Sacramento Suburban Water District v. 3M Company ( 2022 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 1] Sacramento Suburban Water District, No. 2:22-cv-01005-KJM-JDP 12 Plaintiff, ORDER 13 v. 14 The 3M Company, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 Plaintiff Sacramento Suburban Water District (the District) brings this water 19 | contamination action against defendants the 3M Company, E. I. Du Pont De Nemours and 20 | Company (Du Pont), and the Chemours Company. 3M moves to dismiss this action for lack of 21 | personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. Du Pont and Chemours move to dismiss for lack 22 | of personal jurisdiction. Because there are insufficient facts to determine whether this court can 23 | exercise personal jurisdiction over defendants, the court grants the District’s request for 24 | jurisdictional discovery. Given that the court’s jurisdiction over defendants remains unsettled, 25 | the court denies without prejudice defendants’ motions to dismiss. 26 | I. BACKGROUND 27 The District is a public drinking water provider that owns and operates drinking water 28 | wells across Sacramento County. Compl. § 12, ECF No. 1. Those wells have been contaminated 1 with toxic per- and poly-fluoroalkyl substances (PFAS). Id. ¶ 1. PFAS chemicals, often called 2 “forever chemicals,” have special characteristics that cause extensive environmental 3 contamination. Id. ¶¶ 3, 38–39. They are mobile, soluble, and migrate long distances, but “they 4 do not readily biodegrade or chemically degrade in the environment” or even in conventional 5 treatment systems. Id. ¶ 38. These features make them difficult and expensive to remove. Id. In 6 turn, their omnipresence has resulted in the bioaccumulation of PFAS in people, which is linked 7 to a variety of serious public health impacts including kidney cancer and pregnancy 8 complications. Id. ¶¶ 39–42. 9 Although the District identifies 32 specific types of PFAS chemicals involved in this 10 lawsuit, there are more than 3,000 kinds of PFAS, including PFOA, PFOS, and PFHxS.1 Id. 11 ¶¶ 35–36. This “entirely manmade” family of chemicals has been used for decades in a variety of 12 household and commercial products. Id. ¶ 37. PFAS have been incorporated into “dental floss, 13 furniture and carpet coatings, food wrappers, household and commercial pesticides, nonstick 14 pans, clothing,” and other products. Id. Because PFAS have such widespread uses, they can 15 enter the environment from industrial manufacturing facilities, consumer and commercial 16 applications, and after disposal in landfills. Id. ¶¶ 42–44. 17 Defendants are chemical companies that designed, manufactured, marketed, and sold 18 PFAS and products containing PFAS. Id. ¶ 7. Since the 1940s, 3M was the primary 19 manufacturer of PFAS in the United States and marketed PFOA and PFOS in a variety of 20 products including its Scotchgard brand of stain repellant. Id. ¶ 51. 3M operates four 21 manufacturing plants in California, three of which have manufactured PFAS products. Id. ¶ 13. 22 Since 1951, Du Pont produced and sold polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE) products, which required 23 the use of PFOA for production. Id. ¶ 55. Du Pont marketed these products under the “Teflon” 24 trade name. Id. Du Pont used its PTFE in a variety of products, including a sprayable coating, a 25 lubricant, a coating for medical equipment, and an oxidizer in flares. Id. 3M and Du Pont were 1 PFOA is the acronym for perfluorooctanoic acid; PFOS stands for perfluorooctanesulfonic acid; PFHxS is perfluorohexanesulfonic acid. Id. ¶ 35(a), (b), (e). 1 the sole manufacturers of PFOA in the United States, while 3M was the only domestic 2 manufacturer of PFOS and PFHxS. Id. ¶¶ 58, 52. 3 For more than 50 years, 3M and Du Pont had reason to be concerned about the 4 environmental hazards of their PFAS chemicals, including the widespread contamination of 5 groundwater used for public drinking water and corresponding adverse effects on human health. 6 Id. ¶¶ 61–84. Nevertheless, defendants actively “suppress[ed] scientific research” and concealed 7 the scope of the contamination and its risk to human health, even to the U.S. Environmental 8 Protection Agency. Id. ¶¶ 81, 83, 86–88. Ultimately, 3M ceased production in the early 2000s 9 and Du Pont ended sales in 2013. Id. ¶ 57. Du Pont spun off its wholly owned subsidiary 10 Chemours in July 2015 as a separate, publicly traded company. Id. ¶ 16. Chemours took control 11 of Du Pont’s PFAS business, including by assuming all or part of Du Pont’s liabilities for PFAS 12 products. Id. 13 The District brings this action against defendants to recover costs associated with the 14 contaminated well water and to abate the ongoing harm posed by PFAS chemicals. Id. ¶ 2. 