Beeman v. Cruz ( 2022 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ----oo0oo---- 11 12 LINDA BEEMAN, No. 2:21-cv-01774 WBS DB 13 Plaintiff, 14 v. ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 15 JOHN CRUZ and J. CARDOZA, individually and as employees of 16 the AMADOR COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT; COUNTY OF AMADOR; 17 and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, 18 Defendants. 19 20 ----oo0oo---- 21 22 This matter is back before the court on defendants’ 23 motion to dismiss plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint. Whereas 24 in the original Complaint plaintiff alleged violations of her 25 Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, in the First 26 Amended Complaint she alleges only violations of her Fourth 27 Amendment rights and right to “due process”. (First Amended 28 Complaint (“FAC”) at ¶¶ 30-31 (Docket No. 12).) 1 II. Discussion 2 A. Municipal Liability 3 The First Amended Complaint names Amador County as a 4 defendant but appears to assert no claim for municipal liability. 5 (See id.) In her opposition, plaintiff indicates that she does 6 not seek to establish municipal liability against the County but 7 rather seeks to establish supervisory liability against Cardoza. 8 (Opp. at 8-9 (Docket No. 15).) The court will therefore grant 9 defendants’ motion to dismiss as to the County. 10 B. Unreasonable Execution of Warrant 11 In its previous Order, the court evaluated whether 12 plaintiff’s complaint stated a claim for unreasonable execution 13 of warrant, based on allegations detailing damage to plaintiff’s 14 property incurred during execution of two warrants at her home. 15 (See Order at 5-7 (Docket No. 9).) The cour5t held that this 16 claim was fatally defective because, although the original 17 complaint described the damage done to plaintiff’s property, it 18 did not allege which officers caused that damage. (Id. at 6-7 19 (citing Hydrick v. Hunter, 669 F.3d 937, 942 (9th Cir. 2012)).) 20 However, at oral argument addressing the current motion, counsel 21 for plaintiff appeared to suggest that he did not believe such a 22 claim had merit and thus did not in fact intend to pursue it in 23 the First Amended Complaint. 24 Moreover, the only new and relevant allegation in 25 plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is that “Cruz had secured the 26 warrant and was in charge of the execution of the warrant.” (FAC 27 at ¶ 11.) It does not allege that Cruz, or any other 28 individual(s), personally caused the damage. (See id.) Although 1 plaintiff argues that Cruz was “the lead officer on execution of 2 the warrant,” (Opp. at 11 (capital typeface omitted)), Cruz’s 3 mere presence during the warrant execution is insufficient, as 4 there is no vicarious liability under § 1983. See Ashcroft v. 5 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (“Because vicarious liability is 6 inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that 7 each [ ]official defendant, through the official’s own individual 8 actions, has violated the Constitution.”). Because personal 9 participation must be alleged to state a claim under § 1983, see 10 id.; Hydrick, 669 F.3d at 942, plaintiff’s unreasonable execution 11 claim must be dismissed.1 12 C. Malicious Prosecution 13 Plaintiff asserts a claim based on the filing of 14 charges against her, prompted by defendants, which caused her to 15 spend 13 days in jail. (FAC at ¶¶ 15-18.) In its previous 16 Order, the court dismissed plaintiff’s malicious prosecution 17 claim on the ground that she failed to allege facts indicating 18 that defendants overrode the judgment of the District Attorney, 19 who under Ninth Circuit law is presumed to have independently 20 determined the existence of probable cause. (Order at 7-8 21 (quoting Smiddy v. Varney, 803 F.2d 1469, 1471 (9th Cir. 1986); 22 23 1 In her opposition, plaintiff challenges the notion that she must, at the pleading stage, present “evidence of who did 24 what damage.” (See Opp. at 11.) Indeed, plaintiff is not required to prove the truth of her claims at this stage; rather, 25 to survive a motion to dismiss, she need only provide allegations of fact that, if true, would demonstrate the merit of her claims. 26 See Navarro, 250 F.3d at 732; Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 27 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). To do so, she is required to allege which individual defendants caused the damage she challenges. 28 She has not done so here. 1 Beck v. City of Upland, 527 F.3d 853, 862-63 (9th Cir. 2008)).) 2 The court noted that this presumption may be rebutted in 3 circumstances where, inter alia, “the prosecutor . . . was given 4 false information” or “the officers otherwise engaged in wrongful 5 or bad faith conduct that was actively instrumental in causing 6 the initiation of legal proceedings.” (Id. at 8 (quoting Beck, 7 527 F.3d at 862-63) (internal quotation marks omitted).) 8 In the First Amended Complaint, plaintiff alleges that 9 Cruz omitted from his report information suggesting she had 10 innocent intentions in wiring money to her son. (FAC at ¶ 16.)2 11 She alleges that Cruz presented “false evidence” to the District 12 Attorney, obscuring this information, leading to the decision to 13 charge her. (Id. at ¶ 21; see Opp. at 14, 18.) 