Pazmino v. City of Vacaville ( 2022 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ANTHONY PAZMINO, No. 2:22-cv-00273-JAM-DB 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS 14 CITY OF VACACILLE, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Anthony Pazmino (“Plaintiff”) filed this lawsuit against the 18 City of Vacaville (“City”), Vacaville Police Department (“VPD”), 19 Vacaville Police Chief Ian Schmutzler (“Schmutzler”), various VPD 20 officers, and Doe defendants (collectively “Defendants”), 21 alleging a host of civil rights violations relating to a blood 22 alcohol content sample taken from Plaintiff while he was in VPD 23 custody. See First Am. Compl. (“FAC”), ECF No. 11. Defendants 24 filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s second cause of action for 25 Monell liability against the City, Schmutzler, and fictious 26 persons. See Mot. to Dismiss (“Mot.”), ECF No. 12. Plaintiff 27 filed his opposition and Defendants replied. See Opp’n, ECF 28 No. 17; see also Reply, ECF No. 18. 1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ 2 Motion to Dismiss with leave to amend.1 3 I. BACKGROUND 4 On February 14, 2020, VPD officers arrested Plaintiff for 5 allegedly driving under the influence (“DUI”) of alcohol and took 6 him to the local police station. FAC ¶ 1. While in custody, the 7 VPD obtained a warrant to obtain a blood alcohol content sample 8 (“sample”) from Plaintiff. Id. Plaintiff asked to see the 9 warrant, but his request was denied. Id. ¶ 25. Plaintiff 10 alleges that, without provocation, VPD officers collectively 11 restrained him to obtain the sample by handcuffing him with 12 excessive tightness, kicking and kneeing him, placing him in a 13 choke hold, binding him in a WRAP restraint, and eventually 14 putting him in a carotid restraint hold. Id. ¶¶ 24-20. After 15 restraining him, a VPD officer or employee allegedly repeatedly 16 inserted a needle into his right arm to acquire the sample. Id. 17 ¶ 28. 18 In August 2021, the Solano County Superior Court dismissed 19 Plaintiff’s DUI charges after granting Plaintiff’s motion to 20 suppress the sample, finding that the VPD officers’ conduct was 21 excessive under the Constitution. Id. ¶¶ 60-61. The court 22 particularly frowned upon the officers’ choke hold use, stating 23 such actions “shocked the conscience” and that “it is not 24 reasonable for law enforcement to choke somebody for three 25 minutes to gain their compliance.” Id. Plaintiff also alleges 26 27 1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 28 scheduled for August 23, 2022. 1 that after his DUI charges were dismissed, Defendants City, VPD, 2 and Schmurtzler investigated the incident and found the conduct 3 was not improper despite their awareness of the Superior Court’s 4 holding and VPD policies prohibiting choke holds. Id. ¶¶ 61-62. 5 Plaintiff then initiated this action and filed his First 6 Amended Complaint based on two § 1983 claims. Id. ¶¶ 57-66. 7 II. OPINION 8 A. Legal Standard 9 When weighing a motion to dismiss, courts “accept factual 10 allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings 11 in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. 12 St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 13 2008). However, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual 14 matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 15 plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 16 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 17 1974 (2007)). Facial plausibility exists when “the plaintiff 18 pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 19 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 20 misconduct alleged.” Id. However, “a formulaic recitation of a 21 cause of action's elements will not do.” Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 22 1965. Such statements are “legal conclusion[s] couched as 23 factual allegation[s]” that must be dismissed. Papasan v. 24 Allain, 106 S. Ct. 2932, 2944 (1986). 25 B. Analysis 26 1. Plaintiff’s § 1983 Claims 27 Plaintiff’s second cause of action is a Monell claim under 28 § 1983 alleging: (1) Vacaville, the VPD, Schmurtzler, and Does 1 1 through 25 instituted a policy, practice and custom to 2 inadequately train, instruct, monitor, and supervise VPD officers 3 and employees regarding various policies—including the 4 department’s prohibition on choke and (2) Schmurtzler ratified 5 the conduct of the officers involved in taking Plaintiff’s 6 sample. FAC ¶¶ 58-59. Defendants move to dismiss the claim in 7 its entirety, arguing Plaintiff fails to plead sufficient facts 8 to sustain both allegations. Mot. at 4. Defendants also 9 correctly point out the FAC does not specify whether Plaintiff is 10 suing Schmurtzler in his official or individual capacity. Id. at 11 14. 