Halaapiapi v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. ( 2023 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 11 FELETI HALAAPIAPI No. 2 :22-cv-01237-TLN-KJN 12 Plaintiff, 13 ORDER v. 14 WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.; U.S. 15 BANK TRUST NATIONAL ASSOCIATION; ABULLA 16 NOORISTANI; HAMID AZIZ; RAASHDA KHAN; and DOES 1-10, 17 inclusive 18 Defendants. 19 20 21 22 This matter is before the Court on Defendants Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”) 23 and U.S. Bank Trust National Association’s (“U.S. Bank”) (collectively, “Defendants”) Motion to 24 Dismiss.1 (ECF No. 11.) Plaintiff Feleti Halaapiapi (“Plaintiff”) filed an opposition. (ECF No. 25 15.) Defendants filed a reply. (ECF No. 17.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court hereby 26 GRANTS Defendants’ motion. 27 28 1 The remaining Defendants did not join in this motion. 1 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2 This case arises from a completed foreclosure relating to a home loan that Sione Tenefufu 3 and Kalolaine Tenefufu obtained from Wells Fargo’s predecessor-in-interest in 2007. (ECF No. 8 4 at 3.) Plaintiff brings this action “as trustee of the Sione and Kalolaine Tenefufu Family Trust.” 5 (Id. at 1.) Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on August 15, 2022, 6 alleging: (1) a violation of California Civil Code § 2924(a)(1); (2) negligence; (3) wrongful 7 foreclosure; (4) unfair business practices in violation of California Business & Professions Code § 8 17200; and (5) cancellation of written instruments. (Id. at 5–10.) Defendants filed the instant 9 motion to dismiss on September 6, 2022. (ECF No. 11.) 10 II. STANDARD OF LAW 11 A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under 12 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a 13 complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Rule 8(a) requires that a 14 pleading contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 15 relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009). Under 16 notice pleading in federal court, the complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . 17 claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 18 (2007) (internal citation and quotations omitted). “This simplified notice pleading standard relies 19 on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and 20 to dispose of unmeritorious claims.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002). 21 On a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of the complaint must be accepted as 22 true. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). A court must give the plaintiff the benefit of every 23 reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded” allegations of the complaint. Retail 24 Clerks Int’l Ass’n v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). A plaintiff need not allege 25 “‘specific facts’ beyond those necessary to state his claim and the grounds showing entitlement to 26 relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (internal citation omitted). 27 Nevertheless, a court “need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of 28 factual allegations.” U.S. ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1 1986). While Rule 8(a) does not require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an 2 unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A 3 pleading is insufficient if it offers mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the 4 elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 5 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 6 statements, do not suffice.”). Thus, “[c]onclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences 7 are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss” for failure to state a claim. Adams v. Johnson, 355 8 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Moreover, it is inappropriate to assume the 9 plaintiff “can prove facts that it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated the . . . laws in 10 ways that have not been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council 11 of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). 12 Ultimately, a court may not dismiss a complaint in which the plaintiff has alleged “enough 13 facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim 14 has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 15 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 16 680. While the plausibility requirement is not akin to a probability requirement, it demands more 17 than “a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678. This plausibility 18 inquiry is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 19 experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, only where a plaintiff fails to “nudge [his or 20 her] claims . . . across the line from conceivable to plausible[,]” is the complaint properly 21 dismissed. Id. at 680 (internal quotations omitted). 