(PC) Cannedy v. Amador County Sheriff Department ( 2022 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 STEVEN CANNEDY, No. 2:22-cv-2001 TLN AC P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 AMADOR COUNTY SHERIFF DEPARTMENT, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 18 state law and has requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 19 I. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 20 Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1915(a). ECF Nos. 2, 7, 9. Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be 22 granted. 23 Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. 24 §§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff will be assessed an initial partial filing fee in 25 accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct 26 the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and 27 forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments 28 of twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. 1 These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time 2 the amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. 3 § 1915(b)(2). 4 II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints 5 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against “a 6 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 7 The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 8 “frivolous, malicious, or fail[] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” or that “seek[] 9 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). 10 A claim “is [legally] frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” 11 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 12 Cir. 1984). “[A] judge may dismiss . . . claims which are ‘based on indisputably meritless legal 13 theories’ or whose ‘factual contentions are clearly baseless.’” Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 14 640 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327), superseded by statute on other grounds as 15 stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). The critical inquiry is whether a 16 constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. 17 Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227-28 (citations omitted). 18 “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the 19 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of 20 what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 21 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 22 “Failure to state a claim under § 1915A incorporates the familiar standard applied in the context 23 of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Wilhelm v. Rotman, 24 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). In order to survive dismissal for failure 25 to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 26 cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the 27 speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). “[T]he pleading must contain 28 something more . . . than . . . a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally 1 cognizable right of action.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur 2 R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216 (3d ed. 2004)). 3 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 4 relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 5 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 6 content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 7 misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In reviewing a complaint under this 8 standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hosp. Bldg. 9 Co. v. Trs. of the Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976) (citation omitted), as well as construe the 10 pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor, 11 Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969) (citations omitted). 12 III. Complaint 13 The complaint alleges that defendants Martain and Amador County Sheriff’s Department 14 have subjected plaintiff to unconstitutional conditions of confinement. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff 15 alleges that he has “had issues housing on a triple rack” and has a cellmate who uses a walker that 16 does not fit though the door, requiring plaintiff to help him out a lot. Id. at 3. He further alleges 17 that the cells are also used as holding tanks so there is often someone sleeping on the cell floor. 18 Id. Finally, he alleges that the fire marshal has set the maximum capacity of the jail at seventy- 19 six inmates, but that there are over one hundred inmates in the jail, which he believes is a fire 20 hazard. Id. at 4. 21 IV. Failure to State a Claim 22 “The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits punishment of pretrial detainees.”1 Demery v. 23 Arpaio, 378 F.3d 1020, 1024 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979)). 24 1 Plaintiff does not specify whether he was a pretrial detainee or a convicted prisoner at the time 25 of the violation. For purposes of screening, the undersigned therefore assumes that he was a 26 pretrial detainee. See Vazquez v. County of Kern, 949 F.3d 1153, 1163-64 (9th Cir. 2020) (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment is more protective than the Eighth Amendment ‘because the 27 Fourteenth Amendment prohibits all punishment of pretrial detainees, while the Eighth Amendment only prevents the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment of convicted 28 prisoners.’” (quoting Demery v. Arpaio, 378 F.3d 1020, 1029 (9th Cir. 2004))). 1 “For a particular governmental action to constitute punishment, (1) that action must cause the 2 detainee to suffer some harm or ‘disability,’ and (2) the purpose of the governmental action must 3 be to punish the detainee.” Id. at 1029 (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 538). Plaintiff has failed to state a 4 general claim for unconstitutional conditions of confinement, because even assuming that the 5 conditions complained of constitute a harm to plaintiff, he has not alleged facts demonstrating 6 punitive intent. 