(PC) Iseli v. City of Stockton ( 2023 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 BRANDEN WILLIE ISELI, No. 2:23-CV-0013-DMC-P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 CITY OF STOCKTON, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 18 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s original complaint, ECF No. 1. 19 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 20 against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1915A(a). This provision also applies if the plaintiff was incarcerated at the time the action was 22 initiated even if the litigant was subsequently released from custody. See Olivas v. Nevada ex rel. 23 Dep’t of Corr., 856 F.3d 1281, 1282 (9th Cir. 2017). The Court must dismiss a complaint or 24 portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can 25 be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 26 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that 27 complaints contain a “. . . short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 28 entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This means that claims must be stated simply, 1 concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to 2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice 3 of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 4 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity 5 overt acts by specific defendants which support the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail 6 to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is impossible for the Court to conduct the screening 7 required by law when the allegations are vague and conclusory. 8 9 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS 10 Plaintiff names the following as defendants: (1) City of Stockton; and (2) State of 11 California. See ECF No. 1, pg. 2. Plaintiff's complaint is brief and incoherent. Plaintiff’s first 12 claim is merely a string of disjointed sentences regarding an incident involving a “RAVID [sic] 13 DOG.” See id., pg. 3. Plaintiff’s second claim includes sporadic references to Covid-19, the 14 Paradise wildfire, and the “911 twin towers.” See id., pg. 4. The Court is not able to discern from 15 the pleading the facts that Plaintiff believes give rise to his legal claims, or what those legal 16 claims are. 17 18 II. DISCUSSION 19 Plaintiff’s complaint suffers from a number of defects. First, Plaintiff has not 20 alleged sufficient facts to establish the liability of the City of Stockton. Second, the State of 21 California is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. Third, Plaintiff’s complaint fails 22 to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. 23 A. Municipal Liability 24 Municipalities and other local government units are among those “persons” to 25 whom § 1983 liability applies. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). 26 Counties and municipal government officials are also “persons” for purposes of § 1983. See id. at 27 691; see also Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir. 1989). A local 28 government unit, however, may not be held responsible for the acts of its employees or officials 1 under a respondeat superior theory of liability. See Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 2 397, 403 (1997). Thus, municipal liability must rest on the actions of the municipality, and not of 3 the actions of its employees or officers. See id. To assert municipal liability, therefore, the 4 plaintiff must allege that the constitutional deprivation complained of resulted from a policy or 5 custom of the municipality. See id. 6 In this case, though Plaintiff names the City of Stockton as a defendant, Plaintiff 7 has not alleged that any policy or custom of this entity resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff’s 8 rights. Plaintiff will be provided leave to amend. 9 B. Eleventh Amendment Immunity 10 The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing suits brought 11 against a state both by its own citizens, as well as by citizens of other states. See Brooks v. 12 Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. Coop., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991). This prohibition 13 extends to suits against states themselves, and to suits against state agencies. See Lucas v. Dep’t 14 of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th 15 Cir. 1989). A state’s agency responsible for incarceration and correction of prisoners is a state 16 agency for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 17 (1978) (per curiam); Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1398-99 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc). 18 Here, Plaintiff cannot proceed against the State of California, which is immune 19 from suit. 20 C. Rule 8 21 As explained above, Rule 8 requires that a complaint contain a short and plain 22 statement of the plaintiff’s claim which provides fair notice to the defendants. Here, Plaintiff’s 23 complaint, which is rambling and often times incoherent, fails to meet this standard and, as a 24 result, the Court is unable to discern the nature of Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff will be provided an 25 opportunity to amend. 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 III. CONCLUSION 2 Because it is possible that some of the deficiencies identified in this order may be 3 cured by amending the complaint, Plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of the 4 entire action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff 5 is informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See 6 Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, following dismissal with leave to 7 amend, all claims alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in the amended 8 complaint are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, if 9 Plaintiff amends the complaint, the Court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order to make 10 Plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An amended complaint must be 11 complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id. 12 If Plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the 13 conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See 14 Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how 15 each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection 16 between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 17 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 18 Because some of the defects identified in this order cannot be cured by 19 amendment, Plaintiff is not entitled to leave to amend as to such claims. Plaintiff, therefore, now 20 has the following choices: (1) Plaintiff may file an amended complaint which does not allege the 21 claims identified herein as incurable, in which case such claims will be deemed abandoned and 22 the Court will address the remaining claims; or (2) Plaintiff may file an amended complaint which 23 continues to allege claims identified as incurable, in which case the Court will issue findings and 24 recommendations that such claims be dismissed from this action, as well as such other orders 25 and/or findings and recommendations as may be necessary to address the remaining claims. 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / ] Finally, Plaintiff is warned that failure to file an amended complaint within the 2 || time provided in this order may be grounds for dismissal of this action. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 3 || 1260-61; see also Local Rule 110. Plaintiffis also warned that a complaint which fails to comply 4 | with Rule 8 may, in the Court’s discretion, be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b). 5 || See Neviyel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981). 6 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 7 1. Plaintiffs original complaint is dismissed with leave to amend; and 8 2. Plaintiff shall file a first amended complaint within 30 days of the date of 9 || service of this order. 10 11 | Dated: July 24, 2023 Ss..c0_, DENNIS M. COTA 13 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28