15 Du Pont and Chemours move to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. See EID/CC Mot., 16 ECF No. 8. 3M moves to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. 17 See 3M Mot., ECF No. 9. The District opposes both motions. See Opp’n to EID/CC, ECF No. 18 28; Opp’n to 3M, ECF No. 29. Defendants replied. See EID/CC Reply, ECF No. 32; 3M Reply, 19 ECF No. 34. 20 The court held a hearing on October 7, 2022. Hr’g Mins., ECF No. 39. Stephanie Biehl 21 appeared for the District. J. Thomas Boer represented 3M, and Adam Rapp appeared for Du Pont 22 and Chemours. Counsel informed the court that a similar matter is proceeding in the Eastern 23 District of New York: Water Authority of Western Nassau County v. The 3M Company et al., 24 Case No. CV-19-4608 (GRB) and related cases. Counsel noted the court there granted 25 jurisdictional discovery and resolved the motions by bench order. This court requested and the 26 District filed a transcript of the Water Authority hearing. Biehl Ltr., ECF No. 42. 1 II. ANALYSIS 2 No federal statute governs personal jurisdiction in this case, so the court must determine 3 whether California courts could exercise jurisdiction over defendants. See Glob. Commodities 4 Trading Grp., Inc. v. Beneficio de Arroz Choloma, S.A., 972 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2020). 5 California authorizes its courts to exercise jurisdiction “to the full extent permissible under the 6 U.S. Constitution[.]” Picot v. Weston, 780 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Daimler AG 7 v.Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 125 (2014)); see Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 410.10. As a result, this court’s 8 personal jurisdiction turns on the limits of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. See 9 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 923 (2011). 10 Since the Supreme Court’s decision in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, federal 11 courts have assessed whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with the Due Process Clause 12 by determining if the defendant had “minimum contacts” with the forum state, “such that the 13 maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” 14 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citation omitted). “In giving content to that formulation, the Court 15 long focused on the nature and extent of ‘the defendant’s relationship to the forum State.’” Ford 16 Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1024 (2021) (quoting Bristol-Meyers 17 Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., S.F. Cty., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1779 (2017)). 18 The Supreme Court has recognized two forms of personal jurisdiction: general jurisdiction 19 and specific jurisdiction. See id. “In opposition to a defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of 20 personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that jurisdiction is proper.” 21 Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 2008). Here, the District concedes this court 22 does not have general jurisdiction, because defendants are neither incorporated nor headquartered 23 in California. See Opp’n to EID/CC at 4 n.1; Opp’n to 3M at 5 n.1. Accordingly, the sole 24 jurisdictional question for this court is whether there is specific jurisdiction. 25 A. Specific Jurisdiction 26 In the Ninth Circuit, courts use a three-part test to determine whether the defendant’s 27 contacts with the state suffice to support the exercise of specific jurisdiction. See LNS Enters. 28 LLC v. Cont’l Motors, Inc., 22 F.4th 852, 859 (9th Cir. 2022). First, a plaintiff must show the 1 out-of-state defendants purposely directed activities to the forum state, conducted business with 2 the forum or its residents, or otherwise “purposefully avail[ed] [themselves] of the privilege of 3 conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws[.]” 4 Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Lake v. 5 Lake, 817 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 1987)). Second, the claim must “arise[] out of or relate[] to 6 the defendant’s forum-related activities[.]” Id. Third, the exercise of jurisdiction must be 7 reasonable[.] Id. The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the first two prongs, after which 8 the burden shifts to the defendant to show the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable. See 9 Axiom Foods, Inc. v. Acerchem Int’l, Inc., 874 F.3d 1064, 1068–69 (9th Cir. 2017). 10 Here, the parties’ dispute centers on the second prong: whether the District has alleged 11 sufficient facts to establish its claims arise out of or relate to defendants’ contacts with California. 