(PC) Evans v. Lassiter ( 2023 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 GENE EVANS, Case No. 2:16-cv-01997-DAD-JDP (PC) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER AND FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 13 v. ECF Nos. 84 & 88 14 K. LASSITER, et al., OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN FOURTEEN 15 Defendants. DAYS 16 17 18 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights 19 action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges that defendant correctional officers Montemayor, 20 Wong, and Lassiter violated his Eighth Amendment rights by verbally harassing and threatening 21 him. Defendants move for summary judgment on the grounds that plaintiff failed to exhaust his 22 administrative remedies, his claim fails on the merits, and defendants are entitled to qualified 23 immunity. ECF No. 84. Plaintiff opposes the motion and requests appointment of counsel. ECF 24 No. 88. For the reasons set forth below, I will deny plaintiff’s motion for counsel and will 25 recommend that defendants’ motion for summary judgment be granted on the ground that 26 plaintiff’s claim fails on the merits. 27 28 1 Background 2 At all times relevant to this action, plaintiff was housed in the M-1 housing unit at 3 California Medical Facility in Vacaville, California, where defendants were employed as 4 correctional officers. ECF No. 84-4 at 1; ECF No. 84-5 at 1; ECF No. 84-6 at 1. Inmates 5 assigned to the M-1 housing unit were in the Enhanced Outpatient Program (“EOP”) of CDCR’s 6 Mental Health Services Delivery System. ECF No. 84-4 at 2. Inmates at the EOP level of care 7 have mental health conditions that limit their ability to adjust to and to be housed with the general 8 inmate population. Id. 9 In 1993, plaintiff was diagnosed with schizophrenia, and he has taken medication since 10 that time to limit his auditory hallucinations. ECF No. 84-7 at 12-14. In May 2014, plaintiff 11 claims that his auditory hallucinations got so “out of control” that he was placed in a crisis bed at 12 Stockton Hospital for five months. Id. at 15-16. 13 In April and May 2014—that is, shortly before his transfer to Stockton Hospital—plaintiff 14 claims that each of the three defendants threatened him and made comments that were “not nice.” 15 Plaintiff claims that Officer Lassiter told him, “I’m going to kill you, Evans”; stated, “if you’re 16 running, you’re dead”; and called plaintiff’s sisters “bitch words and stuff too.” ECF No. 84-7 at 17 26-27. Plaintiff allegedly replied, “hey, man[—y]ou just threatened me[—t]hat’s not nice to talk 18 to me like that,” which allegedly led Officer Lassiter to apologize. Id. Plaintiff does not allege 19 that Officer Lassiter made physical contact with him, id. at 32, and Officer Lassiter denies ever 20 having made the relevant statements. ECF No. 84-6 at 3. 21 Plaintiff claims that Officer Wong said, “hang yourself,” and “I’ll pour cooking oil all 22 over you,” and called plaintiff’s sisters “bitches and all that.” ECF No. 84-7 at 33-34. Plaintiff 23 allegedly replied, “hey, that’s not nice to talk to me like that.” Id. Plaintiff does not allege that 24 Officer Wong made physical contact with him, id., and Officer Wong denies having made the 25 relevant statements. ECF No. 84-5 at 3. 26 Plaintiff claims that Officer Montemayor once told him, “you ain’t gonna get out of this 27 prison if you’re going to rat”; asked, “you want to get killed or what?”; and told plaintiff, “hang 28 yourself.” ECF No. 84-7 at 38. He also allegedly made crude comments about plaintiff’s 1 daughter. Id. Plaintiff allegedly replied, “hey, that’s not nice to talk to me like that.” Id. 2 Plaintiff does not allege that Officer Montemayor made physical contact with him, id., and 3 Officer Montemayor denies ever having made the relevant statements. ECF No. 84-4 at 2. 4 Plaintiff contends that defendants’ statements caused him stress and weight loss, although 5 he provides no documentation to support these contentions. ECF No. 84-7 at 50. 6 Legal Standards 7 Summary judgment is appropriate where there is “no genuine dispute as to any material 8 fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Washington 9 Mutual Inc. v. United States, 636 F.3d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). An issue of fact is genuine 10 only if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable fact finder to find for the non-moving party, 11 while a fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” 12 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Wool v. Tandem Computs., Inc., 818 13 F.2d 1422, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987). 14 Rule 56 allows a court to grant summary adjudication, also known as partial summary 15 judgment, when there is no genuine issue of material fact as to a claim or a portion of that claim. 16 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Lies v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 641 F.2d 765, 769 n.3 (9th Cir. 1981) (“Rule 17 56 authorizes a summary adjudication that will often fall short of a final determination, even of a 18 single claim . . . .”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The same standards apply to 19 both a motion for summary judgment and a motion for summary adjudication. See Fed. R. Civ. 20 P. 56(a), (c); Mora v. Chem-Tronics, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1200 (S.D. Cal. 1998). 21 Each party’s position must be supported by (1) citations to particular portions of materials 22 in the record, including but not limited to depositions, documents, declarations, or discovery; or 23 (2) argument showing either that the materials cited do not establish the presence or absence of a 24 genuine factual dispute or that the opposing party cannot produce admissible evidence to support 25 its position. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) (quotation marks omitted). The court may consider 26 materials in the record not cited by the parties, but it is not required to do so. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 27 56(c)(3); Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001); see 28 also Simmons v. Navajo Cnty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010). 1 “The moving party initially bears the burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of 2 material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). To meet its burden, “the 3 moving party must either produce evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving 4 party’s claim or defense or show that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an 5 essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. 6 Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). If the moving party meets this 7 initial burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party “to designate specific facts 8 demonstrating the existence of genuine issues for trial.” In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 9 376, 387 (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323). The non-moving party must “show more than 10 the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.” Id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 11 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)). However, the non-moving party is not required to establish a material 12 issue of fact conclusively in its favor; it is sufficient that “the claimed factual dispute be shown to 13 require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. 