(PC)Fletcher v. Clendenin ( 2022 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ALLAN FLETCHER, Case No. 1:22-cv-00249-AWI-BAM (PC) 12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING DISMISSAL OF CERTAIN 13 v. CLAIMS 14 CLENDENIN, et al., (ECF No. 11) 15 Defendants. FOURTEEN (14) DAY DEADLINE 16 17 Plaintiff Allan Fletcher (“Plaintiff”) is a civil detainee appearing pro se and informa 18 pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Individuals detained pursuant to 19 California Welfare and Institutions Code § 6600 et seq. are civil detainees are not prisoners 20 within the meaning of the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Page v. Torrey, 201 F.3d 1136, 1140 21 (9th Cir. 2000). The Court screened Plaintiff’s complaint and was granted leave to amend. 22 Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, filed on April 25, 2022, is before the court for screening. 23 I. Screening Requirement and Standard 24 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 25 governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 26 § 1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous 27 or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b). 28 1 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 2 pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 3 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 4 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 5 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as 6 true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 7 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 8 To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires 9 sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable 10 for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret 11 Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully 12 is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility 13 standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. II. Plaintiff’s Allegations 14 Plaintiff is currently housed at Coalinga State Hospital in Coalinga, CA, where the events 15 in the complaint are alleged to have occurred. Plaintiff names as defendants: (1) Stephanie 16 Clendenin, Director of Department of State Hospitals (“DSH”), and (2) Brandon Price, Executive 17 Director as DSH-Coalinga. Both Defendants are sued in their official capacities. 18 Plaintiff alleges Due Process violations. Defendants Clendenin and Price subjected 19 Plaintiff to unnecessary institutionalization amounting to impermissible punishment by denying 20 him access to state mandated sex offender treatment. They have failed to provide less restrictive 21 alternatives for enrollment and completion in treatment. By denying treatment Plaintiff has been 22 denied adequate, timely and meaningful means to his right to trial. Defendants have hindered his 23 opportunity for release and reintegration into the community. 24 Defendants are responsible for the health and safety of DSH-Coaling patient population to 25 receive care and treatment. In 2011, Plaintiff was transferred for care and treatment to DSH- 26 Coalinga where Plaintiff enrolled in sex offender treatment program (SOTP). Plaintiff advanced 27 through the modules and was poised to advance to Module 3 in early 2020 when Covid-19 28 1 pandemic emerged. The Governor ordered, by Executive Order N-35-3030, Defendant Clendenin 2 to provide continued and uninterrupted care and treatment for mental health patients. Contrary to 3 orders, Clendenin drastically reduced treatment options and barred Plaintiff from moving freely 4 through the facility by establishing “modified programming.” This programming was 5 implemented by Defendant Price and resulted in Plaintiff being restricted to his home unit with 6 negligible access to law library, postal service, copying, canteen, education and other restrictions. 7 Neither Clendenin nor Price have indicated when Plaintiff can enroll in offense specific 8 treatment programs. They are not psychologists or psychiatrists or have other training to make 9 this decision. Plaintiff’s treatment plan consists of three components: SOPT, individual therapy, 10 and offense specific adjunct groups. Administrative guidelines by DSH prescribed SOTP as the 11 primary treatment regime. Plaintiff had been participating, pre-pandemic ,and had been 12 encouraged by progress in one-on-one therapy with SOTP license facilitators. Plaintiff can no 13 longer advance due to the suspension of treatment programs by Clendenin and Price. Eventually, groups of SOTP were reinstated but with drastically decreased requests to 14 once a week and reduced class time. Treatment staff have been reassigned to other units or left 15 the facility under the direct authorization of Defendant Price. Plaintiff’s unit is being 16 understaffed which has interrupted the continuity of his treatment progress, reducing the rapport 17 and trust with new facilitators. Groups are held in small rooms which are crowded, poorly 18 ventilated and no social distancing. Groups are not focused and do not follow the program 19 workbooks. There’s no structured syllabus, homework or participant presentations. 20 Plaintiff’s adjunct treatment groups have not been convened since March 2020. 21 DSH chief psychologist Dr. Fulton proposed to resume treatment and provide patients 22 with access to adjunct groups and other treatments. Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants’ own 23 collaborative decisions were to negate the facilitator’s approach to providing a restored adjunct 24 treatment plan as their mandate requires.” Plaintiff also proposed his own ideas and concerns for 25 resuming treatment, such as video conferences, hold therapies in auditorium rooms. etc. 26 Defendant Clendenin and Price did not respond to Dr. Fulton’s or Plaintiff’s suggestions. 27 Plaintiff’s normal 2-hour/twice weekly session have been suspended. 