12 See EID/CC Mot. at 6; 3M Mot. at 6; Opp’n to EID/CC at 5; Opp’n to 3M at 6. All the parties 13 invoke the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Ford Motor Co., claiming the decision supports 14 their position. A brief review of the case reveals why. In Ford Motor Co., there was no dispute 15 that Ford did “substantial business” in Montana and Minnesota and that the resident-plaintiffs’ 16 cars allegedly malfunctioned in the forum states. 141 S. Ct. at 1026. But Ford claimed personal 17 jurisdiction could attach only (a) “where Ford sold the car in question,” or (b) “where Ford 18 designed and manufactured the vehicle.” Id. The Court disagreed, explaining (1) each complaint 19 alleged a defective Ford vehicle caused an injury, and (2) “Ford had advertised, sold, and serviced 20 those two car models in both States,” creating “a strong ‘relationship among the defendant, the 21 forum and the litigation.’” Id. at 1028 (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. 22 Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984)). Thus, the Court concluded an in-state injury caused by 23 defective products, which were “extensively promoted, sold, and serviced” in the state, sufficed to 24 establish personal jurisdiction, regardless of where those particular cars were sold. Id. at 1032. 25 In addition, the Court emphasized there is no requirement of “proof of causation” between 26 contacts and injury; instead, a defendant “serv[ing] a market for a product in the forum State and 27 the product malfunction[ing] there” is sufficient. Id. at 1026, 1027. 1 In this case, the parties dispute whether defendants did, in fact, “serve[] a market” for the 2 products that malfunctioned in California. Id. at 1027. The District generally alleges 3M, 3 Du Pont, and Chemours manufactured, marketed, distributed, and sold PFAS products in 4 California for many years. See Compl. ¶¶ 13–17. Now, the District’s wells produce drinking 5 water contaminated with PFAS. Id. ¶¶ 33, 93–95. But defendants claim the District does not 6 allege facts to show the groundwater contamination arises from or relates to defendants’ conduct 7 regarding particular PFAS products in California. 3M Mot. at 12–14; EID/CC Mot. at 8–13. 8 Specifically, defendants argue, first, the allegations tying the District’s claims to the California 9 conduct are “conclusory,” and second, the District’s factual allegations are insufficient because 10 they do not show the claims arise out of or relate to the California conduct. 3M Mot. at 13; 11 EID/CC Mot. at 13. The court addresses these arguments in turn. 12 First, defendants argue the District relies too much on conclusory statements in the 13 complaint to show defendants served a market for PFAS in California. The District must meet 14 the plausibility pleading standard laid out in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), which the 15 Ninth Circuit has adopted for “personal jurisdiction questions[.]” Fiore v. Walden, 688 F.3d 558, 16 575 (9th Cir. 2012), rev’d on other grounds, 571 U.S. 277 (2014). Under that standard, “factual 17 allegations” are assumed to be true, but “conclusions” are not. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. As a 18 result, “mere ‘bare bones’ assertions of minimum contacts with the forum or legal conclusions 19 unsupported by specific factual allegations will not satisfy a plaintiff’s pleading burden.” Swartz 20 v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 766 (9th Cir. 2007). 21 The District’s opposition to defendants’ motions relies heavily on conclusory allegations 22 in the complaint, such as the statement that defendants “designed, manufactured, marketed, sold 23 and/or distributed large quantities of PFAS-containing and/or other PFAS Products in California, 24 including in the Sacramento area.” Compl. ¶ 59; see id. ¶ 60; Opp’n to EID/CC at 14; Opp’n to 25 3M at 12, 16. At hearing, when the court asked the District’s counsel to identify with 26 particularity the complaint’s allegations linking defendants’ PFAS conduct to California, counsel 27 again pointed to conclusory statements. See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 32 (“PFAS in the aquifer comes 28 from Defendants’ PFAS Products that were used and disposed of or otherwise released in the area 1 overlying the NAS2 groundwater aquifer.”), 56 (“DuPont produced numerous other PFAS 2 Products, and it marketed and sold PFAS products throughout the United States, including in 3 California and in the Sacramento area.”), 131 (“Defendants’ acts and omissions, including their 4 manufacture, promotion, marketing, sale, distribution, supply, defective design of, and/or failure 5 to warn regarding PFAS in their products, contaminated Plaintiff’s wells.”). These allegations 6 “are no more than conclusions,” and so they “are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 7 556 U.S. at 679. In the absence of concretely factual allegations, plaintiff’s conclusions do not 8 render plausible their assertion that the District’s contaminated groundwater arises out of or 9 relates to defendants’ California conduct. 