Joseph v. Stryker Corp. ( 2022 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 | Bincymol Joseph, No. 2:18-cv-00370-KJM-CKD 12 Plaintiff, ORDER 13 v. 14 CV Medical, LLC and Davis Tool, Inc., 1S Defendants. 16 CV Medical, LLC, 8 Third-Party Plaintiff, 19 V. 0 Davis Tool, Inc., 21 Third-Party Defendant. 22 23 Plaintiff Bincymol Joseph brings this personal injury and contract action against CV 24 | Medical, LLC and Davis Tool, Inc. Davis Tool moves to dismiss the claims against it as barred 25 | by the relevant statute of limitations. The court denies the motion. 26 | I. BACKGROUND 27 On December 2, 2015, Bincymol Joseph was working at Kaiser Permanente as a nurse. 28 | Second Am. Compl (SAC) § 12, ECF No. 35. She was moving a NuBoom or NuCart, which is a 1 rolling medical video display unit, when a monitor dislodged and fell on her. Id. ¶¶ 12–13. 2 Joseph suffered “severe neck and shoulder pain.” Id. ¶ 15. She filed this action in state court on 3 November 30, 2017, against Stryker Corporation and fifty Doe defendants. Not. of Removal ¶ 1, 4 ECF No. 1. On May 21, 2019, after the case was removed here, Joseph amended her complaint. 5 See generally First Am. Compl. (FAC), ECF No. 16. At the time, she believed Stryker “and/or” 6 CV Medical manufactured and installed the monitor on the cart at the hospital. Id. ¶ 13. The 7 First Amended Complaint did not name any Doe defendants in its caption, but the body of the 8 complaint makes extensive allegations about Doe defendants, id. ¶¶ 3, 19,1 51, and asserts all six 9 claims against them, see generally id. After discovery showing Stryker was not liable, the parties 10 stipulated to Stryker’s dismissal, which the court approved. Min. Order, ECF No. 20. In August 11 2020, Joseph and CV Medical jointly sought to bring Davis Tool into the action, through an 12 amended complaint and a third-party complaint by CV Medical, because Davis Tool 13 manufactured the “machine that is alleged to have caused [the] injuries to the plaintiff.” Mot. to 14 Am. and File Third-Party Compl. at 4, ECF No. 31-1. 15 With leave of court, ECF No. 34, Joseph filed her operative complaint, removing any 16 allegations against Doe defendants and adding Davis Tool as a defendant for all claims, see 17 generally SAC. The complaint alleges 1) Strict Products Liability - Personal Injury; 2) Failure to 18 Warn of Defective Condition; 3) Breach of Implied Warranty of Fitness of Particular Purpose; 19 4) Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability; 5) Breach of Express Warranty; and 20 6) Negligence - Personal Injury. Id. CV Medical filed a third-party complaint against Davis 21 Tool. ECF No. 39. 22 Davis Tool moves to dismiss. Mot. to Dismiss (MTD), ECF No. 46. The matter is fully 23 briefed. Opp’n, ECF No. 48; Reply, ECF No. 49; Joint Sur-Reply, ECF No. 52. 24 ///// 1 The court notes that due to a typographical error, the first amended complaint contains two paragraphs numbered 19. See FAC at 4. The court’s citation here is to the second paragraph 19. 1 II. LEGAL STANDARD 2 A party may move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 3 granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The motion may be granted only if the complaint lacks a 4 “cognizable legal theory” or if its factual allegations do not support a cognizable legal theory. 5 Hartmann v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1122 (9th Cir. 2013). The court 6 assumes all factual allegations are true and construes “them in the light most favorable to the 7 nonmoving party.” Steinle v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 919 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 8 2019). If the complaint’s allegations do not “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief,” the 9 motion must be granted. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). A complaint need contain 10 only a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. 11 R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), not “detailed factual allegations,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 12 555 (2007). 13 III. ANALYSIS 14 Davis Tool argues the claims against it are untimely. MTD at 2. A party may move to 15 dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) when “the running of the statute [of limitations] is apparent on the 16 face of the complaint.” Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 17 969 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). The motion “can be granted only if the assertions of the 18 complaint, read with the required liberality, would not permit the plaintiff to prove that the statute 19 was tolled.” Joseph v. Asencio, 976 F.2d 737 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). 20 “Generally, a federal court sitting in diversity applies the applicable statute of limitations 21 of the jurisdiction in which the court sits.” Mendez v. Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Indus. Co., 22 52 F.3d 799, 800 (9th Cir. 1995). The court’s jurisdiction here is premised on diversity, SAC ¶ 23 10, thus California law supplies the statute of limitations. Joseph’s claims implicate two different 24 statutes of limitations. “Personal injury actions based upon products liability are governed by the 25 one-year period of limitations.” G. D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Ct., 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 25 (Ct. 26 App. 1975) (citing Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 340). The statute of limitations for other personal 27 injury actions is two years. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 335.1. It is undisputed that Joseph’s claims 28 against Davis Tool were not filed until after these deadlines had passed. Her claims can proceed 1 only if the limitations period is tolled or her claims against Davis Tool relate back to the date of 2 her original filing. 3 Joseph argues her claims are timely because she only discovered Davis Tool’s role in her 4 injury in June 2020. Opp’n at 1. Under California law, the “discovery rule” postpones the 5 accrual date “until [the plaintiff] either discovers or has reason to discover [the action.]” Soliman 6 v. Philip Morris Inc., 311 F.3d 966, 971 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Norgart v. Upjohn Co., 7 21 Cal. 4th 383, 397 (1999)). A claim accrues “when . . . [the plaintiff] at least suspects . . . that 8 someone has done something wrong to him.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 9 But “because the identity of the defendant is not an element of any cause of action[ ] [i]t follows 10 that failure to discover, or have reason to discover, the identity of the defendant does not postpone 11 the accrual of a cause of action. . . .” Norgart, 21 Cal. 4th at 399 (internal citation omitted). 12 Accordingly, the discovery rule does not operate to make the complaint here timely. 13 Joseph’s claims are timely, however, because they relate back to the date of her original 14 pleading. “An amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when . . . 15 the law that provides the applicable statute of limitations allows relation back.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 15(c)(1)(A). In California, “[w]hen the plaintiff is ignorant of the name of a defendant,” and says 17 so in the complaint, the defendant may be sued under a fictitious name until “his true name is 18 discovered.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 474. The federal court’s general disfavor of Doe defendants 19 gives way here given the application of state law and Rule 15(c)(1)’s permitting relation back 20 under state law “even if the amendment would not otherwise relate back under the federal rules.” 21 Shidler v. Cty. of San Bernardino, No. 5:19-503, 2020 WL 10224752, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 28, 22 2020). Thus, plaintiffs may “effectively extend[ ] the limitations period in question by the filing 23 and amendment of a Doe complaint and invocation of the relation-back doctrine.” Norgart, 24 21 Cal. 4th 383, 399 (citation and quotation marks omitted). However, “if a defendant is added to 25 an amended complaint as a new defendant, and not as a Doe defendant, the amendment does not 26 relate back to the time of the original complaint.” Anderson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 630 F.2d 677, 27 683 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Scherer v. Mark, 64 Cal. App. 3d 834, 841–43 (1976) (citations 28 omitted)). Applying California law, the Ninth Circuit in Anderson v. Allstate Insurance Company 1 | concluded the complaint did not relate back because the plaintiff was not ignorant of the 2 | defendant’s name or role in the case when filing the original complaint. /d. at 682-83. Here, by 3 | contrast, Joseph was “genuinely ignorant of Doe Defendant[’s] identit[y] at the time the original 4 | complaint was filed,” and she is not adding Davis Tool as a new defendant, rather she is 5 | correcting the identification of a former Doe defendant. Shidler, 2020 WL 10224752, at *3 6 | (C.D. Cal. July 28, 2020). She did not become aware of Davis Tool until discovery had 7 | progressed with CV Medical. Reply at 2. She then substituted Davis Tool for a Doe defendant in 8 | her operative pleading. See generally SAC. Her claims relate back under Rule 15(c)(1)(A) and 9 | California law. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 474. 10 Davis Tool argues the operative complaint does not relate back to the date of Joseph’s 11 | original filing because she did not include Doe defendants in the caption of her First Amended 12 | Complaint. See Reply at 2. This omission appears to have been an oversight and is technical, not 13 | substantive. The First Amended Complaint included extensive allegations and claims against the 14 | Doe defendants. Absent controlling law to the contrary, the court declines to dismiss Davis Tool 15 | on this ground. 16 | IV. CONCLUSION 17 The court denies the motion to dismiss. 18 This order resolves ECF No. 46. 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. 20 | DATED: March 22, 2022. [ (] 21 l ti / { q_/ CHIEF NT] ED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 23