28 1 Defendants have failed to provide the necessary and proper means to treat Plaintiff as 2 statutorily mandated. Clendenin and Price have suspended Plaintiff’s treatment plan and have 3 violated his due process rights for a meaningful progress that is necessary and proper for him to 4 advance to trial. Their acts have deprived Plaintiff of his ability to marshal evidence of his 5 treatment progress and potential cure to demonstrate to state evaluators to determine if Plaintiff 6 continues to meet the Sexually Violent Predator criteria. Plaintiff alleges that he has been 7 deprived of his liberty interest as he has now been institutionalized for a decade and two years 8 have been lost. 9 Due to the changes in the SVPA, Plaintiff no longer has the right to a trial (and potential 10 release) every two years, which has been increased to an “indefinite term” of commitment. 11 Plaintiff has a single opportunity to present a defense of his documented treatment progress, but 12 Defendants have placed impassable obstacles on him. Defendants knew or should have known 13 they have deprived Plaintiff for two years of the ability to develop an evidentiary record of his treatment progress. Judges and DA’s ask about adjunct group treatment which Clendenin and 14 Price have suspended. Plaintiff cannot document critical benchmarks associated with a decrease 15 in his risk of recidivism. Plaintiff believes that DSH facilitators, Department of Corrections and 16 Rehabilitation and various county jails are providing SOTP treatment and adjunct groups to 17 Plaintiff’s criminal counterparts. Absent adequate treatment, Plaintiff could be held indefinitely 18 as a result of the alleged mental disorder. Defendants are using Plaintiff’s condition of 19 confinement for the forbidden purpose of punishment which does not meet the minimal standards 20 of treatment and structured protocol. Plaintiff alleges he has been subjected to punitive 21 confinement. 22 As relief, Plaintiff seeks a declaration of rights, that treatment groups be reinstated, that 23 Defendants provide a minimum of 7.5 hours of core group therapy per week for 90 minutes per 24 session, that sessions be consistent with professional standards and fully staffed with properly 25 trained and licensed clinical staff. 26 Plaintiff seeks only declaratory relief and injunctive relief against the Defendants in their 27 official capacities. 28 1 III. Discussion 2 A. Due Process - Conditions of Confinement 3 To state a claim that the conditions of his confinement violate his due process rights under 4 the Fourteenth Amendment, plaintiff must allege facts showing the conditions amount to 5 “punishment.” Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 932 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Youngberg v. Romeo, 6 457 U.S. 307, 321-22 (1982) (requiring civil detainees be given “more considerate treatment” 7 than criminal detainees). Punitive conditions of confinement are those that are either expressly 8 intended to punish or those that are “excessive in relation to the alternative purpose [for 9 confinement].” Demery v. Arpaio, 378 F.3d 1020, 1028 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 10 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979)). “Persons who have been involuntarily committed are entitled to more 11 considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of 12 confinement are designed to punish.” Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321-22, 102 S. Ct. 13 2452, 73 L. Ed. 2d 28 (1982). A civilly committed individual's right to constitutionally adequate conditions is protected by the substantive component of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 14 Amendment. Id. at 315. To determine whether these substantive due process rights have been 15 violated, the Court must balance the individual's “liberty interests against the relevant state 16 interests.” Id. at 320-21. The proper standard in determining whether a condition or restriction is 17 constitutional for a civilly committed individual is whether “professional judgment in fact was 18 exercised,” rather than the “deliberate indifference” standard used for Eighth Amendment cruel 19 and unusual punishment claims brought by prisoners. Id. at 312 n.11, 322. “[D]ecisions made by 20 the appropriate professional are entitled to a presumption of correctness,” and “liability may be 21 imposed only when the decision by the professional is such a substantial departure from accepted 22 professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible 23 actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.” Id. at 323-24. The Ninth Circuit has 24 analyzed such conditions of confinement claims under an objective deliberate indifference 25 standard. See Castro v. Cnty. of L.A., 833 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (adopting 26 objective deliberate indifference standard based on Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 27 (2015), to evaluate failure to protect claim brought by pretrial detainee). That standard demands 28 1 that: 2 (1) The defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which 3 the plaintiff was confined; 4 (2) Those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm; 5 (3) The defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even 6 though a reasonable officer in the circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk 7 involved—making the consequences of the defendant's conduct obvious; and 8 (4) By not taking such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff's injuries. 9 Castro, 833 F.3d at 1071. 10 To the extent Plaintiff is alleging a conditions of confinement claim, that claim fails. 11 Plaintiff does not allege factual support for such a claim, other than groups were held in a small 12 room with no social distancing and that he was limited in his movement around the facility. For 13 instance, Plaintiff does not allege how often these meetings occurred or if he was harmed from close confinement. Moreover, Plaintiff fails to attribute any specific conduct to these Defendants, 14 other than that they were supervisors. Supervisor liability is insufficient to state a cognizable 15 claim against these defendants. As Plaintiff was previously informed, he must allege sufficient 16 factual support for his claim. Plaintiff failed to cure this deficiency. 