12 In opposition, Plaintiff (1) argues his FAC includes enough 13 facts to substantiate his pleading that Schmurtzler ratified the 14 officers’ conduct and (2) clarifies he is suing Schmurtzler 15 individually. Opp’n at 7, 12. In reply, Defendants contend 16 Plaintiff does not dispute his failure to state a cause of action 17 “based on a policy, pattern, practice, or inadequate training” 18 and “offers no opposition to dismissal in this regard.” Reply at 19 1. As a result, Defendants request that Plaintiff’s claims based 20 on these theories be dismissed. Id. Defendants also maintain 21 Plaintiff’s FAC lacks facts to sustain a § 1983 claim against 22 Schmurtzler in his individual capacity. Reply at 5. 23 Section 1983 “imposes liability on “persons” who, under the 24 color of law, deprive others of a constitutional right.” Galvan 25 v. City of Vacaville, No. 2:18-CV-279-KJM-CKD, 2018 WL 4214896, 26 at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2018). Municipalities are liable as 27 “persons” under § 1983 via a Monell claim when: (1) official 28 policies or established customs cause a constitutional injury; 1 (2) omissions or failures to act reflect a local government 2 policy of deliberate indifference to constitutional rights; or 3 (3) a local government official with final policy-making 4 authority ratifies a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct. Id. 5 A Monell claim is not synonymous with a respondeat superior 6 cause of action; a municipality is not liable for an employee’s 7 unconstitutional act. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of 8 New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690-95 (1978). Instead, plaintiffs 9 alleging Monell liability must “identify a municipal ‘policy’ or 10 ‘custom’ that caused the plaintiff’s injury.” Bd. of Cty. 11 Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). Plaintiffs must also 12 explain how that policy or custom was deficient and how it 13 “amounted to deliberate indifference, i.e.[,] explain [] how the 14 deficiency involved was obvious and the constitutional injury was 15 likely to occur.” Galvan, 2018 WL 4214896, at *(4 quoting Young 16 v. City of Visalia, 687 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1149 (E.D. Cal. 2009)). 17 a. Monell Claims Against the VPD & Schmurtzler 18 Plaintiff inappropriately names the VPD and Schmurtzler as 19 parties to his Monell claim. The Supreme Court held an 20 “official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to 21 be treated as a suit against the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 22 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). When a municipal official and entity 23 are both named as parties to a suit, “the claims against the 24 individual[] are duplicative and should be dismissed.” Williams 25 v. Dirkse, No. 1:21-CV-00047-BAM-PC, 2021 WL 2227636, at *1 (E.D. 26 Cal. June 2, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:21- 27 CV-00047-NONE-BAMPC, 2021 WL 4776904 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2021) 28 (quoting Vance v. Cty. of Santa Clara, 928 F. Supp. 993, 996 1 (N.D. Cal. 1996)). The same is true when a municipality’s 2 subdivision, such as a police department, is named in the same 3 suit as the municipality. The appropriate defendant is the 4 entity itself—not the subdivision. Vance, 928 F. Supp. at 996. 5 Given the above caselaw, Plaintiff’s claims against the VPD 6 and Schmurtzler are improper and dismissed with prejudice. The 7 Court reaches this conclusion despite Plaintiff’s opposition 8 stating that he is suing Schmurtzler individually. Opp’n at 1. 9 Such allegations “are not within the four corners of the 10 complaint.” Bailey v. MacFarland, No. 2:15-CV-01725-TLN-AC, 2016 11 WL 2626040, at *4 (E.D. Cal. May 9, 2016). Accordingly, the 12 “Court’s consideration of these allegations is not appropriate in 13 a ruling on a motion to dismiss.” Id. Rather, “the appropriate 14 place to assert these new allegations is in an amended 15 complaint.” Id. 16 b. Monell Claims Against the City 17 With respect to Plaintiff’s Monell claims based on a policy, 18 pattern, practice, or inadequate training, the Court grants 19 Defendants’ motion to dismiss because Plaintiff’s opposition 20 fails to address Defendants’ arguments. Plaintiff therefore 21 concedes Defendants’ arguments in this regard. See Resnick v. 22 Hyundai Motor America, Inc., No. CV 16-00593-BRO (PJWx), 2017 WL 23 1531192 at *22, (C.