Ramirez v. Animal Health International, Inc. ( 2022 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JULIA MARTINEZ, Case No. 1:21-CV-00965-JLT-SKO 12 Plaintiff, ORDER FOR SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING RE: MOTION TO 13 v. SUBSTITUTE PARTY 14 ANIMAL HEALTH INTERNATIONAL, (Doc. 20) INC., a Colorado corporation; and DOES 1 15 through 50, inclusive, 16 Defendant. 17 18 Julia Martinez filed this action in state court, alleging various employment discrimination, 19 labor code, and wrongful termination claims under California law. (Doc. 1, Ex. A.) Defendant 20 removed the case to this Court. (Doc. 1.) At the time this lawsuit was filed, Julia Martinez was 21 still living; however, Ms. Martinez has since passed. (See Doc. 20, Ex. A (Death Certificate).) A 22 Suggestion of Death was filed (Doc. 18) and served on Defendant on January 13, 2022, (Doc. 20, 23 Ex. B), and on decedent’s son, David Ramirez, on January 14, 2022, (id., Ex. C). On January 14, 24 2022, Plaintiff, through counsel, filed a motion to substitute David Ramirez as the Plaintiff in this 25 action. (Doc. 20.) No opposition was filed. 26 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a)(1) provides: 27 If a party dies and the claim is not extinguished, the court may order substitution of the proper party. A motion for substitution may be 28 made by any party or by the decedent’s successor or representative. 1 If the motion is not made within 90 days after service of a statement noting the death, the action by or against the decedent must be 2 dismissed. 3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(a)(1). In evaluating a Rule 25(a)(1) motion, the Court must consider whether: 4 (1) the motion is timely; (2) the claims pled are extinguished; and (3) the person being substituted 5 is the proper party. Maseda v. Saul, 1:20-cv-01657 JLT, 2021 WL 2268871, at *1 (E.D. Cal. June 6 3, 2021). 7 This motion is timely, because it was filed within 90 days of the Suggestion of Death.1 8 “The question of whether an action survives the death of a party must be determined by looking 9 towards the law, state or federal, under which the cause of action arose.” Stribling v. Lucero, No. 10 2:16-CV-01438-TLN-JDP, 2021 WL 516849, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2021). The Complaint 11 pleads the seven claims under California Government Code § 12940, et seq. (“FEHA”): (1) 12 disability discrimination, (2) gender (sex) discrimination, (3) age discrimination, (4) failure to 13 prevent discrimination, (5) failure to accommodate; (6) failure to engage in interactive process; 14 and (7) retaliation. (See generally Doc. 1.) The complaint also alleges: (8) failure to reimburse 15 business expenses in violation of California Labor Code § 2802; (9) violation of California Labor 16 Code § 1102.5; and (10) wrongful termination in violation of public policy. (Id.) These claims are 17 not extinguished by Plaintiff’s death. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 377.20 (“Except as otherwise 18 provided by statute, a cause of action for or against a person is not lost by reason of the person’s 19 1 It is somewhat debatable whether the 90-day period ever began to run under the circumstances. Rule 25(a) “requires two affirmative steps in order to trigger the running of the 90 day period. 20 First, a party must formally suggest the death of the party upon the record. Second, the suggesting 21 party must serve other parties and nonparty successors or representatives of the deceased with a suggestion of death in the same manner as required for service of the motion to substitute.” 22 Barlow v Ground, 39 F.3d 231, 233 (9th Cir. 1994). Rule 25 “was designed ‘to inform all interested persons of the death so that they may take appropriate action.’” Id. (quoting 3B 23 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 25.06[2] (2d ed. 1991) (discussing the 1963 amendments to Rule 25) ) (emphasis added). Here, though Plaintiff’s counsel represents that David Martinez is Plaintiff’s 24 son, it is unclear whether he is the only eligible successor. The Death Certificate, for example, 25 names Celia Ramirez as Plaintiff’s “daughter.” Although Celia Ramirez may in fact be Plaintiff’s daughter-in-law, it remains unclear whether David Ramirez is Plaintiff’s only child or whether 26 there are any other potentially interested parties. However, the primary concern in Barlow was whether a case should be dismissed because no successor or representative timely made a motion 27 to substitute. That is not an issue here. The Court nonetheless discusses the lack of clarity regarding whether David Ramirez is the only successor in relation to the “proper party” element 28 1 death, but survives subject to the applicable limitations period.”). 2 Where, as is the case here, a suit is based on diversity jurisdiction, “state law determines 3 who is a ‘proper party’ for the purposes of Rule 25(a)(1).” Bustillos v. N.H. Ball Bearings, Inc., 4 No. CV 18-3017 PSG (JPRx), 2018 WL 6333680, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2018). Under 5 California law, the decedent’s personal representative or, if none, the decedent’s “successor in 6 interest” is the proper party to be substituted. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 377.31. A decedent’s 7 “successor in interest” is defined as “the beneficiary of the decedent’s estate or other successor in 8 interest who succeeds to a cause of action or to a particular item of the property that is the subject 9 of a cause of action.” Cal. Civ. Pro. Code § 377.11. Relatedly, the term “beneficiary of the 10 decedent’s estate” in § 377.11 is defined as follows: 11 (a) If the decedent died leaving a will, the sole beneficiary or all of the beneficiaries who succeed to a cause of action, or to a particular 12 item of property that is the subject of a cause of action, under the decedent’s will. 13 (b) If the decedent died without leaving a will, the sole person or all 14 of the persons who succeed to a cause of action, or to a particular item of property that is the subject of a cause of action, under 15 Sections 6401 and 6402 of the Probate Code or, if the law of a sister state or foreign nation governs succession to the cause of action or 16 particular item of property, under the law of the sister state or foreign nation. 17 18 Cal. Civ. Pro. Code § 377.10. The Court has no information to indicate whether decedent died 19 leaving a will. Even assuming she did not die leaving a will, the Court has no information that 20 would permit it to determine whether David Ramirez is the “sole person” who would succeed 21 Plaintiff under the California Probate Code. For example, if he has siblings, then the “beneficiary 22 of the decedent’s estate” would be “all of the persons” who succeed Plaintiff under the Probate 23 Code. If David Ramirez is not the only beneficiary of the decedent’s estate, Plaintiff offers no 24 authority addressing whether it is appropriate for the Court to substitute only David Ramirez 25 under Rule 25 and California Code of Civil Procedure § 377.31. 26 It is possible that this matter may be cured or explained by a supplemental filing. 27 Therefore, the Court will hold the matter in abeyance and permit Plaintiff to supplement its 28 motion to address the issues identified above. 1 CONCLUSION AND ORDER 2 For the reasons set forth above, the Court will hold Plaintiff's motion in abeyance to 3 | permit Plaintiff an opportunity to file a supplemental brief and/or declaration. Any such 4 | supplementary materials shall be filed within 30 days of the date of this order. If no such 5 | supplement is timely received, the motion will be denied without prejudice without further notice. 6 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. g | Dated: _ June 3, 2022 Cerin | Tower TED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28