Riley v. Sheet Metal Workers International Association ( 2022 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 EARL L. RILEY, III, Case No. 1:22-cv-00241-JLT-EPG 9 Plaintiff, SCREENING ORDER 10 v. ORDER FOR PLAINTIFF TO: 11 SHEET METAL WORKERS (1) FILE A FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT; 12 INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION, OR 13 Defendant. (2) NOTIFY THE COURT THAT HE WISHES TO STAND ON HIS COMPLAINT 14 (ECF NO. 1) 15 THIRTY (30) DAY DEADLINE 16 17 Plaintiff Earl L. Riley, III, is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this action filed 18 under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., generally alleging that 19 Defendant Sheet Metal Workers International Association has engaged in discriminatory 20 employment practices. (See ECF No. 1, 5). The complaint is now before the Court for screening. 21 The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s complaint and finds that Plaintiff fails to state any 22 cognizable claims. Plaintiff now has the following options as to how to move forward. Plaintiff 23 may file an amended complaint if he believes that additional facts would state a cognizable claim 24 or claims. If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, the Court will screen that amended complaint 25 in due course. Or Plaintiff may file a statement with the Court that he wants to stand on his 26 complaint and have it reviewed by the District Judge, in which case the Court will issue findings 27 and recommendations to the District Judge consistent with this order. 28 1 I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT 2 As Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court screens the complaint under 28 3 U.S.C. § 1915. (ECF No. 5). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may 4 have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that the action or appeal fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 5 A complaint is required to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 6 the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 7 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 8 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 9 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A plaintiff must set forth “sufficient 10 factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. 11 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting 12 this plausibility standard. Id. at 679. While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, courts “are 13 not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 14 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, a plaintiff’s 15 legal conclusions are not accepted as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 16 Pleadings of pro se plaintiffs “must be held to less stringent standards than formal 17 pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that 18 pro se complaints should continue to be liberally construed after Iqbal). 19 II. SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 20 Around July 2021, Plaintiff was hired as a sheet metal journeyman by Acco Engineered 21 Systems (Acco). (ECF No. 1, p. 2). The supervisor was Joey Hernandez. (Id.). Since July 2021, 22 Plaintiff has had to work “alone on jobs that require two or more people” while other workers 23 “are partnered up.”1 (Id.). On September 29, 2021, Plaintiff saw a photo “on the office wall that 24 he found highly inappropriate and very offensive.” (Id.). “It was a monkey wearing construction 25 gear and it was labelled ‘Sheet Metal Worker.’ As an African American sheet metal worker 26 [Plaintiff] found the photo to be insensitive, offensive, and highly inappropriate.” (Id.). 27 1 Minor alterations, such as changing capitalization and correcting misspellings, have been made to 28 Plaintiff’s quoted statements without indicating the alterations. 1 Plaintiff reported seeing the photo to Hernandez and his Local 104 Union representatives, 2 Mike Lopez and David Pena. (Id.). He also filed a complaint with the Equal Employment 3 Opportunity Commission (EEOC) “against Acco for their behavior.”2 (Id.). However, Lopez and 4 Pena tried to persuade him not to file the complaint, with Lopez even suggesting that Plaintiff 5 “should get over it because everyone experiences discrimination.” (Id.). But Plaintiff told Lopez 6 and Pena that he would be going forward with his complaint. (Id.). 7 Since filing the complaint, Plaintiff has “not been referred to any jobs that are available 8 and he [has] been denied access to benefits.” (Id.). Plaintiff has tried to contact Lopez and Pena 9 multiple times but has been unsuccessful. (Id.). To date, Plaintiff has not been contacted or assigned employment “even though he is an A list journeyman and he hold[s] priority over B list 10 workers.” (Id.). No reason has been given for the difference in the treatment Plaintiff has 11 received. 