22 III. ANALYSIS 23 Defendants move to dismiss the FAC in its entirety for two reasons: (1) indispensable 24 parties are missing from this action; and (2) Plaintiff lacks standing to challenge the completed 25 foreclosure.2 The Court will address Defendants’ arguments in turn. 26 27 1. 2 Defendants raise various other grounds for dismissal. Because the Court concludes the FAC should be dismissed in its entirety based on these threshold issues, the 28 Court declines to address Defendants’ remaining arguments. 1 A. Indispensable Parties 2 Defendants first argue the Court should dismiss this action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(7) 3 because Plaintiff fails to join indispensable parties under Rule 19. (ECF No. 11 at 10–11.) More 4 specifically, Defendants argue Rule 19 requires joinder of the borrowers for the subject loan — 5 Sione Tenefufu and Kalolaine Tenefufu. (Id. at 11.) Plaintiff fails to address this argument in its 6 opposition. (ECF No. 15.) 7 When a party makes a motion under Rule 12(b)(7), the court undertakes a three-part 8 inquiry. First, it asks if the absent party is “necessary (i.e., required to be joined if feasible) under 9 Rule 19(a).” Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist. v. Lee, 672 F.3d 1176, 1179 10 (9th Cir. 2012). If so, the court asks whether it is “feasible to order that the absent party be 11 joined.” Id. If it is not feasible to join the absent party, the court asks whether the case can 12 proceed without it — and if not, dismisses the action. Id. 13 Turning to the first inquiry, an absentee party is “necessary” under Rule 19 if the party has 14 a claimed interest in the action. Shermoen v. United States, 982 F.2d 1312, 1317 (9th Cir. 1992). 15 Just adjudication of claims requires that courts protect a party’s right to be heard with the 16 concomitant right “to participate in adjudication of a claimed interest.” Id. Thus, a party is 17 “necessary” under Rule 19(a) if “that person claims an interest relating to the subject action” such 18 that it would “impair or impede the person’s ability to protect the interest” or would “leave an 19 existing party subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent 20 obligations because of that interest.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(B). 21 According to the FAC and attachments thereto, Sione Tenefufu and Kalolaine Tenefufu 22 obtained a $142,800 loan from Wells Fargo’s predecessor-in-interest in 2007 and pledged their 23 interest in the subject property as security for their home loan in a Deed of Trust. (ECF No. 8 at 24 3; ECF No. 8-1.) As persons claiming an interest in the subject property to this action, it appears 25 the Tenefufus are necessary parties under Rule 19(a). See Galang v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 16- 26 cv-03468-HSG, 2017 WL 1210021, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2017) (finding the plaintiff’s wife to 27 be a “required party” under Rule 19(a) because she pledged her interest in the subject property as 28 a co-borrower with her husband and Wells Fargo would be at risk of multiple potentially 1 inconsistent obligations without her participation). 2 The Court next considers whether it is feasible for the Tenefufus to be joined in the action. 3 E.E.O.C. v. Peabody Western Coal Co., 400 F.3d 774, 779 (9th Cir. 2005). Rule 19(a) provides 4 “three circumstances in which joinder is not feasible: when venue is improper; when the absentee 5 is not subject to personal jurisdiction; and when joinder would destroy subject matter 6 jurisdiction.” Id. Even if joinder of a necessary party is not feasible, “a plaintiff must 7 nevertheless allege the name of the necessary party and the reasons for not joining that person.” 8 G.M. v. Poole, No. 2:17-cv-02415-TLN-CKD, 2019 WL 4318573, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 9 2019) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(c)). 10 Plaintiff has not addressed the feasibility of joining the Tenefufus to this action, and there 11 is nothing in the record that would suggest any of the three circumstances rendering joinder 12 infeasible would apply. By failing to address this issue, Plaintiff essentially concedes the 13 infirmity of her claims. See Marziano v. Cnty. of Marin, No. C-10-2740 EMC, 2010 WL 14 3895528, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2010) (viewing the plaintiff’s “failure to oppose the argument 15 as a concession that the . . . claim should be dismissed”). Accordingly, there is no indication that 16 joinder would be infeasible. 