(PC) Fickenworth v. Cooper ( 2023 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 GARRISON FICKENWORTH, Case No. 2:23-cv-00412-JDP (PC) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER 13 v. 14 JIM COOPER, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 19 20 21 Plaintiff brings this section 1983 case against various defendants employed at the 22 Sacramento County Jail. ECF No. 19. For the reasons stated below, the complaint cannot 23 proceed as currently articulated. I will grant plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis. 24 ECF No. 2. 25 26 27 28 1 Screening Order 2 I. Screening and Pleading Requirements 3 A federal court must screen a prisoner’s complaint that seeks relief against a governmental 4 entity, officer, or employee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must identify any cognizable 5 claims and dismiss any portion of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a 6 claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is 7 immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1), (2). 8 A complaint must contain a short and plain statement that plaintiff is entitled to relief, 9 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and provide “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 10 face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plausibility standard does not 11 require detailed allegations, but legal conclusions do not suffice. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 12 662, 678 (2009). If the allegations “do not permit the court to infer more than the mere 13 possibility of misconduct,” the complaint states no claim. Id. at 679. The complaint need not 14 identify “a precise legal theory.” Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg’l Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024, 15 1038 (9th Cir. 2016). Instead, what plaintiff must state is a “claim”—a set of “allegations that 16 give rise to an enforceable right to relief.” Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1264 17 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (citations omitted). 18 The court must construe a pro se litigant’s complaint liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 19 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). The court may dismiss a pro se litigant’s complaint “if it 20 appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which 21 would entitle him to relief.” Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2017). 22 However, “‘a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements 23 of the claim that were not initially pled.’” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 24 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)). 25 II. Analysis 26 Plaintiff alleges that he has been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and as 27 bipolar. ECF No. 1 at 3. He claims that medical staff at the Sacramento County Jail have failed 28 to adequately treat these conditions. Id. The complaint is deficient, however, because it does not 1 sufficiently describe each defendant’s involvement in plaintiff’s treatment. Plaintiff alleges only 2 that an unnamed “JPS” psychiatrist prescribed him a sleeping medication that caused him 3 paranoia and nightmares. Id. Plaintiff does not allege whether the psychiatrist knew that the 4 medication would have negative effects or even whether it was prescribed to treat his PTSD and 5 bipolar conditions. The other defendants receive no mention at all in the complaint. As such, 6 plaintiff’s allegations do not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. 7 Plaintiff may file an amended complaint that addresses this deficiency. He is advised that 8 the amended complaint will supersede the current complaint. See Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 9 F. 3d 896, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). This means that the amended complaint will need to 10 be complete on its face without reference to the prior pleading. See E.D. Cal. Local Rule 220. 11 Once an amended complaint is filed, the current complaint no longer serves any function. 12 Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, plaintiff will need to assert each 13 claim and allege each defendant’s involvement in sufficient detail. The amended complaint 14 should be titled “Second Amended Complaint” and refer to the appropriate case number. 15 Additionally, I will deny plaintiff’s request for appointment of counsel. ECF No. 19 at 16 13-14. Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to appointed counsel in this action, see Rand 17 v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997), and I lack the authority to require an attorney to 18 represent plaintiff. See Mallard v. U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, 490 U.S. 19 296, 298 (1989). The court may request the voluntary assistance of counsel. See 28 U.S.C. 20 § 1915(e)(1) (“The court may request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford 21 counsel”); Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525. However, without a means to compensate counsel, I will seek 22 volunteer counsel only in exceptional circumstances. In determining whether such circumstances 23 exist, “the district court must evaluate both the likelihood of success on the merits [and] the 24 ability of the [plaintiff] to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues 25 involved.” Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 26 Accordingly, it is ORDERED that: 27 1. Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 2, is GRANTED. 28 1 2. Within thirty days from the service of this order, plaintiff may file an amended 2 | complaint. If he does not, I will issue findings and recommendations that the complaint be 3 | dismissed for failure to state a cognizable claim. 4 3. The Clerk of Court is directed to send plaintiff a complaint form. 5 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 ( — Dated: _ May 9, 2023 q-—— 8 awe D. PE i ERSON 9 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28