Lampkin v. Spangner ( 2022 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 TRISHKA LAMPKIN AND ROBERT No. 2:20-cv-01204-JAM-JDP CORTEZ, 12 Plaintiffs, 13 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ v. MOTION TO VACATE 14 COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, M. SPANGER 15 in his official capacity, and MATTHEW CORTEZ, 16 Defendants. 17 18 This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ motion to 19 vacate the Court’s orders granting Defendant’s motion for summary 20 judgment and motion for sanctions. See Mot. to Vacate (“Mot.”), 21 ECF No. 28; Order Granting MSJ, ECF No. 25; Order Granting 22 Sanctions, ECF No. 26. For the reasons set forth below, the 23 Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion to vacate.1 24 /// 25 /// 26 27 1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 28 scheduled for November 1, 2022. 1 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2 As the facts are already known to the parties, the Court 3 repeats them only as necessary to explain its decision. 4 Plaintiffs sued Defendant County of Sacramento for constitutional 5 violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on the actions of co- 6 Defendant, Martha Spagner.2 See Compl., ECF No. 1. Spagner is 7 and was employed by the Superior Court for State of California, 8 County of Sacramento. See Decl. of Alice Kruegar, ECF No. 17-5. 9 The Superior Court and the County are separate entities. Id. As 10 such, Spagner was not and is not an employee of the County of 11 Sacramento. 12 Accordingly, the Court found as a matter of law that 13 Defendant County of Sacramento cannot be held liable under § 1983 14 for the alleged actions of an unrelated non-employee. Order 15 Granting MSJ at 4-6. The Court thus entered summary judgment for 16 Defendant County of Sacramento on all claims. Id. at 6. The 17 Court further found that Plaintiffs failed to conduct a 18 reasonably competent inquiry before filing their complaint and 19 that they recklessly maintained a factually baseless suit despite 20 repeated notice from opposing counsel. Order Granting Sanctions 21 at 4. The Court thus imposed sanctions in the form of attorney’s 22 fees upon Plaintiffs’ counsel. Id. at 7. 23 Plaintiffs move now to vacate the Courts’ orders under Fed. 24 R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1), arguing the Court’s orders were based on 25 “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” Mot. at 26 3. The Court disagrees. 27 28 2 Erroneously named as “Martha Spangner” in the Complaint. 1 II. OPINION 2 A. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment 3 Rule 60(b)(1) allows a court to vacate a final judgment that 4 is based on “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 5 neglect.” Rule 60(b)(1). The United States Supreme Court 6 established a four-factor test to assess whether missing a filing 7 deadline constitutes excusable neglect. See Pioneer Inv. Servs. 8 Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd., 507 U.S. 380. The Pioneer test is 9 "an equitable one, taking account of all relevant circumstances 10 surrounding the party's omission. These include . . . [1] the 11 danger of prejudice to the debtor, [2] the length of the delay 12 and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, [3] the reason 13 for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable 14 control of the movant, and [4] whether the movant acted in good 15 faith." Id. at 395 (internal citation omitted). The Supreme 16 Court emphasized, however, that "inadvertence, ignorance of the 17 rules, or mistakes construing the rules do not usually constitute 18 'excusable' neglect." Id. at 392. In the Ninth Circuit, the 19 Pioneer standard applies to Rule 60(b)(1) motions. See Briones 20 v. Riviera Hotel & Casino, 116 F.3d 379, 381 (9th Cir. 1997). 21 B. Discussion 22 Plaintiffs assert that “[t]he basis for granting the Motions 23 [at issue] is because the Court has chosen to disregard 24 Plaintiff’s untimely Responses.” Mot. at 2. To the extent 25 Plaintiffs suggest the Court was mistaken to have treated 26 Plaintiffs’ untimely opposition briefs as non-oppositions, that 27 argument is groundless. The Court is explicitly permitted under 28 /// 1 its Local Rules to treat untimely opposition filings as non- 2 oppositions. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(c). 3 To the extent Plaintiffs argue that the Court should vacate 4 its previous orders because Plaintiffs’ untimeliness was 5 excusable neglect under Pioneer, Plaintiffs miss the mark of 6 Rule 60. Mot. at 4 (discussing whether untimeliness is excusable 7 neglect). While it is true that Plaintiffs were untimely and 8 that untimeliness may sometimes constitute excusable neglect, 9 Plaintiffs’ particular brand of untimeliness had the unique 10 character of bearing no weight on the outcome of the Court’s 11 orders. The Court decided the motions on their merits and the 12 record before it. Order Granting MSJ at 3 (“In the absence of an 13 opposition, the Court nevertheless decides a motion for summary 14 judgment on its merits”); Order Granting Sanctions at 1 (“The 15 Court has decided this motion for sanctions on its merits despite 16 the absence of an opposition”). Because Plaintiffs’ untimeliness 17 was not the basis for the Court’s orders, Plaintiffs’ 18 untimeliness cannot support a motion to vacate the Court’s orders 19 under Rule 60(b)(1), which only permits a court to relieve a 20 party from a final order for “reasons” of “excusable neglect.” 21 Rule 60(b)(1). 22 Even if Plaintiffs’ untimeliness was the basis for the 23 Court’s orders such that Rule 60(b)(1) applied, it would not be 24 excusable neglect under Pioneer. First, Defendant was prejudiced 25 by Plaintiffs’ delay in filing their oppositions. Plaintiffs 26 missed the Court’s deadline to file an opposition to Defendant’s 27 motion for summary judgment by 46 days and the deadline to file 28 an opposition to Defendant’s motion for sanctions by 59 days. 1 E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(c) (“Opposition, if any, to the granting of 2 the motion shall be in writing and shall be filed and served no 3 later than fourteen (14) days after the motion was filed”) (eff. 4 March 1, 2022). Even under the Court’s prior rule, Plaintiffs’ 5 oppositions would have been late for having been filed less than 6 fourteen days preceding the date of the motion’s hearing. 