Loomis Basin Equine Medical Center, Inc. v. Saniflame, Inc. ( 2022 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 LOOMIS BASIN EQUINE MEDICAL No. 2:21-cv-01404-JAM-KJN CENTER, INC. a corporation, 12 Plaintiff, 13 ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ v. MOTION TO DISMISS 14 SANIFLAME, INC., a corporation; 15 JULES JARC, an individual; ROB FABER, an individual; and DOES 1 16 through 10, inclusive, 17 Defendants. 18 19 Loomis Basin Equine Medical Center, Inc. (“Plaintiff” or 20 “Loomis Basin”), a California corporation, sued Defendants Jules 21 Jarc (“Jarc”), Rob Faber (“Faber”) and SaniFlame, Inc. 22 (“SaniFlame”), a Canadian corporation, alleging ten claims 23 involving a breach of contract. See First Amended Complaint 24 (“FAC”), ECF No. 14. 25 Defendants move to dismiss all claims for lack of personal 26 jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). See 27 Mot. to Dismiss (“Mot.”), ECF No. 17. Plaintiff opposes the 28 motion. See Opp’n, ECF No. 18. Defendants replied. See Reply, 1 ECF No. 19. For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES 2 Defendants’ motion to dismiss.1 3 4 I. BACKGROUND 5 Loomis Basin is a full-service hospital and surgery center 6 for horses located in Loomis, California. FAC ¶¶ 13,17. In 7 2018, Defendants allegedly solicited Plaintiff to purchase an 8 animal cremation device manufactured by SaniFlame that is known 9 as the SaniFlame 1000 (“the Unit”). Id. ¶¶ 12, 14. The Unit 10 consists of a primary cremation chamber and a secondary chamber 11 to burn the emissions released during the cremation process. Id. 12 ¶ 14. Defendant Faber, one of SaniFlame’s agents, allegedly made 13 various representations to Loomis Basin about the quality and 14 ease of use of the Unit, including its suitability for use in 15 California. Id. ¶¶ 12, 17. 16 Loomis Basin alleges that, on May 6, 2019, Faber came to 17 Loomis Basin’s property in Loomis, California to further discuss 18 the Unit’s specifications and suitability. Id. ¶ 17. Following 19 this meeting, on June 16, 2019, Loomis Basin entered into a sales 20 agreement (“Agreement”) with SaniFlame to purchase the Unit for 21 $419,000 (Canadian dollars). Id. ¶ 19. Loomis Basin paid a 40% 22 deposit and then made several subsequent payments, which now 23 total $377,100.00 (Canadian dollars) or $292,188.56 (US dollars), 24 about 90 percent of the contract price. Id. ¶ 19. 25 Plaintiff made modifications to its premises to accommodate 26 27 1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 28 scheduled for March 15, 2022. 1 the Unit in anticipation of delivery. Id. ¶ 16. Relying on 2 Defendants’ representations about the Unit, Plaintiff applied for 3 a permit from Placer County. Id. ¶ 14. Defendants allegedly 4 assisted in the permitting process by providing the County 5 information about the Unit. Id. ¶¶ 14-15. Loomis Basin received 6 a preliminary permit and began making modifications at its own 7 expense. Id. ¶ 16. These accommodations include building 8 infrastructure to support the Unit, modifying a structure to 9 house the Unit, and installing fuel and electrical lines. Id. 10 ¶ 23. Work was allegedly performed “as directed by Defendants.” 11 Id. 12 The Unit was delivered on December 24, 2019, later than the 13 promised delivery window, which the Agreement specified as 14-16 14 weeks from signing or September 23, 2019 to October 7, 2019. Id. 15 ¶¶ 21, 24. The Unit allegedly arrived with “numerous visible 16 defects inconsistent with the specifications Defendants 17 promised,” including peeling paint, a defective right metal door 18 that fell off when opened, faulty hinges on the left door, 19 burners different from the ones Defendants specified, and “metal 20 support legs . . . too short to allow the car holding a carcass 21 to go into the Unit.” Id. ¶¶ 24, 25. Because of these and other 22 problems, the Unit was “nonoperational.” Id. ¶ 26. 23 At Loomis Basin’s requests, Defendants allegedly made 24 multiple attempts to repair the Unit but without success. Id. 25 ¶ 28. Defendants allegedly stopped responding to Loomis Basin’s 26 requests in June 2020, but resumed on November 23, 2020, after 27 being contacted by Loomis Basin’s counsel. Id. ¶ 32. Loomis 28 Basin alleges that Defendants further attempted to repair the 1 Unit on eight occasions between December 2020 and April 2021, 2 also without success. Id. ¶ 35. The Unit remains nonoperational 3 to this day. Id. ¶ 36. Loomis Basin brought suit on August 6, 4 2021. See Compl., ECF No. 1. 