(SS) Lukesic v. Commissioner of Social Security ( 2023 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RUBY JEANNINE LUKESIC, No. 2:20-cv-00607 AC 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, 15 16 Defendant. 17 18 Plaintiff sought judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 19 (“Commissioner”), denying his application for a period of disability and disability insurance 20 benefits (“DIB”) benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act (“the Act”). On March 23, 21 2021, the court granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and remanded the matter back to 22 the Commissioner. ECF No. 17. 23 Now pending before the court is plaintiff’s motion for an award of attorney’s fees 24 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). ECF No. 22. Defendant does not oppose the fee request. ECF 25 No. 23. For the reasons set forth below, the motion will be granted. 26 I. REASONABLENESS OF FEE REQUEST 27 At the outset of the representation, plaintiff and his counsel entered into a contingent-fee 28 agreement. ECF No. 22-1. Pursuant to that agreement plaintiff’s counsel now seeks attorney’s 1 fees in the gross amount of $15,961.25, with an order to reimburse the previously received EAJA 2 fees in the amount of $3,678.19 to the plaintiff, which represents 25% of the $63,845.00 in 3 retroactive disability benefits received by plaintiff on remand, for 18.7 hours of attorney time 4 expended on this matter. ECF No. 22 at 20. 5 Attorneys are entitled to fees for cases in which they have successfully represented social 6 security claimants: 7 Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under this subchapter who was represented before the court by an attorney, 8 the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent of 9 the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment, and the Commissioner of Social Security 10 may . . . certify the amount of such fee for payment to such attorney out of, and not in addition to, the amount of such past-due benefits. 11 12 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). “In contrast to fees awarded under fee-shifting provisions such as 42 13 U.S.C. § 1988, the fee is paid by the claimant out of the past-due benefits awarded; the losing 14 party is not responsible for payment.” Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2009) 15 (en banc) (citing Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 802 (2002)). The goal of fee awards under 16 § 406(b) is “‘to protect claimants against “inordinately large fees” and also to ensure that 17 attorneys representing successful claimants would not risk “nonpayment of [appropriate] fees.”’” 18 Parrish v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 698 F.3d 1215, 1217 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Gisbrecht, 19 535 U.S. at 805). 20 The 25% statutory maximum fee is not an automatic entitlement, and the court must 21 ensure that the fee requested is reasonable. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808-09 (“406(b) does not 22 displace contingent-fee agreements within the statutory ceiling; instead, § 406(b) instructs courts 23 to review for reasonableness fees yielded by those agreements”). “Within the 25 percent 24 boundary . . . the attorney for the successful claimant must show that the fee sought is reasonable 25 for the services rendered.” Id. at 807. “[A] district court charged with determining a reasonable 26 fee award under § 406(b)(1)(A) must respect ‘the primacy of lawful attorney-client fee 27 arrangements,’ ‘looking first to the contingent-fee agreement, then testing it for reasonableness.’” 28 Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1149 (quoting Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 793, 808). 1 In determining whether the requested fee is reasonable, the court considers “‘the character 2 of the representation and the results achieved by the representative.’” Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151 3 (quoting Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808). In determining whether a reduction in the fee is warranted, 4 the court considers whether the attorney provided “substandard representation or delayed the 5 case,” or obtained “benefits that are not in proportion to the time spent on the case.” Id. Finally, 6 the court considers the attorney’s record of hours worked and counsel’s regular hourly billing 7 charge for non-contingent cases. Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151-52 (citing Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 8 808); see also, E.D. Cal. R. 293(c)(1) (in fixing attorney’s fees the court considers “the time and 9 labor required”). Below, the court will consider these factors in assessing whether the fee 10 requested by counsel in this case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) is reasonable. 11 Here, plaintiff’s counsel is an experienced attorney who secured a successful result for 12 plaintiff. There is no indication that a reduction of fees is warranted due to any substandard 13 performance by counsel. There is also no evidence that plaintiff’s counsel engaged in any 14 dilatory conduct resulting in excessive delay. The court finds that the requested fee, which does 15 not exceed 25% of the amount paid in past-due benefits paid to plaintiff, is not excessive in 16 relation to the benefits awarded. In making this determination, the court recognizes the 17 contingent fee nature of this case and counsel’s assumption of the risk of going uncompensated in 18 agreeing to represent plaintiff on such terms. See Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1152 (“[t]he attorneys 19 assumed significant risk in accepting these cases, including the risk that no benefits would be 20 awarded or that there would be a long court or administrative delay in resolving the cases”). 21 Finally, counsel has submitted a detailed billing statement in support of the requested fee. ECF 22 No. 22-4. 23 Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the court concludes that the fees sought by 24 counsel pursuant to § 406(b) are reasonable. 25 II. OFFSET FOR EAJA FEES 26 An award of § 406(b) fees must be offset by any prior award of attorney’s fees granted 27 under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). 28 U.S.C. § 2412; Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796. 28 Here, plaintiff’s attorney was previously awarded $3,678.19 in EAJA fees. See ECF No. 20. 1 | Counsel therefore must remit that amount to plaintiff. 2 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 3 1. Plaintiffs Motion for attorney Fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) (ECF No. 22), is 4 | GRANTED; 5 2. Counsel for plaintiff is awarded $15,961.25 in attorney’s fees under § 406(b); the 6 || Commissioner shall certify that amount to be paid to counsel from the funds previously withheld 7 || for the payment of such fees; and 8 3. Counsel for plaintiff is directed to remit to plaintiff the amount of $3,678.19 for EAJA 9 || fees previously paid to counsel by the Commissioner. 10 | DATED: March 30, 2023 ~ 11 _Athuer—Clore ALLISON CLAIRE 12 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28