- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MARK A. GRIFFITHS, No. 2:22-cv-00439 AC 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, 15 Defendant. 16 17 18 Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 19 (“Commissioner”), denying his application for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) under Title II 20 of the Social Security Act (“the Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-34.1 For the reasons that follow, 21 plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment will be DENIED, and defendant’s cross-motion for 22 summary judgment will be GRANTED. 23 I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 24 Plaintiff applied for DIB on March 11, 2019. Administrative Record (“AR”) 170-171.2 25 The disability onset date was alleged to be February 9, 2017. AR 179. The application was 26 1 DIB is paid to disabled persons who have contributed to the Disability Insurance Program, and 27 who suffer from a mental or physical disability. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1); Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 470 (1986). 28 2 The AR is electronically filed at ECF Nos. 9-1 (AR 1 to AR 527). 1 disapproved initially and on reconsideration. AR 58, 76-78. On December 8, 2020, ALJ 2 Lawrence Levey presided over the hearing on plaintiff’s challenge to the disapprovals. AR 12 – 3 43 (transcript). Plaintiff, who appeared with counsel Joseph Fraulob, was present at the hearing. 4 AR 12. Stephen Davis, a Vocational Expert (“VE”), also testified at the hearing. Id. 5 On January 12, 2021, the ALJ found plaintiff “not disabled” under Sections 216(i) and 6 223(d) of Title II of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423(d). AR 79-94 (decision), 95-98 (exhibit 7 list). On January 4, 2022, after receiving additional exhibits including a letter from plaintiff’s 8 spouse, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request for review, leaving the ALJ’s decision as 9 the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. AR 1-5 (decision and additional 10 exhibit list). Plaintiff filed this action on March 8, 2022. ECF No. 1; see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 11 The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the magistrate judge. ECF No. 13. The parties’ cross- 12 motions for summary judgment, based upon the Administrative Record filed by the 13 Commissioner, have been fully briefed. ECF Nos. 18 (plaintiff’s summary judgment motion), 23 14 (Commissioner’s summary judgment motion). 15 II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 16 Plaintiff was born on in 1981, and accordingly was, at age 38, a younger person under the 17 regulations, when he filed his application.3 AR 170. Plaintiff has a high school education, and 18 can communicate in English. AR 181, 183. Plaintiff has work history as a tree climber, 19 construction worker, maintenance person, and heavy equipment operator/laborer. AR 183. 20 Plaintiff claimed disability due to back injury, arthritis of the spine, depression, anxiety, marital 21 issues, paranoia disorder, and severe lower back pain. AR 182. 22 III. LEGAL STANDARDS 23 The Commissioner’s decision that a claimant is not disabled will be upheld “if it is 24 supported by substantial evidence and if the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards.” 25 Howard ex rel. Wolff v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006, 1011 (9th Cir. 2003). “‘The findings of the 26 Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . ..’” Andrews 27 v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). 28 3 See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(c) (“younger person”). 1 Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla,” but “may be less than a 2 preponderance.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012). “It means such 3 evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. 4 Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (internal quotation marks omitted). “While inferences from the 5 record can constitute substantial evidence, only those ‘reasonably drawn from the record’ will 6 suffice.” Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). 7 Although this court cannot substitute its discretion for that of the Commissioner, the court 8 nonetheless must review the record as a whole, “weighing both the evidence that supports and the 9 evidence that detracts from the [Commissioner’s] conclusion.” Desrosiers v. Secretary of HHS, 10 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988); Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985) (“The 11 court must consider both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the ALJ’s 12 conclusion; it may not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.”). 13 “The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical 14 testimony, and resolving ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th 15 Cir. 2001). “Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of 16 which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 17 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). However, the court may review only the reasons stated by the 18 ALJ in his decision “and may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not rely.” Orn 19 v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007); Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 20 2003) (“It was error for the district court to affirm the ALJ’s credibility decision based on 21 evidence that the ALJ did not discuss”). 