12 Plaintiff alleges that he has been subjected to different terms and conditions of 13 employment, harassed, and constructively discharged based on his race. (Id.). He also asserts that 14 he has been denied job referrals and assignments and discharged in retaliation for the filing of his 15 EEOC complaint. (Id.). Lastly, he alleges that “the union did not represent him fairly and in good 16 faith and without discrimination. (Id.). 17 III. ANALYSIS 18 A. Pleading Standards 19 Title VII makes it unlawful for employers, employment agencies, and labor organizations 20 to discriminate against an individual based on the individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or 21 national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)-(c). 22 Plaintiff’s complaint does not comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 because it 23 does not clearly identify what the Defendant did to discriminate against Plaintiff. See Starr v. 24 Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting that under Rule 8 a complaint “must contain 25 sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to 26 defend itself effectively”). Here, Plaintiff sues the Sheet Metal Workers International Association, 27 2 Plaintiff has attached a copy of a letter dated February 17, 2022, from the EEOC advising him of his right 28 to file a lawsuit. 1 not Acco. However, it is not clear what alleged discrimination Defendant Sheet Metal Workers 2 International Association allegedly engaged in. 3 Plaintiff’s first set of allegations are that, in July 2021, he was hired by Acco, who 4 required him to work alone on jobs requiring two or more people while other sheet metal workers 5 had partners. But it is not clear what role Defendant Sheet Metal Workers International 6 Association had in this decision. Plaintiff also does not allege that he was given this role due to 7 his race, or that the other sheet metal workers who had partners were of a different race. 8 Plaintiff’s second set of allegations are that, on September 29, 2021, he noticed a photo of 9 a monkey dressed in construction gear and labelled as a sheet metal worker “on the office wall” that he felt was “highly inappropriate and very offensive.” (ECF No. 1, p. 2). Plaintiff does not 10 say what “office wall” the photo was on, but the context of his complaint makes it appear likely 11 that the photo was located on Acco’s office wall. First, Plaintiff states that he immediately 12 reported the photo to the supervisor at Acco, Hernandez (although the Court recognizes that he 13 also reported the photo to Lopez and Pena).3 Additionally, he states that he filed an EEOC 14 complaint “against Acco for their behavior.”4 (Id.). Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Sheet 15 Metal Workers International Association had any role in putting the photo on the wall, or 16 otherwise endorsing that conduct. 17 Finally, Plaintiff states that Lopez and Pena tried to dissuade him from filing an EEOC 18 complaint “against Acco,” with Lopez even suggesting Plaintiff should get over the incident 19 because everyone experiences discrimination. (Id.). Thereafter, Plaintiff “was subjected to 20 different terms and conditions of employment, denied job referrals/assignments, and discharged 21 in retaliation for filing the complaint with the EEOC.” (Id.). However, it is unclear if it was Acco, 22 or Lopez and Pena, who Plaintiff blames for this conduct. For example, Plaintiff fails to state who 23 discharged him, and, if it was Acco, what role, if any, Defendant played. (Id.). 24 25 3 While the Court does not ultimately rely on any information outside the complaint for purposes of 26 screening, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis states that he was working at Acco on September 29, 2021. (ECF No. 3). 27 4 Although Plaintiff states that he filed the EEOC complaint against Acco, the “charge of discrimination” form attached to his complaint lists Defendant. Plaintiff should clarify against whom he filed the EEOC 28 complaint if he decides to file an amended complaint. (ECF No. 1, p. 4). 1 Lastly, even assuming that Lopez and Pena were involved in any of Plaintiff’s core 2 allegations, it is important to note that Plaintiff identifies them as Local 104 Union 3 representatives, not employees of Defendant Sheet Metal Workers International Association. 