5 6 II. OPINION 7 A. Judicial Notice 8 As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff asks the Court to take 9 judicial notice of Plaintiff’s FAC, filed January 12, 2022, at 10 ECF No. 14. See Pl.’s Req. for Judicial Notice at 1, ECF 11 No. 18-2. While the Court may take judicial notice of matters 12 in the public record, the Court need not take judicial notice of 13 Plaintiff’s FAC, because it is the operative pleading in this 14 case. See Nanavati v. Adecco, 99 F. Supp. 3d 1072, 1075 (N.D. 15 Cal. 2015) (“The Court need not take judicial notice of Exhibit 16 A, which is the operative pleading in this action”). 17 Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiff’s request for judicial 18 notice as moot. 19 B. Personal Jurisdiction 20 Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for lack 21 of personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil 22 Procedure 12(b)(2). Mot. at 1. 23 1. Legal Standard 24 A party may move to dismiss a suit for lack of personal 25 jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2). To defeat a Rule 12(b)(2) 26 motion, the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of 27 jurisdictional facts sufficient to establish that jurisdiction 28 is proper. Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Tech., Inc. 647 F.3d 1 1218, 1223 (9th Cir. 2011). Here, where there is no applicable 2 federal statute governing personal jurisdiction, the Court 3 applies the law of California. Id. Because California’s long- 4 arm statute is coextensive with federal due process 5 requirements, the jurisdictional analysis under state law and 6 federal due process are the same. Id. (citing Cal. Civ. Proc. 7 Code § 410.10). For this Court to exercise personal 8 jurisdiction consistent with due process, the defendant must 9 have “minimum contacts” with this forum “such that the 10 maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of 11 fair play and substantial justice.’” Int’l Shoe Co. v. 12 Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (internal citations 13 omitted). A court may exercise either general or specific 14 jurisdiction over a defendant. Goodyear Dunlop Tires 15 Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919-20 (2011). 16 When parties offer conflicting factual allegations, the 17 matter may be determined by reference to the burden of proof on 18 each party. Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Technology Associates, 19 Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1977). The party seeking to 20 invoke the jurisdiction of the federal court has the burden of 21 establishing that jurisdiction exists. KVOS, Inc. v. Associated 22 Press, 299 U.S. 269, 278 (1936). The quantum of proof required 23 to meet that burden varies depending on how the trial court 24 decides to resolve a motion for dismissal. Data Disc, Inc., 557 25 F.2d at 1285. If, as here, the court decides to resolve the 26 matter based on written materials and affidavits rather than an 27 evidentiary hearing, “a plaintiff must make only a prima facie 28 showing of jurisdictional facts through the submitted materials 1 in order to avoid a defendant’s motion to dismiss.” Martinez v. 2 Aero Caribbean, 764 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2014). In 3 determining whether a plaintiff met its burden, the Court must 4 take uncontroverted allegations in the complaint as true and 5 “[c]onflicts between parties over statements contained in the 6 affidavits must be resolved in the plaintiff’s favor.” Dole 7 Food Co. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 2002). 8 Plaintiff’s argument must rest on more than “bare bones’ 9 assertions of minimum contacts with the forum or legal 10 conclusions unsupported by specific factual allegations.” 11 Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 766 (9th Cir. 2007). 12 2. General Jurisdiction Analysis 13 A court has general jurisdiction over a party whose 14 “continuous operations within a state [are] so substantial and 15 of such a nature as to justify a suit against it on causes of 16 action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those 17 activities.” Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 318. This is an 18 exacting standard that requires Defendants’ activities in 19 California be “so continuous and systematic as to render [it] 20 essentially at home” in the state. Goodyear Dunlop Tires, 564 21 U.S. at 919. Generally, a corporate defendant is “at home” in 22 California in three situations: (1) It is incorporated in the 23 state; (2) it has its principal place of business in the state; 24 or (3) it has “continuous and systematic contacts” with the 25 state. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014). 26 Defendants argue that they are not subject to general 27 jurisdiction in California. Mot. at 3. Defendant SaniFlame is 28 neither incorporated nor does it have its principal place of 1 business in California. Mot. at 4; see also Decl. of Jules Jarc 2 (“Jarc”) ¶ 5, ECF No. 17-3. Further, the remaining individual 3 Defendants Jarc and Faber are both domiciled in Canada. Mot. 4 at 4.; FAC ¶¶ 6-7. Plaintiff does not respond to Defendants’ 5 general jurisdiction argument in its opposition, choosing 6 instead to cabin its response to specific jurisdiction 7 arguments. Opp’n at 8, 12. Because Plaintiff does not oppose 8 Defendants’ argument that the Court lacks general jurisdiction, 9 Plaintiff waives this argument. See Resnick v. Hyundai Motor 10 America, Inc., No. CV 16-00593-BRO (PJWx), 2017 WL 1531192 at 11 *22, (C.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2017) (“Failure to oppose an argument 12 raised in a motion to dismiss constitutes waiver of that 13 argument”). Accordingly, the Court does not find general 14 jurisdiction exists over Defendants. 15 3. Specific Jurisdiction Analysis 16 Specific jurisdiction “depends on an affiliation between 17 the forum and the underlying controversy, principally, activity 18 or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is 19 therefore subject to the State’s regulation.” Goodyear Dunlop 20 Tires, 564 U.S. at 919. For specific jurisdiction to attach, 21 the relationship between the defendant and the forum “must arise 22 out of contacts that the ‘defendant himself’ creates with the 23 forum State.” Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1122 (2014) 24 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 25 (1985)). The Court’s analysis “looks to the defendant’s 26 contacts with the forum State itself, not the defendant’s 27 contacts with persons who reside there.” Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 28 1122. 1 The Ninth Circuit prescribes a three-prong test for 2 analyzing claims of specific jurisdiction: (1) The nonresident 3 defendant must purposefully direct its activities or consummate 4 some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; or perform 5 some act by which it purposefully avails itself of the privilege 6 of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the 7 benefits and protections of its laws; (2) the claim must be one 8 which arises out of or relates to the defendant’s forum-related 9 activities; (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with 10 fair play and substantial justice such that it is reasonable. 11 See Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 802 12 (9th Cir. 2004). The plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying 13 the first two prongs of the test. Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 14 1357, 1361 (9th Cir. 1990). If the plaintiff makes a sufficient 15 showing on the first two prongs, the burden shifts to the 16 defendant to prove that jurisdiction would be unreasonable in 17 light of traditional consideration of fair play and substantial 18 justice. Dole Food Co., 303 F.3d at 1114. 19 a. Specific Personal Jurisdiction Over Defendant 20 SaniFlame, Inc. 21 Under the first prong of the specific-jurisdiction inquiry, 22 the Plaintiff must make a prima facie showing that Defendant 23 SaniFlame purposely availed or directed its activities at the 24 forum. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802. Purposeful availment 25 and direction represent “two distinct concepts,” with availment 26 analysis used for suits sounding in contract and direction 27 analysis for suits sounding in torts. Id. Here, where a party 28 alleges both tort and contract claims, and the tort claims are 1 based on the parties' purported contractual relationship, it is 2 appropriate to utilize the jurisdictional test applied in 3 contract cases. See Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1016 4 (9th Cir. 2008) (the purposeful availment test was properly used 5 where plaintiff's claims for violation of the California 6 Consumer Protection Act, breach of contract, misrepresentation, 7 and fraud "sound[ed] primarily in contract"). 