(HC)Kenneth L. Faulkner v. State of California ( 2022 )


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  • 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 KENNETH L. FAULKNER, Case No. 1:21-cv-01612-JLT-HBK 12 Petitioner, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO DISMISS PETITION FOR LACK OF 13 v. JURISDICTION1 14 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, OBJECTIONS DUE IN 14 DAYS 15 Respondent. (Doc. No. 1) 16 17 18 Petitioner Kenneth L. Faulkner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, petitioned for a writ of 19 habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. No. 1). This matter is before the court for preliminary 20 review. Under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, the court must examine the 21 habeas corpus petition and order a response unless it “plainly appears” that the petitioner is not 22 entitled to relief. Under Rule 4, courts have “an active role in summarily disposing of facially 23 defective habeas petitions.” Ross v. Williams, 896 F.3d 958, 968 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). 24 The court may dismiss claims at screening for “easily identifiable” procedural defects. See id. 25 Finding the petition successive, the undersigned recommends that the petition be dismissed. 26 27 1 The undersigned submits these factual finding and recommendation to the District Court pursuant to 28 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302 (E.D. Cal. 2019). 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 Petitioner initiated this case on October 29, 2021 by filing the instant petition, and it was 3 transferred to the Eastern District of California on November 4, 2021. (Doc. Nos. 1, 3). The 4 Court takes judicial notice of its files and notes Petitioner has filed seven previous habeas 5 petitions in this court, all challenging his 2006 conviction for annoying and molesting a child 6 entered by the Kern County Superior Court in case no. BF110832: See Faulkner v. Mule Creek 7 State Prison, No. 1:08-cv-00806-JMD HC (E.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2009) (petition denied on the 8 merits with prejudice); Faulkner v. Knipp, No. 1:11-cv-01163-LJO-MJS HC (E.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 9 2011) (petition dismissed as second or successive); Faulkner v. Davies, No. 1:17-cv-00695-DAD- 10 SKO (E.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2017) (petition dismissed as successive); Faulkner v. Foulk, No. 1:17- 11 cv-00810-LJO-SAB (E.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2017) (petition dismissed as successive); Faulkner v. 12 Davies, No. 1:17-cv-00752-JLT HC (E.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2017) (petition dismissed as successive); 13 Faulkner v. Foulk, No. 1:19-cv-01544-AWI-JDP (E.D. Cal. May 7, 2020) (petition dismissed as 14 successive); Faulkner v. Pollard, 1:20-cv-01748-JLT-HBK (E.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2021) (petition 15 dismissed as successive). 16 Petitioner’s first petition (No. 1:08-cv-00806-JMD HC) was denied on the merits; the 17 remaining petitions were dismissed as second or successive. Nothing in the docket shows that 18 petitioner obtained an order from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals authorizing him to file a 19 second or successive petition. 20 II. APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS 21 A second or successive petition that raises the same grounds as a prior petition must be 22 dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1). Dismissal also is required for a second or successive petition 23 raising a new ground unless the petitioner can show that (1) the claim rests on a new constitutional 24 right, made retroactive by the United States Supreme Court or (2) the factual basis of the claim was 25 not previously discoverable through due diligence, and these new facts establish by clear and 26 convincing evidence that but for the constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found 27 the applicant guilty of the underlying offense. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A)-(B). 28 1 However, it is not the district court that decides whether a second or successive petition 2 meets these requirements; the petitioner must obtain leave from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 3 to proceed. See § 2244 (b)(3)(A) (“Before a second or successive application permitted by this 4 section is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for 5 an order authorizing the district court to consider the application.”); Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 6 147, 152-53 (2007); Chades v. Hill, 976 F.3d 1055, 1056 (9th Cir. 2020). This court is mandated 7 to dismiss a second or successive petition unless the Court of Appeals has given petitioner leave to 8 file the petition because a district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over a second or successive 9 petition. Burton, 549 U.S. at 152 (2007); Cooper v. Calderon, 274 F.3d 1270, 1274 (9th Cir. 2001). 10 Because petitioner has sought relief from this court on seven prior occasions for the same 11 conviction, the undersigned finds that the instant petition is an unauthorized successive petition 12 prohibited by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). Petitioner makes no showing that he has obtained prior leave 13 from the Ninth Circuit to file his successive petition. Therefore, this court has no jurisdiction to 14 consider petitioner’s renewed application for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and must dismiss the 15 petition. See Burton, 549 U.S. at 157. 16 III. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 17 State prisoners in a habeas corpus action under § 2254 do not have an automatic right to 18 appeal a final order. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36 19 (2003). To appeal, a prisoner must obtain a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); 20 see also R. Governing Section 2254 Cases 11 (requires a district court to issue or deny a certificate 21 of appealability when entering a final order adverse to a petitioner); Ninth Circuit Rule 22-1(a); 22 United States v. Asrar, 116 F.3d 1268, 1270 (9th Cir. 1997). Where, as here, the court denies 23 habeas relief on procedural grounds without reaching the merits of the underlying constitutional 24 claims, the court should issue a certificate of appealability only “if jurists of reason would find it 25 debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that 26 jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural 27 ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “Where a plain procedural bar is present 28 and the district court is correct to invoke it to dispose of the case, a reasonable jurist could not 1 | conclude either that the district court erred in dismissing the petition or that the petitioner should 2 | be allowed to proceed further.” Jd. Here, reasonable jurists would not find the undersigned’s 3 | conclusion debatable or conclude that petitioner should proceed further. The undersigned therefore 4 | recommends that a certificate of appealability not issue. 5 Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED: 6 1. The petition be dismissed as successive. 7 2. No certificate of appealability be issued. 8 3. The Clerk of Court be directed to terminate any pending motions/deadlines and 9 | close this case. 10 NOTICE TO PARTIES 11 These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States district judge 12 || assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen 13 | (14) days after being served with these findings and recommendations, a party may file written 14 | objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s 15 | Findings and Recommendations.” Parties are advised that failure to file objections within the 16 | specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 17 | 838-39 (Oth Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 18 | Dated: _ March 23, 2022 law Nh. fareh Base □□□ 20 HELENA M. BARCH-KUCHTA 1 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

Document Info

Docket Number: 1:21-cv-01612

Filed Date: 3/24/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 6/20/2024