(PS) Walton v. Hopper ( 2022 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 GREGORY WAYNE WALTON II and No. 2:22-cv-00453 JAM AC PS ELIJAH WALTON III, 12 Plaintiffs, 13 ORDER and v. 14 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS AMANDA HOPPER, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 Plaintiff has commenced this action pro se. The matter was accordingly referred to the 19 undersigned by E.D. Cal. 302(c)(21). Plaintiff has filed a request for leave to proceed in forma 20 pauperis (“IFP”), and has submitted the affidavit required by that statute. See 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1915(a)(1). The motion to proceed IFP (ECF No. 2) will therefore be granted. 22 I. Screening Requirement 23 The federal IFP statute requires federal courts to dismiss a case if the action is legally 24 “frivolous or malicious,” fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks 25 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). A 26 claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. 27 Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court will 28 (1) accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint, unless they are clearly 1 baseless or fanciful, (2) construe those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and 2 (3) resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; Von Saher v. Norton 3 Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 564 U.S. 4 1037 (2011). 5 The court applies the same rules of construction in determining whether the complaint 6 states a claim on which relief can be granted. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (court 7 must accept the allegations as true); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974) (court must 8 construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff). Pro se pleadings are held to a 9 less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 10 (1972). However, the court need not accept as true conclusory allegations, unreasonable 11 inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 12 624 (9th Cir. 1981). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action does not suffice 13 to state a claim. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 14 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 15 To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must allege enough facts “to 16 state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has 17 facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 18 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 19 678. A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the complaint and an opportunity 20 to amend, unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See Noll v. 21 Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987), superseded on other grounds by statute as stated in 22 Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc). 23 II. The Complaint 24 Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and his child, is suing Amanda L. Hopper (Sutter County 25 District Attorney), Cameron King (Sutter County District Attorney), and Clint Curry (Yuba 26 County District Attorney). ECF No. 1 at 2-3. Plaintiff also names the Sutter County District 27 Attorney’s Office as a defendant. Id. at 5. Plaintiff alleges violation of his civil rights by the 28 District Attorneys and “abuse of process (court procedures).” Id. at 4. Plaintiff alleges the 1 defendants wrongfully or intentionally sought a “restraining order” as part of his criminal 2 sentencing to unjustly prevent him from obtaining custody of his biological son. Id. at 5. The 3 improper order is also referred to in the complaint as a condition of probation. Id. at 6.1 Plaintiff 4 alleges that the prosecutors had ulterior motives in pursuing the restraining order, resulting in a 5 violation of his parental and human rights. Id. Plaintiff alleges the illegal restraining order was 6 unlawfully upheld by the Lassen County Superior Court during plaintiff’s family law case. Id. at 7 6. Plaintiff seeks fifty million dollars in damages. Id. at 5. 8 III. Failure to State a Claim 9 This complaint is defective in several fundamental ways: (1) plaintiff, the senior Mr. 10 Walton, seeks to represent both himself and his child without an attorney; (2) the complaint seeks 11 monetary relief from defendants who are immune from such relief; and (3) the complaint is 12 barred by legal doctrines that prevents federal courts from interfering with state court judgments. 13 First, the senior Mr. Walton purports to bring this case on behalf of himself and his minor 14 child. As a self-represented litigant, Mr. Walton can represent only himself. The Ninth Circuit 15 has clearly held that “a parent or guardian cannot bring an action on behalf of a minor child 16 without retaining a lawyer.” Johns v. County of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 1997). 17 Thus, plaintiff cannot bring this case on behalf of his child. He can only bring suit for legal 18 harms he suffered himself. 19 Second, plaintiff cannot maintain a civil rights action against district attorneys for the way 20 that they do their jobs, including seeking a particular sentence, ruling, or court order. In other 21 words, prosecutors acting within the scope of their duties as advocates for the state are absolutely 22 immune from civil suits for damages under Section 1983. