(PC) Callins v. Mason ( 2022 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 11 CARLTON RAY CALLINS, ) Case No.: 1:22-cv-00603-SAB (PC) ) 12 Plaintiff, ) ) ORDER FOR PLAINTIFF TO SHOW CAUSE 13 v. ) WHY ACTION SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED AS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF 14 C. MASON, et.al., ) LIMITATIONS ) 15 Defendants. ) (ECF No. 1) ) 16 ) ) 17 18 Plaintiff Carlton Ray Callins is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights 19 action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 20 Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s complaint, filed May 20, 2022. 21 I. 22 SCREENING REQUIREMENT 23 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 24 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court 25 must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous 26 or malicious,” that “fail[] to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or that “seek[] monetary 27 28 1 relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also 28 2 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). 3 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 4 entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but 5 “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do 6 not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 7 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated 8 in the deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). 9 Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings liberally 10 construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th 11 Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which 12 requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is 13 liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 14 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and 15 “facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” falls short of satisfying the plausibility 16 standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 17 II. 18 COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS 19 The Court accepts Plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint as true only for the purpose of the sua 20 sponte screening requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 21 From September 24, 2015 to December 23, 2015, officer C. Kyt continued to sexually assault 22 and harass Plaintiff while completing his pat down searches by placing his penis on Plaintiff’s buttock 23 and grabbing his breast. During this time period, Kyt would repeatedly tell officers D. Garrison and 24 C. Zamora about the harassment and request to speak to the sergeant. When Plaintiff tried to talk to 25 sergeant C. Mason and officer A. Flores they would always ignore him. Plaintiff went on suicide 26 watch and when captain Kevin Hixon went to interview Plaintiff he cleared Plaintiff to go back to D- 27 yard after he was told about the sexual harassment and assaults. 28 1 On January 7, 2016, during the Institution Classification Committee, Plaintiff told warden 2 Pfeiffer about the security risk he faced because of the harassment and assaults, and he told Plaintiff, 3 “oh well maybe you should threaten my officers” and cleared Plaintiff to go back to D-yard where the 4 sexual harassment and assaults continued. 5 III. 6 DISCUSSION 7 Failure to comply with the applicable statute of limitations may be grounds for dismissal at the 8 screening phase if it is evident from the face of the complaint that the plaintiff cannot “prevail, as a 9 matter of law, on the equitable tolling issue.” Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 1276 (9th 10 Cir. 1993). 11 Section 1983 does not have its own statute of limitations, so the court applies California’s 12 statute of limitations for personal injury actions. See Butler v. Nat’l Cmty. Renaissance of California, 13 766 F.3d 1191, 1198 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Without a federal limitations period, the federal courts apply 14 the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions, along with the forum state’s law 15 regarding tolling, including equitable tolling, except to the extent any of these laws is inconsistent with 16 federal law.”). California’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions requires that a claim be 17 asserted within two years of its accrual. Butler, 766 F.3d at 1198 (citing Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 18 335.1). Prisoners receive an additional two years to file personal injury claims, generally resulting in a 19 total of four years period from accrual for prisoners to file a claim under § 1983. See Cal. Civ. Proc. 20 Code § 352.1(a) (“If a person entitled to bring an action, ... is, at the time the cause of action accrued, 21 imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in execution under the sentence of a criminal court for a term less 22 than for life, the time of that disability is not a part of the time limited for the commencement of the 23 action, not to exceed two years.”). 24 “Where exhaustion of an administrative remedy is mandatory prior to filing suit, equitable 25 tolling is automatic: ‘It has long been settled in this and other jurisdictions that whenever the 26 exhaustion of administrative remedies is a prerequisite to the initiation of a civil action, the running of 27 the limitations period is tolled during the time consumed by the administrative proceeding.’” 28 McDonald v. Antelope Valley Cmty. Coll. Dist., 45 Cal. 4th 88, 101 (2008) (quoting Elkins v. Derby, 1 || 12 Cal. 3d 410, 414 (1974)). See also Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 943 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he 2 || applicable statute of limitations must be tolled while a prisoner completes the mandatory exhaustion 3 || process.”). 4 “Although courts look to state law for the length of the limitations period, the time at which 5 § 1983 claim accrues is a question of federal law, conforming in general to common-law tort 6 || principles. That time is presumptively when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of 7 || action....” McDonough v. Smith, 139 S. Ct. 2149, 2155 (2019) (citations and internal quotation mark: 8 || omitted). 9 Plaintiff alleges that the relevant incidents occurred on September 24, 2015 through January 7 10 2016. Plaintiff's claims thus appear untimely. Accordingly, the Court will order plaintiff to show 11 || cause why this action should not be dismissed for failure to comply with the 12 || applicable statute of limitations. 13 IV. 14 ORDER 15 As it appears from the face of the complaint that Plaintiff's claims are time-barred, it is 16 |} HEREBY ORDERED that, within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff 17 || shall show cause why this action should not be dismissed because Plaintiffs claims are barred by 18 || the statute of limitations. Failure to comply with this order will result in a recommendation to dismis 19 || the action as barred by the statute of limitations. 20 21 □□ IS SO ORDERED. Al (re 22 |! Dated: _May 27, 2022 OF 23 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 24 25 26 27 28