(UD)(PS) JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Nelson-Rogers ( 2022 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, No. 2:22-cv-00892-TLN-AC 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 MARY ALICE NELSON-ROGERS, 15 Defendant. 16 17 This matter is before the Court on Defendant Mary Alice Nelson-Rogers’s (“Defendant”) 18 Notice of Removal and Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1, 2.) For the reasons 19 set forth below, the Court hereby REMANDS the action to the Superior Court of California, 20 County of Sacramento due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction and DENIES Defendants’ Motion 21 to Proceed in Forma Pauperis as moot. 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2 On May 25, 2022, Defendant filed a Notice of Removal removing what appears to be an 3 unlawful detainer action from the Sacramento County Superior Court. (ECF No. 1.) Defendant 4 did not attach the state court complaint (“Complaint’) to her Notice of Removal. 5 II. STANDARD OF LAW 6 28 U.S.C. § 1441 permits the removal to federal court of any civil action over which “the 7 district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Removal is 8 proper only if the court could have exercised jurisdiction over the action had it originally been 9 filed in federal court. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). 10 Courts “strictly construe the removal statute against removal jurisdiction,” and “the 11 defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 12 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). Furthermore, “[i]f the district court at any time 13 determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the removed action, it must remedy the 14 improvident grant of removal by remanding the action to state court.” California ex rel. Lockyer 15 v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 838, as amended, 387 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied 544 16 U.S. 974 (2005). 17 Federal question jurisdiction is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. “The 18 presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint 19 rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on 20 the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar Inc., 482 U.S. at 392. Federal 21 question jurisdiction therefore cannot be based on a defense, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third- 22 party claim raising a federal question. See Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 60–62 (2009), 23 superseded by statute on other grounds, as stated in Vermont v. MPHJ Tech. Investments, LLC, 24 803 F.3d 635, 643 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1658, and 136 S. Ct. 1666 (2016); 25 Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042–43 (9th Cir. 2009). 26 Alternatively, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 governs diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 27 Section 1332 states that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions 28 where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and 1 costs, and is between — (1) citizens of different States.” Id. The burden of proving the amount 2 in controversy depends on the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint. Lowdermilk v. U.S. Bank 3 Nat’l Ass’n, 479 F.3d 994, 998–1000 (9th Cir. 2007). When the complaint alleges damages less 4 than the jurisdictional requirement, the party seeking removal must prove the amount in 5 controversy with legal certainty. Id.; Rynearson v. Motricity, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1240 6 (W.D. Wash. 2009). 7 III. ANALYSIS 8 It appears Defendant removed this action on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. 9 (ECF No. 1 at 1–3.) To support her claim of federal question, Defendant argues Plaintiff 10 “violated certain rights provided by the United States Constitution” (she seems to suggest a 11 violation of “the right of due process”) and did not comply with the “[A]dministrative 12 [P]rocedure [A]ct.” (Id. at 1, 3.) Defendant also argues the Court has jurisdiction based on 13 “private matters dealing with a whistleblower claim of securities fraud 22UD00860, filed with 14 unclean hands, under seal” and “there is supplemental jurisdiction regarding the other claims in 15 this action.” (Id. at 3.) 16 However, without the Complaint, the Court cannot determine whether the action arises 17 under federal law. See Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 386 (“[F]ederal jurisdiction exists only when a 18 federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.”). 19 Defendant attaches to her Notice of Removal a letter notifying her than an unlawful detainer 20 action has been filed against her. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) Generally, unlawful detainer actions are 21 grounded solely in state law. To the extent Defendant is arguing she was denied due process or 22 other constitutional rights, or that Plaintiff violated the Administrative Procedure Act, such an 23 argument likely relates to an affirmative defense or potential counterclaim, which cannot be 24 considered in evaluating whether a federal question appears on the face of Plaintiff’s Complaint. 25 See Vaden, 556 U.S. at 60–62. In any event, Defendant bears the burden of showing removal is 26 proper. See Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566. By failing to attach the Complaint, Defendant has not met 27 her burden. 28 /// 1 It is further unclear whether Defendant also seeks removal on the basis of diversity 2 | jurisdiction. Regardless, removal based on diversity jurisdiction is improper for the same reason 3 | already discussed. Without the Complaint, the Court cannot determine whether the diversity of 4 | citizenship or amount in controversy requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 are satisfied. See 5 | Lowdermilk, 479 F.3d at 998-1000. 6 As there are no apparent grounds for federal jurisdiction, it is appropriate to remand this 7 | case, sua sponte, for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction. See United Investors Life Ins. Co. 8 | v. Waddell & Reed Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 967 (9th Cir. 2004) (‘the district court ha[s] a duty to 9 | establish subject matter jurisdiction over the removed action sua sponte, whether the parties 10 | raised the issue or not.”). 11 IV. CONCLUSION 12 For the reasons stated above, the Court hereby REMANDS this action to the Superior 13 | Court of California, County of Sacramento and DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Proceed in 14 || Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 2) as moot. 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. 16 | DATED: June 1, 2022 17 18 () 19 ! Vk 20 Troy L. Nuhlep ] > United States District Judge 22 23 24 25 26 27 28