(PS) Padilla v. Bluebond ( 2023 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MARIA D. PADILLA, No. 2:23-cv-0236 KJM DB PS 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 HON. SHERI BLUEBOND, 15 Defendant. 16 17 Plaintiff Maria D. Padilla is proceeding in this action pro se. This matter was referred to 18 the undersigned in accordance with Local Rule 302(c)(21) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Pending 19 before the court are plaintiff’s complaint and motion to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 20 U.S.C. § 1915. (ECF Nos. 1 & 2.) The complaint alleges that plaintiff’s rights were violated as 21 the result of “an erroneous court order” issued by the defendant. (Compl. (ECF No. 1) at 1.) 22 The court is required to screen complaints brought by parties proceeding in forma 23 pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 24 2000) (en banc). Here, plaintiff’s complaint is deficient. Accordingly, for the reasons 25 stated below, the undersigned will recommend that plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed without 26 leave to amend. 27 //// 28 //// 1 I. Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 2 Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis application makes the financial showing required by 28 3 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). However, a determination that a plaintiff qualifies financially for in forma 4 pauperis status does not complete the inquiry required by the statute. “‘A district court may deny 5 leave to proceed in forma pauperis at the outset if it appears from the face of the proposed 6 complaint that the action is frivolous or without merit.’” Minetti v. Port of Seattle, 152 F.3d 7 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Tripati v. First Nat. Bank & Trust, 821 F.2d 1368, 1370 (9th 8 Cir. 1987)); see also McGee v. Department of Child Support Services, 584 Fed. Appx. 638 (9th 9 Cir. 2014) (“the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying McGee’s request to proceed 10 IFP because it appears from the face of the amended complaint that McGee’s action is frivolous 11 or without merit”); Smart v. Heinze, 347 F.2d 114, 116 (9th Cir. 1965) (“It is the duty of the 12 District Court to examine any application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis to determine 13 whether the proposed proceeding has merit and if it appears that the proceeding is without merit, 14 the court is bound to deny a motion seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis.”). 15 Moreover, the court must dismiss an in forma pauperis case at any time if the allegation of 16 poverty is found to be untrue or if it is determined that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to 17 state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against an immune 18 defendant. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). A complaint is legally frivolous when it lacks an 19 arguable basis in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. 20 Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 1984). Under this standard, a court must dismiss a 21 complaint as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the 22 factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). 23 To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to 24 state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 25 570 (2007). In considering whether a complaint states a cognizable claim, the court accepts as 26 true the material allegations in the complaint and construes the allegations in the light most 27 favorable to the plaintiff. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. 28 Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976); Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 1 (9th Cir. 1989). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by 2 lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, the court need not accept as true 3 conclusory allegations, unreasonable inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western 4 Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). 5 The minimum requirements for a civil complaint in federal court, as explained by Rule 8 6 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rules”), are as follows: 7 A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief . . . shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court’s 8 jurisdiction depends . . . , (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for 9 judgment for the relief the pleader seeks. 10 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 11 II. Plaintiff’s Complaint 12 The complaint alleges that the Honorable Sheri Bluebond, a judge in the United States 13 Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California, issued “an erroneous order” that “ordered 14 for a foreclosure” resulting in plaintiff being evicted. (Compl. (ECF No. 1) at 1-2.) The 15 complaint seeks “damages” against the defendant. (Id.) 16 However, judges are generally absolutely immune from civil liability for actions taken in 17 their judicial capacity. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991). A judge is “subject to 18 liability only when he has acted in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’” Stump v. Sparkman, 19 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 351 (1872)). A judge will 20 not be deprived of immunity because the action she took “was in error, was done maliciously, or 21 was in excess of [her] authority.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. at 356. Moreover, a judge’s 22 jurisdiction is quite broad. “[T]he factors determining whether an act by a judge is a ‘judicial’ 23 one relates to the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a 24 judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial 25 capacity.” Partington v. Gedan, 961 F.2d 852, 866 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 26 435 U.S. at 362); see also Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 13 (1991) (in determining whether 27 judicial immunity applies, court looks to the “particular act’s relation to a general function 28 //// 1 normally performed by a judge”); Meek v. County of Riverside, 183 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir. 2 1999). 3 Here, the complaint is seeking civil liability against a judge for actions taken in their 4 judicial capacity. As such, the complaint should be dismissed. See Patel v. DeCarolis, 701 Fed. 5 Appx. 590, 591 (9th Cir. 2017) (“The district court properly dismissed Patel’s damages claims 6 against Judge Pacheco on the basis of judicial immunity because the claims arose out of Judge 7 Pacheco’s judicial acts.”). 8 III. Leave to Amend 9 For the reasons stated above, plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed. The undersigned 10 has carefully considered whether plaintiff may amend the complaint to state a claim upon which 11 relief can be granted. “Valid reasons for denying leave to amend include undue delay, bad faith, 12 prejudice, and futility.” California Architectural Bldg. Prod. v. Franciscan Ceramics, 818 F.2d 13 1466, 1472 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Klamath-Lake Pharm. Ass’n v. Klamath Med. Serv. Bureau, 14 701 F.2d 1276, 1293 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that while leave to amend shall be freely given, the 15 court does not have to allow futile amendments). 16 Here, given the defects noted above, the undersigned finds that granting plaintiff leave to 17 amend would be futile. 18 CONCLUSION 19 Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 20 1. Plaintiff’s February 8, 2023 application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) be 21 denied; 22 2. The complaint filed on February 8, 2023, be dismissed without prejudice; and 23 3. This action be dismissed. 24 These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge 25 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen days 26 after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written objections 27 with the court. A document containing objections should be titled “Objections to Magistrate 28 Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within 1 /the specified time may, under certain circumstances, waive the right to appeal the District 2 Court’s order. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 3 DATED: May 4, 2023 /s/ DEBORAH BARNES UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 DLB:6 DB\orders\orders.pro se\padilla0236.dism.f&rs 23 24 25 26 27 28