Adams v. City of Redding ( 2022 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CINDY ADAMS, individually and as No. 2:20-cv-01610-TLN-DMC Personal Representative to the Estate of 12 JESSE ADAMS, 13 Plaintiff, ORDER 14 v. 15 CITY OF REDDING; KYLE CORRIGAN, CHRISTOPHER STAUP, EDWARD 16 MCGINNIS, and DOES 4 through 10, 17 Defendants. 18 19 This matter is before the Court on Defendant City of Redding’s (“Defendant”) Motion to 20 Dismiss.1 (ECF No. 30.) Plaintiff Cindy Adams (“Plaintiff”) filed an opposition (ECF No. 31), 21 and Defendant replied (ECF No. 33). For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES 22 Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 27 1 Plaintiff alleges claims against multiple defendants, but only Defendant City of Redding brings the instant motion to dismiss. However, the Court notes the other named defendants have 28 not filed a responsive pleading to Plaintiff’s second amended complaint. 1 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiff’s claims arise from the death of Jesse Adams (“Mr. Adams”). (ECF No. 28.) On 3 December 22, 2019, Mr. Adams was stopped by police while driving through the City of 4 Redding. (Id. at 4.) During the traffic stop, Defendant Kyle Corrigan allegedly asked Mr. Adams 5 for identification and instructed him to put his hands in plain sight. (See id.) Plaintiff alleges that 6 despite Mr. Adams’s compliance with the instructions, Defendant Kyle Corrigan shattered Mr. 7 Adams’s vehicle window and sprayed pepper spray or mace inside the vehicle. (Id.) This 8 allegedly caused Mr. Adams to lose control of the vehicle and collide into a police vehicle 9 blocking his path. (Id. at 4–5.) After the collision, Defendant Christopher Staup allegedly 10 discharged his firearm, instantly killing Mr. Adams. (Id. at 5.) 11 Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and Mr. Adams’s estate, filed the instant action on August 12 11, 2020. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff filed the operative Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) on 13 June 16, 2021, alleging various federal and state claims, including two claims for Monell liability 14 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”). (ECF No. 28.) Plaintiff’s second claim alleges Monell 15 liability for unconstitutional custom, policy, or practice and Plaintiff’s fifth claim alleges Monell 16 liability for failure to train. (Id. at 6, 18.) Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s second and fifth 17 claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 30.) 18 II. STANDARD OF LAW 19 A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under 20 Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th 21 Cir. 2001). Rule 8(a) requires that a pleading contain “a short and plain statement of the claim 22 showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 23 (2009). Under notice pleading in federal court, the complaint must “give the defendant fair notice 24 of what the claim . . . is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 25 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citation and quotations omitted). “This simplified notice 26 pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define 27 disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 28 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002). 1 On a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true. 2 Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). A court is bound to give the plaintiff the benefit of every 3 reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded” allegations of the complaint. Retail 4 Clerks Int’l Ass’n v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). A plaintiff need not allege 5 “‘specific facts’ beyond those necessary to state his claim and the grounds showing entitlement to 6 relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (internal citation omitted). 7 Nevertheless, a court “need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of 8 factual allegations.” U.S. ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986). 9 While Rule 8(a) does not require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an 10 unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A 11 pleading is insufficient if it offers mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the 12 elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 13 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 14 statements, do not suffice.”). Thus, “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences 15 are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss” for failure to state a claim. Adams v. Johnson, 355 16 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Moreover, it is inappropriate to assume the 17 plaintiff “can prove facts that it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated the . . . laws 18 in ways that have not been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State 19 Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). 20 Ultimately, a court may not dismiss a complaint in which the plaintiff has alleged “enough 21 facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim 22 has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 23 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 24 678. While the plausibility requirement is not akin to a probability requirement, it demands more 25 than “a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. This plausibility inquiry is “a 26 context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and 27 common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, only where a plaintiff fails to “nudge [his or her] claims . . . 