Estate of Kenneth Dale Sumner v. State of CA ( 2023 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ESTATE OF KENNETH DALE No. 2:22-cv-01638-JAM-DB SUMNER, KERRI SUMNER, 12 individually and as successors-in-interest to 13 KENNETH DALE SUMNER; and ORDER GRANTING CALIFORNIA D.S.A., a minor, by and DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND 14 through her guardian ad REHABILITATION’S MOTION TO litem, KERRI SUMNER, DISMISS 15 Plaintiffs, 16 v. 17 CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF 18 CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION; DAVID 19 AGUILAR; HUNTER DUNCAN; LENOARDO HERNANDEZ; ANTHONY 20 LUNA; ISAAC SALCEDO; ANTHONY VELASQUEZ; OKALANI LATU, an 21 individual; and DOES 7-20, 22 Defendants. 23 24 The estate of Kenneth Sumner (“Sumner”), Kerri Sumner, and 25 Sumner’s minor child (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed this 26 lawsuit against the California Department of Corrections and 27 Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), various CDCR officers, Okalani Latu 28 (“Latu”), and fictitious persons, alleging a host of civil rights 1 violations relating to Sumner’s incarceration at CDCR’s Substance 2 Abuse Treatment Facility (“SATF”) in Corcoran, California. See 3 Second Am. Compl. (“SAC”), ECF No. 27. CDCR filed a motion to 4 dismiss (“motion”), asking the court to dismiss all of 5 Plaintiffs’ claims against it. See Mot. to Dismiss (“Mot.”), ECF 6 No. 29. Plaintiffs filed their opposition and CDCR replied. See 7 Opp’n, ECF No. 36; Reply, ECF No. 38. 8 For the reasons explained below, the Court GRANTS CDCR’s 9 motion to dismiss with prejudice.1 10 11 I. BACKGROUND 12 Sumner was incarcerated at CDCR’s SATF in Corcoran, 13 California where he shared a cell with Latu. See SAC ¶ 19. 14 After hearing “loud knocking noises” and observing “blood coming 15 from the bottom” of Sumner’s and Latu’s cell, Officer Duncan 16 activated his personal alarm. See Id. ¶¶ 23-25. Sergeant 17 Salcedo and Officers Aguilar, Hernandez, Velasquez, and Luna 18 responded to the scene. Id. ¶¶ 26-28. Officer Duncan opened the 19 cell’s door and Officers Hernandez and Aguilar removed Latu to a 20 holding cell. See Id. ¶ 28. Meanwhile, the remaining Officers 21 discovered Sumner on the cell’s floor in cardiac arrest. See Id. 22 ¶ 25, 31. Sumner was airlifted to Kaweah Delta Medical Center 23 and found apneic and pulseless upon arrival. See Id. ¶ 31. 24 Sumner was placed on life support but died five days later. See 25 Id. ¶ 33. This lawsuit was filed approximately one year after 26 27 1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was scheduled 28 for April 25, 2023. 1 Sumner’s death. 2 3 II. OPINION 4 A. Legal Standard 5 When weighing a motion to dismiss, courts “accept factual 6 allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings 7 in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. 8 St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 9 2008). However, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual 10 matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 11 plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 12 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 13 1974 (2007)). Facial plausibility exists when “the plaintiff 14 pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 15 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 16 misconduct alleged.” Id. However, “a formulaic recitation of a 17 cause of action’s elements will not do.” Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 18 1965. Such statements are “legal conclusion[s] couched as 19 factual allegation[s]” that must be dismissed. Papasan v. 20 Allain, 106 S. Ct. 2932, 2944 (1986). 21 B. Analysis 22 CDCR asks the court to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against it 23 because: (1) the Eleventh Amendment immunizes it from suit in 24 federal court; and (2) the Supreme Court has determined it is not 25 “a person” under § 1983. See Mot. at 2. In opposition, 26 Plaintiffs ignore CDCR’s Eleventh Amendment defense entirely, 27 arguing instead that: (1) they “met and exceeded their burden at 28 the pleading stage;” and (2) the Supreme Court’s Decision in 1 Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S.Ct. 1731, 1738 (2020) “is forcing 2 courts to reexamine” § 1983’s “preclusion of states being sued 3 for police misconduct.” Opp’n at 3, 4-5. 