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 23 430-31 (1976); Botello v. Gammick, 413 F.3d 971, 975 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Prosecutors are 24 absolutely immune from liability under § 1983 for their conduct insofar as it is ‘intimately 25 associated’ with the judicial phase of the criminal process.”). Seeking a particular sentence, 26 1 The court cannot tell whether plaintiff is complaining about a no-contact condition of probation 27 which was imposed initially as part of his criminal sentence, or an independently existing TRO with which he was ordered to comply while on probation. For the reasons that follow, this is a 28 distinction without a difference. 1 condition of probation, or restraining order is a traditional function of an advocate and thus 2 entitles the prosecutors named here to absolute immunity. See Genzler v. Longanbach, 410 F.3d 3 630, 636 (9th Cir. 2005). Even claims of malicious prosecution, falsification of evidence, 4 coercion of perjured testimony and concealment of exculpatory evidence must be dismissed 5 where prosecutorial immunity applies under Imbler. See Stevens v. Rifkin, 608 F. Supp. 710, 728 6 (N.D. Cal. 1984). Accordingly, plaintiff cannot state any kind of claim against defendants 7 Hopper, King or Curry for seeking the imposition or enforcement of a restraining order or 8 condition of probation. These defendants are immune from suit, and that immunity is absolute. 9 Plaintiff also seeks to sue the District Attorney’s Office itself, but he does not make any 10 allegations specifically against the Office. To the extent plaintiff intends to hold the Office 11 responsible for the prosecutors’ conduct, he cannot do so. “There is no respondeat superior 12 liability under section 1983.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). It is true that, 13 as a branch of the County, the District Attorney’s Office can be held accountable for civil rights 14 violations under certain circumstances. “[M]unicipalities and other local government units...[are] 15 among those persons to whom § 1983 applies.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 16 690 (1978). However, “a municipality can be liable under § 1983 only where its policies are the 17 ‘moving force [behind] the constitutional violation.’ ” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 18 389 (1989) (alteration in original) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694 and Polk County. v. Dodson, 19 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981)). There must be “a direct causal link between a municipal policy or 20 custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Id. at 385. Here, the complaint does not 21 allege any specific action taken by the Office, and it does not reference any policy or custom as 22 the cause of a constitutional violation. 23 Finally, plaintiff’s case is barred doctrines that prevent the federal courts from setting 24 aside state court rulings and judgments in most circumstances. The complaint makes allegations 25 about a restraining order that is also described as a condition of probation; it references both a 26 related criminal sentence and a family law order. There is no information about plaintiff’s 27 underlying criminal conviction, and it is unclear whether the criminal court order sought by the 28 defendant prosecutors was a no-contact condition of probation or a condition requiring 1 compliance with an independent restraining order. Either way, and under any of the possible 2 scenarios consistent with plaintiff’s allegations, the complaint is barred by either Heck v. 3 Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) or the Rooker–Feldman doctrine.2 4 To the extent that the “restraining order” plaintiff complains about is a condition of 5 probation and thus part of a criminal sentence, his civil rights claim may be Heck-barred. Heck 6 bars § 1983 claims that assert or imply the invalidity of a criminal conviction or sentence, unless 7 the conviction or sentence at issue has previously been invalidated. Id. at 486-487. Although 8 plaintiff does not allege or imply any underlying wrongful conviction, a probation condition is 9 part of a sentence imposed by a criminal trial court. Accordingly, many courts have found that 10 Heck bars a § 1983 challenge to a condition of probation unless and until that condition has been 11 successfully challenged and set aside. See Drollinger v. Milligan, 552 F.2d 1220, 1224-25 (7th 12 Cir. 1977) (noting that a challenge to conditions of probation is an attack on the sentence of the 13 trial court); cf. Thornton v. Brown, 757 F.3d 834 (9th Cir. 2013) (distinguishing Drollinger and 14 holding that a challenge to term of parole is not subject to Heck bar, because conditions of parole 15 are not imposed by the trial court as part of the sentence). Courts in the Ninth Circuit have held 16 that Heck applies to claims challenging conditions of probation.3 However, if plaintiff is no 17 longer on probation and therefore does not have post-conviction remedies available to him, the 18 Heck bar may not apply. See Beckway v. DeShong, 717 F. Supp. 2d 908, 925-926 (N.D. Cal. 19 July 28, 2010) (on reconsideration). The complaint does not specify whether plaintiff remains on 20 probation, but there is no need to inquire into the matter. If Heck does not bar the claims, the 21 Rooker-Feldman doctrine does. 22 Federal district courts cannot hear cases that essentially appeal a state court decision of 23 any kind. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415–16 (1923). The legal doctrine known 24 2 See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415–16 (1923); District of Columbia Court of 25 Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). 