17 Even if joinder is infeasible, the Court must finally determine “whether the absent party is 18 indispensable such that without joinder the action cannot proceed in ‘equity and good 19 conscience.’” Bickoff v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 11-cv-02452 BEN (WVG), 2012 WL 3637381, 20 at *3 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b)). There are four factors for assessing whether a party is 21 indispensable: (1) the extent to which “a judgment rendered in the person’s absence might be 22 prejudicial to the person or those already parties”; (2) the extent to which the prejudice can be 23 lessened by the shaping of relief or protective provisions in the judgment; (3) “whether a 24 judgment rendered in the person’s absence will be adequate”; (4) and “whether the plaintiff will 25 have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.” Shermoen v. United States, 26 982 F.2d 1312, 1318–19 (9th Cir. 1992). 27 The parties fail to adequately address this final inquiry. However, for the same reasons 28 already discussed and absent argument to the contrary, the Court concludes the Tenefufus are 1 indispensable parties to this action and dismissal is proper. 2 Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(7). 3 B. Standing 4 Defendants next argue Plaintiff lacks the required standing to bring this action because 5 “only a party to a contract or an intended third-party beneficiary has standing to sue under a 6 contract.” (ECF No. 11 at 11.) In opposition, Plaintiff only addresses standing for the Unfair 7 Competition Law (“UCL”) claim and argues “they have suffered damages” such as loss of the 8 home, litigation expenses, and other fees related to the foreclosure. (ECF No. 15 at 14.). 9 The Court agrees with Defendants. Based on the allegations in the FAC, it appears the 10 only named Plaintiff in this action is not a party to the contract. Several district courts in the 11 Ninth Circuit have concluded that “[a] person who is not a party to a contract does not have 12 standing either to seek its enforcement or to bring tort claims based on the contractual 13 relationship.” Ambers v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 13-CV-03940 NC, 2014 WL 883752, at *4 14 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2014); see also Somerville as Tr. of Saint Andrews Tr. v. Wells Fargo Bank, 15 N.A., No. 2:18-CV-02033-JAM-EFB, 2018 WL 6201953, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2018) 16 (holding there was no standing as plaintiff was not a party to the loan); Bianchi v. Bank of Am., 17 N.A., No. 12CV750-MMA MDD, 2012 WL 11946982, at *2 (S.D. Cal. May 17, 2012) (holding 18 plaintiff did not have standing to sue regarding a loan in her husband’s name as she was not a 19 party to the loan); Willis v. Affinia Default Servs., LLC, No. 2:19-CV-02440-ODW-SKX, 2019 20 WL 3841796, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2019) (holding plaintiff, even as a third party beneficiary 21 and executer of the estate, did not have standing as she was not a party to the loan). Additionally, 22 district courts have consistently held that a plaintiff who is not a party to a mortgage loan cannot 23 assert, among other claims, UCL or fraud claims against a lender for improper disclosures. See 24 Ambers, 2014 WL 883752, at *4 (collecting cases). 25 Plaintiff fails to explain how she has standing to bring this action as a non-party to the 26 contract. Instead, Plaintiff argues only that she has standing to bring a UCL claim. (ECF No. 15 27 at 10.) To support this contention, Plaintiff cites two factually distinct cases without any 28 meaningful analysis. (ECF No. 15 at 10.) For example, Sacchi is irrelevant to the instant case 1 | because the costs awarded were for plaintiff's efforts to prevent a foreclosure, not overturn one. 2 | Sacchi v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., No. CV 11-1658 AHM CWX, 2011 WL 2533029 3 | (C.D. Cal. June 24, 2011). In sum, Plaintiffs inadequate briefing is insufficient to persuade the 4 | Court that she has standing to bring this action on behalf of the Tenefufus. 5 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss based on Plaintiffs lack 6 | of standing. 7 IV. CONCLUSION 8 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss with leave 9 | toamend. (ECF No. 11.) Plaintiff may file an amended complaint not later than thirty (30) days 10 | from the electronic filing date of this Order. Defendants shall file a responsive pleading not later 11 | than twenty-one (21) days from the electronic filing date of the amended complaint. If Plaintiff 12 | opts not to amend the FAC, the Court will dismiss this action and close the case. 13 IT IS SO ORDERED. 14 Date: September 15, 2023 15 16 { /) 7 “ ! the 18 Troy L. Nuhlep ] 19 United States District Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28