4 While an “employer” also includes “any agent” of the “employer” under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), 5 that Lopez and Pena were employees of Local 104 does not necessary make Defendant, the 6 International Union, liable for their conduct. As the Ninth Circuit has concluded, this 7 determination revolves around agency principles: Laughon contends that Local 16 was acting as an agent of the International in 8 discriminating against women, thus making IATSE liable for Local 16’s violation 9 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Common law agency principles determine whether such a relationship exists between an 10 international and one of its locals. See Carbon Fuel Co. v. United Mine Workers, 444 U.S. 212, 216, 100 S. Ct. 410, 62 L.Ed.2d 394 (1979) (applying the common 11 law agency test to determine whether an international was liable for an unauthorized strike by its local); Berger v. Iron Workers Reinforced Rodmen Local 12 201, 843 F.2d 1395, 1427–28 (D.C.Cir.1988) (applying the Carbon Fuel test in the 13 context of a Title VII action); Shimman v. Frank, 625 F.2d 80, 97-98 (6th Cir.1980). Thus, if the local engages in illegal conduct in furtherance of its role as 14 an agent of the international, the international will be liable for the local’s actions. See Carbon Fuel, 444 U.S. at 217, 100 S. Ct. 410. However, if the local exercises 15 considerable autonomy in conducting its affairs, it cannot be regarded as an agent 16 of the international, and the international accordingly cannot be held liable under an agency theory for the local’s actions. See Shimman, 625 F.2d at 97–98. 17 Laughon v. Int’l All. of Theatrical Stage Emps., Moving Picture Technicians, Artists & Allied 18 Crafts of the United States & Canada, 248 F.3d 931, 934–35 (9th Cir. 2001). 19 In short, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to contain sufficient allegations to notify Defendant of 20 the claims against it. Should Plaintiff decide to amend his complaint, he should make sure to 21 specifically identify Defendant’s alleged misconduct, keeping in mind the Court’s discussion in 22 this order. 23 A. Legal Standards 24 Here, Plaintiff generally alleges that he was subjected to discrimination, a hostile work 25 environment (or “harassment”), and constructively discharged. (ECF No. 1, p. 2). Additionally, 26 he alleges that he was retaliated against and “the union,” presumably meaning Defendant, did not 27 fairly represent him. (Id.). In the event Plaintiff amends his complaint, the Court provides the 28 following legal standards for federal causes of action, which may be relevant to his action: 1 1. Discrimination 2 Plaintiff alleges that he was “discriminated against because of race.” (ECF No. 1, p. 2). To 3 establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination (known as “disparate treatment”) under 4 Title VII, a plaintiff must show that: “(1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified 5 for his position; (3) he experienced an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated 6 individuals outside his protected class were treated more favorably, or other circumstances 7 surrounding the adverse employment action give rise to an inference of discrimination.” Peterson 8 v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 2004). While plaintiffs are not required to 9 plead a prima facie case at the screening stage, courts may review the allegations in light of the prima facie elements to determine whether a plaintiff either sufficiently pleads an element of the 10 prima facie case or provides enough factual allegations that can lead the court to plausibly infer 11 each element of the prima facie case. Thomas v. Sec’y of The United States Dep’t of Veterans 12 Affs., No. CV2102433JAKRAO, 2021 WL 2593643, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 19, 2021), report and 13 recommendation adopted, No. CV2102433JAKRAO, 2021 WL 2590160 (C.D. Cal. June 23, 14 2021) (internal citations omitted). 15 2. Hostile work environment/Constructive Discharge 16 Plaintiff also alleges that he faced harassment “due to his race.” (ECF No. 1, p. 2). To 17 establish a prima facie case of a hostile work environment under Title VII, a plaintiff must show 18 that (1) because of his race, (2) he was subjected to unwelcome conduct, (3) that was sufficiently 19 severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of his employment and create an abusive work 20 environment. Campbell v. Hawaii Dep’t of Educ., 892 F.3d 1005, 1016 (9th Cir. 2018). 21 Plaintiff’s complaints of “constructive discharge” relate to his allegations of a hostile 22 work environment. (ECF No. 1, p. 2). “Like a hostile work environment claim, a claim for 23 constructive discharge usually results from a series of discriminatory actions on the part of the 24 employer that are in the nature of a continuing violation: A constructive discharge occurs when a 25 person quits his job under circumstances in which a reasonable person would feel that the 26 conditions of employment have become intolerable.” Draper v. Coeur Rochester, Inc., 147 F.3d 27 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 1998). To establish constructive discharge, a “plaintiff must make a further 28 1 showing” beyond a hostile-work-environment claim, establishing “that the abusive working 2 environment became so intolerable that her resignation qualified as a fitting response.” 