10 Second, defendants claim the District’s allegations do not link their claims to any 11 California conduct. The District’s complaint does incorporate several factual allegations about 12 defendants’ California conduct. It alleges 3M operates four manufacturing plants in California, at 13 least three of which have manufactured “PFAS Products[.]” Compl. ¶ 13. The District also 14 alleges Du Pont employs workers, conducts research on PFAS, and contracts with distributors in 15 California. Id. ¶ 15. The District simultaneously admits “[t]here are more than 3,000 different 16 types of PFAS.” Id. ¶ 36. Although the District alleges 3M manufactures PFAS products in 17 California and Du Pont conducts research on PFAS in California, it does not link any specific 18 PFAS chemicals that contaminate the District’s groundwater to defendants’ California conduct. 19 Unlike in Ford Motor Co., where the plaintiffs alleged in-state marketing, sales, and servicing of 20 the specific types of cars that then malfunctioned, the District does not specify which PFAS 21 products were manufactured, advertised, or researched in California. As a result, the District has 22 not at this time linked defendants’ actions in California to the contamination of the groundwater 23 with “PFOA, PFOS, PFBS, PFHpA, PFHxS, and PFHxA.” Id. ¶ 33. Instead, the complaint’s 24 factual allegations could support the inference that the groundwater contamination is unrelated to 2 NAS is the acronym for the North American Sub-basin, a 548 square mile groundwater basin located in California’s Sutter, Placer, and Sacramento counties; the District’s wells are located within the surface boundaries of the NAS. Id. ¶ 31. 1 defendants’ California conduct because that conduct involves other PFAS compounds. Such 2 uncertainty raises a doubt about this court’s jurisdiction over defendants. 3 In response, the District argues defendants’ “[e]xtensive nationwide sales” mean they 4 served a California market for PFAS products and claims it does not need to link any particular 5 PFAS product to California. Opp’n to EID/CC at 6. The District cites two cases rejecting an 6 interpretation of Ford Motor Co. that requires in-state conduct to exactly match the products that 7 caused the harm. See Opp’n to 3M at 9 (citing Godfried v. Ford Motor Co., No. 19-0372, 2021 8 WL 1819696 (D. Me. May 6, 2021), and Sibley v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., No. 20-7697, 2021 9 WL 2688819 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2021)). At hearing, the District relied on these cases to claim 10 its allegations are sufficient, pointing primarily to Godfried. This reliance on Godfried is 11 unavailing. 12 In Godfried, a Maine resident alleged he was injured by a defect in a specific component 13 of the Rear Attached Mower Series 501. 2021 WL 1819696, at *1. The defendant-manufacturer 14 claimed the court could not exercise personal jurisdiction because there were no factual 15 allegations linking the Series 501 Mower to the manufacturer’s Maine conduct. Id. The court 16 disagreed. It explained, even if there are no allegations that the defendant marketed or sold the 17 particular product in the forum state, specific jurisdiction “can still attach where the defendant’s 18 contacts are only marginally more attenuated.” Id. at *5. The Godfried court found the 19 defendant-manufacturer’s rear mower conduct sufficed in the absence of specific allegations 20 regarding 501 rear mowers—the 501 series apparently being a type of rear mower. Id. at *7; see 21 id. at *5 n.5 (“The parties offer no evidence as to how rear mowers are classified . . . .”). It 22 concluded specific jurisdiction attached because the defendant-manufacturer extensively 23 marketed and sold rear mowers throughout Maine during the relevant time period. Id. at *5. The 24 court noted the defendants’ advertisements “d[id] not specify any particular type of rear 25 mower[.]” Id. at *5 n.5 (emphasis in original). Moreover, based on depositions taken during 26 jurisdictional discovery, the resident-plaintiff alleged the defendant-manufacturer was unable to 27 distinguish manufacturing, distribution, advertising, or sales information between rear mowers in 28 general and 501 rear mowers. See id. at *1–2. Accordingly, the resident-plaintiff’s rear mower 1 allegations likely included 501 rear mowers, and there was no apparent way to distinguish the 2 products. See id. 3 Even if this court agreed with Godfried’s interpretation of Ford Motor Co. – and it is not 4 inclined to --, the District’s allegations here still fall short. The District does not allege even 5 “marginally more attenuated” conduct. Id. at *5. In other words, the District does not allege 6 specific California chemical advertising or sales by defendants that mirrors the Godfried 7 plaintiff’s allegations and quotations of specific advertisements in the Farm Journal publication 8 circulated in Maine. The District also does not allege that distinguishing defendants’ California 9 conduct based on particular PFAS products is impracticable. 