(PC) Mills v. Jones ( 2022 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 THOMAS K. MILLS, Case No. 1:21-cv-01193-DAD-HBK 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS TO APPOINT COUNSEL 13 v. (Doc. No. 65, 68) 14 I.Z. JONES, J. RIVERA, 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 Pending before the Court are a series of repeat motions from Plaintiff including two 19 motions to appoint counsel filed nine days apart.1 (Doc. Nos. 65, 68). Plaintiff previously filed a 20 first motion to appoint counsel on September 30, 2021, which the Court denied. (Doc. Nos. 10, 21 14). On February 9, 2022, Plaintiff filed this, his second motion requesting appointment of 22 counsel, and, before this Court ruled on Plaintiff’s second motion to appoint counsel, Plaintiff 23 filed his third motion requesting appointment of counsel on February 18, 2022. (Doc. Nos. 65, 24 1 Just since January 3, 2022, Plaintiff has filed 14 motions. Plaintiff has filed the same or similar motions multiple 25 times, including the two motions to appoint counsel which are subject to this Order. Motions filed by Plaintiff include but are not limited to a motion to amend his complaint filed on January 3, 2022 (this would be Plaintiff’s second amendment of his complaint) (Doc. No. 53); motion to compel discovery filed on February 8, 2022 (Doc. No. 26 64); a second motion to appoint counsel filed on February 9, 2022 (Doc. No. 65); a third motion requesting the appointment of counsel filed on February 18, 2022 (Doc. No. 68); a motion to amend the complaint filed on February 27 24, 2022 (Doc. No. 71); a motion requesting CT scan records filed on March 21, 2022 (Doc. No. 75); a motion to enter a letter into the record filed on March 28, 2022 (Doc. No. 76); and a motion to compel discovery filed on March 28 30, 2022 (Doc. No. 77). 1 68). 2 Plaintiff’s two motions are duplicative in asserting the grounds upon which he seeks 3 appointment of counsel: (1) he is unable to afford an attorney; (2) his imprisonment makes 4 litigation more difficult; (3) he has limited knowledge of the law and limited law library access, 5 and this case is complex; (4) conflicting testimony may be presented at trial; and (5) he has been 6 unable to independently secure an attorney. (Doc. Nos. 65 at 1-2, 68 at 1-2). Plaintiff raised 7 these grounds in his previous motion, which the Court found did not warrant exceptional 8 circumstances to appoint Plaintiff counsel. (See Doc. Nos. 10, 14). The Court finds no changed 9 circumstances to warrant appointment of counsel and will not continue to reiterate the law and its 10 reasons for denying appointment of counsel. Instead, the Court incorporates the reasons and law 11 set forth in the Court’s October 6, 2021, Order as through set out at length herein. (Doc. No. 14). 12 VEXATIOUS LITIGANT CAUTION WARNING 13 As discussed supra, Plaintiff has filed numerous motions which are duplicative, were 14 previously denied by this Court, do not assert changed circumstances, or are premature. See 15 generally docket. Again, as discussed supra, Plaintiff filed 14 motions between January 3, 2022, 16 and March 31, 2022. See generally docket. Some of the motions filed are on the same subject 17 matter and were filed a mere few days apart. (See Doc. Nos. 65, 68) (duplicative motions to 18 appoint counsel filed nine days apart); (see also Doc Nos. 64, 77) (motions to compel discovery); 19 cf. (Doc. Nos. 50, 58) (where this Court denied Plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery because it 20 was improper and premature since no Discovery and Scheduling Order was issued). 21 A district court has the power under the All-Writs Act to place certain requirements on 22 individuals who have lengthy histories of abusive litigation. See 28 U.S.C. § 1651. Federal 23 courts may “regulate the activities of abusive litigants by imposing carefully tailored restrictions 24 under . . . appropriate circumstances.” Ringgold-Lockhart v. County of Los Angeles, 761 F.3d 25 1057, 1061 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting DeLong v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 1990)). 26 “Flagrant abuse of the judicial process cannot be tolerated because it enables one person to 27 preempt the use of judicial time that properly could be used to consider the meritorious claims of 28 other litigants.” DeLong, 912 F.3d at 1148; see also Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 1 | F.3d 1047, 1057 (9th Cir. 2007). “Any individual representing himself or herself without an 2 | attorney is bound by the Federal Rules of Civil or Criminal Procedure, these Rules, and all other 3 | applicable laws. All obligations placed on “counsel” by these Rules apply to individuals 4 | appearing in propria persona. Failure to comply therewith may be ground for dismissal, judgment 5 || by default, or any other sanction appropriate under these Rules.” L.R. 183 (2022). 6 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Local Rules, and other legal obligations 7 | discussed supra apply to Plaintiff. Plaintiff's pro se status is not and excuse to ignore the Court’s 8 || repeated warnings, violate various rules; instead, Plaintiff is expected to abide by them. See L.R. 9 | 183 (2022). Plaintiff is cautioned because of his litigious behaviour—filing duplicative motions, 10 | filing premature motions, filing duplicative motions a few days apart, filing motions that have 11 little to no success on the merits, and filing improper motions—he is on the verge of being 12 | sanctioned, and if Plaintiff continues his litigious behaviour, the Court will be forced to sanction 13 | him with a recommendation that the district court dismiss this action. 14 Accordingly, it is ORDERED: 15 Plaintiff's motions to appoint counsel (Doc. Nos. 65, 68) are DENIED. 16 '7 | Dated: _ March 31. 2022 Mile. Wh fareh Zaskth 18 HELENA M. BARCH-KUCHTA 9 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28