3 Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 134 (2004). 4 3. Retaliation 5 Plaintiff also alleges that he was “subjected to different terms and conditions of 6 employment, denied job referrals/assignments, and discharged in retaliation for filing the 7 complaint with the EEOC.” (ECF No. 1, p. 2). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under 8 Title VII, a plaintiff must show that: “(1) he engaged in a protected activity; (2) he suffered an 9 adverse employment decision; and (3) there was a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse employment decision.” Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1064 (9th 10 Cir. 2002). 11 4. Breach of duty of fair representation 12 Lastly, Plaintiff states that “the union did not represent him fairly and in good faith.” (ECF 13 No. 1, p. 2). “The duty of fair representation is a judicially established rule imposed on labor 14 organizations because of their status as the exclusive bargaining representative for all of the 15 employees in a given bargaining unit.” Peterson v. Kennedy, 771 F.2d 1244, 1253 (9th Cir. 1985); 16 DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 164 n.14 (1983) (“The duty of fair 17 representation exists because it is the policy of the National Labor Relations Act to allow a single 18 labor organization to represent collectively the interests of all employees within a unit, thereby 19 depriving individuals in the unit of the ability to bargain individually or to select a minority union 20 as their representative.”). And “in order to hold that union conduct breached the duty of fair 21 representation, [a court] must determine either that the union conduct at issue is a discriminatory 22 or bad faith exercise of judgment, or is an arbitrary (meaning wholly irrational, inexplicable, or 23 unintentional) action that substantially injured an employee.” Beck v. United Food & Com. 24 Workers Union, Loc. 99, 506 F.3d 874, 880 (9th Cir. 2007). Further, to show that a “union’s 25 exercise of judgment was discriminatory, a plaintiff must adduce ‘substantial evidence of 26 discrimination that is intentional, severe, and unrelated to legitimate union objectives.”’ Id. 27 (quoting Amalgamated Ass’n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Emp. of Am. v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 28 1 274, 301 (1971)). 2 IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 3 The Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state any cognizable claims. 4 Under Rule 15(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “the court should freely give 5 leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Accordingly, the Court will provide Plaintiff with time to file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified above. Lopez v. Smith, 203 6 F.3d 1122, 1126-30 (9th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint 7 within thirty days. 8 If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, the amended complaint must allege 9 violations under the law as discussed above. Plaintiff should note that although he has been given 10 the opportunity to amend, it is not for the purpose of changing the nature of this suit or adding 11 unrelated claims. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no “buckshot” complaints). 12 Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint, Lacey v. 13 Maricopa County, 693 F.3d. 896, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), and must be complete in 14 itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleading, Local Rule 220. Therefore, in an 15 amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each 16 defendant must be sufficiently alleged. The amended complaint should be clearly and boldly 17 titled “First Amended Complaint,” refer to the appropriate case number, and be an original signed 18 under penalty of perjury. 19 Alternatively, Plaintiff may choose to stand on this complaint, in which case the Court 20 will issue findings and recommendations to the District judge recommending dismissal of the 21 action consistent with this order. 22 Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that: 23 1. The Clerk of Court is directed to send Plaintiff a complaint for employment discrimination form (Form - Pro Se 7); 24 2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall either: 25 a. File a First Amended Complaint; or 26 b. Notify the Court in writing that he wants to stand on his complaint. 27 28 1 3. Should Plaintiff choose to amend his complaint, Plaintiff shall caption the 2 amended complaint “First Amended Complaint” and refer to the case number 3 1:22-cv-00241-JLT-EPG; and 4 4. Failure to comply with this order may result in the dismissal of this action 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. | Dated: _ March 23, 2022 [see hey UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28