(PC) Norris v. Youngblood ( 2023 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 URIE NORRIS, ) Case No.: 1:21-cv-0904 JLT HBK ) 12 Plaintiff, ) ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO ) ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO 13 v. ) FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 59(e) ) 14 DONNY YOUNGBLOOD, et al., ) (Doc. 33) 15 Defendants. ) ) 16 17 The Court entered judgment in this matter on May 12, 2023, following the Court’s dismissal of 18 Plaintiff’s claims for failure to prosecute. (Docs. 29, 31, 32.) Plaintiff now moves to “set aside” the 19 May 12, 2023 order. (Doc. 33 at 2.) Because the motion was filed within 28 days of the final 20 judgment being challenged, the Court construes the motion as made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 21 Procedure 59(e) to modify the judgment. (Id.) 22 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) permits a party to move a court to alter or amend its 23 judgment. “A district court may grant a Rule 59(e) motion if it ‘is presented with newly discovered 24 evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the controlling law.’” Wood v. 25 Ryan, 759 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks, citation omitted). Reconsideration 26 is an “extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of judicial 27 resources.” Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000). Ultimately, 28 whether to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration is in the “sound discretion” of the district 1 court. Navajo Nation v. Norris, 331 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Kona, 229 F.3d at 883). A 2 Rule 59(e) motion “may not be used to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence 3 that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 4 486 n. 5 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). 5 Plaintiff does not dispute the underlying facts and analysis concerning his failure to prosecute 6 thus action, which formed the basis of the Court’s order. (See generally Doc. 33.) Rather, Plaintiff 7 appears to challenge the order on the erroneous belief that the undersigned is the magistrate judge and 8 improperly entered a dispositive order in his case. (Id. at 1.) In fact, Judge Helena Barch-Kuchta is the 9 assigned magistrate judge in this matter. Though Plaintiff consented to U.S. Magistrate Judge 10 jurisdiction (Doc. 14), the magistrate judge may not “order the entry of judgment” in a case until all 11 parties have consented. See 28 U.S.C. 636(c). Because no defendant was served or consented to U.S. 12 Magistrate Judge jurisdiction, the magistrate judge was not authorized to order entry of judgment. 13 Accordingly, the undersigned, as the District Judge, issued the order adopting the Findings and 14 Recommendations and dismissed this case for failure to prosecute. 15 Plaintiff also contends the Court made “several concrete and objective errors” in adopting the 16 F&Rs for failure to prosecute. (Doc. 33 at 1-2.) Plaintiff points to Court’s prior observation that 17 Plaintiff’s motion filed April 25, 2023 “purports to have been prepared by an attorney, Roger 18 Lampkin.” (Id. at 1.) Regardless, this observation—because Plaintiff’s motion requested the Court to 19 send all court records to Mr. Lampkin, and the fact that Lampkin is a licensed attorney—was not 20 material to the Court’s decision and cannot therefore be a basis for reversing the Court’s order. See 21 E.D. Cal. R. 230(j)) (requiring movant to set forth “material facts” warranting reconsideration). 22 Next, Plaintiff appears to disagree with the denial of his requests for an extension of time and 23 for copies of his court documents. (See Doc. 33 at 1-2.) However, mere disagreement with a Court’s 24 ruling is insufficient to warrant reconsideration. Cromer v. Songer, 2016 WL 3351408, *1 (E.D. Cal. 25 June 15, 2016); see Collins v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 252 F.Supp.2d 936, 938 (D. Ariz. 2003) (a motion 26 for reconsideration cannot be used to ask the Court to rethink what the Court has already 27 considered merely because a party disagrees with the Court’s decision); see also Leong v. Hilton Hotels 28 Corp., 689 F.Supp. 1572, 1573 (D. Haw. 1988) (mere disagreement with a previous order is an 1 || insufficient basis for reconsideration). More importantly, Plaintiff does not directly address the 2 || underlying basis for the dismissal: his failure to respond to Judge Barch-Kuchta’s Screening Order 3 || finding his initial Complaint failed to state a claim. (Doc. 29 at 2; Doc. 31 at 1.) 4 Plaintiff failed to present newly discovered evidence, show the Court committed clear error, o 5 || argue an intervening change in controlling law that would necessitate alteration or amendment of the 6 || judgment. Wood, 759 F.3d at 1121. Rather, Plaintiff merely disputes the findings of the Court and 7 renews arguments previously rejected by the Court, which is insufficient to support the relief □□□□□□□ 8 || See Gates v. Colvin, 2017 WL 8220232, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2017) (‘Mere disagreement with thi 9 || result does not justify the filing of a Rule 59(e) motion.”) (citing U.S. ex rel. Becker v. Westinghouse 10 || Savannah River Co., 305 F.3d 284, 290 (4th Cir. 2002)). Accordingly, the Court ORDERS: Plaintiff 11 || “motion to set aside JLT order” (Doc. 33), construed as a motion for relief under Rule 59(e), is 12 || DENIED. 13 14 IS SO ORDERED. 15 || Dated: _ July 17, 2023 ( LAW pA L. wan 16 TED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28