(PC) Jackson v. Sacramento County Jail ( 2022 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ELIJAH LEE JACKSON, No. 2:21-CV-1814-KJM-DMC-P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 SACRAMENTO COUNTY JAIL, 15 Defendant. 16 17 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 18 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s complaint, ECF No. 1. 19 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 20 against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or 22 malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief 23 from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, 24 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “short and plain statement 25 of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This means 26 that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 27 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the 28 complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it 1 rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiff must allege 2 with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the 3 claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is 4 impossible for the Court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague 5 and conclusory. 6 A complaint must contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 7 cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the 8 speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007). The complaint 9 must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. 10 “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a 11 sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 12 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The mere possibility of misconduct will not suffice 13 to meet this standard. See id. at 679. 14 “The Supreme Court has instructed the federal courts to liberally construe the 15 inartful pleading of pro se litigants. It is settled that the allegations of [a pro se litigant’s 16 complaint] however inartfully pleaded are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings 17 drafted by lawyers.” See Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation and 18 internal quotation marks omitted; brackets in original). The rule, however, “applies only to a 19 plaintiff’s factual allegations.” See Neitzke v.Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). ‘“[A] 20 liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim 21 that were not initially pled.”’ See Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th 22 Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)). 23 In some cases, because pro se litigants often are unfamiliar with legal processes 24 and procedures, district courts in the Ninth Circuit have been willing to construe documents that 25 the litigants mischaracterize or submit using incorrect forms as having been properly named or 26 submitted. See e.g., Cunningham v. Kramer, 178 F. Supp. 3d 999, 1002 (E.D. Cal. 2016) 27 (construing pro se litigant’s “first amended complaint” as a motion for reconsideration as opposed 28 to an amended complaint). 1 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS 2 Here, Plaintiff did not submit his complaint on the Court’s standard form for 3 prisoner civil rights cases. See ECF No. 1. Instead, Plaintiff submitted what appears to be a 4 complaint seeking relief on a Department of General Services Office of Risk and Insurance 5 Management Form, No. DS ORIM 006. See id. The Court will screen the document as if it was 6 a properly-filed complaint, given that pro se litigants are held to a less stringent standard in 7 formulating pleadings. 8 In Plaintiff’s submission, Plaintiff names only the Sacramento County Jail as the 9 apparent Defendant. See ECF No. 1, pg. 3. Plaintiff seeks $66.6 million in damages based on his 10 claim of “spiritual damage.” Id. According to Plaintiff, he “had a satanic bible sent to [him] and 11 it was denied” by Defendant. Id. Plaintiff adds that he hasn’t been able to “read or pray because 12 [his] prayers and everything are in the satanic bible.” ECF No. 1, pg. 3. 13 14 II. DISCUSSION 15 Plaintiff has named the Sacramento County Jail as the only defendant. As 16 discussed below, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to contain sufficient allegations to 17 sustain an action against a municipal entity. 18 Municipalities and other local government units are among those “persons” to 19 whom § 1983 liability applies. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). 20 Counties and municipal government officials are also “persons” for purposes of § 1983. See id. at 21 691; see also Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir. 1989). A local 22 government unit, however, may not be held responsible for the acts of its employees or officials 23 under a respondeat superior theory of liability. See Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 24 397, 403 (1997). Thus, municipal liability must rest on the actions of the municipality, and not of 25 the actions of its employees or officers. See id. To assert municipal liability, therefore, the 26 plaintiff must allege that the constitutional deprivation complained of resulted from a policy or 27 custom of the municipality. See id. 28 / / / 1 In this instance, Plaintiff names only a county institution, the Sacramento County 2 Jail, as a defendant. Plaintiff has not, however, alleged any official policy or custom as the basis 3 for any alleged violation of his civil rights. Plaintiff will be provided an opportunity to amend. 4 5 III. CONCLUSION 6 Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by 7 amending the complaint, Plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of the entire 8 action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is 9 informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See 10 Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, following dismissal with leave to 11 amend, all claims alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in the amended 12 complaint are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987), overruled on other 13 grounds by Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2012). Therefore, if Plaintiff amends 14 the complaint, the Court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order to make Plaintiff’s amended 15 complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. 16 If Plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the 17 conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See 18 Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how 19 each named Defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection 20 between each Defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 21 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Further, if 22 Plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, then Plaintiff shall use the proper form or format in 23 which to plead the amended allegations. 24 Finally, Plaintiff is warned that failure to file an amended complaint within the 25 time provided in this order may be grounds for dismissal of this action. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 26 1260-61; see also Local Rule 110. Plaintiff is also warned that a complaint which fails to comply 27 with Rule 8 may, in the Court’s discretion, be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b). 28 See Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981). ] Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 2 1. Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed with leave to amend; and 3 2. Plaintiff shall file a first amended complaint within 30 days of the date of 4 | service of this order. 5 6 | Dated: November 14, 2022 Svc 7 DENNIS M. COTA 8 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 9 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28