(SS) Martinez v. Commissioner of Social Security ( 2022 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 V. LORRAINE MARTINEZ, No. 2:20-cv-02068 WBS CKD (SS) 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, 15 Defendant. 16 17 18 Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 19 (“Commissioner”) denying an application for disability and disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) 20 under Title II of the Social Security Act (“Act”). For the reasons discussed below, the 21 undersigned Magistrate Judge will recommend that plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be 22 granted except as to remedy, and the Commissioner’s motion to remand (which concedes harmful 23 error by the ALJ) be granted. 24 BACKGROUND 25 Plaintiff, born in 1973, served in the military for twelve years and, after leaving service in 26 2012, went into business with a military colleague and worked a few hours a week as a 27 bookkeeper until 2015. Administrative Transcript (“AT”) 34, 47-50. She applied on March 22, 28 2017 for DIB, alleging disability beginning April 27, 2015. AT 22. Plaintiff alleged she was 1 unable to work due to a combination of impairments including chronic fatigue, joint pain, 2 depression, anxiety, and pain in her right shoulder, hip, knee, neck, and back. AT 69, 87, 203, 3 301. In a decision dated January 9, 2020, the ALJ determined that plaintiff was not disabled.1 4 AT 22-36. The ALJ made the following findings (citations to 20 C.F.R. omitted): 5 1. The claimant last met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act on December 31, 2018. 6 2. The claimant did not engage in substantial gainful activity from 7 her alleged onset date of April 27, 2015 through her date last insured of December 31, 2018. 8 3. Through the date last insured, the claimant had the following 9 severe impairments: fibromyalgia; chronic fatigue syndrome; hypothyroidism; depression; anxiety. 10 1 Disability Insurance Benefits are paid to disabled persons who have contributed to the 11 Social Security program, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. Supplemental Security Income is paid to 12 disabled persons with low income. 42 U.S.C. § 1382 et seq. Both provisions define disability, in part, as an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity” due to “a medically 13 determinable physical or mental impairment. . . .” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(a) & 1382c(a)(3)(A). A parallel five-step sequential evaluation governs eligibility for benefits under both programs. 14 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 404.1571-76, 416.920 & 416.971-76; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-142, 107 S. Ct. 2287 (1987). The following summarizes the sequential evaluation: 15 Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful 16 activity? If so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed to step two. 17 Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? If 18 so, proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is appropriate. 19 Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination 20 of impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App.1? If so, the claimant is automatically determined 21 disabled. If not, proceed to step four. 22 Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step five. 23 Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional 24 capacity to perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled. 25 Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995). 26 27 The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation process. Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5, 107 S. Ct. at 2294 n.5. The Commissioner bears the 28 burden if the sequential evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id. 1 4. Through the date last insured, the claimant did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically 2 equals one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 3 5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned 4 finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work except that she was limited to no more than occasional 5 climbing, balancing, stooping, crouching, drawling, and kneeling; she was limited to no more than frequent handling, fingering, 6 pushing, or pulling with her bilateral upper extremities; she had to avoid concentrated exposure to vibrations, unprotected heights, 7 moving machinery, and similar hazards; she could have no more than occasional contact with supervisors, co-workers, and the general 8 public; and she had to avoid working around crowded areas. 9 6. Through the date last insured, the claimant was unable to perform any past relevant work. 10 7. The claimant was born on XX/XX/1973, which is defined as a 11 younger individual 45-49, on the date the application was filed. 12 8. The claimant has at least a high-school education and is able to communicate in English. 13 9. Transferability of job skills is not an issue in this case because 14 using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding that the claimant is ‘not disabled,’ whether or not the 15 claimant has transferable job skills. 16 10. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there were jobs that existed in 17 significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant could have performed.2 18 11. The claimant was not under a disability, as defined in the Social 19 Security Act, at any time from April 25, 2017, the alleged onset date, through December 31, 2018, the date last insured. 20 AT 24-35. 