- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 BRIAN MICHAEL RODRIGUEZ, Case No. 2:22-cv-00602-JDP (PC) 11 Plaintiff, SCREENING ORDER THAT PLAINTIFF: 12 v. (1) STAND BY HIS COMPLAINT SUBJECT TO A 13 PATRICK COVELLO, et al., RECOMMENDATION OF DISMISSAL OF CLAIMS AND 14 Defendants. PARTIES, OR 15 (2) FILE A SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 16 ECF No. 17 17 THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE 18 19 20 21 Plaintiff, a state prisoner, raises at least three separate and unrelated claims against 22 multiple defendants. These claims, described below, cannot proceed jointly; I will give plaintiff 23 an opportunity to amend his complaint so that it includes only related claims. If he declines to 24 file an amended complaint, I will screen his first viable claim through and recommend that other 25 unrelated parties and claims be dismissed. 26 27 28 1 Screening Order 2 I. Screening and Pleading Requirements 3 A federal court must screen a prisoner’s complaint that seeks relief against a governmental 4 entity, officer, or employee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must identify any cognizable 5 claims and dismiss any portion of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a 6 claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is 7 immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1), (2). 8 A complaint must contain a short and plain statement that plaintiff is entitled to relief, 9 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and provide “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 10 face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plausibility standard does not 11 require detailed allegations, but legal conclusions do not suffice. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 12 662, 678 (2009). If the allegations “do not permit the court to infer more than the mere 13 possibility of misconduct,” the complaint states no claim. Id. at 679. The complaint need not 14 identify “a precise legal theory.” Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg’l Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024, 15 1038 (9th Cir. 2016). Instead, what plaintiff must state is a “claim”—a set of “allegations that 16 give rise to an enforceable right to relief.” Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1264 17 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (citations omitted). 18 The court must construe a pro se litigant’s complaint liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 19 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). The court may dismiss a pro se litigant’s complaint “if it 20 appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which 21 would entitle him to relief.” Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2017). 22 However, “‘a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements 23 of the claim that were not initially pled.’” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 24 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)). 25 26 27 28 1 II. Analysis 2 Plaintiff brings at least three unrelated claims. First, he alleges that on February 5, 2021, 3 after suffering from Covid-19-related symptoms for more than a month, he asked defendant 4 Delgado, a nurse, to order a lay-in and to inform a physician that he needed medical attention. 5 ECF No. 17 at 2. Delgado allegedly ignored his request and, when plaintiff threatened to write a 6 grievance against her, she wrote a false disciplinary report against him. Id. at 3. 7 Next, plaintiff alleges that, at the subsequent disciplinary hearing on those charges, 8 defendant Elston violated his due process rights by acting as the hearing officer and as one of the 9 officials who reviewed the report initially. Id. at 4. Elston also allegedly refused to accept 10 plaintiff’s documentary evidence. Id. at 5. This due process claim is separate legally and 11 factually from the claim that Delgado violated his Eighth and First Amendment rights. 12 Finally, he broadly alleges that defendant Khashchuk, at some unspecified time, failed to 13 monitor him after he contracted Covid-19. Id. at 7. 14 Multiple, unrelated claims against more than one defendant belong in separate lawsuits. 15 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a); George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Thus multiple 16 claims against a single party are fine, but Claim A against Defendant 1 should not be joined with 17 unrelated Claim B against Defendant 2.”). Because these claims cannot proceed jointly, plaintiff 18 should file an amended complaint that contains only related claims. He is advised that the 19 amended complaint will supersede the current complaint. See Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F. 20 3d 896, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). This means that the amended complaint will need to be 21 complete on its face without reference to the prior pleading. See E.D. Cal. Local Rule 220. Once 22 an amended complaint is filed, the current complaint no longer serves any function. Therefore, in 23 an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, plaintiff will need to assert each claim and 24 allege each defendant’s involvement in sufficient detail. The amended complaint should be titled 25 “Second Amended Complaint” and refer to the appropriate case number. 26 27 28 1 Accordingly, it is ORDERED that: 2 1. Within thirty days from the service of this order, plaintiff must either file an amended 3 | complaint or advise the court of his intent to stand by his current complaint, subject to a 4 | recommendation that claims and parties be dismissed. 5 2. Failure to comply with this order may result in the dismissal of this action. 6 3. The Clerk of Court is directed to send plaintiff a complaint form. 4 g IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: _ December 2, 2022 Q_—_—. 10 JEREMY D. PETERSON i UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
Document Info
Docket Number: 2:22-cv-00602
Filed Date: 12/5/2022
Precedential Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 6/20/2024