14 Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Assoc., 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). 15 The court must apply standards consistent with Rule 56 to determine whether the moving 16 party has demonstrated there to be no genuine issue of material fact and that judgment is 17 appropriate as a matter of law. See Henry v. Gill Indus., Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1993). 18 “[A] court ruling on a motion for summary judgment may not engage in credibility 19 determinations or the weighing of evidence.” Manley v. Rowley, 847 F.3d 705, 711 (9th Cir. 20 2017) (citation omitted). The evidence must be viewed “in the light most favorable to the 21 nonmoving party” and “all justifiable inferences” must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. 22 Orr v. Bank of America, NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 772 (9th Cir. 2002); Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 23 198 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000). 24 Discussion 25 A. Motion for Appointment of Counsel 26 Plaintiff asks that counsel be appointed because he has mental health issues and because 27 the issues in this case are complex. Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to appointed 28 counsel in this action, see Rand v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997), and the court 1 lacks the authority to require an attorney to represent plaintiff. See Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for 2 the S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). The court can request the voluntary assistance of 3 counsel. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) (“The court may request an attorney to represent any person 4 unable to afford counsel”); Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525. But without a means to compensate counsel, 5 the court will seek volunteer counsel only in exceptional circumstances. In determining whether 6 such circumstances exist, “the district court must evaluate both the likelihood of success on the 7 merits [and] the ability of the [plaintiff] to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of 8 the legal issues involved.” Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525 (internal quotation marks and citations 9 omitted). 10 While I am sympathetic to the difficulties plaintiff may be experiencing, these factors 11 alone do not establish exceptional circumstances warranting the appointment of counsel. Plaintiff 12 was diagnosed with schizophrenia in 1993, yet he has actively litigated this case since 2016. I do 13 not find the issues in this case so complex as to warrant appointment of counsel. Plaintiff’s 14 motion will therefore be denied. 15 B. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment 16 Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment verbal harassment claim is premised on three separate 17 interactions with defendants in April and May 2014. According to plaintiff, Officer Lassiter told 18 him, “I’m going to kill you, Evans,” and “if you’re running, you’re dead.” Officer Wong 19 allegedly said, “hang yourself,” and “I’ll pour cooking oil all over you.” Officer Montemayor is 20 alleged to have said, variously, “you ain’t gonna get out of this prison if you’re going to rat”; 21 “you want to get killed or what?”; and “hang yourself.” Plaintiff alleges that these were one-time 22 incidents and that none of the defendants touched him. 23 Defendants argue that none of their alleged statements violate the Eighth Amendment’s 24 prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, noting that allegations of name-calling, verbal 25 abuse, and threats generally fail to support an Eighth Amendment claim. See Keenan v. Hall, 83 26 F.3d 1083, 1092 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[V]erbal harassment generally does not violate the Eighth 27 Amendment.”), opinion amended on denial of reh’g, 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Gaut 28 1 v. Sunn, 810 F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that a prisoner’s allegations of threats 2 allegedly made by guards failed to state a cause of action). 3 Verbal harassment may violate the constitution when it is “unusually gross even for a 4 prison setting and [is] calculated to and [does] cause [plaintiff] psychological damage.” Cox v. 5 Kernan, 2019 WL 6840136, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2019) (alterations in original) (quoting 6 Keenan, 83 F.3d 1083 at 1092). But even taking plaintiff’s version of events as true, I find that 7 summary judgment should be entered for defendants because plaintiff makes insufficient showing 8 that defendants’ comments were unusually gross even for a prison setting and intended to cause 9 him psychological damage. Moreover, a defendant’s threats to kill or harm a plaintiff are 10 insufficient, without more, to impose liability for verbal harassment. See Bailey v. Soto, 2019 11 WL 4452970, at *9 (C.D. Cal. July 10, 2019). Here, plaintiff has not submitted any evidence that 12 would elevate defendants’ alleged threats to an Eighth Amendment violation. As such, I find that 13 defendants have shown summary judgment in their favor to be appropriate, since the statements 14 attributed to them are insufficient to support liability under the Eighth Amendment. See Somers 15 v. Thurman, 109 F.3d 614, 622 (9th Cir. 1997) (“the exchange of verbal insults between inmates 16 and guards is a constant, daily ritual observed in this nation’s prisons” of which “we do not 17 approve” but which does not violate the Eighth Amendment); Monroe v. Mortell, 2022 WL 18 624996, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 1004715 19 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2022) (“[A] defendant’s threats to kill or harm a plaintiff are insufficient, 20 without more, to give rise to a cognizable verbal harassment claim.”). 21 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, I find that there is no genuine 22 issue of material fact regarding whether defendants violated plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment right 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 | to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Summary judgment should be entered for 2 | defendants on plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim.! 3 Conclusion 4 Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for appointment of 5 | counsel is DENIED, and 6 It is hereby RECOMMENDED that defendants’ motion for summary judgment be 7 | GRANTED. 8 I submit these findings and recommendations to the U.S. district judge presiding over the 9 | case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 304. Within fourteen days of the service of 10 | the findings and recommendations, the parties may file written objections to the findings and 11 | recommendations with the court and serve a copy on all parties. The document containing the 12 || objections must be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 13 | Recommendations.” The presiding district judge will then review the findings and 14 | recommendations under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). 15 16 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: _ November 28, 2023 Q_-——— 18 JEREMY D. PETERSON 19 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 ||§_ ———R_ ' Because plaintiff has failed to present a triable issue of fact regarding the alleged 28 | constitutional violation, I decline to reach defendants’ alternative grounds for summary judgment.