(PC) Riley v. Prudhle ( 2023 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RICO LYNTICE RILEY, No. 2:23-cv-1511-EFB P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 PRUDHLE, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff is a state prisoner inmate proceeding without counsel in an action brought under 18 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In addition to filing a complaint, plaintiff has filed an application to proceed in 19 forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 20 Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 21 Plaintiff’s application makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and (2). 22 Accordingly, by separate order, the court directs the agency having custody of plaintiff to collect 23 and forward the appropriate monthly payments for the filing fee as set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 24 1915(b)(1) and (2). 25 Screening Standards 26 Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek 27 redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 28 § 1915A(a). The court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion 1 of the complaint, if the complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which 2 relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 3 relief.” Id. § 1915A(b). 4 A pro se plaintiff, like other litigants, must satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) 5 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8(a)(2) “requires a complaint to include a short and 6 plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the 7 defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 8 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554, 562-563 (2007) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). 9 While the complaint must comply with the “short and plaint statement” requirements of Rule 8, 10 its allegations must also include the specificity required by Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 11 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 12 To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than “naked 13 assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 14 action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-557. In other words, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of 15 a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 16 678. 17 Furthermore, a claim upon which the court can grant relief must have facial plausibility. 18 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 19 content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 20 misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. When considering whether a complaint states a 21 claim upon which relief can be granted, the court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v. 22 Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the 23 plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). 24 Screening Order 25 Plaintiff is a prisoner at California State Prison – Sacramento suing four staff members 26 from the same prison. His complaint (ECF No. 1) contains a number of somewhat garbled 27 allegations. First, plaintiff alleges that on March 13th of an unspecified year, his property was 28 stolen when he was transferred to a new prison. ECF No. 1 at 4. 1 Plaintiff’s remaining allegations appear to center on a period he spent in administrative 2 segregation. He claims that, on April 29, 2022, defendants Lieutenants Bulgery and Stake failed 3 to put in routine paperwork “(found not guilty).” Id. Between April 29, 2022 and May 25, 2022, 4 defendant Captain Lecky failed to “figure out what reasoning [plaintiff] continued to be in 5 administrative segregation “after not guilty finding by aforementioned subordinates Lt. Stake & 6 Lt. Bulgery.” Id. “Chief Deputy Warden Prudle failed to act was malicious and intentional on 7 the basis complaint form (260756) was granted by associate director Howard E. Mosley of 8 CDCR, indicating claimant Mr. Riley was obviously and clearly false imprisoned.” Id. 9 Plaintiff claims that or around June 15, 2022, he went on a “hunger strike 10 days until 10 Captain Lecky acted or Lt. Stake or Lt. Bulgery or Chief Deputy Warden Prudle.” Id. Captain 11 Lecky told plaintiff, “if you don’t come off hunger strike ‘well starve then.’” Id. On June 20, 12 2022, “routine paperwork [was] not in whereupon my information I was being put up for 13 Tehachapi because of me writing 602.” Id. Defendant Prudle “refused to listen to reason” even 14 though plaintiff’s dad had only weeks to live due to stage four cancer. Id. at 4-5. 15 Plaintiff also claims that he was unable to see his dad in his last days because defendants’ 16 actions or inactions caused him to be falsely imprisoned. Id. at 5. Plaintiff’s mental health 17 deteriorated as a result; he hung himself and was placed in a mental hospital. Id. 18 Plaintiff’s allegations largely fail to make grammatical sense. The court infers, as best it 19 can, that plaintiff wishes to claim that he was unlawfully deprived of his property on some March 20 13th, that he was unlawfully held in administrative segregation for an unknown period of time 21 including April-June of 2022, that defendant Lecky violated his rights by saying, “Well, starve 22 then,” and that he was unlawfully “put up” to be transferred to a prison in Tehachapi. 23 To the extent that plaintiff attempts to state a claim based on the alleged theft of his 24 personal property, that claim fails for a number of reasons. First, plaintiff has provided 25 insufficient facts for the court to determine who this claim is asserted against, when or where it 26 occurred. More importantly, though, there is no federal due process claim for the deprivation of 27 property by a California inmate where post-deprivation remedies are available. Even in the event 28 of an intentional deprivation of property, there is no cognizable claim if “a meaningful post- 1 deprivation remedy for the loss is available.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). The 2 Ninth Circuit has held that California law provides such a remedy for property deprivations by 3 public officials. See Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994). 4 To the extent that plaintiff alleges that his stay in administrative segregation and/or his 5 proposed transfer to another state prison violated his constitutional due process rights, he fails to 6 allege that he was exposed to conditions that arise to a liberty interest protected by the 7 Constitution. While “prisoners do not shed all constitutional rights at the prison gate, . . . lawful 8 incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights . . 9 . .” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485 (1995) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 10 “Discipline by prison officials in response to a wide range of misconduct falls within the expected 11 parameters of the sentence imposed by a court of law.” Id.; see also Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 12 F.2d 1080, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 1986) (administrative segregation falls within the terms of 13 confinement ordinarily contemplated by a sentence). In a prison setting, a liberty interest is 14 recognized and protected where the conditions of confinement impose a hardship that is atypical 15 and significant in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485. 16 Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing that the conditions he was subjected to while he was 17 housed in administrative segregation or due to the proposed transfer imposed an atypical or 18 significant hardship on him in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. See also Myron v. 19 Terhune, 476 F.3d 716, 718 (9th Cir. 2007) (placement in a higher security level does not in itself 20 impose an atypical and significant hardship); Fiorito v. Entzel, No. 5:17-cv-02158-JFW-KES, 21 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55830, at *10-11 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2019) (allegations of transfer, even 22 to a higher security or more dangerous prison, do not state a due process claim absent facts 23 showing specific conditions that amount to an atypical and significant hardship). 24 To the extent that plaintiff alleges that the proposed transfer was retaliation in violation of 25 the First Amendment due to his filing of a prison grievance, plaintiff has stated insufficient facts 26 to make out the claim. To state a claim for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment, a 27 prisoner must allege facts showing five elements: (1) that a state actor took some adverse action 28 against him (2) because of (3) his protected conduct, (4) that such action chilled his exercise of 1 his First Amendment rights, and (5) that the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate 2 correctional goal. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). The plaintiff need 3 not allege that his speech was actually inhibited or suppressed, but merely that the defendant’s 4 conduct was such as would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from future First 5 Amendment activities. Id. at 568-69. Conduct protected by the First Amendment includes 6 communications that are “part of the grievance process.” Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1271 7 n.4 (9th Cir. 2009). Here, plaintiff has not pled facts showing that any named defendant was 8 involved in the proposed transfer, that he was actually transferred, or that the transfer did not 9 further a legitimate correctional goal. 10 Lastly, to the extent that plaintiff alleges that Captain Lecky violated his rights by saying, 11 “Well, starve then,” this conduct, even if true, does not arise to a violation of the Constitution. 12 Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1092 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[V]erbal harassment generally does not 13 violate the Eighth Amendment.”). 14 Leave to Amend 15 Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed with leave to amend. If plaintiff chooses to file an 16 amended complaint it should observe the following: 17 Any amended complaint must identify as a defendant only persons who personally 18 participated in a substantial way in depriving him of a federal constitutional right. Johnson v. 19 Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (a person subjects another to the deprivation of a 20 constitutional right if he does an act, participates in another’s act or omits to perform an act he is 21 legally required to do that causes the alleged deprivation). The complaint should also describe, 22 in sufficient detail, how each defendant personally violated or participated in the violation of his 23 rights. The court will not infer the existence of allegations that have not been explicitly set forth 24 in the amended complaint. 25 The amended complaint must contain a caption including the names of all defendants. 26 Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). 27 Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by alleging new, unrelated claims. See 28 George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). 1 Any amended complaint must be written or typed so that it so that it is complete in itself 2 || without reference to any earlier filed complaint. E.D. Cal. 220. This is because an amended 3 | complaint supersedes any earlier filed complaint, and once an amended complaint is filed, the 4 || earlier filed complaint no longer serves any function in the case. See Forsyth v. Humana, 114 5 | F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997) (the “‘amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter 6 | being treated thereafter as non-existent.’”) (quoting Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 7 || 1967)). 8 Finally, the court notes that any amended complaint should be as concise as possible in 9 | fulfilling the above requirements. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Plaintiff should avoid the inclusion of 10 || procedural or factual background which has no bearing on his legal claims. 11 Conclusion 12 Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that: 13 1. Plaintiffs application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED; 14 2. Plaintiff shall pay the statutory filing fee of $402. All payments shall be collected in 15 accordance with the notice to the California Department of Corrections and 16 Rehabilitation filed concurrently herewith; 17 3. Plaintiff's complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED with leave to amend within 30 18 days of service of this order; and 19 4. Failure to comply with this order may result in dismissal of this action for the 20 reasons stated herein. 22 || Dated: October 30, 2023 LD LT tins LAC AM, 73 EDMUND F. BRENNAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 24 25 26 27 28