4 1. CDCR’s Eleventh Amendment Immunity 5 The Eleventh Amendment protects a state from suit in federal 6 court unless the state expressly waives, or Congress abrogates, 7 this constitutional shield. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 8 159, 169 (1985); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 9 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). This prohibition extends to state agencies— 10 like CDCR. See Aranda v. Martel, 416 F. App'x 651 (9th Cir. 11 2011) (“The [CDCR], as a state agency, is immune from suit under 12 the Eleventh Amendment”). The Eleventh Amendment therefore 13 prohibits litigants from pursuing both federal and “pendent state 14 claims against nonconsenting state defendants in federal courts.” 15 Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 16 2004) 17 CDCR did not waive, nor has Congress abrogated, its immunity 18 under the Eleventh Amendment. In turn, the Eleventh Amendment 19 unequivocally precludes Plaintiffs claims against CDCR. The 20 Court therefore finds Plaintiffs failed to state a plausible 21 cause of action against CDCR and dismisses their claims 22 accordingly. Plaintiffs’ failure to address CDCR’s Eleventh 23 Amendment argument further supports the Court’s conclusion. 24 Specifically, such an omission indicates Plaintiffs concede 25 CDCR’s Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Resnick v. Hyundai Motor 26 America, Inc., No. CV 16-00593-BRO (PJWx), 2017 WL 1531192 at 27 *22, (C.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2017) (“Failure to oppose an argument 28 raised in a motion to dismiss constitutes waiver of that 1 argument”). The Court dismisses all claims against CDCR with 2 prejudice finding that amendment would be futile. See Gompper v. 3 VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding leave to 4 amend need not be granted when amendment would be futile). 5 2. Plaintiffs Cannot Sue CDCR Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 6 In addition to the Eleventh Amendment shield raised by CDCR, 7 the Supreme Court has determined that state agencies are not 8 “persons” under § 1983. Howlett By & Through Howlett v. Rose, 9 496 U.S. 356, 365(1990) (stating a state agency “is not a 10 ‘person’ within the meaning of § 1983”). As a result, CDCR 11 cannot be held liable under § 1983 as a matter of law. 12 Despite this uncontested precedent, Plaintiffs urge the 13 Court to hold the opposite based on the Supreme Court’s decision 14 in Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S.Ct. 1731, 1738 (2020). 15 Plaintiffs argue that Bostock has prompted courts “to reexamine 16 § 1983 and how states should not necessarily be precluded from 17 liability, especially when they have direct involvement in the 18 violation of an individual’s federal rights.” Opp’n at 5. 19 Bostock, however, is clearly distinguishable from the instant 20 case. (Bostock involved the issue of whether an “employer who 21 fires an individual for being homosexual or transgender does so 22 ‘because of sex’ and therefore violates Title VII of the Civil 23 Rights Act.” 140 S.Ct. at 1737.) Importantly, Bostock lacks any 24 analysis concerning §1983 and the statute’s definition of 25 “persons.” Plaintiffs’ reliance on Bostock is misplaced and 26 CDCR’s motion to dismiss all claims against it with prejudice 27 must be granted on this ground as well. 28 /// eee eee EI IIE IE IRE III EO EEE 1 TILT. ORDER 2 For the reasons set forth above, the Court DISMISSES all of 3 Plaintiffs’ claims against CDCR WITH PREJUDICE. 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. 5 Dated: May 5, 2023 6 : APs JOHN A. MENDEZ 8 SENIOR UNITED*STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28