17 B. Due Process - Failure to Provide Mental Health Treatment 18 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to provide mental treatment for two years due to 19 their policies eliminating treatment. “[T]he due process clause includes a substantive component 20 which guards against arbitrary and capricious government action, even when the decision to take 21 that action is made through procedures that are in themselves constitutionally adequate.” 22 Halverson v. Skagit Cty., 42 F.3d 1257, 1261 (9th Cir. 1994), as amended on denial of reh'g (Feb. 23 9, 1995) (quoting Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass'n v. City of Simi Valley, 882 F.2d 1398, 1407 (9th 24 Cir.1989). States are required “to provide civilly-committed persons with access to mental health 25 treatment that gives them a realistic opportunity to be cured and released,” and to provide “more 26 considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of 27 confinement are designed to punish.” Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2000) 28 1 (citations omitted). Although the state enjoys wide latitude in developing treatment regimens, the 2 courts may take action when there is a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment 3 or when there has been no exercise of professional judgment at all. Id. A person committed based 4 on mental incapacity has a due process right to receive “such individual treatment as will give 5 [him] a realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve his ... mental condition ... because, absent 6 treatment, [he] could be held indefinitely as a result of [his] mental illness.” Ohlinger v. Watson, 7 652 F.2d 775, 778 (9th Cir. 1980) (internal citations omitted). Thus, a person committed based on 8 mental incapacity has a due process right to receive “such individual treatment as will give [him] 9 a realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve his ... mental condition ... because, absent 10 treatment, [he] could be held indefinitely as a result of [his] mental illness.” Ohlinger, 652 F.2d at 11 778 (internal citations omitted). 12 Although civilly detained persons must be afforded more considerate treatment and 13 conditions of confinement than convicted defendants, where specific standards are lacking, courts may look to decisions defining the constitutional rights of prisoners to establish a floor for the 14 constitutional rights of persons detained under a civil commitment scheme, Padilla v. Yoo, 678 15 F.3d 748, 759 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 989 (9th Cir. 2007), 16 vacated and remanded on other grounds by 556 U.S. 1256 (2009), and may borrow Eighth 17 Amendment standards to do so, Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998); Redman v. 18 County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1441 (9th Cir. 1991), abrogated on other grounds by 511 19 U.S. 825 (1994). But the conditions under which civil detainees are held cannot be harsher than 20 those under which prisoners are detained except where the statute itself creates a relevant 21 difference. Hydrick, 500 F.3d at 989 n.7. 22 The Due Process Clause requires that the nature and duration of the civil commitment 23 must bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed. Jones v. 24 Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 931 (9th Cir. 2004). However, civilly detained individuals can be subject to 25 restrictions that have a legitimate, non-punitive government purpose and that do not appear to be 26 excessive in relation to that purpose. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). “A reasonable 27 relationship between the governmental interest and the challenged restriction does not require an 28 1 exact fit, nor does it require showing a ‘least restrictive alternative.’ ” Valdez v. Rosenbalm, 302 2 F.3d 1039, 1046 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). The only question is whether the defendants 3 might reasonably have thought that the policy would advance its interests. Id. Jones v. Blanas, 4 393 F.3d 918, 933 (9th Cir. 2004)(“due process requires that the conditions and duration of 5 confinement ... bear some reasonable relation to the purposes for which persons are committed.”) 6 Liberally construing the allegations, Plaintiff states a cognizable claim for failure to treat 7 Plaintiff under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process clause, which requires states to provide 8 civilly-committed persons with access to mental health treatment that gives them a realistic 9 opportunity to be cured and released. Taking Plaintiff's factual allegations as true, Plaintiff has 10 already remained civilly committed for years and for two years has had minimal to no treatment 11 due to the policy of Defendant Clendenin and Price. To prove liability for an action or policy, the 12 plaintiff “must...demonstrate that his deprivation resulted from an official policy or custom 13 established by a...policymaker possessed with final authority to establish that policy.” Waggy v. Spokane County Washington, 594 F.3d 707, 713 (9th Cir.2010). Supervisory liability may also 14 exist without any personal participation if the official implemented “a policy so deficient that the 15 policy itself is a repudiation of the constitutional rights and is the moving force of the 16 constitutional violation.” Redman v. Cty. of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) 17 (citations and quotations marks omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 18 U.S. 825 (1970). Absent a treatment plan and treatment, Plaintiff is left without an opportunity to 19 cure or improve his mental illness and no prospect of ever being released. These facts constitute 20 injury stemming from Defendants' alleged policy of failure to treat Plaintiff. 