14 Even assuming that these allegations standing alone 15 might be sufficient to rebut the presumption of prosecutorial 16 independence, plaintiff’s claim cannot succeed because, as the 17 court previously noted, plaintiff and defendants have both 18 acknowledged that, at a May 10, 2021 preliminary hearing, the 19 magistrate was told about Anthony Adams’ statement to Cruz and 20 nevertheless ordered plaintiff held over for trial. (Order at 21 8.) Therefore, omission of this information cannot have caused 22 plaintiff to be improperly incarcerated for 13 days, as that 23 24 2 Specifically, plaintiff alleges that she wired $200 to her son, Jerry Adams, to enable him to return to Jackson, 25 California, to turn himself in to authorities. (FAC at ¶¶ 15- 16.) She alleges that in a report submitted to the District 26 Attorney, however, Cruz erroneously stated that she had sent 27 Adams the money to help Adams avoid apprehension, and that Cruz failed to rectify this error after being informed of plaintiff’s 28 true intentions. (Id. at ¶¶ 13, 15.) 1 information was in fact before the state court when the 2 magistrate ordered plaintiff’s incarceration. See Johnson v. 3 Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (§ 1983 liability 4 requires causal link between defendant’s conduct and alleged 5 violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights).3 Because 6 plaintiff cannot show Cruz caused her to suffer a constitutional 7 violation, her malicious prosecution claim must be dismissed.4 8 D. Supervisory Liability 9 Plaintiff also seeks to establish that Cardoza is 10 liable as a supervisor for his role in the alleged violations of 11 her constitutional rights. (FAC at ¶¶ 11, 15, 17, 23.) “A 12 supervisory official is liable under § 1983 so long as ‘there 13 exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the 14 constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection 15 between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional 16 violation.’” Rodriguez v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 891 F.3d 776, 17 798 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 18 1242-43 (9th Cir. 2018)). The existence of an underlying 19 constitutional violation is thus a necessary predicate to a 20 finding of supervisory liability. See id. As explained, 21 22 3 Plaintiff argues that the magistrate’s probable cause determination at the May 10 preliminary hearing was negated when 23 the charges against her were dismissed during a subsequent hearing on June 18, 2021. (See Opp. at 14-17.) Even assuming 24 this is correct, however, it does not explain how Cruz’s conduct could have caused plaintiff to be incarcerated during the 25 intervening period -- notwithstanding the magistrate’s awareness of Anthony Adams’ statement to Cruz -- as explained above. 26 27 4 Because the court concludes plaintiff’s allegations fail to demonstrate causation, it does not reach the parties’ 28 arguments regarding issue preclusion. nee nen nnn nen enn nnn nnn nn nn ne enn eID OE 1 however, the First Amended Complaint fails to state a claim 2 either for unreasonable execution of warrant or for malicious 3 | prosecution. It thus also necessarily fails to state a claim for 4 supervisory liability, which must therefore be dismissed. 5 EB. Due Process 6 Finally, the First Amended Complaint includes a lone 7 allegation that defendants deprived plaintiff of her right to 8 “due process.” (FAC at J 30.) It does not elaborate on how 9 defendants’ actions deprived her of due process, however. Nor 10 does plaintiff explain this claim in her opposition, to the 11 extent that she means for it to be distinct from the claims 12 discussed above, (see Opp.), and counsel for plaintiff did not 13 address it at oral argument. Because the court is unable to 14 otherwise identify a basis for this claim, it will be dismissed. 15 See Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). 16 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion to 17 dismiss plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (Docket No. 13-1) be, 18 and the same hereby is, GRANTED.° 19 | Dated: April 11, 2022 bitten th. 2d. beE—~ 50 WILLIAM B. SHUBB UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 21 22 ° At oral argument, the parties agreed that, at the May 2021 hearing, the magistrate was aware Cruz had been told that 23 plaintiff’s intentions were innocent when wiring $200 to her son, and that the magistrate nonetheless ordered plaintiff to be held 24 over for trial. Because, as explained above, the magistrate’s informed decision precludes liability for malicious prosecution 29 against the initiating officers, the court concludes that this 26 claim “could not be saved by any amendment.” In re Daou Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 2005). Because the claim for 27 supervisory liability is derivative of the malicious prosecution claim, the same is true for it as well. Accordingly, the court 28 | will not grant further leave to amend. See id.