22 The court will not reverse the Commissioner’s decision if it is based on harmless error, 23 which exists only when it is “clear from the record that an ALJ’s error was ‘inconsequential to the 24 ultimate nondisability determination.’” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 25 2006) (quoting Stout v. Commissioner, 454 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 2006)); see also Burch v. 26 Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). 27 IV. RELEVANT LAW 28 Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income are available for every 1 eligible individual who is “disabled.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(d)(1)(B)(ii) (DIB), 1381a (SSI). Plaintiff 2 is “disabled” if she is “‘unable to engage in substantial gainful activity due to a medically 3 determinable physical or mental impairment . . ..’” Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987) 4 (quoting identically worded provisions of 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A)). 5 The Commissioner uses a five-step sequential evaluation process to determine whether an 6 applicant is disabled and entitled to benefits. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4); 7 Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24-25 (2003) (setting forth the “five-step sequential evaluation 8 process to determine disability” under Title II and Title XVI). The following summarizes the 9 sequential evaluation: 10 Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful activity? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step two. 11 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i), (b). 12 Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? If so, 13 proceed to step three. If not, the claimant is not disabled. 14 Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), (c). 15 Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 404, 16 Subpt. P, App. 1? If so, the claimant is disabled. If not, proceed to step four. 17 Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), (d). 18 Step four: Does the claimant’s residual functional capacity make him 19 capable of performing his past work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step five. 20 Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), (e), (f). 21 Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional capacity 22 perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled. 23 Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), (g). 24 25 The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation 26 process. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(a) (“In general, you have to prove to us that you are blind or 27 disabled”), 416.912(a) (same); Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5. However, “[a]t the fifth step of the 28 sequential analysis, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to demonstrate that the claimant is not 1 disabled and can engage in work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy.” Hill 2 v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012); Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5. 3 V. THE ALJ’s DECISION 4 The ALJ made the following findings: 5 1. The claimant last met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act on March 31, 2020. 6 2. [Step 1] The claimant did not engage in substantial gainful activity 7 during the period from his alleged onset date of February 9, 2017 through his date last insured of March 31, 2020 (20 CFR 404.1571 8 et seq.) 9 3. [Step 2] Through the date last insured, the claimant had the following severe combination of impairments: Cervical 10 Degenerative Disc Disease, Lumbar Degenerative Disc Disease, Depressive Disorder, Anxiety Disorder, Adjustment Disorder, and 11 Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) (20 CFR 404.1520(c)). 12 4. [Step 3] Through the date last insured, the claimant did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically 13 equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525 and 14 404.1526). 15 5. [Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”)] After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that, through 16 the date last insured, the claimant had the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b), except he 17 could have occasionally climbed ramps or stairs, balanced, stooped, kneeled, and crouched. The claimant was precluded from climbing 18 ladders, ropes, or scaffolds and from crawling. He was required to avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold, excessive vibration, 19 unprotected heights, and hazardous machinery. The claimant was limited to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks, performed in a work 20 environment free of fast-paced production requirements that involved only simple work-related changes and few, if any, 21 workplace changes. He was limited to occasional interpersonal interaction with the general public, co-workers, and supervisors. 22 6. [Step 4] The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work 23 (20 CFR 404.1565). 24 7. [Step 5] The claimant was born [in 1981] and was 38 years old, which is defined as a younger individual age 18-49, on the date last 25 insured (20 CFR 404.1563). 26 8. [Step 5, continued] The claimant has at least a high school education (20 CFR 404.1564). 27 9. [Step 5, continued] Transferability of job skills is not material to 28 the determination of disability because using the Medical-Vocational 1 Rules as a framework supports a finding that the claimant is “not disabled,” whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills (See 2 SSR 82-41 and 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2). 