7 To the extent plaintiff is attempting to allege a claim for failure-to-protect, he must allege 8 facts showing that 9 (1) The defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; 10 (2) Those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering 11 serious harm; 12 (3) The defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable officer in the circumstances 13 would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved—making the consequences of the defendant’s conduct obvious; and 14 (4) By not taking such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff’s 15 injuries. 16 Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2016). 17 The facts alleged are insufficient to show that plaintiff was at substantial risk of suffering 18 serious harm or that the defendants did not take reasonable measures to abate the risk. Moreover, 19 even assuming that the conditions put plaintiff at substantial risk of harm, he has not alleged facts 20 showing that he suffered any injuries as a result of defendants’ failure to abate the risk. 21 Furthermore, while “municipalities and other local government units . . . [are] among 22 those persons to whom § 1983 applies,” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 23 (1978), “a municipality can be liable under § 1983 only where its policies are the ‘moving force 24 [behind] the constitutional violation,’” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989) 25 (alteration in original) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694 and Polk County. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 26 312, 326 (1981)). There must be “a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and 27 the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Id. at 385. Assuming that the housing conditions of 28 which plaintiff complains are the result of a jail policy, plaintiff has not demonstrated that he has 1 suffered a constitutional violation and therefore fails to state a claim against the County. 2 Finally, though plaintiff names Martain as a defendant, he does not allege any actions by 3 Martain and therefore fails to state any claims against him. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 4 371, 376 (1976) (no liability under § 1983 without an affirmative link or connection between a 5 defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation). 6 V. Leave to Amend 7 The complaint does not state any cognizable claims for relief and plaintiff will be given an 8 opportunity to file an amended complaint. If plaintiff chooses to file a first amended complaint, 9 he must demonstrate how the conditions about which he complains resulted in a deprivation of his 10 constitutional rights. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976). Also, the complaint must 11 allege in specific terms how each named defendant is involved. Arnold v. Int’l Bus. Machs. 12 Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981). There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 13 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed 14 deprivation. Id.; Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Furthermore, “[v]ague and 15 conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient.” Ivey v. 16 Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). 17 Plaintiff is also informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to make 18 his first amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint be 19 complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a general rule, an 20 amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 21 1967) (citations omitted), overruled in part by Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th 22 Cir. 2012) (claims dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend do not have to be re-pled 23 in subsequent amended complaint to preserve appeal). Once plaintiff files a first amended 24 complaint, the original complaint no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an 25 amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each 26 defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 27 //// 28 //// 1 VI. Plain Language Summary of this Order for a Pro Se Litigant 2 Your request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. That means you do not have to pay 3 the entire filing fee now. You will pay it over time, out of your trust account. 4 Your complaint will not be served because the facts you alleged are not enough to state a 5 claim. You have not alleged facts that show you suffered any harm or that the conditions you 6 complain about were meant to punish you. Also, you also have not alleged any facts showing that 7 defendant Martin personally violated your rights or was responsible for the conditions about 8 which you complain. 9 You may amend your complaint to try to fix these problems. Be sure to provide facts that 10 show exactly what each defendant did to violate your rights or to cause a violation of your rights. 11 If you choose to file a first amended complaint, it must include all claims you want to 12 bring. Once an amended complaint is filed, the court will not look at any information in the 13 original complaint. Any claims and information not in the first amended complaint will not 14 be considered. 15 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 16 1. Plaintiff’s requests for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF Nos. 2, 7) are 17 GRANTED. 18 2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. Plaintiff 19 is assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 20 § 1915(b)(1). All fees shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the 21 appropriate agency filed concurrently herewith. 22 3. Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, see 28 23 U.S.C. § 1915A, and will not be served. 24 4. Within thirty days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff may file an amended 25 complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules of Civil 26 Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice. The amended complaint must bear the docket 27 number assigned this case and must be labeled “First Amended Complaint.” Failure to file an 28 //// 1 | amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a recommendation that this action 2 || be dismissed. 3 5. The Clerk of the Court is directed to send plaintiff a copy of the prisoner complaint 4 | form used in this district. 5 | DATED: December 28, 2022 fA ~ 6 ALLISON CLAIRE 7 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28