Shanmugam v. Mercedes-Benz USA LLC ( 2022 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ----oo0oo---- 11 12 ARULSENTHILK SHANMUGAM, an No. 2:20-cv-01647 WBS KJN individual, and SUJAI 13 SHANMUGASUNDARAM, an individual, 14 Plaintiffs, ORDER 15 v. 16 MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability 17 Company, and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive, 18 Defendants. 19 20 ----oo0oo---- 21 22 Plaintiffs have filed a bill of costs totaling $555.00. 23 (Docket No. 17.) Although defendant has not objected, Federal 24 Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) and Local Rule 292, which govern 25 taxation of costs, provide that costs are available only to the 26 “prevailing party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1); E.D. Cal. Local R. 27 292(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (enumerating taxable costs). 28 It is “well-settled” that “[a] ‘prevailing party’ . . . 1 is a party that has been afforded some relief by the court.” 2 York v. Beard, 1:14-cv-1234 LJO GSA PC, 2016 WL 7324703, at *1 3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2016) (citing Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, 4 Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603 5 (2001); Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. U.S. Bureau of Land 6 Mgmt., 589 F.3d 1027, 1030 (9th Cir. 2009)). In other words, “to 7 be considered a prevailing party . . ., a plaintiff must not only 8 achieve some material alteration of the legal relationship of the 9 parties, but that change must also be judicially sanctioned.” 10 P.N. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 474 F.3d 1165, 1171 (9th Cir. 11 2007) (quoting Shapiro v. Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 374 12 F.3d 857, 865 (9th Cir. 2004)). The Ninth Circuit has held that, 13 where a case is “resolved by a settlement agreement signed only 14 by the parties,” -- i.e., one that lacks a “judicial imprimatur” 15 -- a plaintiff is not a prevailing party eligible for costs. See 16 id. at 1167, 1171-73 (citing Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 600). 17 Plaintiffs have not been “afforded . . . relief by the 18 court.” Rather, judgment was entered in favor of defendant as to 19 one of plaintiffs’ claims, (Docket No. 13), and plaintiffs 20 stipulated to dismissal of the remaining claims, (Docket No. 14). 21 Although the probable explanation for the parties’ joint 22 stipulation of dismissal is that a settlement was reached, the 23 court has received no indication that such a settlement was 24 judicially sanctioned. See P.N., 474 F.3d at 1171; see, e.g., 25 Justin R. ex rel. Jennifer R. v. Matayoshi, 561 F. App’x 619, 620 26 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding existence of settlement agreement 27 providing for district court’s retention of jurisdiction, 28 together with fact that verbal settlement was reached before nnn nme ne nn nnn nnn nn nnn nn nn nn nnn neo nn es I OD 1 | magistrate judge during court-initiated settlement conference, 2 “provided sufficient judicial imprimatur”). Accordingly, the 3 court cannot conclude that plaintiffs were prevailing parties in 4 this case and therefore declines to award the requested costs. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED.1} 6 Dated: April 21, 2022 eh teow HK. fate, Se 7 WILLIAM B. SHUBB UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 1 Nothing in this Order should be construed as preventing 5 the parties from arranging for payment of costs via their own > agreement. Because defendant did not respond to plaintiffs’ bill 26 of costs, the court invited defendant to do so (Docket No. 18), but defendant did not. To the extent that defendant’s lack of 27 opposition may mean defendant is agreeable to paying the costs plaintiffs identify, defendant is free to do so without the 28 | court’s involvement.