(PS) Costa v. Haet ( 2023 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MICHAEL S. COSTA, No. 2:22-cv-1003 TLN DB PS 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 DAVID L HAET, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff Michael S. Costa is proceeding in this action pro se. This matter was referred to 18 the undersigned in accordance with Local Rule 302(c)(21) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Pending 19 before the Court are plaintiff’s amended complaint and motions to proceed in forma pauperis 20 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. (ECF Nos. 2, 6, 7.) The amended complaint concerns allegations 21 related to a child custody dispute. 22 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by parties proceeding in forma 23 pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 24 2000) (en banc). Here, plaintiff’s amended complaint is deficient. Accordingly, for the reasons 25 stated below, the undersigned will recommend that plaintiff’s amended complaint be dismissed 26 without further leave to amend. 27 //// 28 //// 1 I. Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 2 Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis application makes the financial showing required by 28 3 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). However, a determination that a plaintiff qualifies financially for in forma 4 pauperis status does not complete the inquiry required by the statute. “‘A district court may deny 5 leave to proceed in forma pauperis at the outset if it appears from the face of the proposed 6 complaint that the action is frivolous or without merit.’” Minetti v. Port of Seattle, 152 F.3d 7 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Tripati v. First Nat. Bank & Trust, 821 F.2d 1368, 1370 (9th 8 Cir. 1987)); see also McGee v. Department of Child Support Services, 584 Fed. Appx. 638 (9th 9 Cir. 2014) (“the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying McGee’s request to proceed 10 IFP because it appears from the face of the amended complaint that McGee’s action is frivolous 11 or without merit”); Smart v. Heinze, 347 F.2d 114, 116 (9th Cir. 1965) (“It is the duty of the 12 District Court to examine any application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis to determine 13 whether the proposed proceeding has merit and if it appears that the proceeding is without merit, 14 the court is bound to deny a motion seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis.”). 15 Moreover, the court must dismiss an in forma pauperis case at any time if the allegation of 16 poverty is found to be untrue or if it is determined that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to 17 state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against an immune 18 defendant. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). A complaint is legally frivolous when it lacks an 19 arguable basis in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. 20 Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 1984). Under this standard, a court must dismiss a 21 complaint as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the 22 factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). 23 To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to 24 state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 25 570 (2007). In considering whether a complaint states a cognizable claim, the court accepts as 26 true the material allegations in the complaint and construes the allegations in the light most 27 favorable to the plaintiff. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. 28 Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976); Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 1 (9th Cir. 1989). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by 2 lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, the court need not accept as true 3 conclusory allegations, unreasonable inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western 4 Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). 5 The minimum requirements for a civil complaint in federal court are as follows: 6 A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief . . . shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court’s 7 jurisdiction depends . . . , (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for 8 judgment for the relief the pleader seeks. 9 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 10 II. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint 11 Plaintiff’s amended complaint alleges that the defendants are various employees of the 12 California Department of Child Support Services (“DCSS”). The amended complaint alleges that 13 these defendants “work together” to “destroy a non-custodial parent” and that “a father should 14 [be] able to go to any court that he is a resident of and get visitation rights[.]” (Am. Compl. (ECF 15 No. 6) at 19.) Plaintiff is “asking the courts to order DCSS to stop all [child support] 16 garnishments and % on arrears” until plaintiff can “get visitors for my daughter.” (Id. at 21.) 17 Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine a federal district court is precluded from hearing 18 “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments 19 rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and 20 rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 21 284 (2005). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies not only to final state court orders and 22 judgments, but to interlocutory orders and non-final judgments issued 23 by a state court as well. Doe & Assoc. Law Offices v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 24 2001); Worldwide Church of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 893 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1986). 