(PC) Holguin v. Madera County Jail Captain 2015 ( 2023 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 FELIPE ROMAN HOLGUIN, 1:21-cv-01586-JLT-GSA-PC 12 Plaintiff, ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN FULL 13 v. (Doc. 21.) 14 MADERA COUNTY JAIL CAPTAIN 2015, et al., ORDER DISMISSING THIS CASE, WITH 15 PREJUDICE, AS BARRED BY HECK V. Defendants. HUMPHREY AND THE STATUTE OF 16 LIMITATIONS 17 ORDER FOR CLERK TO CLOSE CASE 18 19 The assigned magistrate judge issued findings and recommendations recommending 20 that this case be dismissed as barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and the 21 applicable statute of limitations. (Doc. 21.) Plaintiff filed objections. (Doc. 26.) 22 According to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 304, this court has conducted a 23 de novo review of this case. Having carefully reviewed the entire file, including Plaintiff’s 24 objections, the Court concludes the findings and recommendations are supported by the record 25 and proper analysis. First, the findings and recommendations correctly conclude that many of 26 Plaintiff’s claims are barred by Heck. (Doc. 21 at 5–6.) Plaintiff does not contest this point. 27 (Doc. 26 at 3.) A few other points raised in Plaintiff’s objections merit some discussion. 28 Plaintiff argues that his claims are not barred by the statute of limitations because he did 1 not know until 2020 that the defendants’ acts in refusing him legal materials were unlawful. 2 (See Doc. 21 at 8.) The findings and recommendations reject this argument, concluding instead 3 that the record suggests Plaintiff had knowledge of the facts underlying his claims in 2015. (See 4 id. at 9 (indicating that Plaintiff’s own complaint “clearly demonstrates that Plaintiff knew in 5 2015 that his rights were being violated by Defendants and that he attempted to pursue 6 exhaustion”).) In support of this conclusion, the magistrate judge pointed to the following 7 allegation in the first amended complaint: “In Madera County Jail they do not have a grievance 8 appeals process for the year of 2015 and if they did they denied me the ability to access it and 9 the knowledge to exhaust remedies. I filed a [sic] inmate request form for the purpose [sic] it 10 was all they provided.” (See id. (citing Doc. 11 at 8).) The magistrate judge reasoned that 11 “[t]his statement supports the fact that Plaintiff knew at the time that Defendants were violating 12 his rights and he followed up by filing an inmate request form as ‘they do not have a grievance 13 appeal process.” (Id.) Plaintiff appears to object to this finding on the ground that he did not at 14 that time understand the grievance process, his constitutional rights, or how to bring a lawsuit 15 under § 1983. (Doc. 26 at 7–8.) Plaintiff misunderstands what triggers the running of the statute 16 of limitations. It is not his knowledge of the law that triggers the limitations period; rather, it is 17 his knowledge of facts that might give rise to a claim. See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 18 111, 122 (1979) (statute of limitations period generally begins when plaintiff has knowledge of 19 “critical facts” of his injury, which are “that he has been hurt and who has inflicted the injury”). 20 Given this, the magistrate correctly concluded that his filing of an inmate request form suggests 21 he had knowledge of the critical facts giving rise to the claims he now presents in this lawsuit. 22 Plaintiff also argues that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled because he 23 was under duress. (Doc. 18 at 4.) The findings and recommendations conclude that Plaintiff has 24 not established entitlement to equitable tolling because Plaintiff failed to tie any defendant’s 25 actions to the claimed sources of duress. (See Doc. 21 at 9–11.) In his objections, Plaintiff 26 explains, among other things, that the defendants’ actions “frustrated me and impeded me so 27 much that I had a mental breakdown so much so I and cut myself and ended up in a mental 28 hospital and gave up.” (Doc. 26 at 8.) This transfer to a mental health facility apparently 1 happened around the time Plaintiff was transferred out of Madera County Jail to state prison in 2 March 2016. (See Doc. 21 at 8; see also Doc. 18 at 2.) He also mentions that he suffers from 3 schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and mood disorder. (Doc. 18 at 2.) California’s equitable 4 tolling rules control in this § 1983 action. Azer v. Connell, 306 F.3d 930, 936 (9th Cir. 2002). 5 California Code of Civil Procedure § 352(a) provides for tolling if the plaintiff lacks the legal 6 capacity to make decisions1 at the time the cause of action accrued. Section 352(a) has been 7 applied to periods of time when, for example, a plaintiff is in a coma, Feely v. S. Pac. Transp. 8 Co., 234 Cal. App. 3d 949, 951(1991), is “incompetent, without basic physical or cognitive 9 skills,” Alcott Rehab. Hosp. v. Superior Court, 93 Cal. App. 4th 94, 96 (2001), or has “a 10 condition of mental derangement which renders the sufferer incapable of caring for his property 11 or transacting business, or understanding the nature or effects of his acts.” Hsu v. Mt. Zion 12 Hosp., 259 Cal. App. 2d 562, 571 (1968). However, the absence of capacity must exist at the 13 time the cause of action accrues to toll the limitations period. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 357. 14 “Once the cause of action has accrued and the statute of limitations has begun to run, no later 15 disability can suspend it.” Larsson v. Cedars of Lebanon Hosp., 97 Cal. App. 2d 704, 707 16 (1950); see also Shehee v. Cosby, No. 1:16-CV-00354-DAD-SAB (PC), 2017 WL 202182, at 17 *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2017) (applying § 357 and Larson in § 1983 case to find that 18 incompetency that occurred after claims accrued did not toll the limitations period), aff’d sub 19 nom. Shehee v. Valley, No. 17-15569, 2017 WL 8727426 (9th Cir. Dec. 18, 2017). Nothing in 20 the record suggests Plaintiff was suffering from a qualifying incapacity at the time of the events 21 complained of in this case. Therefore, under California equitable tolling rules, his mental health 22 status in 2016 does not entitle him to tolling here. As a result, the Court will adopt the findings 23 and recommendations’ conclusion that equitable tolling does not save Plaintiff’s claims in this 24 case. Thus, the Court ORDERS: 25 26 1 The California Legislature amended Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 352 in 2015 to replace the term “insane” with “lacking 27 the legal capacity to make decisions,” a “technical change[ ],” which did not change the meaning of the statutory provision in ways that are material to the present case. See Bader v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 2D CIV. B280551, 28 2018 WL 3867177, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2018). 1 1. The findings and recommendations issued by the magistrate judge on December 2 13, 2022, are ADOPTED IN FULL. 3 2. This action is DISMISSED, with prejudice, as barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 4 U.S. 477 (1994), and the applicable Statute of Limitations. 5 3. The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE THIS CASE. 6 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 8 || Dated: _ April 24, 2023 Charis [Tourn 9 TED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28