(PC) Moore v. Dodd ( 2022 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MARCUS J. MOORE, 1:20-cv-01321-GSA-PC 12 Plaintiff, ORDER FOR CLERK TO RANDOMLY 13 ASSIGN A UNITED STATES DISTRICT v. JUDGE TO THIS CASE 14 MICHELE DODD, et al., AND 15 Defendants. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 16 RECOMMENDING THAT THIS CASE BE DISMISSED, WITH PREJUDICE, FOR 17 FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM 18 (ECF No. 14.) 19 OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS 20 21 I. BACKGROUND 22 Marcus J. Moore (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis 23 with this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On September 15, 2020, Plaintiff filed 24 the Complaint commencing this action. (ECF No. 1.) On November 8, 2021, the Court dismissed 25 the Complaint for failure to state a claim, with leave to amend. (ECF No. 13.) On December 10, 26 2021, Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint, which is now before the court for screening. 27 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 28 1 II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT 2 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 3 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 4 Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 5 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 6 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 7 “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall 8 dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that the action or appeal fails to state a claim 9 upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 10 A complaint is required to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 11 the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 12 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 13 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 14 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken 15 as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, 16 Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To state 17 a viable claim, Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim 18 to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 19 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal 20 conclusions are not. Id. The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this 21 plausibility standard. Id. 22 III. SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 23 Plaintiff is a state prisoner presently incarcerated at the R.J. Donovan Correctional 24 Facility in San Diego, California. The events at issue in the Complaint allegedly occurred at 25 Valley State Prison in Chowchilla, California, when Plaintiff was incarcerated there in the 26 custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). Plaintiff names 27 as the sole defendant Michele Dodd (Social Worker) (“Defendant”). 28 Plaintiff allegations follow: 1 On July 21, 2020, Defendant Social Worker Michele Dodd lowered Plaintiff’s level of 2 mental health care, violating Plaintiff’s right to adequate medical care. Defendant Dodd knew 3 the seriousness of Plaintiff’s mental health needs, yet still acted against Plaintiff. Dodd was not 4 Plaintiff’s clinician and was not part of Plaintiff’s treatment team. By doing this, Defendant 5 Dodd also violated CDCR’s Mental Health Program Guide under the Coleman v. Wilson 6 decision. 7 Plaintiff requests monetary damages, including punitive damages, as relief. 8 IV. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS 9 A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 10 The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides: 11 Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, 12 or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 13 secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . . 14 15 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “[Section] 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely 16 provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Graham v. Connor, 490 17 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)); see also 18 Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979); Hall v. City of Los Angeles, 19 697 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2012); Crowley v. Nevada, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 2012); 20 Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006). 21 B. Mental Health Care Claim – Eighth Amendment 22 Prisoners’ mental health needs are among the medical needs covered by the Eighth 23 Amendment. See Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Hoptowit 24 v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982) (mental health care requirements analyzed as part 25 of general health care requirements), abrogated in part on other grounds by Sandin v. Connor, 26 515 U.S. 472 (1995). Where a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment claim arises in the context of 27 medical care, including mental health care, the prisoner must allege and prove “acts or omissions 28 sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle v. 1 Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). An Eighth Amendment medical claim has two elements: “the 2 seriousness of the prisoner’s medical need and the nature of the defendant’s response to that 3 need.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds by 4 WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). This principle extends to 5 an inmate’s mental-health-care needs. Smith v. Jenkins, 919 F.2d 90, 92–93 (8th Cir. 1990). 6 Deliberate indifference by prison personnel to an inmate’s serious mental-health-care 7 needs violates the inmate’s Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual 8 punishment. Id. Deliberate indifference is shown by “a purposeful act or failure to respond to a 9 prisoner’s pain or possible medical need, and harm caused by the indifference.” Jett, 439 F.3d 10 at 1096 (citing McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060). In order to state a claim for violation of the Eighth 11 Amendment, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to support a claim that the named defendants 12 “[knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to [plaintiff’s] health . . . .” Farmer v. Brennan, 13 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). 14 The two-part test for deliberate indifference requires the plaintiff to show (1) “‘a serious 15 medical need’ by demonstrating that ‘failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further 16 significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’” and (2) “the defendant’s 17 response to the need was deliberately indifferent.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (quoting McGuckin, 18 974 F.2d at 1059, overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc., 104 F.3d at 1136 (en banc) 19 (internal quotations omitted)). 20 Deliberate indifference may be manifested “when prison officials deny, delay or 21 intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it may be shown by the way in which prison 22 physicians provide medical care.” Id. Where a prisoner is alleging a delay in receiving medical 23 treatment, the delay must have led to further harm in order for the prisoner to make a claim of 24 deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. McGuckin at 1060 (citing Shapely v. Nevada 25 Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985)). 