8 The purposeful availment contract analysis is “a highly 9 realistic approach that recognizes that a contract is ordinarily 10 but an intermediate step serving to tie up prior business 11 negotiations with future consequences, which themselves are the 12 real object of the business transaction.” Burger King, 471 U.S. 13 at 488. The Supreme Court directs courts to examine four 14 factors: (1) prior negotiations; (2) contemplated future 15 consequences; (3) terms of the contract; and (4) the parties’ 16 actual course of dealing. Id. at 479. The Ninth Circuit has 17 emphasized “that courts must evaluate the parties’ entire course 18 of dealing, not solely the particular contract or tortious 19 conduct giving rise to the claim, when assessing whether a 20 defendant has minimum contacts with a forum.” Global 21 Commodities Trading Grp., Inc. v. Beneficio de Arroz Choloma, 22 S.A., 972 F.3d 1101, 1108 (9th Cir. 2020). 23 Taking uncontroverted allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint 24 as true, the Court finds that Plaintiff has made a prima facie 25 showing that Defendant SaniFlame “reach[ed] out beyond [Canada] 26 to create continuing relationships and obligations with citizens 27 of [California].” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473. For one, 28 negotiations began only after SaniFlame sent unsolicited emails 1 to Plaintiff’s agents about its cremation unit on July 27, 2018. 2 FAC ¶¶ 12, 14; see Decl. of Dr. Christopher Langdon Fielding 3 (“Fielding”) ¶ 2, ECF No. 18-1. Negotiations began on July 30, 4 2018. Id. ¶ 7. During negotiations, on May 6, 2019, 5 SaniFlame’s agent, Defendant Faber, travelled to Loomis, 6 California “to tour the proposed site where the cremation unit 7 was to be housed,” and “discussed the design, specifications, 8 and infrastructure for the proposed cremation unit.” Decl. of 9 Fielding ¶ 11. Defendant Faber also “spoke with a 10 representative from the Placer County California building permit 11 office regarding the cremation unit’s specifications to ensure 12 its compliance with California and Placer County laws and 13 regulations.” Id. ¶ 13. These facts demonstrate an 14 understanding that the Unit would be delivered to California and 15 installed there according to California regulations. 16 Defendants’ visit and efforts culminated in a sales 17 Agreement on June 16, 2019. Id. ¶ 15. The terms of the 18 Agreement included a warranty. Mot. at 6. Although Defendants 19 insist that a warranty “can be processed remotely from out of 20 state,” the uncontroverted allegations show that warranty 21 repairs have all been made in-person at Plaintiff’s Loomis 22 facility. Mot. at 6; Decl. of Fielding ¶¶ 25, 27 (listing at 23 least nine occasions when a technician came out to service the 24 Unit on behalf of SaniFlame.). 25 Defendants make much of the fact it “has only ever sold a 26 single incinerator to a resident of California.” Mot. at 3. 27 Defendants refer repeatedly to its transaction as a “single 28 contract.” Mot. at 1, 4, 6, 8-9. However, as Plaintiff points 1 out, a finding of specific jurisdiction requires a qualitative 2 evaluation of Defendants’ contact with the forum state, not a 3 quantitative evaluation. See Boschetto, 539 F.3d at 1017 4 (emphasis added). Qualitatively, Plaintiff’s uncontested 5 allegations establish that Defendants marketed their product 6 specifically to a California corporation located in California, 7 engaged in extensive negotiations over suitability, 8 specifications, and compliance with California regulations, and 9 were responsible for repairs in California when defects were 10 discovered that rendered the Unit nonoperational. Opp’n at 10. 11 These facts together demonstrate that “the center of gravity” of 12 the business relationship between Plaintiff and Defendants 13 rested squarely in California. Global Commodities Trading Grp., 14 Inc., 972 F.3d at 1108. Taking into consideration the entire 15 course of dealings between the parties, the Court finds that 16 Defendant SaniFlame purposefully availed itself of the 17 privileges of conducting activities in the forum. 