10 In addition, even if Ford Motor Co. does not require an “exact-product theory,” Opp’n to 11 3M at 9, the Court’s decision does require a stronger relationship between forum contacts and the 12 alleged injury than that supported by the District’s factual allegations. The District must plead 13 defendants’ California conduct relates to the groundwater contamination they complain of by, at 14 least, alleging defendants’ forum conduct regarding a particular PFAS chemical that now 15 contaminates the groundwater. The District’s other cited cases show why its current allegations 16 are not sufficient. 17 In In re: Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Prods. Liab. Litig., the plaintiff’s claims were 18 linked to the defendants’ in-state conduct because the plaintiff traced a specific type of PFAS to 19 marketing and sales nationwide, including contacts to create that chemical within the forum state. 20 See No. 18-2873, 2022 WL 678992, at *6 (D.S.C. Jan. 27, 2022). Moreover, the plaintiff’s 21 complaint involved extensive allegations about a particular PFAS-containing end product 22 (aqueous film-forming foam or AFFF), how it was used, where it was advertised, and why it was 23 certainly used in the forum state. Id. at *1, *5. Similarly specific allegations were pled in the 24 other cited cases. See, e.g., SUEZ Water N.Y. Inc. v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., et al., 25 578 F. Supp. 3d 511, 530–32 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (describing how and when defendants licensed and 26 sold PFAS products in forum state, and to what types of customers); Sibley, 2021 WL 2688819, at 27 *3 (explaining decedent worked on asbestos-containing pump during time period when defendant 28 supplied asbestos-containing pumps in forum state); Hardwick v. 3M Co., No. 18-1185, 1 2019 WL 4757134, at *16 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 2019) (discussing how plaintiff firefighter was 2 exposed to PFAS chemicals through fire-fighting foams). In contrast, the District’s complaint 3 lacks similar allegations. 4 The District does not identify a particular type of PFAS used or manufactured in 5 California, nor specify how or where it was advertised. The closest the District comes is its 6 allegations regarding 3M’s manufacturing plants and Du Pont’s “Teflon” brand comprising 7 PTFE, a type of PFAS. Compl. ¶¶ 13, 55. However, these allegations do not identify any 8 specific PFAS products or the PFAS chemicals used at defendants’ plants, and do not include 9 factual allegations linking Teflon to California. These omissions mean there is an insufficient 10 link between defendants’ conduct in California and the District’s groundwater contamination. To 11 survive dismissal ultimately, the District must allege at least one example to tether the District’s 12 claims to defendants’ contacts with California, and establish this court’s ability to exercise 13 personal jurisdiction over defendants. See generally In re: Aqueous Film-Forming Foams, 2022 14 WL 678992. 15 In sum, the District’s factual allegations do not establish personal jurisdiction over 16 defendants. 17 B. Discovery Request 18 Anticipating this court’s conclusion, the District seeks leave to conduct “limited 19 jurisdictional discovery” if the complaint’s allegations are inadequate. Opp’n to 3M at 20; Opp’n 20 to EID/CC at 12. District courts are vested with “broad discretion” to permit or deny 21 jurisdictional discovery. Butchers Union Loc. No. 498, United Food & Com. Workers v. SDC 22 Inv., Inc., 788 F.2d 535, 540 (9th Cir. 1986). Such discovery “may be appropriately granted 23 where pertinent facts bearing on the question of jurisdiction are controverted or where a more 24 satisfactory showing of the facts is necessary.” Boschetto, 539 F.3d at 1020 (quoting Data Disc, 25 Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assoc., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 n.1 (9th Cir. 1977)). A request “based on 26 little more than a hunch” is insufficient. Id. (citing Butchers Union, 788 F.2d at 540). If the 27 evidence sought would not “change the analysis,” then discovery is not required. Sky Optic, Inc. 28 v.AreaTrend, LLC, 843 F. App’x 66, 69 (9th Cir. 2021). 