Martinez v. City of Clovis ( 2022 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 12 13 DESIREE MARTINEZ, No. 1:15-cv-00683-JAM-SKO 14 Plaintiff, 15 v. ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS CITY 16 CITY OF CLOVIS, et al. OF CLOVIS, CITY OF SANGER, HERSHBERGER, YAMBUPAH, SANDERS 17 Defendants. AND HIGH’S BILL OF COSTS 18 19 The City of Sanger, the City of Clovis, Officers 20 Hershberger, Yambupah, Sanders, and High (“Defendants”) request 21 $14,999.66 in costs after the Court granted summary judgment in 22 their favor. Bill of Costs, ECF No. 212. Desiree Martinez 23 (“Plaintiff”) opposed awarding many of these costs. See Opp’n, 24 ECF No. 213. For the reasons stated below, the Court grants in 25 part and denies in part Defendants’ bill of costs.1 26 27 1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was scheduled 28 for March 15, 2022. 1 I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2 In 2015, Plaintiff sued Defendants, among others, for their 3 handling of her domestic abuse complaints. First. Am. Compl., 4 ECF No. 6. In August 2017, Defendants moved for summary 5 judgment, which the Court granted in part and denied in part. 6 Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Mot. for Summ. J., ECF 7 No. 94. Specifically, the Court granted summary judgment to the 8 City of Clovis, the City of Sanger, Hershberger, Yambupah, and 9 Sanders. Id. at 2. With respect to High, the Court granted 10 summary judgment on the Equal Protection claim but denied summary 11 judgment on the Due Process claim. Id. Plaintiff appealed the 12 grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of Clovis, the 13 City of Sanger, Hershberger, Yambupah, and Sanders, which the 14 Ninth Circuit affirmed. Ninth Circuit Order, ECF No. 123. 15 Thereafter, Defendant High again moved for summary judgment on 16 the Due Process claim. High’s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 206. 17 The Court granted High’s renewed motion. Order Granting High’s 18 Renewed Mot. for Summ. J, ECF No. 210. Defendants subsequently 19 submitted this bill of costs. 20 II. OPINION 21 A. Legal Standard 22 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) allows for a 23 prevailing party to be awarded taxable costs other than 24 attorneys’ fees. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). This rule creates a 25 presumption that costs will be taxed against the losing party, 26 but “vests in the district court discretion to refuse to award 27 costs” if the losing party shows why costs should not be 28 awarded. Ass’n of Mexican-Am. Educators v. State of California, 1 231 F.3d 572, 591-92 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). “Although a 2 district court must ‘specify reasons’ for its refusal to tax 3 costs to the losing party [the Ninth Circuit has] never held 4 that a district court must specify reasons for its decision to 5 abide the presumption and tax costs to the losing party.” Save 6 Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 945 (9th Cir. 2003) 7 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 8 28 U.S.C. § 1920 generally defines the expenses that may be 9 taxed as costs under Rule 54(d). See Crawford Fitting Co. v. 10 J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 441-42 (1987). Pursuant to 28 11 U.S.C. § 1920, a judge or court clerk may tax as costs: fees of 12 the clerk and marshal; fees for printed or electronically 13 recorded transcripts necessarily obtained for use in the case; 14 fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses; fees for 15 copies of necessary papers; docket fees; and compensation of 16 court appointed experts. 28 U.S.C § 1920. 17 B. Analysis 18 1. Transcripts 19 Fees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts are 20 recoverable so long as they were “necessarily obtained for use 21 in the case.” 28 U.S.C. 1920(2). A document need not be 22 offered as evidence to have been necessarily obtained for use in 23 the case. Haagen-Dazs Co., Inc. v. Double Rainbow Gourmet Ice 24 Creams, Inc., 920 F.2d 587, 588 (9th Cir. 1990). However, 25 depositions “merely useful for discovery” are not taxable “and 26 their expense should have been borne by the party taking them, 27 as incidental to normal preparation for trial.” Indep. Iron 28 Works, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 322 F.2d 656, 678 (9th Cir. 1 1963). “When a deposition is not actually used at trial or as 2 evidence on some successful preliminary motion, whether its 3 costs may be taxed generally is determined by deciding if the 4 deposition reasonably seemed necessary at the time it was 5 taken.” 10 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay 6 Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2676 (4th ed. 2022). 7 Defendants seek $3,398.90 in deposition transcript 8 expenses, $5,126.67 for the cost of the transcript of a related 9 criminal proceeding, $315.25 for the summary judgment hearing 10 transcript, and $260.50 for the cost of transcribing a telephone 11 recording. Plaintiff disputes all but $2,083.20 – the costs for 12 the depositions of Plaintiff, Kristina Hershberger, Angela 13 Yambupah, Kyle Pennington, and Channon High – which were used in 14 their summary judgment motions. Opp’n at 3. Plaintiff opposes 15 the remaining $7,018.07, on the grounds that Defendants have not 16 shown why those materials reasonably seemed necessary at the 17 time. Id. The Court agrees. Defendants offer no explanation 18 for why these other depositions and transcripts seemed necessary 19 at the time. However, the Court will allow $315.25 for the 20 summary judgment hearing transcript, which was also used in a 21 dispositive motion. Ex. A. to Def. High’s Motion for Summ. J., 22 ECF No. 206-3. The Court therefore reduces the taxable costs 23 for depositions and transcripts from $9,101.32 to $2,398.45. 24 2. Witness Fees 25 Section 1821(b) limits witness fees, other than court- 26 appointed experts, to “an attendance fee of $40 per day” at a 27 deposition or trial, plus other travel expenses where 28 applicable. Here, Defendants seek $1,255 in witness fees. 1 Because they have not indicated their witness costs with 2 sufficient specificity for the Court to determine which costs 3 are allowable as attendance fees, travel expenses, or 4 subsistence allowances the Court does not grant Defendants these 5 costs. 6 3. Other Costs 7 Defendants also seek reimbursement for $1,833.34 in 8 mediation expenses, $292.81 for Federal Express expenses, and 9 $2,525.22 for the costs of obtaining files from another 10 attorney. However, Defendants do not offer any authority or 11 explanation for why such fees are taxable as costs. 12 Accordingly, the Court declines to award this additional 13 $4,651.37. 14 4. Final Reductions 15 As explained above, the Court finds Defendants are entitled 16 to $2,398.45 in costs. However, Defendants Jesus Santillan and 17 Ralph Salazar were dismissed in June 2017, conditioned upon a 18 mutual waiver of costs and fees. Stip. and Order Dismissing 19 Defs. Santillan and Salazar, ECF No. 70. Accordingly, the Court 20 reduces the deposition transcript costs by one-fourth, from 21 $2,083.20 to $1,562.40, to account for their share of the costs. 22 That, plus the $315.25 cost for the summary judgment hearing 23 transcript, incurred after Defendants Santillan and Salazar were 24 dismissed, amounts to $1,877.65. 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// eee eee enn nnn nn nn nn EID EO 1 Til. ORDER 2 For the reasons set forth above, the Court awards costs to 3 Defendants in the amount of $1,877.65. 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. 5 | Dated: April 26, 2022 Lh Ion 7 teiren staves odermacr 7008 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28