3 10. [Step 5, continued] Through the date last insured, considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual 4 functional capacity, there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant could have 5 performed (20 CFR 404.1569 and 404.1569(a)). 6 11. The claimant was not under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, at any time from March 31, 2020, through the date last 7 insured (20 CFR 404.1520(g)). 8 AR 81-93. As noted, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff was “not disabled” under Title II of the 9 Act. AR 93. 10 VI. ANALYSIS 11 Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ erred by (1) rejecting the opinion of consultative examiner 12 Dr. C. Chambers; (2) failing to provide legally sufficient reasons for discrediting plaintiff’s 13 subjective testimony; and (3) failing to consider medical evidence dated after plaintiff’s date last 14 insured. ECF No. 18 at 8-14. 15 A. The ALJ Properly Addressed the Opinion of Dr. Chambers 16 Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ’s RFC determination is flawed because the ALJ improperly 17 discredited the opinion of psychological consultative examiner Dr. Carol Chambers. ECF No. 18 18 at 9. With respect to medical opinions, new regulations apply to claims filed on or after March 19 27, 2017, which change the framework for evaluation of medical opinion evidence. Revisions to 20 Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 2017 WL 168819, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844-01 21 (Jan. 18, 2017); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c. The new regulations provide that the ALJ will no longer 22 “give any specific evidentiary weight . . . to any medical opinion(s)” but instead must consider 23 and evaluate the persuasiveness of all medical opinions or prior administrative medical findings 24 from medical sources and evaluate their persuasiveness. Revisions to Rules, 2017 WL 168819, 25 82 Fed. Reg. 5844, at 5867-68; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a) and (b). 26 The factors for evaluating the persuasiveness of a physician opinion include 27 supportability, consistency, relationship with the claimant (including length of the treatment, 28 frequency of examinations, purpose of the treatment, extent of the treatment, and the existence of 1 an examination), specialization, and “other factors that tend to support or contradict a medical 2 opinion or prior administrative medical finding” (including, but not limited to, “evidence showing 3 a medical source has familiarity with the other evidence in the claim or an understanding of our 4 disability program’s policies and evidentiary requirements”). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1)-(5). 5 Supportability and consistency are the most important factors, and therefore the ALJ is required 6 to explain how both factors were considered. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2). Supportability and 7 consistency are defined in the regulations as follows: 8 (1) Supportability. The more relevant the objective medical evidence and supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to 9 support his or her medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), the more persuasive the medical opinions or prior 10 administrative medical finding(s) will be. 11 (2) Consistency. The more consistent a medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) is with the evidence from other 12 medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more persuasive the medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical 13 finding(s) will be. 14 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1)-(2). 15 The ALJ may, but is not required to, explain how the other factors were considered. 20 16 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2). However, when two or more medical opinions or prior administrative 17 findings “about the same issue are both equally well-supported . . . and consistent with the record 18 . . . but are not exactly the same,” the ALJ must explain how “the other most persuasive factors in 19 paragraphs (c)(3) through (c)(5)” were considered. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(3). The Ninth 20 Circuit has confirmed that the new regulatory framework eliminates the “treating physician rule” 21 and displaces the longstanding case law requiring an ALJ to provide “specific and legitimate” or 22 “clear and convincing” reasons for rejecting a treating or examining doctor’s opinion. Woods v. 23 Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785 (9th Cir. 2022). Still, in rejecting any medical opinion as unsupported or 24 inconsistent, an ALJ must provide an explanation supported by substantial evidence. Id. In sum, 25 the ALJ “must ‘articulate . . . how persuasive’ [he or she] finds ‘all of the medical opinions’ from 26 each doctor or other source . . . and ‘explain how [he or she] considered the supportability and 27 consistency factors’ in reaching these findings.” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b), 28 404.1520(b)(2)). 