25 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits “a direct appeal from the final judgment of a state 26 court,” Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003), and “may also apply where the parties 27 do not directly contest the merits of a state court decision, as the doctrine prohibits a federal 28 district court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over a suit that is a de facto appeal from a 1 state court judgment.” Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 525 F.3d 855, 859 (9th Cir. 2008) 2 (internal quotation marks omitted). “A suit brought in federal district court is a ‘de facto appeal’ 3 forbidden by Rooker-Feldman when ‘a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly 4 erroneous decision by a state court, and seeks relief from a state court judgment based on that 5 decision.’” Carmona v. Carmona, 603 F.3d 1041, 1050 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Noel, 341 F.3d 6 at 1164); see also Doe v. Mann, 415 F.3d 1038, 1041 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he Rooker-Feldman 7 doctrine bars federal courts from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction over a proceeding in 8 ‘which a party losing in state court’ seeks ‘what in substance would be appellate review of the 9 state judgment in a United States district court, based on the losing party’s claim that the state 10 judgment itself violates the loser’s federal rights.’”) (quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 11 997, 1005-06 (1994), cert. denied 547 U.S. 1111 (2006)). “Thus, even if a plaintiff seeks relief 12 from a state court judgment, such a suit is a forbidden de facto appeal only if the plaintiff also 13 alleges a legal error by the state court.” Bell v. City of Boise, 709 F.3d 890, 897 (9th Cir. 2013). 14 [A] federal district court dealing with a suit that is, in part, a forbidden de facto appeal from a judicial decision of a state court 15 must refuse to hear the forbidden appeal. As part of that refusal, it must also refuse to decide any issue raised in the suit that is 16 ‘inextricably intertwined’ with an issue resolved by the state court in its judicial decision. 17 18 Doe, 415 F.3d at 1043 (quoting Noel, 341 F.3d at 1158); see also Exxon, 544 U.S. at 286 n. 1 (“a 19 district court [cannot] entertain constitutional claims attacking a state-court judgment, even if the 20 state court had not passed directly on those claims, when the constitutional attack [is] 21 ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state court’s judgment”) (citing Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482 n. 22 16)); Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 898, 900 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2003) (“claims raised in the 23 federal court action are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state court’s decision such that the 24 adjudication of the federal claims would undercut the state ruling or require the district court to 25 interpret the application of state laws or procedural rules”) (citing Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n. 16, 26 485). 27 Disputes over child custody matters fall squarely within the Rooker-Feldman bar. See, 28 e.g., Moor v. Cnty. of Butte, 547 Fed. Appx. 826, 829 (9th Cir. 2013) (affirming dismissal of suit 1 concerning state court divorce and child custody proceedings on Rooker-Feldman grounds); 2 Gomez v. San Diego Family Ct., 388 Fed. Appx. 685 (9th Cir. 2010) (affirming dismissal of state 3 court custody decision on Rooker-Feldman grounds); Sareen v. Sareen, 356 Fed. Appx. 977 (9th 4 Cir. 2009) (affirming dismissal of action alleging constitutional violation in state court child 5 custody action on Rooker-Feldman grounds). 6 III. Leave to Amend 7 For the reasons stated above, plaintiff’s amended complaint should be dismissed. The 8 undersigned has carefully considered whether plaintiff may further amend the complaint to state a 9 claim upon which relief can be granted. “Valid reasons for denying leave to amend include 10 undue delay, bad faith, prejudice, and futility.” California Architectural Bldg. Prod. v. Franciscan 11 Ceramics, 818 F.2d 1466, 1472 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Klamath-Lake Pharm. Ass’n v. Klamath 12 Med. Serv. Bureau, 701 F.2d 1276, 1293 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that while leave to amend shall 13 be freely given, the court does not have to allow futile amendments). 14 Here, plaintiff was previously advised of the defects noted above and granted leave to 15 amend. (ECF No. 3.) Given the defects noted above, and plaintiff’s inability to successfully 16 amend the complaint, the undersigned finds that granting plaintiff further leave to amend would 17 be futile. 18 CONCLUSION 19 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 20 1. Plaintiff’s June 9, 2022 application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) be 21 denied; 22 2. Plaintiff’s January 6, 2023 application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 7) be 23 denied; 24 3. The amended complaint filed on January 6, 2023, be dismissed without further leave to 25 amend; and 26 4. This action be closed. 27 These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge 28 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen days 1 | after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written objections 2 | with the court. A document containing objections should be titled “Objections to Magistrate 3 | Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within 4 | the specified time may, under certain circumstances, waive the right to appeal the District Court’s 5 || order. See Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 6 | Dated: May 8, 2023 7 8 9 ORAH BARNES UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | DLB:6 35 DB\orders\orders.pro se\costal003.dism.f&rs 26 27 28