Goodwin v. Royal Properties ( 2023 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DUCHUN LAFRE GOODWIN, Case No. 1:23-cv-00260-ADA-HBK 12 Plaintiff, SCREENING ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED 13 v. COMPLAINT 14 ROYAL PROPERTIES, VICTORIA May 26, 2023 DEADLINE BRAMBLE, and ANGELA HILL, 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 Plaintiff, Duchun Lafre Goodwin (“Goodwin”), who is proceeding pro se and in forma 19 pauperis, initiated this action on February 21, 2023 by filing a form “Complaint for a Civil Case.” 20 (Doc. No. 1, “Complaint”). Plaintiff’s Complaint is before the Court for screening pursuant to 21 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 22 I. Screening Requirement 23 Because Plaintiff is proceeding in form pauperis, the Court may dismiss a case “at any 24 time” if the Court determines, inter alia, the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state claim 25 on which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from 26 such relief. 28 U.S.C § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) -(iii); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F. 3d 1122, 1129 27 (9th Cir. 2000) (section 1915(e) applies to all litigants proceeding in form pauperis). A 28 complaint, however, should not be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can 1 prove no set of facts in support of his or her claim that would entitle him to relief. Johnson v. 2 Knowles, 113 F.3d 1114, 1117 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 996 (1997). A complaint must 3 include a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed. 4 R. Civ. P. 8(a). Dismissal for failure to state a claim in this context is governed by the same 5 standard as dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Barren v. Harrington, 152 6 F. 3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). As such, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to 7 state a claim to relief that is “plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 8 “A complaint is plausible on its face when it contains sufficient facts to support a reasonable 9 inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. At this stage, the court 10 accepts the facts stated in the complaint as true. Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Tr., 425 U.S. 738, 11 740 (1976). The Court does not accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, 12 unreasonable inferences, or unwarranted deductions. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 13 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). Nor are legal conclusions considered facts. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 14 Due to Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court must liberally construe the Complaint in the 15 light most favorable to the Plaintiff. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969); Bernhardt 16 v. L.A. County, 339 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2003). If a pleading could be cured by the allegation 17 of other facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before dismissal 18 of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Lucas v. 19 Department of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995). However, it is not the role of the Court to 20 advise a litigant on how to cure the defects. Such advice “would undermine district judges’ role 21 as impartial decisionmakers.” Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004); see also Lopez, 203 F.3d 22 at 1131 n.13. 23 II. Summary of Complaint 24 The Complaint names the following Defendants: (1) Royal Properties, Property 25 Management Firm; (2) Victoria Bramble, Supervisor Agent; and (3) Angela Hill, Real Estate 26 Agent. (Id. at 2-3). 1 Under the “Basis of Jurisdiction” section of the Complaint, Plaintiff checks 27 1 The Court refers to the CMECF page numbers of the Complaint. In this case, the CMECF page numbers 28 correspond to the same page numbers on the Complaint. 1 neither of the boxes which enable a plaintiff to choose either “federal question” or “diversity” 2 jurisdiction. (Id. at 3). When requested to list the “Basis for Jurisdiction” if a jurisdiction is 3 predicated upon a “Federal Question,” Plaintiff states: “Sections 102 and 103 of the Civil Rights 4 Act of 1991.” (Id. at 4). When requested to list the “Basis for Jurisdiction” if jurisdiction is 5 predicated upon “Diversity,” Plaintiff indicates he is a citizen of the State of California and 6 identifies both Defendants Victoria Bramble and Angela Hill as citizens of California but does 7 not list the citizenship of Defendant Royal Properties. (Id. at 4-5). Plaintiff states the amount in 8 controversy is $11,770.00. Under the “Statement of Claim” section, Plaintiff writes only 9 “Intentional Discrimination.” (Id. at 5). Plaintiff leaves blank the section asking what relief he is 10 seeking. (Id. at 6). 11 III. Analysis 12 As an initial matter, “[c]ourts have an independent obligation to determine whether 13 subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even when no party challenges it.” Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 14 U.S. 77, 94 (2010). A federal court is presumed to lack subject matter jurisdiction, and a plaintiff 15 bears the burden of establishing that subject matter jurisdiction is proper. See Kokkonen v. 16 Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). If a federal court lacks subject matter 17 jurisdiction, the action must be dismissed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). 18 Liberally construed, Plaintiff appears to assert that his claim is based both on a federal 19 question and diversity of citizenship. Although Plaintiff does not identify a specific federal 20 question upon which this case is based, he lists “Sections 102 and 103 of the Civil Rights Act of 21 1991.” The Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides for protection against discrimination and 22 harassment in the workplace. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.L. No. 102–166; § 102, 105 Stat. 23 1071 (U.S.C.S., Adv. Legis. Serv., Lawyers, Coop. Pub. Co.). Section 102 of the Civil Rights 24 Act of 1991 allows a plaintiff bringing a charge of intentional discrimination, made unlawful 25 under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2, or 2000e–3), to recover compensatory 26 and punitive damages. Id. Section 103, which amended 41 U.S.C. § 1988, allows for recovery of 27 attorney fees in certain intentional discrimination cases. Id. 28 //// 1 Nonetheless, the Complaint contains no facts pertaining to any named Defendant. Nor 2 does the Complaint describe any action by any Defendant that amounts to a violation of 3 Plaintiff’s federal rights under the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Other than identifying the 4 Defendants under the list of Defendants, no individual Defendant is named anywhere in the 5 Complaint. Further, the Complaint contains only a single, conclusory statement alleging 6 “intentional discrimination.” As currently pled, the Complaint does not contain any facts to 7 permit the Court to draw the reasonable inference that any named Defendant is liable for any 8 misconduct to sustain a federal violation under the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 9 678. For these reasons, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not comply with the requirements of Rule 10 8(a)(2). 11 Additionally, it appears that Plaintiff predicates this action on diversity, i.e., where the 12 amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and where the matter in 13 controversy is between citizens of different states. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). However, 14 diversity of citizenship requires that each of the plaintiffs be a citizen of a different state than each 15 of the defendants. See Williams v. United Airlines, Inc., 500 F.3d 1019, 1025 (9th Cir. 2007) 16 (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 553 (2005)); Morris v. 17 Princess Cruises, Inc., 236 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff acknowledges in his 18 Complaint that both he and Defendants Bramble and Hill are citizens of California.2 (Doc. No. 1 19 at 4-5). Further, Plaintiff indicates the amount in controversy is $11,770.00, which is less than 20 the $75,000.00 threshold. Thus, on the Complaint’s face, the Court lacks diversity jurisdiction. 21 //// 22 //// 23 //// 24 //// 25 26 2 Plaintiff does not list the citizenship of Royal Properties. It is well settled that a corporation is a citizen of “(1) the state where its principal place of business is located, and (2) the state in which it is 27 incorporated.” (Citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1)). See Johnson v. Columbia Props. Anchorage, LP, 437 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2006). 28 1 IV. Conclusion and Options 2 To continue the prosecution of this action, Plaintiff must take one of the following three 3 options on or before May 22, 2023. First Option: Because the Court cannot determine that the 4 filing of an amended complaint cannot cure the deficiencies identified above, the Court will 5 afford Plaintiff an opportunity to file an amended complaint if he chooses. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 15(a)(2); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-30 (9th Cir. 2000). An amended complaint 7 supersedes (replaces) the original complaint and, thus, the amended complaint must be free- 8 standing and complete. Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d. 896, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (en 9 banc); E.D. Cal. Local Rule 220. Each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be 10 sufficiently alleged. The amended complaint should be titled “First Amended Complaint,” 11 include the above case number, and be signed and dated under penalty of perjury. Plaintiff may 12 not change the nature of this suit or adding unrelated claims in his amended complaint. George v. 13 Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no “buckshot” complaints). Second Option: Plaintiff 14 may file a Notice stating he intends to stand on his current complaint subject to the undersigned 15 recommending the district court dismiss for the reasons stated in this Order. Third Option: 16 Because no defendant has yet been served, Plaintiff may file a Notice of Voluntarily Dismissal 17 without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1). Alternatively, if Plaintiff fails 18 to timely respond to this Court Order, i.e., fails to perform any of the three options, the 19 undersigned will instead recommend that the district court dismiss this case as a sanction for 20 Plaintiff’s failure to comply with a court order and for failing to prosecute this action. 21 Accordingly, it is ORDERED: 22 1. On or before May 26, 2023, Plaintiff shall take one of the following actions: (a) 23 file a First Amended Complaint; (b); file a Notice that he intends to stand on the Complaint as 24 screened subject to the undersigned recommending the district court dismiss certain claims and 25 Defendants for the reasons stated in this Order; (c) file a Notice to voluntarily dismiss this action 26 without prejudice under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41. 27 2. If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with this Court Order or seek an extension of 28 time to comply, the Court will recommend the district court dismiss this action for Plaintiff’s 1 | failure to comply with this Court Order and prosecute this action. 2 3. The Clerk of Court shall include a blank non-prisoner civil rights complaint form 3 | for Plaintiff's use as appropriate. 4 > | Dated: __April 25, 2023 Mile. □□□ foareA Zacks 6 HELENA M. BARCH-KUCHTA 4 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28