1 With respect to mental limitations, the ALJ reviewed the medical record and the opinions 2 of State agency phycological consultants P. Caruso-Radin, Psy. D. and S. Koutrakos, Psy. D., as 3 well as psychological consultative examiner C. Chambers, Psy. D. AR 89. Dr. Caruso-Radin and 4 Dr. Koutrakos’s opinions were based on a review of the record and they each assessed only mild 5 and moderate limitations. AR 53-55; 70-72. The ALJ found these opinions persuasive, noting 6 “they are generally consistent with one another as well as with the mental status examinations 7 throughout the record.” AR 89. 8 On May 21, 2019, consultative psychologist Dr. Chambers examined plaintiff. AR 401- 9 405. Dr. Chambers found plaintiff had a cooperative attitude, with normal motor activities, good 10 eye contact, and no speech abnormalities. AR 403. Dr. Chambers found plaintiff had intact 11 intelligence, adequate attention, good concentration, an adequate fund of knowledge, adequate 12 memory, and intact abstract thinking. AR 403-404. Dr. Chambers also found plaintiff had intact 13 judgment, insight, and thought process. AR 404. Dr. Chambers recorded plaintiff’s mood as 14 significantly anxious, and noted that plaintiff denied current and/or recent suicidal ideation as 15 well as hallucinations. AR 404. Dr. Chambers diagnosed Plaintiff with major depressive 16 disorder, severe, as well as an unspecified anxiety disorder (AR 404). 17 Dr. Chambers opined that Plaintiff was not significantly limited in the following areas: 18 performing simple and repetitive tasks; performing detailed and complex tasks; and ability to 19 accept instructions from supervisors. AR 404-405. However, she opined the plaintiff had 20 moderate to marked limitations with maintaining regular attendance in the workplace, performing 21 work activities on a consistent basis and without special or additional supervision, and completing 22 a normal workday or workweek without interruptions and had marked limitations interacting with 23 co-workers and the public and dealing with work stresses. The ALJ addressed the opinion of Dr. 24 Chambers as follows: 25 This opinion is not persuasive because it is not supported by her in- person mental status examination of the claimant, which showed 26 claimant was cooperative, had good eye contact, displayed intact intelligence, had good concentration and adequate attention, and 27 displayed adequate fund of knowledge, memory, and abstract thinking as well as intact calculations, insight, judgment, and 28 throughout processes (Exhibit 4F). Additionally, the limitations 1 opined are not consistent with the mental status examinations throughout the record, which generally indicated the claimant had 2 intact memory, concentration, insight and judgment (Exhibits 10F). Furthermore, the limitations opined are inconsistent with the 3 claimant’s own reports of activities of daily living, including regularly leaving his house to take walks, taking his children to 4 school, and socializing with others (Exhibit 8E). Accordingly, the undersigned finds the opinions of the State agency consultants are 5 more persuasive for the reasons discussed above (Exhibits 1A; 3A). 6 AR 89-90. 7 Plaintiff asserts the ALJ’s rationale is “insufficient to support wholesale rejection of Dr. 8 Chambers’ opinion.” ECF No. 18 at 9. The court disagrees. First, the ALJ addressed the 9 supportability factor, finding Dr. Chambers’ opinion was not supported by her own examination 10 notes. AR 89. This is borne out by Dr. Chambers’ report, which contained unremarkable 11 observations. AR 401-02. For example, though Dr. Chambers opines that plaintiff “is markedly 12 limited due to anxiety and depression” with respect to his ability to interact with co-workers and 13 the public, the report contains no abnormal findings with result to plaintiff’s behavior. AR 405. 14 To the contrary, Dr. Chambers found plaintiff “interacted appropriately with the examiner 15 throughout the evaluation. No bizarre behavior was observed.” AR 401. The ALJ reasonably 16 concluded that Dr. Chambers’ opinion was not properly supported. 17 The ALJ also found Dr. Chambers’ opinion was not consistent with mental status 18 examinations throughout the record, which generally indicated that plaintiff had intact memory, 19 concentration, insight, and judgment. AR 89, 495, 502, 509, 513, 526. The ALJ also determined 20 that Dr. Chambers’ opinion was inconsistent with plaintiff’s own reports of daily activities, which 21 included self-reported social interaction. AR 89-90, 230-233. Accordingly, the ALJ adequately 22 reviewed Dr. Chambers’ opinion and assessed its internal supportability as well as its consistency 23 with other medical evidence and other evidence of record, as required by the applicable 24 regulations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1)-(2). The court finds no error here. 25 B. The ALJ Properly Rejected Plaintiff’s Subjective Testimony 26 The ALJ did not err in rejecting plaintiff’s subjective testimony regarding his mental 27 impairments. Evaluating the credibility of a plaintiff’s subjective testimony is a two-step process. 28 First, the ALJ must “determine whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of 1 an underlying impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other 2 symptoms alleged. . . . In this analysis, the claimant is not required to show that her impairment 3 could reasonably be expected to cause the severity of the symptom she has alleged; she need only 4 show that it could reasonably have caused some degree of the symptom.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 5 F.3d 995, 1014 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal citations omitted). Objective medical evidence of the 6 pain or fatigue itself is not required. Id. (internal citations omitted). Second, if the ALJ does not 7 find evidence of malingering, the ALJ may only reject the claimant’s testimony by offering 8 “specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” Id. (internal citations omitted). 