7 Plaintiffs’ delay deprived Defendant of its fairly allotted time 8 to file a reply: The Local Rules provides “ten (10) days” for a 9 reply to be filed “after the opposition was filed,” but Defendant 10 would have only had eight. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(d). This 11 prejudice may be small under different circumstances, but it is 12 noteworthy here, where the case was factually baseless to begin 13 with. 14 Regarding the second factor, the length of the delay was 15 significant, but its potential impact on the proceedings was 16 admittedly minimal. The motions were ultimately taken under 17 submission and a hearing did not need to be rescheduled. 18 However, as discussed above, because the present case is 19 factually baseless, the inclusion of Plaintiffs’ opposition 20 briefings would also have had minimal impact on the Court’s 21 proceedings. As such, this factor does not militate strongly in 22 Plaintiffs’ favor. 23 Conversely, regarding the third factor, the Court finds 24 Plaintiffs’ reason for delay cuts strongly against a finding of 25 excusable neglect. Plaintiffs were afforded an opportunity to 26 show good cause for their untimeliness. See Pls.’ Resp. to the 27 Court’s Order to Show Cause (“Resp.”), ECF No. 21. In response 28 to the Court’s inquiry for good cause, Plaintiffs’ counsel stated 1 that her office “relied on its own memory of the Local Rules” and 2 thus “mistakenly believed the due date for the Responses to be 3 ten days before the hearing.” Resp. at 3 (emphasis added). 4 Plaintiffs’ untimeliness was not, as Plaintiffs contend, “the 5 result of a misunderstanding of the local rules” so much as an 6 ignorance of them. Id. Plaintiffs’ counsel’s error was clearly 7 “within the reasonable control of the movant,” because the 8 Court’s rules are publicly available, and a quick internet search 9 would have sufficed. Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 395. As such, 10 Plaintiffs’ counsel had no reason to remain unaware of the 11 Court’s deadline except for her lack of trying. 12 Regarding the fourth and final factor, the Court finds 13 Plaintiffs’ counsel did not act in bad faith. There is nothing 14 in the record to suggest that Plaintiffs’ counsel’s behavior was 15 tactical or calculated to effect some advantage in litigation. 16 By the same measure, however, the Court cannot say Plaintiffs’ 17 counsel acted in good faith, as her ignorance of the Court’s 18 rules explanation borders on the willful. On the whole, 19 balancing the Pioneer factors, Plaintiffs’ counsel’s behavior 20 does not constitute excusable neglect. 21 The Court’s analysis is consistent with precedent in this 22 Circuit. As the Ninth Circuit held, in the absence of “a 23 persuasive justification for [counsel’s] misconstruction of 24 nonambiguous rules . . . there is no basis from deviating from 25 the general rule that a mistake of law does not constitute 26 excusable neglect.” Kyle v. Campbell Soup Co., 28 F.3d 928, 931- 27 32 (9th Cir. 1994). This general rule keeps faith with the 28 Supreme Court’s emphasis in Pioneer that "inadvertence, ignorance 1 of the rules, or mistakes construing the rules do not usually 2 constitute 'excusable' neglect." Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 392 3 (emphasis added). A litigants’ egregious failure to research, 4 read, and follow clear and unambiguous rules is only excusable 5 neglect when countervailing circumstances allow for it in equity. 6 See Briones v. Riviera Hotel & Casino, 116 F.3d 379 (9th Cir. 7 1996) (vacating and remanding a district court’s denial of a 8 Rule 60(b)(1) motion where the litigant was pro se and had 9 difficulty with English); Bateman v. United States Postal Serv., 10 231 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding excusable neglect where a 11 lawyer was out of the country and jetlagged upon return); Lemoge 12 v. United States, 587 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding 13 excusable neglect where a lawyer delayed due to injury requiring 14 multiple surgeries and extensive surgery). It is plainly the 15 exception and not the rule that a lawyer’s neglectful behavior is 16 excusable under the auspices of Pioneer. 17 It would be a particularly perverse incentive to grant 18 Plaintiffs’ motion to vacate in this instance, because it would 19 open the door to all tardy filers to challenge final orders even 20 when their tardiness had no material impact on the outcome of 21 their case. For this reason and for the reasons above, the Court 22 finds that Rule 60(b)(1) does not apply and that, if it did, 23 Plaintiffs’ untimeliness would not constitute excusable neglect 24 under the Pioneer test. Accordingly, the Court denies 25 Plaintiffs’ motion to vacate its prior orders. 26 III. SANCTIONS 27 Defendant requested additional sanctions in the amount of 28 $4,500 in attorney’s fees for work done preparing its opposition en een meen ne nn nnn nnn een en nnn nn nnn ne nN ED 1 to Plaintiff’s motion to vacate. Opp’n at 9. The Court declines 2 to impose these additional sanctions. While Plaintiffs’ counsel’s 3 | stubborn refusal to accept the Court’s prior orders in this case 4 is of concern, this motion to vacate does not appear to have been 5 | brought in bad faith such that additional sanctions are 6 warranted. 7 8 Iv. ORDER 9 For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES 10 Plaintiffs’ Motion to Vacate. 11 IT IS SO ORDERED. 12 Dated: November 28, 2022 13 opens JOHN A. MENDEZ 15 SENIOR UNITED*STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28