21 ISSUES PRESENTED 22 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed the following errors in finding plaintiff not 23 disabled: (1) the ALJ erred in evaluating the medical opinions; (2) the ALJ erroneously rejected 24 the VA disability rating; (3) the ALJ erred in assessing plaintiff’s credibility; (4) the ALJ’s 25 hypothetical questions to the vocational expert were based on an erroneous residual functional 26 27 2 Relying on VE testimony, the ALJ found that plaintiff would have been able to perform the requirements of representative occupations such as office helper, housekeeping cleaner, and 28 cafeteria attendant, all at the light exertional level. AT 35. 1 capacity; and (5) the ALJ’s decision is constitutionally defective. 2 LEGAL STANDARDS 3 The court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether (1) it is based on 4 proper legal standards pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and (2) substantial evidence in the record 5 as a whole supports it. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial 6 evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Connett v. Barnhart, 340 7 F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). It means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable 8 mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th 9 Cir. 2007), quoting Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). “The ALJ is 10 responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and resolving 11 ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). 12 “The court will uphold the ALJ’s conclusion when the evidence is susceptible to more than one 13 rational interpretation.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008). 14 The record as a whole must be considered, Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1487 (9th 15 Cir. 1986), and both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the ALJ’s 16 conclusion weighed. See Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). The court may not 17 affirm the ALJ’s decision simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. Id.; see 18 also Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). If substantial evidence supports the 19 administrative findings, or if there is conflicting evidence supporting a finding of either disability 20 or nondisability, the finding of the ALJ is conclusive, see Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 21 1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987), and may be set aside only if an improper legal standard was applied in 22 weighing the evidence. See Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988). 23 ANALYSIS 24 A. Medical Opinions 25 Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred in evaluating the opinions of several doctors, including 26 treating rheumatologist Dr. Anhvu Nguyen and consultative examiner Dr. H. Afupwape. Plaintiff 27 argues that the ALJ also erred in rejecting the opinions of U. S. Veterans Affairs Department 28 (VA) providers Dr. Elizabeth Brandon, Dr. Baljit Atwal, and Nurse Practitioner Jorge Garcia. 1 See AT 32-33. 2 VA Providers. In 2015, Dr Brandon opined that, due to chronic fatigue syndrome, 3 plaintiff was limited to short-term sedentary work, at her own pace, with the ability to adjust 4 hours according to her symptoms, and could not perform a regular eight-hour day of sedentary 5 work. AT 33, citing AT 545. In 2019, Dr. Atwal opined that plaintiff had occupational and 6 social impairment with reduced reliability and productivity due to persistent depressive disorder 7 with anxious distress. AT 33, citing AT 840. Also in 2019, NP Garcia opined that plaintiff’s 8 chronic fatigue syndrome was “debilitating” and would incapacitate her for at least six weeks per 9 year. AT 33, citing AT 850-51. The ALJ accorded these providers’ opinions little weight, citing 10 a lack of “quantification and specificity.” AT 33. The ALJ found these opinions to be “based on 11 one-time examinations” and “inconsistent with the longitudinal medical record.” AT 33. 12 Consultative examiner. Dr. Afuwape examined plaintiff in 2017 and diagnosed 13 “fibromyalgia with chronic fatigue and chronic pain involving the shoulders, back, hips, and 14 knees.” AT 31, citing AT 610-14. The doctor opined that plaintiff could stand/walk up to four 15 hours in an eight-hour day and had no sitting limitations; she could lift/carry/push/pull 50 pounds 16 occasionally and 25 pounds frequently; and she could frequently perform all postural and 17 manipulative activities. AT 31, citing AT 610-614. The ALJ found Dr. Afuwape’s opinion 18 “somewhat persuasive” as the “opinion for a range of medium work was generally consistent with 19 his own largely unremarkable physical examination findings[.]” AT 31. However, the ALJ 20 found that plaintiff could stand/walk at the light level (up to six hours per day) rather than the 21 four hours opined by Dr. Afuwape, reasoning that “the record indicates that [her] symptoms of 22 pain and fatigue were fairly well treated with chiropractic treatment” and noting normal imaging 23 studies and exam findings in some areas. AT 32. The ALJ also found that plaintiff was limited to 24 light lifting/carrying, not medium-level lifting/carrying as Dr. Afuwape opined. AT 32. 25 Treating specialist. Dr. Nguyen, who treated plaintiff in the VA rheumatology clinic 26 from 2016 to 2019, completed a Fibromyalgia Residual Functional Capacity Questionnaire in 27 2018. He opined that plaintiff met the American College of Rheumatology criteria for 28 fibromyalgia and diagnosed her with chronic pain and fatigue, citing symptoms including panic 1 attacks, depression, anxiety, frequent and severe headaches, multiple tender points, and pain 2 throughout her body. AT 637. Dr. Nguyen opined that plaintiff’s pain and other symptoms 3 would frequently interfere with the attention and concentration needed to perform simple work 4 tasks; that she could sit, stand, or walk for less than two hours in an eight-hour workday; and that 5 she was likely to be absent more than four days per month as a result of her impairments. AT 32, 6 639-641. 