Rice v. County of Lassen ( 2022 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 BRENT RICE, et al., No. 2:20-cv-02427-TLN-KJN 12 Plaintiffs, 13 v. ORDER 14 COUNTY OF LASSEN, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 This matter is before the Court on Defendants County of Lassen (“County”), Kelley Cote, 18 Elizabeth Krier (“Krier”), and Tricia Diamond’s (“Diamond”) (collectively, “Defendants”) 19 Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 7.) Plaintiffs Brent Rice (“Rice”) and A.R. (collectively, 20 “Plaintiffs”) filed an opposition. (ECF No. 9.) Defendants filed a reply. (ECF No. 11.) For the 21 reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion. 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1 2 A.R. suffers from autism. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) In February 2014, when A.R. was 12 years 3 old, police responded to her mother’s report of domestic violence based on a verbal disagreement 4 between A.R. and her mother. (Id.) During the investigation, A.R. accused her father, Rice, of 5 sexually molesting her. (Id.) The police forwarded the report to the district attorney. (Id.) 6 Although no criminal charge or dependency proceeding ensued, Krier, a County social worker, 7 verbally threatened to remove A.R. to a foster home if Rice visited her. (Id.) Thereafter, Rice 8 maintained contact with A.R. by telephone. (Id. at 6.) 9 In May 2018, Krier filed a declaration in support of a warrant to remove A.R. from her 10 mother’s home. (Id. at 5.) The declaration stated that Rice “has not had custody of the child in 11 many years and is believed to not have been in contact with the child.” (Id.) Plaintiffs allege this 12 statement was false as Rice had joint custody rights and maintained contact with A.R. by 13 telephone after being warned not to visit her. (Id. at 5–6.) Plaintiffs also allege the declaration 14 failed to disclose either Krier’s 2014 removal threat or Rice’s desire and ability to care for A.R. 15 (Id. at 6.) After learning of the warrant’s existence, Rice informed Krier he would care for A.R. 16 and that her mother would so consent. (Id.) 17 A week later, the County filed a juvenile dependency petition as to A.R., verified by 18 Krier, which did not mention Rice. (Id. at 7.) Krier later prepared a detention report that stated 19 A.R. had no relatives to consider for placement. (Id.) Plaintiffs allege this statement was false as 20 A.R. had relatives willing to step in that were never contacted. (Id.) Because of the alleged 21 misrepresentations and omissions, the juvenile court approved A.R.’s continuing detention, 22 resulting in her placement at a group home, Paradise Oaks Youth Services (“Paradise Oaks”). 23 (Id. at 7–8.) While at Paradise Oaks, A.R. was not enrolled in school and was given overly high 24 doses of daily medication. (Id. at 8.) Rice called Krier, who indicated that he needed a court 25 order to lower the doses. (Id.) The group home also provided A.R. with sexual education, for 26 which she was unprepared. (Id.) 27 28 1 This statement of facts is taken, sometimes verbatim, from the Complaint. (ECF No. 1.) 1 After months of separation, the juvenile court determined Rice to be a suitable parent and 2 recommended he receive physical custody. (Id.) At a subsequent meeting with Rice, Krier said 3 she had received information that Rice supplied A.R. with marijuana and supervisor Diamond 4 demanded A.R. undergo a drug test, which proved negative, yet subsequent social worker reports 5 did not disclose the test result. (Id.) In December 2018, the juvenile court awarded A.R.’s legal 6 and physical custody to Rice. (Id. at 9.) 7 On December 8, 2020, Plaintiffs filed the instant Complaint, which alleges: (1) a 42 8 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”) claim based on the violation of Plaintiffs’ rights to familial association 9 and fabrication of evidence under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment against Krier and 10 Diamond; (2) a Monell claim for fabrication of evidence, unlawful removal, and failure to train 11 against the County and its social workers; (3) a § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act claim against all 12 Defendants; and (4) a Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) claim against all 13 Defendants. (Id. at 9–17.) On February 26, 2021, Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims 14 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 7.) 15 II. STANDARD OF LAW 16 A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under 17 Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th 18 Cir. 2001). Rule 8(a) requires that a pleading contain “a short and plain statement of the claim 19 showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 20 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009). Under notice pleading in federal court, the complaint must “give 21 the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell 22 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citation and quotations omitted). 