Houff v. City of Sacramento ( 2022 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CHARLES HOUFF, individually and as No. 2:22-cv-01150-MCE-JDP successor-in-interest to Decedent 12 Amelian Houff, et al., 13 Plaintiffs, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 14 v. 15 CITY OF SACRAMENTO, et al, 16 Defendants. 17 18 Through the present action, Plaintiffs Charles and Olivia Houff, individually and as 19 successors-in-interest to Decedent Amelian Houff (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), seek to 20 recover from Defendants City of Sacramento and County of Sacramento (collectively, 21 “Defendants”) for injuries sustained when Amelian was involved in a car accident that 22 followed a high-speed pursuit by City of Sacramento police officers. Presently before the 23 Court is the County of Sacramento’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against it for 24 failure to state a claim. ECF No. 12.1 25 1 On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), all allegations of material fact must be accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to the 26 nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–38 (9th Cir. 1996). Rule 8(a)(2) “requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief’ in order 27 to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). A 28 complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not require detailed factual allegations. 1 The operative Complaint fails to allege any facts implicating the County of 2 Sacramento with regard to Plaintiffs’ federal causes of action. Those claims are thus 3 DISMISSED with leave to amend, and the Court declines to exercise supplemental 4 jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims. Accordingly, the City’s Motion to Dismiss, 5 ECF No. 12, is GRANTED with leave to amend. Not later than twenty (20) days 6 following the date this Memorandum and Order is electronically filed, Plaintiff may, but is 7 not required to, file an amended complaint. If no amended complaint is timely filed, the 8 causes of action dismissed by virtue of this Order will be deemed dismissed with 9 prejudice upon no further notice to the parties. 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 11 DATED: December 20, 2022 12 However, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than 13 labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). A court is not required to accept as true a “legal conclusion 14 couched as a factual allegation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” 15 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216 (3d ed. 2004) (stating that the pleading must contain something more than “a statement of facts 16 that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action”)). Furthermore, “Rule 8(a)(2) . . . requires a showing, rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement 17 to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Thus, “[w]ithout some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirement of 18 providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.” Id. (citing Wright & Miller, supra, at 94, 95). A pleading must contain “only enough facts to state a claim to 19 relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. If the “plaintiffs . . . have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed.” Id. However, “a well-pleaded 20 complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and ‘that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.’” Id. at 556 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 21 (1974)). A court granting a motion to dismiss a complaint must then decide whether to grant leave to 22 amend. Leave to amend should be “freely given” where there is no “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, . . . undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the 23 amendment, [or] futility of [the] amendment . . . .” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (listing the Foman factors as those to be 24 considered when deciding whether to grant leave to amend). Not all of these factors merit equal weight. Rather, “the consideration of prejudice to the opposing party . . . carries the greatest weight.” Id. (citing 25 DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 185 (9th Cir. 1987)). Dismissal without leave to amend is proper only if it is clear that “the complaint could not be saved by any amendment.” Intri-Plex Techs., Inc. 26 v. Crest Group, Inc., 499 F.3d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing In re Daou Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 2005); Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Leave 27 need not be granted where the amendment of the complaint . . . constitutes an exercise in futility . . . .”)). 28