(PC) Maddox v. Lara ( 2023 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 LEMONTA MADDOX, No. 2:22-cv-1545 AC P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 Y. LARA, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 18 has requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 19 I. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 20 Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1915(a). ECF No. 2, 5. Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted. 22 Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. 23 §§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff will be assessed an initial partial filing fee in 24 accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct 25 the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and 26 forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments 27 of twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. 28 These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time 1 the amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. 2 § 1915(b)(2). 3 II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints 4 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against “a 5 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 6 The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 7 “frivolous, malicious, or fail[] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” or that “seek[] 8 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). 9 A claim “is [legally] frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” 10 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 11 Cir. 1984). “[A] judge may dismiss . . . claims which are ‘based on indisputably meritless legal 12 theories’ or whose ‘factual contentions are clearly baseless.’” Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 13 640 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327), superseded by statute on other grounds as 14 stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). The critical inquiry is whether a 15 constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. 16 Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227-28 (citations omitted). 17 “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the 18 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of 19 what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 20 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 21 “Failure to state a claim under § 1915A incorporates the familiar standard applied in the context 22 of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Wilhelm v. Rotman, 23 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). In order to survive dismissal for failure 24 to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 25 cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the 26 speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). “[T]he pleading must contain 27 something more . . . than . . . a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally 28 cognizable right of action.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur 1 R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216 (3d ed. 2004)). 2 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 3 relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 4 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 5 content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 6 misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In reviewing a complaint under this 7 standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hosp. Bldg. 8 Co. v. Trs. of the Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976) (citation omitted), as well as construe the 9 pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor, 10 Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969) (citations omitted). 11 III. Complaint 12 The complaint sets forth three Fourteenth Amendment due process and racial 13 discrimination claims against defendants Lara, Mitchell, Haynie, Haring, and Lynch. ECF No. 1. 14 In Claim One, plaintiff alleges that Lara falsely wrote him up for indecent exposure and 15 that her motivation was racial discrimination. Id. at 3. As a result of the rules violation report 16 (RVR), plaintiff lost ninety days of credit. Id. In Claims Two and Three, plaintiff alleges that 17 Haynie and Mitchell violated his due process rights and right to be free from discrimination when 18 they conspired with Lara. Id. at 4-5. Haynie allegedly put plaintiff in administrative segregation 19 based on the falsified RVR while Mitchell was the reviewing supervisor. Id. 20 IV. Failure to State a Claim 21 A. Falsifying Documents 22 Plaintiff’s allegation that Lara violated his due process rights when she wrote him up on 23 falsified charges fails to state a claim for relief. See Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 24 1997) (“[T]here are no procedural safeguards protecting a prisoner from false retaliatory 25 accusations.”). 26 B. Discrimination 27 It is a fundamental principle that “[p]risoners are protected under the Equal Protection 28 Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from invidious discrimination based on race.” Harrington 1 v. Scribner, 785 F.3d 1299, 1305 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 2 (1974)). However, while plaintiff alleges that he has been subject to racial discrimination, his 3 conclusory allegation is insufficient to state a claim and he provides no facts demonstrating that 4 any defendant’s conduct was motivated by his race. 5 C. Due Process 6 “Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full 7 panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 8 U.S. 539, 556 (1974) (citation omitted). Rather, with respect to prison disciplinary proceedings 9 that include the loss of good-time credits, an inmate must receive (1) twenty-four-hour advanced 10 written notice of the charges against him, id. at 563-64; (2) “a written statement by the factfinders 11 as to the evidence relied on and reasons for the disciplinary action,” id. at 564 (citation and 12 internal quotation marks omitted); (3) an opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary 13 evidence where doing so “will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional 14 goals,” id. at 566; (4) assistance at the hearing if he is illiterate or if the matter is complex, id. at 15 570; and (5) a sufficiently impartial fact finder, id. at 570-71. In addition, due process requires 16 that the disciplinary decision be supported by “some evidence.” Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 17 445, 455 (1985). Plaintiff has not provided facts showing that he was denied any of the minimum 18 protections guaranteed by Wolff, let alone that defendants were responsible for such denials. 19 Accordingly, to the extent plaintiff is attempting to allege due process violations in connection 20 with his disciplinary proceedings, he fails to state a claim. 