18 Regarding the second prong of the specific-jurisdiction 19 inquiry, the parties do not contest that the claims arise from 20 Defendants’ forum-related activities. See Mot. at 4 (“[T]his 21 entire case arises out of a contract for sale of a good between 22 SaniFlame and Plaintiff”); Opp’n at 5 (“Plaintiff’s claims arise 23 from Defendants’ sale, design, and (non)operation of the 24 cremation unit”). As such, the Court finds this element is 25 satisfied. 26 Since Plaintiff has made a prima facie showing sufficient 27 to establish the first two prongs, the burden shifts to 28 Defendants to present “a compelling case that the exercise of 1 jurisdiction would not be reasonable.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 2 478. The Court considers the following seven factors: “(1) the 3 extent of purposeful interjection; (2) the burden on the 4 defendant to defend the suit in the chosen forum; (3) the extent 5 of conflict with the sovereignty of the defendant’s state; 6 (4) the forum state’s interest in the dispute; (5) the most 7 efficient forum for judicial resolution of the dispute; (6) the 8 importance of the chosen forum to the plaintiff’s interest in 9 convenient and effective relief; and (7) the existence of an 10 alternative forum.” Gray & Co. v. Firstenberg Mach. Co., 913 11 F.2d 758, 761 (9th Cir. 1990). Defendants argue that personal 12 jurisdiction would be unreasonable based on these factors. Mot. 13 at 9-10. The Court disagrees. 14 As to the first factor, the Court finds unpersuasive 15 Defendants’ argument that their “purposeful injection into 16 California is extremely minimal.” Mot at 9. Although 17 Defendants “sold a single product to a single consumer,” they 18 also purposefully sought out their customer through unsolicited 19 emails, and they purposefully tailored their product to fit 20 California specifications. Id. Neither of these actions 21 support characterizing their injection into California as 22 “extremely minimal.” Id. 23 As to the second factor, the Court acknowledges the burden 24 placed on foreign nationals to defend a suit abroad. Litigating 25 abroad imposes significant inconveniences upon the party 26 appearing in a foreign country. See Olsen By Sheldon v. Mexico, 27 729 F.2d 641, 650 (9th Cir. 1984). However, “[m]odern advances 28 in communications and transportation have significantly reduced 1 the burden of litigating in another country.” Sinatra v. Nat'l 2 Enquirer, Inc., 854 F.2d 1191, 1199 (9th Cir. 1988). This 3 factor weighs in Defendants’ favor but does not carry the day. 4 As to the third factor, the Court must consider the 5 seriousness of the potential affront to the sovereignty of the 6 Defendants’ state. “A foreign nation presents a higher 7 sovereignty barrier than that between two states within our 8 union.” Gates Learjet Corp. v. Jensen, 743 F.2d 1325, 1333 (9th 9 Cir. 1984). Canada has a clear interest in resolving disputes 10 involving its citizens, however, this factor by itself is not 11 dispositive, for, if “given controlling weight, [the sovereignty 12 factor] would always prevent suit against a foreign national in 13 a United States court"). Id. 14 As to the remaining four factors, Defendants have not shown 15 a compelling reason that Canada would be a more interested, 16 effective, or efficient forum for dispute when compared to 17 California, though it is one possible alternative. Mot at 10 18 (weighing factors four through six as “equal.”). 19 When the Court considers all of these factors, only two 20 factors weigh compellingly in favor of Defendants. The Court 21 concludes that the exercise of personal jurisdiction 22 sufficiently comports with substantial justice and fair play. 23 Accordingly, the Court finds specific jurisdiction appropriate 24 as to Defendant SaniFlame. 25 b. Specific Personal Jurisdiction Over Individual 26 Defendants Jules Jarc and Rob Faber 27 The Court next considers whether it may exercise 28 jurisdiction over individual Defendants Jarc and Faber based on 1 their contacts with the forum on behalf of a corporation. The 2 Supreme Court allows the exercise of specific jurisdiction over 3 employees based on actions they took on behalf of a corporation. 4 See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984) (“[T]heir status 5 as employees does not somehow insulate them from jurisdiction”). 