to remand (Doc. No. 9) is granted; 21 2. This action is remanded to the Sacramento County Superior Court due to this 22 court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction; and 23 3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close the case. 24 IT IS SO ORDERED. * | Dated: _ October 19, 2022 Dab A. 2, ayel 26 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 27 28 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28