Krueger v. Advent Health System/West ( 2022 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CARRIE KRUEGER, for herself No. 2:21-cv-01549-JAM-DMC and for her minor daughter, 12 Plaintiff, 13 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S v. MOTION TO DISMISS 14 ADVENTIST HEALTH SYSTEM/WEST, 15 d/b/a FEATHER RIVER HEALTH CLINIC, 16 Defendant. 17 18 I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1 19 On August 16, 2021, Carrie Krueger (“Plaintiff”) and her 20 minor daughter attempted to enter Adventist Health System’s 21 (“Defendant”) prompt care medical clinic in Paradise, California 22 in order to have her daughter examined and treated. Sec. Am. 23 Compl. (“SAC”) ¶¶ 1-3, 8, ECF No. 10. At that time, Defendant 24 had a COVID-19 policy in effect requiring patients and visitors 25 to wear a face covering to enter the clinic. Mot. to Dismiss 26 27 1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was scheduled 28 for May 17, 2022. 1 (“Mot.”) at 2-3, ECF No. 18-1; see also Ex. A to Def.’s Request 2 for Judicial Notice (“RFJN”), ECF No. 18-3. Telehealth 3 appointments were available for individuals who could not abide 4 by the mask policy or who did not wish to travel to the clinic. 5 Mot. at 3; see also Ex. B to Def.’s RFJN. 6 That day, Plaintiff and her daughter were not wearing masks. 7 SAC ¶ 9. Plaintiff advised Defendant’s staff that she and her 8 daughter had medical exemptions and could not wear masks over 9 their faces, and she showed “the written medical exemptions.” 10 Id. She further alleges one of Defendant’s medical professionals 11 had written her medical exemption. Id. Plaintiff and her 12 daughter were denied entry for refusing to wear masks. Id. 13 In response, Plaintiff initiated the present lawsuit. See 14 Compl., ECF No 1. Claiming she is a disabled individual, 15 Plaintiff asserts two causes of action against Defendant for: 16 (1) violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”); and 17 (2) violation of California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act (the “Unruh 18 Act”). SAC at 2-3. She seeks damages and injunctive relief. 19 Id. at 4. 20 Defendant now moves to dismiss both claims. See generally 21 Mot. Plaintiff filed an opposition. See Opp’n, ECF No. 24. 22 Defendant replied. See Reply, ECF No. 25. For the reasons set 23 forth below, the Court grants Defendant’s motion. 24 25 II. OPINION 26 A. Request for Judicial Notice 27 Defendant requests the Court take judicial notice of the 28 following: (1) Adventist Health’s Face Covering Policy in effect 1 when Plaintiff attempted to enter the clinic in August 2021; 2 (2) Adventist Health’s Telehealth Policy; (3) the United States 3 Center for Disease Control and Prevention’s (“CDC”) COVID-19 4 webpage providing masking guidance; (4) Butte County’s Mask 5 Policy as of March 2022; (5) the California Department of Public 6 Health’s (“CDPH”) July 26, 2021 Public Health Order in effect 7 when Plaintiff attempted to enter the clinic; (6) the New York 8 Times’ and Google’s interactive webpages on COVID-19 statistics; 9 (7) the Department of Justice’s (“DOJ”) June 30, 2020 Press 10 Release; (8) the CDC’s webpage on the science behind masking to 11 prevent COVID-19 spread; (9) the CDPH’s webpage providing masking 12 guidance; and (10) Adventist Health’s current Face Covering 13 Policy for hospitals. See Def.’s RFJN at 2-4. Plaintiff opposes 14 the request and in particular contends Defendant’s own webpage is 15 not a proper subject for judicial notice. Opp’n at 6. 16 After carefully reviewing Defendant’s request and 17 Plaintiff’s opposition, the Court finds all ten exhibits to be 18 matters of public record and therefore proper subjects of 19 judicial notice. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 20 689 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Threshold Enterprises Ltd. v. 21 Pressed Juicery, Inc., 445 F.Supp.3d 139, 146 (N.D. Cal. 2020) 22 (“In general, websites and their contents may be judicially 23 noticed.”). However, the Court takes judicial notice only of 24 their existence and declines to take judicial notice of their 25 substance, including any disputed or irrelevant facts within 26 them. See Lee, 250 F.3d at 690. 27 B. Legal Standard 28 Dismissal is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal 1 Rules of Civil Procedure when a plaintiff’s allegations fail “to 2 state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 3 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss [under 12(b)(6)], a 4 complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as 5 true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” 6 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While “detailed 7 factual allegations” are unnecessary, the complaint must allege 8 more than “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of 9 action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Id. In 10 considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the 11 court generally accepts as true the allegations in the complaint 12 and construes the pleading in the light most favorable to the 13 plaintiff. Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 588 (9th 14 Cir. 2008). “In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to 15 dismiss, the non-conclusory ‘factual content,’ and reasonable 16 inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a 17 claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret 18 Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 19 C. Analysis: ADA Claim 20 Plaintiff claims Defendant violated the ADA by prohibiting 21 her and her daughter from entering its Paradise prompt care 22 medical clinic when they refused to wear masks. SAC at 2-3. 23 Defendant raises various arguments as to why Plaintiff fails to 24 state a claim, see Mot. at 4-14, not all of which the Court needs 25 to reach to conclude that dismissal is warranted. Defendant’s 26 leading argument - that Plaintiff fails to allege a prima facie 27 case of disability discrimination - has merit. Id. at 5-7; see 28 also Reply at 2-3. 