26 3 See e.g., Larson v. Baker, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74481(D. Mon. Feb. 15, 2019); see also Chico Scrap Metal, Inc. v. Robinson, 560 F. App’x 650 (9th Cir. 2014) (“In addition, Heck bars 27 the claims because Plaintiffs were sentenced to compliance with the challenged cleanup orders as a condition of their probation in the criminal case, as specifically directed by the state court in its 28 criminal judgment. . . .”). 1 as Rooker–Feldman provides that “lower federal courts are without subject matter jurisdiction to 2 review state court decisions[.]” Mothershed v. Justices of Supreme Ct., 410 F.3d 602, 606 (9th 3 Cir. 2005) (as amended). To determine whether the Rooker–Feldman bar applies, a district court 4 asks whether “the action contains a forbidden de facto appeal of a state court decision.” Bell v. 5 City of Boise, 709 F.3d 890, 897 (9th Cir. 2013). “A de facto appeal exists when ‘a federal 6 plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous decision by a state court, and seeks relief 7 from a state court judgment based on that decision.’ ” Id. (quoting Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 8 1164 (9th Cir. 2003)). Here, plaintiff has clearly asserted as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous 9 state court decision depriving him of contact with his child, and he seeks relief from that state 10 court order and his consequent loss of custody and parental rights. Accordingly, the complaint 11 must be construed as a de facto appeal of the pertinent state court judgment(s). Rooker-Feldman 12 therefore bars this suit. 13 Child custody and parental rights are quintessentially state law matters that are generally 14 outside the purview of the federal court. See Moore v. County of Butte, 547 Fed. Appx. 826, 829 15 (9th Cir. 2013); Riley v. Knowles, No. 1:16-cv-0057-JLT, 2016 WL 259336, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 16 21, 2016); Conerly v. Winn, No. 2:20-cv-01833 JAM AC, 2020 WL 6083668, at *2 (E.D. Cal. 17 Sept. 16, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:20-CV-1833 JAM AC, 2020 WL 18 6075708 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2020), aff'd, 851 F. App’x 815 (9th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. 19 Ct. 585 (2021). This court has no jurisdictional basis to insert itself into matters adjudicated in 20 Sutter, Yuba and/or Lassen Counties regarding plaintiff’s access to and relationship with his 21 minor child. 22 For all these reasons, plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed. 23 IV. Leave to Amend Is Not Appropriate 24 The court finds that the complaint fails to state any cognizable civil rights claim under 42 25 U.S.C. § 1983. Amendment of the complaint would be futile because no federal claim is 26 available based on the facts alleged. “A district court may deny leave to amend when amendment 27 would be futile.” Hartmann v. CDCR, 707 F.3d 1114, 1130 (9th Cir. 2013); accord Lopez v. 28 Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Courts are not required to grant leave to amend if a 1 complaint lacks merit entirely.”). Here, plaintiff’s claims are barred in their entirety because he 2 seeks relief from defendants clothed with absolute immunity. Genzler, 410 F.3d at 636. This is 3 not a defect that can be cured by amendment. Moreover, the gravamen of the complaint amounts 4 to a de facto appeal of state court orders and is therefore barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 5 See Bell, 709 F.3d at 897. Accordingly, even plaintiff were to drop his minor child as a putative 6 plaintiff, demonstrate the inapplicability of Heck, and assert a theory of municipal liability, 7 dismissal would still be required. For these reasons, the complaint should be dismissed without 8 leave to amend. 9 V. Pro Se Plaintiff’s Summary 10 Your request to proceed without paying the filing fee is being granted, and you will not 11 have to pay a filing fee in this case. However, the Magistrate Judge is recommending that this 12 case be dismissed, for several reasons: (1) you cannot sue prosecutors for the things they do in 13 court cases; (2) you cannot sue the District Attorney’s Office for actions taken by its employees; 14 (3) you cannot represent your child without an attorney; (4) you cannot challenge the validity of a 15 criminal sentence, including a condition of probation, in a civil rights lawsuit if that condition is 16 still in effect; and (5) federal courts have no authority to overturn the orders of state courts, 17 particularly as relates to child custody and parental rights. You have 21 days to file objections to 18 this recommendation. 19 VI. Conclusion 20 For the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s request to 21 proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED. 22 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the complaint (ECF No. 1) be DISMISSED 23 with prejudice because it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and because it 24 brings claims against immune defendants. 25 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 26 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within twenty one days 27 after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written objections 28 with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Id.; see also Local Rule 304(b). Such a document 1 | should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure 2 || to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s 3 | order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153, 4 | 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991). 5 || DATED: March 21, 2022 ~ 6 Lhar—e_ ALLISON CLAIRE 7 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 8 9 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28