1 Defendants claim the District seeks jurisdictional discovery “in a broad, wide-ranging 2 fishing expedition based on” a hunch that its claims relate to defendants’ California conduct. 3M 3 Reply at 4–5; see also EID/CC Reply at 6–8. But the District’s request is predicated on more 4 than a hunch. The District alleges 3M is the only known domestic manufacturer of PFOS and 5 PFHxS and has three facilities manufacturing PFAS products in California. Compl. ¶¶ 13, 52. 6 Further, the District alleges Du Pont conducts research relating to PFAS products in California, 7 works to distribute PFAS products in California, and along with 3M, was the only domestic 8 manufacturer of PFOA. Id. ¶¶ 15, 58. The District offers extensive allegations regarding 3M and 9 Du Pont’s decades-long awareness of PFAS groundwater contamination and efforts to conceal the 10 immense hazards the contamination posed. Id. ¶¶ 61–88. Now, PFHxS and PFOA, along with 11 other PFAS chemicals, contaminate the District’s wells. Id. ¶ 33. 12 The sole missing factual link is a supportable allegation that defendants’ California 13 conduct regarding a particular PFAS chemical contaminates the District’s wells. Given that 3M 14 and Du Pont were the only domestic manufacturers for several PFAS chemicals found in the 15 wells, the District’s request does not appear “to be a fishing expedition in search of a 16 jurisdictional hook.” Sky Optic, 843 F. App’x at 69. Instead, the District seeks specific facts to 17 bolster its conclusory statement that defendants “designed, developed, manufactured, marketed, 18 sold, distributed, supplied, transported, handled, used, released, and/or disposed of PFAS 19 Products in California[.]” Compl. ¶ 60. Such an inquiry is tailored to produce the “more 20 satisfactory showing of the facts . . . necessary” for the court to exercise personal jurisdiction 21 over defendants. Boschetto, 539 F.3d at 1020 (quoting Data Disc, 557 F.2d at 1285 n.1). 22 Jurisdictional discovery is warranted here. Cf. Hr’g Tr. at 47:25–48:01, Biehl Ltr., ECF No. 42-1 23 (court explaining from bench in Water Authority case that “record needs to be more developed 24 before we go forward”). 25 The District’s specificity in its discovery request confirms its appropriateness. Despite 26 defendants’ statements to the contrary, see EID/CC Reply at 8; 3M Reply at 4–5, the District has 27 identified particular discovery it says it needs to establish personal jurisdiction: (1) information on 28 the manufacture and sale of PFAS products in California by defendants, (2) the customers in 1 California to whom defendants sold PFAS products, (3) quantities of PFAS products sold in and 2 shipped to California by defendants, (4) defendants’ marketing materials directed at California 3 regarding their PFAS products, (5) any warnings defendants issued to consumers or users of 4 PFAS in California, and (6) any other information uniquely in defendants’ possession or 5 knowledge about their California contacts relating to this case. See Opp’n to EID/CC at 14; 6 Opp’n to 3M at 20. 7 The evidence the District seeks, for the most part, will allow the court ultimately to make 8 a fully-informed, reasoned decision regarding jurisdiction. One area of proposed discovery, area 9 6 seeking any other information uniquely in defendants’ possession about their California 10 contacts related to this case, is overbroad however. Jurisdictional discovery will be limited to the 11 first five areas. 12 III. CONCLUSION 13 The District has not established the court has personal jurisdiction over defendants. But 14 the District has shown that a more satisfactory showing of the facts is necessary and likely with 15 limited discovery, and so the court grants limited jurisdictional discovery. Discovery is 16 confined to the following five areas: (1) information on the manufacture and sale of PFAS 17 products in California by defendants, (2) the customers in California to whom defendants sold 18 PFAS products, (3) quantities of PFAS products sold in and shipped to California by defendants, 19 (4) defendants’ marketing materials directed at California regarding their PFAS products, and 20 (5) any warnings defendants issued to consumers or users of PFAS in California. 21 Jurisdictional discovery shall be completed within 90 days of the filed date of this 22 order. “Completed” means not only that discovery itself is concluded, but also that any 23 discovery disputes are fully resolved. The District may seek leave to amend its complaint 24 following the completion of jurisdictional discovery, with any motion seeking leave filed by 14 25 days after the discovery deadline. The scheduling conference is SET for April 27, 2023. 26 ///// 27 ///// 28 ///// 1 Defendants’ motions to dismiss are denied without prejudice. 2 This order resolves ECF Nos. 8, 9. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 DATED: November 10, 2022.