28 across the line from conceivable to plausible[,]” is the complaint properly dismissed. Id. at 680 1 (internal quotations omitted). 2 In ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court may consider only the complaint, any exhibits 3 thereto, and matters which may be judicially noticed pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201. 4 See Mir v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 844 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1988); Isuzu Motors Ltd. v. 5 Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1042 (C.D. Cal. 1998); see also Daniels- 6 Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010) (the court need not accept as true 7 allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice). 8 If a complaint fails to state a plausible claim, “‘[a] district court should grant leave to 9 amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading 10 could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.’” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 11 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)); 12 see also Gardner v. Martino, 563 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding no abuse of discretion in 13 denying leave to amend when amendment would be futile). Although a district court should 14 freely give leave to amend when justice so requires under Rule 15(a)(2), “the court’s discretion to 15 deny such leave is ‘particularly broad’ where the plaintiff has previously amended its 16 complaint[.]” Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 713 F.3d 502, 520 (9th Cir. 17 2013) (quoting Miller v. Yokohama Tire Corp., 358 F.3d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 2004)). 18 III. ANALYSIS 19 Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s second and fifth claims on the basis the factual 20 allegations are conclusory, do not rise to a constitutional violation, or do not show a longstanding 21 custom or practice. (ECF No. 30 at 2.) 22 The Court proceeds by addressing the standard for Monell liability before determining 23 whether the SAC states a claim regarding its second and fifth claims. 24 A. Legal Standard for Monell Liability 25 A municipality may not be vicariously liable under § 1983 for an injury caused by its 26 employee or agent. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 27 (1978). However, a municipal entity can be liable in a § 1983 case premised on: (1) an official 28 policy; (2) a “longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the standard operating procedure 1 of the local government entity”; (3) the act of an “official whose acts fairly represent official 2 policy such that the challenged action constituted official policy”; or (4) where “an official with 3 final policy-making authority ‘delegated that authority to, or ratified the decision of, a 4 subordinate.’” Price v. Sery, 513 F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Trevino v. Gates, 99 5 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996). 6 Additionally, a Monell claim “may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but 7 must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the 8 opposing party to defend itself effectively.” AE ex rel. Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 9 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011)). 10 B. Claim Two: Municipal Liability for Unconstitutional 11 Custom/Policy/Practice 12 Plaintiff’s SAC alleges there is a longstanding custom of failing to enforce the policies in 13 the Redding Police Department Policy Manual and she alleges Defendant’s officers failed to 14 adhere to twenty department policies because such policies are deficient or not enforced by 15 Defendant. (ECF No. 28 at ¶ 30.) Plaintiff further alleges there are twenty-two policies omitted 16 from the Redding Police Department Policy Manual that should have been included. (Id. at ¶ 31.) 17 Finally, Plaintiff cites to seven prior lawsuits against Defendant to show a longstanding custom or 18 practice of using excessive force against individuals who pose no immediate threat of death or 19 serious bodily injury. (See id. at ¶ 32.) 20 Where the plaintiff seeks to establish a Monell claim based on a longstanding custom, he 21 must prove that: (1) he possessed a constitutional right of which he was deprived; (2) the 22 municipality had a longstanding custom which amounted to a policy; (3) the custom amounts to 23 deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional right; and (4) the custom is the moving 24 force behind the constitutional violation. See Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 25 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. No. 40 Cnty. of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th 26 Cir. 1997)). “The custom must be so ‘persistent and widespread’ that it constitutes a ‘permanent 27 and well settled city policy.’” Trevino, 99 F.3d at 918 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 691). 