(PC) Singh v. Blizzard ( 2023 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RAGHVENDRA SINGH, No. 2:23-cv-0024 KJM DB PS 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 THADD A. BLIZZARD, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff Raghvendra Singh is proceeding in this action pro se. This matter was referred to 18 the undersigned in accordance with Local Rule 302(c)(21) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Pending 19 before the court are plaintiff’s complaint and motion to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 20 U.S.C. § 1915. (ECF Nos. 1 & 2.) The complaint alleges that the defendants “are the state 21 judges,” that have “caused killings, suicides and terror . . . among minorities.” (Compl. (ECF No. 22 1) at 1.) 23 The court is required to screen complaints brought by parties proceeding in forma 24 pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 25 2000) (en banc). Here, plaintiff’s complaint is deficient. Accordingly, for the reasons stated 26 below, the undersigned will recommend that plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed without leave to 27 amend. 28 //// 1 I. Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 2 Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis application makes the financial showing required by 28 3 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). However, a determination that a plaintiff qualifies financially for in forma 4 pauperis status does not complete the inquiry required by the statute. “‘A district court may deny 5 leave to proceed in forma pauperis at the outset if it appears from the face of the proposed 6 complaint that the action is frivolous or without merit.’” Minetti v. Port of Seattle, 152 F.3d 7 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Tripati v. First Nat. Bank & Trust, 821 F.2d 1368, 1370 (9th 8 Cir. 1987)); see also McGee v. Department of Child Support Services, 584 Fed. Appx. 638 (9th 9 Cir. 2014) (“the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying McGee’s request to proceed 10 IFP because it appears from the face of the amended complaint that McGee’s action is frivolous 11 or without merit”); Smart v. Heinze, 347 F.2d 114, 116 (9th Cir. 1965) (“It is the duty of the 12 District Court to examine any application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis to determine 13 whether the proposed proceeding has merit and if it appears that the proceeding is without merit, 14 the court is bound to deny a motion seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis.”). 15 Moreover, the court must dismiss an in forma pauperis case at any time if the allegation of 16 poverty is found to be untrue or if it is determined that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to 17 state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against an immune 18 defendant. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). A complaint is legally frivolous when it lacks an 19 arguable basis in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. 20 Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 1984). Under this standard, a court must dismiss a 21 complaint as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the 22 factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). 23 To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to 24 state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 25 570 (2007). In considering whether a complaint states a cognizable claim, the court accepts as 26 true the material allegations in the complaint and construes the allegations in the light most 27 favorable to the plaintiff. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. 28 Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976); Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 1 (9th Cir. 1989). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by 2 lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, the court need not accept as true 3 conclusory allegations, unreasonable inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western 4 Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). 5 The minimum requirements for a civil complaint in federal court, as explained by Rule 8 6 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rules”), are as follows: 7 A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief . . . shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court’s 8 jurisdiction depends . . . , (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for 9 judgment for the relief the pleader seeks. 10 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 11 II. Plaintiff’s Complaint 12 As noted above, the complaint alleges that the “defendants caused killings, suicides and 13 terror . . . among minorities.” (Compl. (ECF No. 1) at 1.) And that the “SacDA terrorized 14 minorities.” (Id.) In support of these allegations, the complaint refers to various state court cases 15 involving the plaintiff, which the complaint alleges were “illegal, unconstitutional and ‘beyond 16 the jurisdiction of judges.’” (Id. at 3.) 17 For example, the complaint alleges that in “County of Sacramento v. Singh (Sacramento 18 Superior Court Case No. 34-2013-00145898), the County requested Receiver was ordered to 19 move the occupants but he did not do so.” (Id.) The “properties were burned down and 20 occupants were killed.” (Id.) In “City of Placerville v. Rawat (El Dorado Superior Court Case 21 No. PC20170462)” plaintiff’s “properties were taken away[.]” (Id.) In “City of Elk Grove v. 22 Rawat (Sacramento Superior Court Case No. 34-2017-000216691)” the judge “did not have 23 subject jurisdiction and the jurisdiction on [plaintiff] and on properties[.]” (Id.) 24 Plaintiff is advised that under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine a federal district court is 25 precluded from hearing “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by 26 state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting 27 district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. 