6 Personal jurisdiction over an individual who acts as an agent of 7 a third party must be assessed on the individual’s actions 8 alone. Sher, 911 F.2d at 1366; see also Keeton v. Hustler 9 Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 n.13 (1984) ("[J]urisdiction 10 over an employee does not automatically follow from jurisdiction 11 over the corporation which employs him."). Plaintiff’s 12 uncontested factual allegations show that Defendants Jarc and 13 Faber’s were an integral part of the negotiation and follow-up 14 on the contract that gives rise to this suit, enough to 15 establish minimum contacts sufficient for personal jurisdiction 16 to attach. The relevant allegations are as follows. 17 Defendant Faber sent multiple unsolicited emails 18 advertising SaniFlame’s cremation product. Decl. of Jarc ¶ 6; 19 Decl. of Fielding ¶¶ 4,10. He visited Plaintiff in California 20 to discuss the suitability of the Unit for use at Plaintiff’s 21 California location. Decl. of Fielding ¶ 11. He made multiple 22 representations that worked to secure the sale, including the 23 assertion that he was “100% positive [their] unit will surpass 24 all California Air [sic] regulations.” Id. ¶ 8. He also worked 25 with the local planning department so Plaintiff could obtain a 26 conditional permit to modify its premises to accommodate the 27 Unit. Id. ¶¶ 13,17-18. He continued to be a point of contact 28 after the Agreement was signed to discuss “delivery dates, 1 installation of the unit, power requirements, gas requirements, 2 and additional work needed to be completed prior to delivery of 3 the cremation unit.” Id. ¶ 17. When the Unit was delivered, he 4 visited Loomis, California on two separate occasions to assist 5 with installation. Id. ¶ 21. 6 Defendant Jarc, though not as involved as Faber, also 7 participated in the negotiation and follow through of the 8 Agreement. He was in e-mail contact with the Plaintiff for 9 months leading up to the Agreement “regarding the sale, 10 operation, design, construction, operation, and manufacturing of 11 the cremation unit.” Id. ¶ 9. Critically, Plaintiff’s 12 uncontroverted declaration specifies that “I was advised on 13 multiple occasions by Jules Jarc that he specifically designed 14 the SaniFlame, Inc., [sic] cremation unit for Loomis Basin to 15 comply with California’s regulations. These specifications and 16 modifications were required to meet the unique needs of Loomis 17 Basin located in California. Accordingly, I, on behalf of 18 Loomis Basin, entered into a sales agreement with SaniFlame, 19 Inc., on June 16, 2019.” Id. ¶¶ 14-15 (emphasis added). Jarc 20 then continued to be a point of contact for Plaintiff and 21 visited Loomis, California to assist with installation on two 22 separate occasions. Id. ¶¶ 17,21. 23 At this stage in the proceedings, when deciding whether 24 personal jurisdiction applies, the Court must accept Plaintiff’s 25 uncontroverted allegations as true. Dole Food Co., 303 F.3d at 26 1108. Although Defendants submitted declarations by Jarc and 27 Faber, their allegations do not contradict the allegations, 28 referenced above, set forth in Plaintiff’s declaration. Based nee nme een nn nnn nn on nn nnn nn EE SEI IED 1 on Plaintiff’s allegations, therefore, Defendants Jarc and Faber 2 made representations to Plaintiff about the specifications of 3 the Unit and its suitability for California use. They also made 4 representations about the accommodations that would be needed to 5 install the Unit, in reliance upon which Plaintiff made changes 6 to its premises at its own expense. They both visited 7 Plaintiff’s premises on at least two occasions to assist with 8 installing the Unit. They both remained in contact with 9 Plaintiff after the Unit was installed to coordinate repair 10 efforts, unsuccessful though they were. Decl. of Fielding 11 GI 24-25. As such, the Court finds that Jarce and Faber’s 12 individual actions were integral to the controversy at issue and 13 sufficient for them to have “reasonably foreseen” that they 14 | would be subject to jurisdiction in California’s courts if their 15 actions caused harm here. Davis v. Metro Productions, Inc., 885 16 F.2d 515, 523 (9th Cir. 1989). Accordingly, the Court concludes 17 it may exercise personal jurisdiction over individual Defendants 18 Jare and Faber. 19 20 Til. ORDER 21 For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES 22 Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. 24 | Dated: May 13, 2022 25 Me 26 Benlek, sunk 27 28 16