28 “Liability for improper custom may not be predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents; it must be 1 founded upon practices of sufficient duration, frequency and consistency that the conduct has 2 become a traditional method of carrying out policy.” Id. 3 Defendant argues the allegations of customs and policies are conclusory. (ECF No. 30-1 4 at 9–11.) This Court disagrees with Defendant. The allegations are not, as Defendant claims, 5 “boilerplate conclusions” regarding excessive force. (See id. at 11.) Plaintiff has alleged specific 6 policies of Defendant — the rules and performance procedures of the Redding Police Department 7 Policy Manual — that were allegedly wrongfully ignored by Defendant’s officers in the incident 8 involving Mr. Adams. (See ECF No. 28 at ¶ 30.) Because Plaintiff’s allegations concern specific 9 policies in the Redding Police Department Policy Manual that Defendant’s officers did not 10 follow, the allegations are more detailed than in cases where the policy allegations were too 11 insufficiently detailed. See Garcia v. Cnty. of Napa, No. 21-cv-03519-HSG, 2022 WL 110650, at 12 *6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2022); see also Johnson v. Shasta Cnty., 83 F. Supp. 3d 918, 931 (E.D. 13 Cal. 2015) (holding that a list of specific policies was sufficient to state a Monell claim and 14 “g[a]ve [the defendant] fair notice to enable it to defend itself”). Thus, the Court finds the SAC 15 “contain[s] sufficient factual allegations to plausibly suggest a . . . custom.” Est. of Osuna v. 16 Cnty. of Stanislaus, 392 F. Supp. 3d 1162, 1174 (E.D. Cal. 2019). 17 As indicated, Plaintiff must also show the alleged custom is longstanding, which Plaintiff 18 attempts to do by alleging seven prior incidents involving Defendant’s officers that led to 19 lawsuits.2 (ECF No. 28 at ¶ 32.) Defendant argues the prior incidents are too few and dissimilar 20 to the instant case to show a longstanding custom.3 (See ECF No. 30-1 at 18.) In opposition, 21 Plaintiff argues that through the prior incidents Defendant has a custom and practice of: (1) using 22 excessive force against individuals who pose no immediate threat of death or serious bodily 23 2 The Court notes Defendant has indicated one of the prior lawsuits was ultimately 24 adjudicated in the defendants’ favor, and Plaintiff does not dispute this. (See ECF No. 30-1 at 18; ECF No. 31.) Thus, the Court does not consider that prior lawsuit, Frazier v. Redding Police 25 Dept., No. 2:11-cv-01351-AC, when evaluating Plaintiff’s allegations. 26 3 Defendant requests the Court take judicial notice of the dockets and papers of the prior 27 lawsuits. (ECF No. 30-2.) Because judicial notice of the prior lawsuits would not alter the Court’s ruling on the motion to dismiss infra, the Court DENIES Defendant’s request as 28 unnecessary. 1 injury; (2) shooting these types of individuals or using force so great that results in their death or 2 bodily injury; and (3) failing to discipline or retrain these officers as a result of their actions. 3 (ECF No. 31 at 16–17.) 4 The six prior incidents all led to lawsuits being filed over the span of six years. (See ECF 5 No. 28 at ¶ 32.) The incidents generally involve allegations of excessive force, with some of the 6 incidents involving deadly force. (See id.) Although Defendant argues the lawsuits are 7 insufficient because they are composed of allegations and no finding of liability (ECF No. 30-1 at 8 17–18), “[p]rior incidents involving lawsuits alone, even those which do not result in a finding or 9 admission of wrongdoing, can be sufficient for Monell liability purposes in the face of a motion to 10 dismiss.”4 Bagos v. Vallejo, No. 2:20-cv-00185-KJM-AC, 2020 WL 6043949, at *5 (E.D. Cal. 11 Oct. 13, 2020); see also McCoy v. City of Vallejo, No. 2:19-cv-001191-JAM-CKD, 2020 WL 12 374356, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2020). 13 Turning to Defendant’s argument that the prior incidents are too sporadic, the Court 14 acknowledges “[t]he line between ‘isolated or sporadic incidents’ and ‘persistent and widespread 15 conduct’ is not clearly delineated.” Warkentine v. Soria, No. 1:13-cv-01550-LJO-MJS, 2014 WL 16 2093656, at *6 (E.D. Cal. May 19, 2014). The six prior incidents led to cases being filed between 17 2013 and 2019, and more specifically, 2013 (one case), 2014 (three cases), 2015 (one case), 2019 18 (one case). (ECF No. 28 at ¶ 32.) The Court observes a gap of four years between the most 19 recent case and the second most recent case. However, this gap in time is not as significant as the 20 gaps in another case where the Monell allegations were found insufficient. See Est. of Mendez v. 21 City of Ceres, 390 F. Supp. 3d 1189, 1209 (E.D. Cal. 2019); see also Lemus v. Cnty. of Merced, 22 No. 1:15-cv-00359-MCE-EPG, 2016 WL 2930523, at *4 (E.D. Cal. May 19, 2016), aff’d, 711 F. 23 App’x 859 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[W]here more than a few incidents are alleged, the determination 24 25 4 While Defendant cites to Hughey v. Drummond, No. 2:14-cv-00037-TLN-AC, 2017 WL 26 590265 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2017) to argue allegations of prior wrongdoing are insufficient, this 27 Court in Hughey ultimately denied the motion to dismiss the Monell claim. Id. at *5. Thus, even though some of the prior incidents identified in Hughey settled before trial, that fact was 28 insufficient to cause the dismissal of the Monell claim. Id. 1 appears to require a fully-developed factual record.”). Therefore, the Court proceeds to examine 2 the factual similarity of the prior incidents to the instant case. 3 Defendant argues the prior incidents are not sufficiently similar because they did not 4 involve a single, fatal gunshot to a driver (ECF No. 30-1 at 20), but the factual similarity 5 requirement is not as rigorous as Defendant argues. See Ochoa v. City of San Jose, No. 21-cv- 6 02456-BLF, 2021 WL 7627630, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2021) (noting the defendants were “too 7 granular” in arguing that the prior incidents were factually dissimilar). As stated, the prior 8 incidents concern instances of alleged excessive force. (ECF No. 28 at ¶ 32.) Three of the prior 9 incidents, like the instant case, allegedly involved deadly force. (Id.; ECF No. 30-1 at 20–21.) 