26 “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 27 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). “Under this standard, the prison official must not only ‘be aware of the 28 facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but 1 that person ‘must also draw the inference.’” Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). “‘If 2 a prison official should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated 3 the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.’” Id. (quoting Gibson v. County of 4 Washoe, Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002)). “A showing of medical malpractice or 5 negligence is insufficient to establish a constitutional deprivation under the Eighth Amendment.” 6 Id. at 1060. “[E]ven gross negligence is insufficient to establish a constitutional violation.” Id. 7 (citing Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990)). 8 “A difference of opinion between a prisoner-patient and prison medical authorities 9 regarding treatment does not give rise to a § 1983 claim.” Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 10 1344 (9th Cir. 1981) (internal citation omitted). 11 Plaintiff has not provided sufficient facts for the court to determine whether he states an 12 Eighth Amendment claim against the Defendant. Plaintiff has not established that he had a 13 serious medical need when he interacted with Defendant Dodd, and to state a claim, Plaintiff 14 must allege specific facts demonstrating that the Defendant knew and understood that Plaintiff 15 had a serious medical need and was at substantial risk of serious harm (objective prong). Plaintiff 16 has not done so. 17 Neither has Plaintiff alleged sufficient facts showing what the individual Defendant 18 personally did that violated his constitutional rights. Specifically, Plaintiff has not alleged 19 detailed facts showing that Defendant knew he had a serious medical need, knew he was at 20 excessive risk of serious harm, and yet ignored the risk or otherwise acted unreasonably while 21 knowing about the risk (subjective prong). Based on Plaintiff’s existing allegations, Plaintiff 22 demonstrates at most that his claim is based on a difference of opinion with the Defendant 23 regarding treatment, which does not give rise to a § 1983 claim. 24 Based on the foregoing, the court finds that Plaintiff fails to state an Eighth Amendment 25 medical claim against Defendant Dodd. 26 C. Violation Of Prison Rules 27 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Dodd violated the rules in CDCR’s Mental Health 28 Program Guide. Plaintiff is advised that violation of state tort law, state regulations, rules and 1 policies of the CDCR, or other state law is not sufficient to state a claim for relief under § 1983. 2 Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for violations of state law. See Galen v. Cnty. 3 of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 662 (9th Cir. 2007). To state a claim under § 1983, there must be 4 a deprivation of federal constitutional or statutory rights. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); 5 also see Buckley v. City of Redding, 66 F.3d 188, 190 (9th Cir. 1995); Gonzaga University v. 6 Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 279 (2002). 7 Although the court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims, Plaintiff 8 must first have a cognizable claim for relief under federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. In this 9 instance, the Court has not found a cognizable federal claim in the Complaint and therefore 10 Plaintiff’s potential state claim(s) fail as well. 11 Moreover, “California’s Government Claims Act requires that a tort claim against a 12 [state] public entity or its employees for money or damages be presented to the [Department of 13 General Services] no more than six months after the cause of action accrues.” Lopez v. Cate, 14 No. 1:10-cv-01773-AWI, 2015 WL 1293450, at *13 (E.D. Cal. 2015) (citing Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 15 905.2, 910, 911.2, 945.4, 950-950.2). “Timely claim presentation is not merely a procedural 16 requirement, but is . . . a condition precedent to plaintiff’s maintaining an action against defendant 17 and thus an element of the plaintiff’s cause of action.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations 18 omitted). The “obligation to comply with the Government Claims Act” is independent of the 19 obligation to exhaust administrative remedies pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act. 20 McCoy v. Torres, No. 119CV01023NONEJLTPC, 2020 WL 5257842, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 21 2020), report and recommendation adopted, No. 119CV01023NONEJLTPC, 2021 WL 111748 22 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2021) (citing McPherson v. Alamo, No. 3:15-cv-03145-EMC, 2016 WL 23 7157634, at *6 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (citing Parthemore v. Col, 221 Cal. App. 4th 1372, 1376 (2013)). 24 In the present case, Plaintiff has not sufficiently pleaded facts demonstrating that he complied 25 with the Government Claims Act in bringing his state law claims. 26 Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendant for violation of the rules in 27 CDCR’s Mental Health Program Guide. 28 1 V. CONCLUSION, ORDER, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2 For the reasons set forth above, the court finds that Plaintiff fails to state any cognizable 3 claims in the Complaint against Defendant Michele Dodd. Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules 4 of Civil Procedure, “[t]he court should freely give leave to amend when justice so requires.” 5 However, a district court may deny leave to amend when amendment would be futile.” Hartmann 6 v. CDCR, 707 F.3d 1114, 1130 (9th Cir. 2013). In this action, the Court previously granted 7 Plaintiff an opportunity to amend the complaint, with guidance by the Court. Plaintiff has now 8 filed two complaints without alleging facts against any Defendants which states a claim under § 9 1983. The Court finds that the deficiencies outlined above are not capable of being cured by 10 amendment, and therefore further leave to amend should not be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 11 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000). 12 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of Court randomly assign a 13 United States District Judge to this case; 14 AND 15 Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 16 1. This case be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim; and 17 2. The Clerk be directed to enter judgment and close this case. 18 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 19 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen 20 (14) days after the date of service of these findings and recommendations, Plaintiff may file 21 written objections with the court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to 22 Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file 23 objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. 24 Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 25 (9th Cir. 1991)). 26 IT IS SO ORDERED. 27 28 Dated: November 22, 2022 /s/ Gary S. Austin UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28