23 “This simplified notice pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment 24 motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims.” Swierkiewicz 25 v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002). 26 On a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true. 27 Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). A court must give the plaintiff the benefit of every 28 reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded” allegations of the complaint. Retail 1 Clerks Int’l Ass’n v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). A plaintiff need not allege 2 “‘specific facts’ beyond those necessary to state his claim and the grounds showing entitlement to 3 relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (internal citation omitted). 4 Nevertheless, a court “need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of 5 factual allegations.” U.S. ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986). 6 While Rule 8(a) does not require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an 7 unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A 8 pleading is insufficient if it offers mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the 9 elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 10 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 11 statements, do not suffice.”). Thus, “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences 12 are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss” for failure to state a claim. Adams v. Johnson, 355 13 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Moreover, it is inappropriate to assume the 14 plaintiff “can prove facts that it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated the . . . laws 15 in ways that have not been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State 16 Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). 17 Ultimately, a court may not dismiss a complaint in which the plaintiff has alleged “enough 18 facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim 19 has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 20 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 21 678. While the plausibility requirement is not akin to a probability requirement, it demands more 22 than “a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. This plausibility inquiry is “a 23 context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and 24 common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, only where a plaintiff fails to “nudge [his or her] claims . . . 25 across the line from conceivable to plausible[,]” is the complaint properly dismissed. Id. at 680. 26 If a complaint fails to state a plausible claim, “a district court should grant leave to amend 27 even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could 28 not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th 1 Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)); see also 2 Gardner v. Martino, 563 F.3d 981, 992 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding no abuse of discretion in denying 3 leave to amend when amendment would be futile). 4 III. ANALYSIS 5 Defendants move to dismiss each of Plaintiffs’ claims. (ECF No. 7-1.) The Court will 6 address Plaintiffs’ claims in turn. 7 A. Claims One and Two 8 Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim (Claim One) for “violation of their 9 rights to familial association” and “fabrication of evidence” because: (1) no relationship 10 interference is alleged; and (2) allegations about the warrant application and detention report are 11 incomplete. (ECF No. 7-1 at 11–17.) Defendants also argue that to the extent Plaintiffs allege 12 Krier interfered with Plaintiffs’ father-daughter association in 2014 by threatening to place A.R. 13 in foster care if Rice continued to visit, such claims are time-barred. (Id. at 11.) 14 In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that prior to Defendants’ involvement, Rice enjoyed joint 15 legal and physical custody of A.R. and he was denied the right to live with, visit with, and spend 16 time with A.R. when Krier threatened him in 2014. (ECF No. 9 at 16 (citing ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 16– 17 18).) Plaintiffs do not address Defendants’ argument that claims based on the 2014 threat are 18 time-barred, nor do they address Defendants’ argument that allegations relating to the warrant 19 application and detention report are incomplete. 20 “[C]laims brought under § 1983 are subject to the forum state’s statute of limitations for 21 personal injury suits.” Flynt v. Shimazu, 940 F.3d 457, 461 (9th Cir. 2019). “California’s statute 22 of limitations for personal injury actions is two years.” Wheeler v. City of Santa Clara, 894 F.3d 23 1046, 1059 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Code of Civil Procedure § 335.1). 