10 Additionally, two of the prior incidents allegedly involved officers shooting individuals, including 11 one incident involving deadly force. (ECF No. 28 at ¶ 32; ECF No. 30-1 at 20–21.) Moreover, 12 the majority of the prior incidents allegedly involved the use of force on individuals that posed no 13 immediate threat or were complying with officer commands (ECF No. 28 at ¶ 32; see also ECF 14 No. 30-1 at 20–21), which the SAC alleges was the case with Mr. Adams (see ECF No. 28 at 15 ¶ 16). Finally, the SAC alleges no officer was disciplined or retrained as a result of their actions 16 in the prior incidents. (Id. at ¶ 32); see J.M. by & Through Rodriguez v. Cnty. of Stanislaus, No. 17 1:18-cv-01034-LJO-SAB, 2018 WL 5879725, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2018). 18 Thus, the incidents alleged in the SAC are multiple, specific events in which significant 19 force was utilized by Defendant’s officers in situations where the force used may plausibly be 20 said to have been excessive. J.M. by & Through Rodriguez, 2018 WL 5879725, at *6; see also 21 McCoy, 2020 WL 374356, at *4 (finding sufficient factual similarity and noting how the prior 22 incidents, like the incident at issue, involved deadly officer shootings). Thus, the Court finds 23 sufficient similarity with the prior incidents to allow Plaintiff’s claim to survive the motion to 24 dismiss. 25 Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s second claim 26 for municipal liability for unconstitutional custom/policy/practice.5 27 5 Because the Court finds the allegations in paragraphs 30 and 32 of the SAC sufficient to 28 survive a motion to dismiss, the Court need not address Defendant’s arguments regarding 1 C. Claim Five – Failure to Train 2 The SAC alleges Defendant’s training policies were inadequate and Plaintiff identifies 3 twelve areas of allegedly inadequate training. (ECF No. 28 at ¶¶ 52, 54.) Plaintiff also alleges 4 examples of Defendant’s longstanding practices or customs by citing the same prior incidents 5 discussed supra. (See id. at ¶ 55.) 6 A failure to train or supervise can also amount to a “policy or custom” sufficient to 7 impose liability under § 1983 “where a municipality’s failure to train its employees in a relevant 8 respect evidences a ‘deliberate indifference’ to the rights of its inhabitants.” City of Canton, Ohio 9 v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989). The Ninth Circuit has addressed the circumstances under 10 which a Monell claim for failure to train can be asserted: 11 The first is a deficient training program, intended to apply over time to multiple employees. The continued adherence by policymakers to 12 an approach that they know or should know has failed to prevent tortious conduct by employees may establish the conscious disregard 13 for the consequences of their action — the deliberate indifference — necessary to trigger municipal liability. Further, the existence of a 14 pattern of tortious conduct by inadequately trained employees may tend to show that the lack of proper training, rather than a one-time 15 negligent administration of the program or factors peculiar to the officer involved in a particular incident, is the moving force behind 16 the plaintiff’s injury. 17 Long v. Cnty. of L.A., 442 F.3d 1178, 1186 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal citations and quotation marks 18 omitted). 19 Thus, allegations of prior incidents involving a defendant that resulted in litigation or 20 settlement can be sufficient to state a claim for failure to train. See Thurston v. City of Vallejo, 21 No. 2:19-cv-1902-KJM-CKD, 2021 WL 1839717, at *4–5 (E.D. Cal. May 7, 2021); McCoy, 22 2020 WL 374356, at *2–5. 23 Defendant argues the prior incidents alleged by Plaintiff do not show a failure to train for 24 the same reasons that the prior incidents are inadequate to support Plaintiff’s second claim. (ECF 25 No. 30-1 at 25.) For the same reasons as with Plaintiff’s second claim, the Court finds the alleged 26 27 paragraph 31 of the SAC. Moreover, as Defendant requests judicial notice of a policy manual in connection with the SAC’s paragraph 31 (ECF No. 30-2), the Court DENIES the request as 28 unnecessary. 1 | prior incidents are sufficient to state a claim for failure to train. See Thurston, 2021 WL 2 | 1839717, at *5; McCoy, 2020 WL 374356, at *4—5. 3 Therefore, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff's fifth claim for 4 | failure to train. 5 IV. CONCLUSION 6 For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. 7 | CECF No. 30.) Defendants City of Redding, Kyle Corrigan, Christopher Staup, and Edward 8 | McGinnis shall file an answer not later than twenty-one (21) days from the electronic filing 9 | date of this Order. 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 11 DATED: November 15, 2022 2 /) 13 “ Mh / Vockay 14 Troy L. Nunley ] 15 United States District Judge 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 | ° Because the Court finds the allegations of prior incidents are sufficient to cause □□□□□□□□□□□ claim to survive the motion to dismiss, the Court need not address Defendant’s argument that 28 | Plaintiffs other failure to train allegations are conclusory. 10