1 To state a claim under the ADA, Plaintiff must plausibly 2 allege: (1) she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; 3 (2) the defendant is a private entity that owns, leases, or 4 operates a place of public accommodation; and (3) she was denied 5 public accommodations by the defendant because of her disability. 6 Arizona ex rel. Goddard v. Harkins Amusement Enters., Inc., 603 7 F.3d 666, 670 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Hubbard v. Twin Oaks 8 Health and Rehab. Ctr., 408 F.Supp.2d 923, 929 (E.D. Cal. 2004). 9 The Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff’s allegations 10 do not satisfy these basic requirements. Mot. at 6. In 11 particular, Plaintiff has not alleged what her disability is or 12 how her disability prevented her from wearing a face covering. 13 See SAC. She offers only the conclusory allegations that she is 14 a “disabled individual” and has a “medical exemption” from 15 wearing a mask. Id. ¶¶ 2, 9. 16 In opposition, Plaintiff contends Defendant is wasting the 17 Court’s time by raising this issue because she has already agreed 18 to “fix” it and “amend her complaint to more fully define [her] 19 disability under the ADA.” Opp’n at 1, 4. As an initial matter, 20 stating she will “fix” this issue is a concession that the 21 present allegations are insufficient. Thus, the only question 22 that remains is whether Plaintiff should be granted the leave she 23 requests to plead her ADA disability in more detail. See Opp’n 24 at 6 n.4. 25 Courts dismissing claims under Federal Rule of Civil 26 Procedure 12(b)(6) have discretion to permit amendment, and there 27 is a presumption in favor of granting leave to amend. Eminence 28 Cap., LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051-52 (9th Cir. 1 2003). “Dismissal with prejudice and without leave to amend is 2 not appropriate unless it is clear . . . that the complaint could 3 not be saved by amendment.” Id. at 1052 (internal citation 4 omitted). 5 If granted leave to amend, Plaintiff contends she would 6 plead that her disability is high blood pressure which causes her 7 “to have severe, debilitating migraines and panic like attacks” 8 that in turn have “sent Plaintiff to the emergency room.” Opp’n 9 at 2. She further states: “[m]ajor life activities are impaired 10 when she experience[s] these types of hypertensive migraines, as 11 she has been confined to bed.” Id. 12 Defendant counters that Plaintiff has already had three 13 chances, in the original, first, and second amended complaints, 14 to properly plead her disability. Reply at 2-3. Yet, she offers 15 no explanation as to why she was not able to do so in the first 16 three iterations of the complaint. Id. Perplexingly, 17 Plaintiff’s counsel admits that he has filed similar ADA cases 18 and is thus aware of the pleading standard. Opp’n at 4; see, 19 e.g. Warner v. Delano, Case No. 21-cv-05666-HSG, 2021 WL 5507160, 20 at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2021) (granting motion to dismiss in 21 one of Plaintiff’s counsel prior ADA cases and stating “Plaintiff 22 does not explain how he meets the statutory definition . . . he 23 simply asserts he is a ‘disabled individual’ who ‘has a medical 24 exemption and cannot wear a mask over his face’ . . . this is 25 insufficient . . . for the Court to conclude that Plaintiff is 26 disabled for purposes of the ADA.”). As such, Defendant argues, 27 there is no reasonable explanation why Plaintiff needs a fourth 28 chance to properly plead her ADA disability. Reply at 2. The 1 Court agrees. 2 Moreover, even if the Court were to grant Plaintiff leave to 3 add allegations regarding her high blood pressure, she could not 4 plausibly allege she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA. 5 Reply at 2-3. Disability for purposes of the ADA is defined as 6 “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or 7 more major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). “Major 8 life activities” include “caring for oneself, performing manual 9 tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, 10 lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, 11 concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.” Id. § 12 12102(2)(A). Here, as a matter of law, Plaintiff’s high blood 13 pressure does not constitute a disability within the meaning of 14 the ADA. See Murphy v. U.S. Parcel Serv., 527 U.S. 516, 522 15 (1999) (holding employee was not disabled under the ADA due to 16 high blood pressure as his high blood pressure did not 17 substantially limit him in any major life activity). 18 Additionally, Plaintiff fails to identify any connection between 19 her high blood pressure and her inability to wear a mask into a 20 hospital clinic setting during the COVID-19 pandemic. See 21 generally Opp’n. 22 For all of these reasons, the Court finds that further 23 amendment would be futile. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s ADA claim is 24 dismissed with prejudice. See Eminence Cap., LLC, 316 F.3d at 25 1052. 26 D. Unruh Claim 27 Plaintiff also asserts an Unruh Act claim predicated on the 28 ADA violations. SAC ¶¶ 16-19. However, because Plaintiff fails eee RE OI IIE RE NO II 1 to state a claim under the ADA, the dependent Unruh Act claim 2 | must also be dismissed. See Cullen v. Netflix, Inc., 600 3 F.App’x. 508, 509 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding where district court 4 properly dismissed ADA claim, the “ADA-predicated . . . Unruh 5 Civil Rights Act claim fail[s] as a matter of law.”). Thus, 6 Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim is dismissed with prejudice. See 7 Eminence Cap., LLC, 316 F.3d at 1052. 8 9 Til. ORDER 10 For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS 11 Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Both of Plaintiff’s claims are 12 DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 13 IT IS SO ORDERED. 14 Dated: June 6, 2022 15 kA 16 teiren staves odermacr 7008 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28