21 To the extent plaintiff may be attempting to state a claim based upon his placement in 22 administrative segregation, he also fails to state a claim. When an inmate is placed in 23 administrative segregation, the Constitution requires only that he be given “an informal, 24 nonadversary review of the information supporting [his] administrative confinement, including 25 whatever statement [he] wishe[s] to submit, within a reasonable time after confining him to 26 administrative segregation.” Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 472 (1983), overruled on other 27 grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). “An inmate must merely receive some notice 28 of the charges against him and an opportunity to present his views to the prison official charged 1 with deciding whether to transfer him to administrative segregation. Ordinarily a written 2 statement by the inmate will accomplish this purpose . . . .” Id. at 476. There are no allegations 3 demonstrating that any defendant failed to provide plaintiff these protections. 4 D. Conspiracy 5 Plaintiff makes conclusory assertions about a conspiracy between all defendants. ECF 6 No. 1 at 4-5. However, to state a conspiracy claim he cannot simply state that defendants 7 conspired against him; plaintiff must instead allege facts demonstrating that there was “an 8 agreement or ‘meeting of the minds’ to violate constitutional rights,” Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 9 423, 441 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 10 1539, 1540-41 (9th Cir. 1989)), and that an “actual deprivation of his constitutional rights resulted 11 from the alleged conspiracy,” Hart v. Parks, 450 F.3d 1059, 1071 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 12 Woodrum v. Woodward County, 866 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1989)). Mere joint employment 13 by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and the conclusory allegation that 14 defendants conspired to violate plaintiff's rights is insufficient to establish the common objective 15 required for a conspiracy or that his rights were violated as a result. 16 E. Personal Involvement 17 “Liability under § 1983 must be based on the personal involvement of the defendant,” 18 Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 19 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980)), and “[v]ague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil 20 rights violations are not sufficient,” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982) 21 (citations omitted). Furthermore, “[t]here is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983,” 22 Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). Plaintiff makes no 23 allegations against Lynch and Haring and therefore fails to state any claims for relief against these 24 defendants. It appears that these individuals, who are identified as a warden and a lieutenant 25 respectively, were named as defendants based solely on their positions as supervisors. 26 V. Leave to Amend 27 The complaint does not state any cognizable claims for relief and plaintiff will be given an 28 opportunity to file an amended complaint. If plaintiff chooses to file a first amended complaint, 1 he must demonstrate how the conditions about which he complains resulted in a deprivation of his 2 constitutional rights. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976). The complaint must also 3 allege in specific terms how each named defendant is involved. Arnold v. Int’l Bus. Machs. 4 Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981). There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 5 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed 6 deprivation. Id.; Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Furthermore, “[v]ague and 7 conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient.” Ivey v. 8 Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). 9 Plaintiff is also informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to make 10 his first amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint be 11 complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a general rule, an 12 amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 13 1967) (citations omitted), overruled in part by Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th 14 Cir. 2012) (claims dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend do not have to be re-pled 15 in subsequent amended complaint to preserve appeal). Once plaintiff files a first amended 16 complaint, the original complaint no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an 17 amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each 18 defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 19 VI. Plain Language Summary of this Order for a Pro Se Litigant 20 Your request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. That means you do not have to pay 21 the entire filing fee now. You will pay it over time, out of your trust account. 22 Your complaint will not be served because the facts you alleged are not enough to state a 23 claim. Falsifying an RVR does not violate your right to due process and you have not provided 24 any facts showing that any defendant discriminated against you because of your race. Although 25 you allege that you lost good-time credit and were sent to administrative segregation, you do not 26 allege any facts showing that you were not provided the procedural protections required. 27 You may amend your complaint to try to fix these problems. Be sure to provide facts that 28 show exactly what each defendant did to violate your rights or to cause a violation of your rights. ] If you choose to file a first amended complaint, it must include all claims you want to 2 || bring. Once an amended complaint is filed, the court will not look at any information in the 3 || original complaint. Any claims and information not in the first amended complaint will not 4 | be considered. 5 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 6 1. Plaintiffs request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED. 7 2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. Plaintiff 8 || is assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 9 || § 1915(b)(1). All fees shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the 10 || appropriate agency filed concurrently herewith. 11 3. Plaintiffs complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, see 28 12 | U.S.C. § 1915A, and will not be served. 13 4. Within thirty days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff may file an amended 14 | complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules of Civil 15 || Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice. The amended complaint must bear the docket 16 || number assigned this case and must be labeled “First Amended Complaint.” Failure to file an 17 || amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a recommendation that this action 18 || be dismissed. 19 5. The Clerk of the Court is directed to send plaintiff a copy of the prisoner complaint 20 | form used in this district. 21 | DATED: April 24, 2023 ' A/ 22 MIISONCLAIRE 3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 24 25 26 27 28