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2017) (“Failure to oppose an 24 argument raised in a motion to dismiss constitutes waiver of that 25 argument”). 26 Plaintiff’s remining Monell claim—that Schmutzler ratified 27 the officers’ conduct—also fails. For such a claim to survive a 28 motion to dismiss, Plaintiff is required to state facts showing 1 an “official with final policymaking authority ratified a 2 subordinate’s unconstitutional decision or action and the basis 3 for it.” Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346-47 (9th Cir. 4 1992). “A policymaker’s knowledge of an unconstitutional act 5 does not, by itself, constitute ratification.” Christie v. Iopa, 6 176 F.3d 1231, 1239 (9th Cir. 1999). Additionally, “a 7 policymaker’s mere refusal to overrule a subordinate’s completed 8 act does not constitute approval.” Id. Instead, ratification 9 occurs when the appropriate policymaker makes a “conscious, 10 affirmative choice.” Gillette, 979 F.2d at 137. Here, Plaintiff 11 fails to plead any facts alleging Schmutzler is a final 12 policymaking authority. Plaintiff also fails to plead facts to 13 substantiate his contention that Schmutzler consciously and 14 affirmatively chose to ratify the VPD officers’ conduct. 15 State law determines who is a final policymaker under 16 Monell. City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 124 17 (1988). Here, Plaintiff pleads unconstitutional actions and 18 omissions were “ratified by policy making officers for Vacaville 19 VPD” and states in his opposition that “[t]he Chief of Police is 20 a policymaking authority in a California city police department.” 21 FAC ¶ 65; Opp’n at 8. Plaintiff’s FAC, in turn, fails to state 22 facts alleging Schmutzler is a final policymaking authority under 23 state law. See Galvan v. City of Vacaville, No. 2:18-CV-279-KJM- 24 CKD, 2018 WL 4214896, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2018) (finding 25 Plaintiff did not plead who was the final policymaker under state 26 law despite naming Chief of Police as an authorized policymaker). 27 The Court therefore finds Plaintiff’s allegation that Schmutzler 28 ratified the officers’ conduct fails. 1 Even if the Court found Plaintiff properly alleged 2 Schmutzler is a final policymaker, Plaintiff’s FAC lacks facts 3 demonstrating Schmutzler made a conscious and affirmative choice 4 to ratify the officers’ conduct and the basis for such actions. 5 Again, a final policymaker’s refusal to overrule a subordinate’s 6 unconstitutional act is not enough to substantiate a Monell 7 ratification claim. Christie, 176 F.3d at 1239, Sheehan v. City 8 and Cty. of San Francisco, 743 F.3d 1211, 1231 (9th Cir. 2014) 9 (finding a “mere failure to discipline” police officers for their 10 unconstitutional actions does not amount to ratification). 11 Instead, a final policymaker must make a conscious and 12 affirmative choice. 13 Here, Plaintiff argues “it appears Schmutzler condoned the 14 use of the choke hold . . . since no remedial or other actions 15 whatsoever were taken in response to the Superior Court’s 16 findings.” Opp’n at 8. As a result, the crux of Plaintiff’s 17 claim is that Schmutzler did not discipline the officers involved 18 in taking Plaintiff’s blood sample—an impermissible basis for 19 ratification. Moreover, Plaintiff does not plead any other facts 20 suggesting Schmutzler approved of the alleged excessive force. 21 Plaintiff, as a result, fails to sufficiently plead facts showing 22 Schmutzler made a conscious and affirmative choice to approve the 23 contested behavior. Accordingly, the Court dismisses the second 24 claim. 25 III. ORDER 26 For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS 27 Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff’s Monell claim against 28 the City of Vacaville is dismissed without prejudice. ene enn enn nen nnn nnn sn nnn nnn IE OE 1 Plaintiff’s Monell claim against the Vacaville Police Department 2 and Vacaville Police Chief Ian Schmutzler, is dismissed with 3 | prejudice. If Plaintiff intends to file an amended Monell claim, 4 he must do so within twenty (20) days of this Order. Defendants’ 5 response pleading is due twenty (20) days thereafter. If 6 | Plaintiff does not file an amended complaint, the case will 7 proceed on the remaining claim in the FAC. 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 Dated: October 20, 2022 10 opens JOHN A. MENDEZ 12 SENIOR UNITED*STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28