28 Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies not only to final state 1 court orders and judgments, but to interlocutory orders and non-final judgments issued by a state 2 court as well. Doe & Assoc. Law Offices v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001); 3 Worldwide Church of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 893 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1986). 4 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits “a direct appeal from the final judgment of a state 5 court,” Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003), and “may also apply where the parties 6 do not directly contest the merits of a state court decision, as the doctrine prohibits a federal 7 district court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over a suit that is a de facto appeal from a 8 state court judgment.” Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 525 F.3d 855, 859 (9th Cir. 2008) 9 (internal quotation marks omitted). “A suit brought in federal district court is a ‘de facto appeal’ 10 forbidden by Rooker-Feldman when ‘a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly 11 erroneous decision by a state court, and seeks relief from a state court judgment based on that 12 decision.’” Carmona v. Carmona, 603 F.3d 1041, 1050 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Noel, 341 F.3d 13 at 1164); see also Doe v. Mann, 415 F.3d 1038, 1041 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he Rooker-Feldman 14 doctrine bars federal courts from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction over a proceeding in 15 ‘which a party losing in state court’ seeks ‘what in substance would be appellate review of the 16 state judgment in a United States district court, based on the losing party’s claim that the state 17 judgment itself violates the loser’s federal rights.’”) (quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 18 997, 1005-06 (1994), cert. denied 547 U .S. 1111 (2006)). “Thus, even if a plaintiff seeks relief 19 from a state court judgment, such a suit is a forbidden de facto appeal only if the plaintiff also 20 alleges a legal error by the state court.” Bell v. City of Boise, 709 F.3d 890, 897 (9th Cir. 2013). 21 [A] federal district court dealing with a suit that is, in part, a forbidden de facto appeal from a judicial decision of a state court 22 must refuse to hear the forbidden appeal. As part of that refusal, it must also refuse to decide any issue raised in the suit that is 23 ‘inextricably intertwined’ with an issue resolved by the state court in its judicial decision. 24 25 Doe, 415 F.3d at 1043 (quoting Noel, 341 F.3d at 1158); see also Exxon, 544 U.S. at 286 n. 1 (“a 26 district court [cannot] entertain constitutional claims attacking a state-court judgment, even if the 27 state court had not passed directly on those claims, when the constitutional attack [is] 28 ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state court’s judgment”) (citing Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482 n. 1 16)); Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 898, 900 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2003) (“claims raised in the 2 federal court action are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state court’s decision such that the 3 adjudication of the federal claims would undercut the state ruling or require the district court to 4 interpret the application of state laws or procedural rules”) (citing Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n. 16, 5 485). 6 Here, it appears that plaintiff is a state-court loser complaining of injuries caused by state- 7 court judgments rendered before this action commenced and is inviting the court to review and 8 reject those judgments. Moreover, the complaint alleges that the “Defendants are the State 9 Judges.” (Compl. (ECF No. 1) at 2.) Judges, however, are absolutely immune from suit for acts 10 performed in a judicial capacity. See Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 435 & 11 n.10 (1993); Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 357-60 12 (1978); Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (“Judges are immune 13 from damage actions for judicial acts taken within the jurisdiction of their courts.”). 14 III. Leave to Amend 15 For the reasons stated above, plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed. The undersigned 16 has carefully considered whether plaintiff may amend the complaint to state a claim upon which 17 relief can be granted. “Valid reasons for denying leave to amend include undue delay, bad faith, 18 prejudice, and futility.” California Architectural Bldg. Prod. v. Franciscan Ceramics, 818 F.2d 19 1466, 1472 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Klamath-Lake Pharm. Ass’n v. Klamath Med. Serv. Bureau, 20 701 F.2d 1276, 1293 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that while leave to amend shall be freely given, the 21 court does not have to allow futile amendments). 22 Here, given the defects noted above, the undersigned finds that granting plaintiff leave to 23 amend would be futile. 24 //// 25 //// 26 //// 27 //// 28 //// 1 CONCLUSION 2 Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 3 1. The complaint filed January 6, 2023 be dismissed without leave to amend; 4 2. Plaintiffs January 6, 2023 application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) be 5 | denied; and 6 3. This action be dismissed. 7 These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge 8 | assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen days 9 | after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written objections 10 | with the court. A document containing objections should be titled “Objections to Magistrate 11 || Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within 12 || the specified time may, under certain circumstances, waive the right to appeal the District Court’s 13 | order. See Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 14 | Dated: April 24, 2023 15 16 U7 ORAH BARNES UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | DLB:6 35 DB\orders\orders.pro se\singh0024.dism.f&rs 26 27 28