24 In the instant case, Plaintiffs filed the Complaint on December 8, 2020. (ECF No. 1.) 25 Plaintiffs seem to base Claim One on conduct that took place before December 8, 2018. (See 26 ECF No. 9 at 16 (citing ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 16–21, 26–30).) Absent argument to the contrary, the 27 Court concludes claims based on these allegations are time-barred. 28 /// 1 Plaintiffs also assert a Monell claim (Claim Two) against the County. (ECF No. 1 at 10.) 2 To bring a Monell claim against a municipality, a plaintiff must establish “the local government 3 had a deliberate policy, custom, or practice that was the ‘moving force’ behind the constitutional 4 violation [he] suffered.” Whitaker v. Garcetti, 486 F.3d 572, 581 (9th Cir. 2007). In the instant 5 case, Plaintiffs have failed to establish an underlying constitutional violation. “[A] 6 municipality . . . [cannot] be held liable under § 1983 where no injury or constitutional violation 7 has occurred.” Jackson v. City of Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646, 653 (9th Cir. 2001). 8 Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Claims One and Two with 9 leave to amend. 10 B. Claims Three and Four 11 Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ disability-related claims because: (1) Plaintiffs fail 12 to allege affirmative participation by Defendants; (2) individuals are not proper Defendants under 13 the Rehabilitation Act or ADA; (3) Plaintiffs do not allege federal funds were used to pay the 14 group home; (4) Plaintiffs fail to allege A.R. was able to handle normal or special education 15 classes; (5) Plaintiffs fail to allege deliberate discrimination; and (6) neither the provision of 16 sexual education nor higher doses of medication qualify as a program exclusion or benefit denial. 17 (ECF No. 7-1 at 23–24.) 18 To establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination under Title II of the ADA, a 19 plaintiff must prove: (1) she is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) she was either excluded 20 from participation in or denied the benefits of a public entity’s services, programs, or activities, or 21 was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) such exclusion, denial of 22 benefits, or discrimination was by reason of her disability. Weinreich v. L.A. Cty. Metro. Transp. 23 Auth., 114 F.3d 976, 978 (9th Cir. 1997). A prima facie case under the Rehabilitation Act has 24 similar elements, except that the plaintiff must also prove that the program at issue receives 25 federal financial assistance. Duvall v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1135 (9th Cir. 2001). 26 Plaintiffs, who are represented by counsel, fail to respond to most of Defendants’ 27 arguments in a meaningful way. (See ECF No. 9 at 20–23.) For example, Plaintiffs fail to 28 address Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs cannot bring ADA or Rehabilitation Act claims 1 | against individual Defendants. (See id.); see Everett H. v. Dry Creek Joint Elementary Sch. Dist., 2 | 5 F. Supp. 3d 1167, 1181 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (dismissing ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims 3 | brought against individual school administrators); A. A. P. v. Sierra Plumas Joint Unified Sch. 4 | Dist., No. 2:19-cv-00882-TLN-CKD, 2021 WL 847812, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2021) (same). 5 | As another example, Plaintiffs do not provide case law or sufficiently explain how A.R.’s 6 || overmedication and participation in sexual education classes constitutes exclusion, denial of 7 | benefits, or discrimination. (See ECF No. 9 at 20-23.) Nor do Plaintiffs point to allegations that 8 || suggest any exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of A.R.’s disability. 9 | (See id.) Indeed, Plaintiffs offer only conclusory allegations that Defendants acted “intentionally 10 | and/or with deliberate indifference.” (ECF No. | at 16.) It is also unclear whether Plaintiffs 11 | adequately allege the relevant program receives federal funding as required for a Rehabilitation 12 || Act claim. Based on Plaintiffs’ deficient briefing — which lacks case law, analysis, and 13 clarity — the Court cannot say that Plaintiffs have alleged plausible claims under the ADA or 14 | Rehabilitation Act. 15 As such, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Claims Three and Four with 16 | leave to amend. 17 IV. CONCLUSION 18 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss with leave 19 | toamend. (ECF No. 7.) Plaintiffs shall file an amended complaint not later than (30) days from 20 | the electronic filing date of this Order. Defendants shall file a responsive pleading to the 21 | amended complaint within twenty-one (21) days from the electronic filing date of the amended 22 | complaint. 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. Ay /) 24 | DATED: October 31, 2022 \ } jf “ / } ArAaPhW 25 sae A 6 Troy L. Nunley } United States District Judge 27 28