9 Here, the ALJ’s opinion states that plaintiff’s testimony was discredited because it “is 10 inconsistent with the objective medical evidence, the claimant’s longitudinal medical history, as 11 well as with the claimant’s own statements.” AR 85. Plaintiff testified that he has been unable to 12 work due to low back pain, depression, and anxiety, since February 9, 2017. AR 18-23. Plaintiff 13 testified that his mental impairments cause panic attacks every other day and each panic attack 14 lasts about 30 minutes. AR 23-24. 15 In discrediting plaintiff, the ALJ primarily relied on a finding that the testimony was not 16 supported by the medical record, which contained mild findings and very limited mental health 17 treatment history. An ALJ may consider a claimant’s conservative treatment when assessing 18 subjective complaints. Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1434 (8th Cir, 1995) (conservative 19 treatment suggests a lower level of functional limitation than asserted by claimant). The ALJ 20 noted that “there is no evidence in the record that the claimant relied, on an ongoing basis, upon 21 medical treatment, mental health therapy, psychosocial support, or a highly structured setting, to 22 diminish the symptoms and signs of his mental disorder, that his adaptation to the requirements of 23 daily life is fragile, or that he has minimal capacity to adapt to changes in his environment or to 24 demands that are not already part of his daily life.” AR 84. Indeed, a medical record from March 25 2020 indicates that plaintiff had discontinued counseling services because “he felt the therapy was 26 unnecessary” and he was continuing to take his prescribed medications as directed. AR 433. 27 Though there is no requirement that a plaintiff be hospitalized to have a disabling mental health 28 condition, the ALJ reasonably concluded that in this case, that the lack of significant mental 1 health treatment conflicts with the intensity of symptoms described in plaintiff’s testimony. 2 Though plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to consider that plaintiff’s level of impairment 3 waxed and waned, the court finds that the ALJ did account for periods of more significant mental 4 impairment by assigning a fairly restrictive RFC with regard to mental limitations. AR 84 5 (limiting plaintiff to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks, performed in a work environment free 6 of fast-paced production requirements that involved only simple work-related changes and few, if 7 any, workplace changes, and only occasional interpersonal interaction with the general public, co- 8 workers, and supervisors). The court finds no error here. 9 C. The ALJ Properly Considered the Evidence 10 Finally, plaintiff asserts the ALJ erred by failing to consider evidence pertaining to mental 11 impairments dated after his date last insured. ECF No. 18 at 13. Plaintiff points to a footnote in 12 the ALJ decision which states: “Records after the claimant’s disability insured status expired may 13 indicate a subsequent progression in the severity of his psychological impairments (Exhibit 10F). 14 As noted above, the claimant’s earnings record shows that the claimant has acquired sufficient 15 quarters of coverage to remain insured through March 31, 2020 (hereinafter “the date last 16 insured”). Thus, the claimant must establish disability on or before that date in order to be 17 entitled to a period of disability and disability insurance benefits.” AR 88. Plaintiff argues this is 18 error because he need only establish that the onset of disability occurred before the date last 19 insured, not that he has been disabled for 12 months by the date last insured. ECF No. 18 at 13. 20 Plaintiff’s argument is not persuasive, particularly because the exhibit addressed by the 21 ALJ is a medical record indicating that a new incident occurred in September of 2020, after the 22 date last insured, that intensified plaintiff’s mental health symptoms. AR 464. Specifically, the 23 October 9, 2020 record states that “about a month ago a young man pulled a handgun on 24 [plaintiff] while he confronted the person for being on his property while attending a party at his 25 next-door neighbors house.” Id. The record goes on to state that following this threat, plaintiff’s 26 symptoms became “extreme hypervigilance, paranoia, nightmares w/ combative thrashing that 27 requires the client to sleep in a different room from his spouse to protect her, auditory 28 hallucinations, and constant anxiety and several panic attacks a day.” AR 464. This note does 1 || not indicate a natural, uninterrupted progression of a disability that onset before March 31, 2020. 2 || The court finds no error. 3 VI. CONCLUSION 4 For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 5 1. Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 18), is DENIED; 6 2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 23) is 7 || GRANTED; 8 3. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment for defendant, and close this case. 9 | DATED: September 14, 2023 10 thin Chane ALLISON CLAIRE 11 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 12
Document Info
Docket Number: 2:22-cv-00439
Filed Date: 9/15/2023
Precedential Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 6/20/2024