21 C. Equal Protection 22 The Equal Protection Clause requires the State to treat all similarly situated people 23 equally. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 24 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985). This does not mean, however, that all prisoners must receive identical 25 treatment and resources. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 n. 2 (1972); Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 26 873, 880 (9th Cir. 1993); Allen v. Toombs, 827 F.2d 563, 568–69 (9th Cir. 1987). 27 “To prevail on an Equal Protection claim brought under § 1983, Plaintiff must allege facts 28 1 plausibly showing that ‘ “the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against 2 [them] based upon membership in a protected class,’ ” (citing see Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 3 425 F.3d 1158, 1166 (9th Cir. 2005)) (quoting Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th 4 Cir. 2001)), or that similarly situated individuals were intentionally treated differently without a 5 rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose, Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agr., 553 6 U.S. 591, 601-02, 128 S.Ct. 2146 (2008); Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564, 7 120 S.Ct. 1073 (2000); Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 592 (9th Cir. 2008); North 8 Pacifica LLC v. City of Pacifica, 526 F.3d 478, 486 (9th Cir. 2008). 9 Plaintiff has not stated a cognizable equal protection claim. Plaintiff does not allege that 10 he was discriminated against because of his membership in any protected class. He also does not 11 allege factual support that he was intentionally treated differently than other similarly situated 12 inmates without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. Plaintiff has not provided 13 any factual support for this claim. Plaintiff has failed to cure this deficiency. D. Injunctive Relief 14 Injunctive relief, whether temporary or permanent, is an “extraordinary remedy, never 15 awarded as of right.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 22, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 16 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008). “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely 17 to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary 18 relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” 19 Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir.2009) (quoting 20 Winter, 555 U.S. at 20). The Court does not have jurisdiction to order injunctive relief which 21 would require directing parties not before the Court to take action. Zepeda v. United States 22 Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir.1985) (“A federal court may 23 issue an injunction if it has personal jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter jurisdiction 24 over the claim; it may not attempt to determine the rights of persons not before the court.”); City 25 of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983) (Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and in 26 considering a injunctive relief, the Court is bound by the requirement that as a preliminary matter, 27 it have before it an actual case or controversy.) In any amended complaint, Plaintiff should allege 28 1 the type of injunctive relief requested. The injunctive relief Plaintiff is seeking may go beyond 2 what would be allowed as it must be narrowly tailored to address the violations of the rights at 3 issue in this action and is too ambiguous and vague. Caribbean Marine Servs. Co., Inc. v. 4 Baldridge, 844 F.2d 668, 674-75 (9th Cir. 1988). Therefore, the Court cannot grant broad 5 requests for relief or requests based on the possibility of an injury. 6 IV. Conclusion and Recommendation 7 Based on the above, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, filed on April 8 25, 2022, states a cognizable claim against Defendant Stephanie Clendenin, Director of 9 Department of State Hospitals and Brandon Price, Executive Director as DSH-Coalinga for 10 failure to treat Plaintiff under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process clause due to their policy. 11 However, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state any other cognizable claims for relief. Despite being 12 provided the relevant pleading and legal standards, Plaintiff has been unable to cure deficiencies. 13 Therefore, leave to amend should not be granted. Accordingly, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 14 1. This action proceed on Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, filed April 25, 2022, (ECF No. 15 11), against Defendant Stephanie Clendenin, Director of Department of State Hospitals 16 and Brandon Price, Executive Director as DSH-Coalinga for failure to treat Plaintiff 17 under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process clause due to their official policy; and 18 2. All other claims be dismissed based on Plaintiff’s failure to state claims upon which relief 19 may be granted. 20 * * * 21 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 22 Judge assigned to the case, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen (14) days after 23 being served with these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may file written objections 24 with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings 25 and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that the failure to file objections within the specified 26 /// 27 /// 28 1 time may result in the waiver of the “right to challenge the magistrate’s factual findings” on 2 appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 3 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 4 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 Dated: July 14, 2022 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _ 7 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28