(PC) Miller v. Mule Creek State Prison ( 2022 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MATTHAIS MILLER, No. 2:22-cv-0599 DB P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 MULE CREEK STATE PRISON, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff, a state prisoner, has filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As best 18 this court can tell, in his complaint filed April 5, 2022, plaintiff alleges that he has been unable to 19 get his property since he was transferred to Mule Creek State Prison on March 12, 2022. He 20 appears to also allege he has been subject to retaliation. Plaintiff admits that he has not fully 21 exhausted his claims by presenting them to the highest level of administrative review. (ECF No. 22 1 at 3, 4.) Plaintiff states that he has not fully exhausted because this suit involves an “emergency 23 mental health issue.” For relief, plaintiff asks for the “retaliation to stop,” for proper mental 24 health care, for immediate return of his property, and for nominal damages. 25 SCREENING 26 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 27 governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 28 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims 1 that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be 2 granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 3 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2). 4 EXHAUSTION 5 The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA) mandates that “[n]o action shall be 6 brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 ... or any other Federal law, by a 7 prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative 8 remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (emphasis added). The Supreme 9 Court has established the guidelines for assessing whether a prisoner’s administrative remedies 10 were unavailable. “[A]n inmate is required to exhaust those, but only those, grievance procedures 11 that are ‘capable of use’ to obtain ‘some relief for the action complained of.’” Ross v. Blake, 578 12 U.S. 632, 642 (2016) (quoting Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 738 (2001)). 13 There are only “three kinds of circumstances in which an administrative remedy, although 14 officially on the books, is not capable of use to obtain relief.” Ross, 578 U.S. at 642. These 15 circumstances are: (1) the “administrative procedure . . . operates as a simple dead end – with 16 officers unable or consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates;” (2) the 17 “administrative scheme ... [is] so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use . . 18 . so that no ordinary prisoner can make sense of what it demands;” and (3) “prison administrators 19 thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination, 20 misrepresentation, or intimidation.” Id. at 642-43 (citations and internal punctuation omitted). 21 Other than these circumstances demonstrating the unavailability of an administrative remedy, the 22 mandatory language of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) “foreclose[es] judicial discretion,” which “means a 23 court may not excuse a failure to exhaust, even to take [special] circumstances into account.” Id. 24 at 638-39. 25 The fact plaintiff feels his case is an emergency is not, without more, an exception to the 26 exhaustion requirement. Plaintiff does not explain why the administrative appeal process was not 27 available to him. Plaintiff’s concession that he did not exhaust his administrative remedies 28 requires dismissal of this action unless plaintiff can plausibly demonstrate that administrative 1 || remedies were effectively unavailable to him. Plaintiff will be given the opportunity to file a 2 || statement showing that his failure to exhaust meets one of the exceptions identified in Ross. If 3 || plaintiff is unable to make that showing, this court must recommend dismissal of this action. 4 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that within thirty days of the date of 5 || this order, plaintiff shall file either (1) a statement demonstrating that he meets one of the 6 || exceptions to the exhaustion requirement set out in Ross; or (2) a notice that he is dismissing this 7 || case. 8 | Dated: April 15, 2022 10 ll BORAH BARNES UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 12 13 14 15 16 DB Prisoner Inbox/Civil Rights/R/mill0599.scrn exh osc 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28