7 The ALJ found Dr. Nguyen’s opinion unpersuasive, citing conflicts with other evidence of 8 record, plaintiff’s hearing testimony, and presentation as “attentive with normal thought 9 processes.” AT 32. “As for the off-task and missed work portion of Dr. Nguyen’s report, no 10 explanation or clinical notes were referenced in support of these opinions, so it is unclear what 11 these are based upon. Overall,” the ALJ wrote, “Dr. Nguyen’s opinions significantly overstate 12 the claimant’s limitations given the other evidence of record, and are not even consistent with his 13 own chart note from August 2018.” AT 32-33. 14 1. Applicable Legal Standard 15 For applications filed before March 27, 20173, the weight given to medical opinions 16 depends in part on whether they are proffered by treating, examining, or non-examining 17 professionals. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). Ordinarily, more weight is 18 given to the opinion of a treating professional, who has a greater opportunity to know and observe 19 the patient as an individual. Id.; Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1285 (9th Cir. 1996). 20 To evaluate whether an ALJ properly rejected a medical opinion, in addition to 21 considering its source, the court considers whether (1) contradictory opinions are in the record, 22 and (2) clinical findings support the opinions. An ALJ may reject an uncontradicted opinion of a 23 treating or examining medical professional only for “clear and convincing” reasons. Lester, 81 24 F.3d at 831. 25 In contrast, a contradicted opinion of a treating or examining professional may be rejected 26 27 3 For disability applications filed on or after March 27, 2017, the Commissioner revised the rules for the evaluation of medical evidence at the administrative level. See Revisions to Rules 28 Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed. Reg 5844-01 (Jan. 18, 2017). 1 for “specific and legitimate” reasons, that are supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 830. 2 While a treating professional’s opinion generally is accorded superior weight, if it is contradicted 3 by a supported examining professional’s opinion (e.g., supported by different independent clinical 4 findings), the ALJ may resolve the conflict. Andrews v. Shalala , 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 5 1995) (citing Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989)). In any event, the ALJ 6 need not give weight to conclusory opinions supported by minimal clinical findings. Meanel v. 7 Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1113 (9th Cir. 1999) (treating physician’s conclusory, minimally supported 8 opinion rejected); see also Magallanes , 881 F.2d at 751. The opinion of a non-examining 9 professional, without other evidence, is insufficient to reject the opinion of a treating or 10 examining professional. Lester, 81 F.3d at 831. 11 2. Parties Agree ALJ Erred 12 Defendant concedes that the ALJ applied the wrong regulations in evaluating the medical 13 opinions in this case. Plaintiff filed her DIB application on March 22, 2017. AT 201. For all 14 applications filed before March 27, 2017, an ALJ must apply 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527, which 15 underpinned the older medical opinion standard outlined above. However, the ALJ evaluated the 16 medical opinion evidence in this case under the revised regulation, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c. See 17 AT 30 (“[T]he undersigned has carefully considered the medical opinion evidence and has 18 assigned each opinion weight according to its consistency with the objective medical evidence of 19 record, testimony, and other opinion evidence.”). 20 Defendant further concedes that “[t]he ALJ’s incorrect application of the regulation was 21 not harmless error, because the change in the regulations embodied in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c 22 marks a significant shift in Social Security disability law that eliminates decades of case law from 23 the Ninth Circuit and elsewhere regarding the treating source rule and the concept of a hierarchy 24 of medical source opinions.” (ECF No. 18 at 3.) Previously, the Ninth Circuit recognized “a 25 hierarchy among the sources of medical opinions.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 26 (9th Cir. 2008). Those who treated a claimant were treating physicians, those who examined but 27 did not treat the claimant were examining physicians, and those who neither examined nor treated 28 the claimant were nonexamining physicians. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). 1 This hierarchy was known as the treating physician rule, which generally afforded greater weight 2 to the opinions of treating physicians. Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 2001), 3 as amended on reh’g (Aug. 9, 2001). However, it is not clear to what extent, if any, the treating 4 source rule remains in effect for cases governed by the new regulations. See, e.g., Jones v. Saul, 5 No. 2:19-cv-01273 AC, 2021 WL 620475 at *9 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2021) (concluding that the 6 new regulations displaced case law on the treating source rule), citing Lambert v. Saul, 980 F.3d 7 1266 (9th Cir. 2020). In the instant case, the ALJ’s decision affords no particular importance to 8 the fact that Dr. Nguyen was a treating source, even though plaintiff’s application should have 9 been assessed under the old rules. 10 Under the treating source rule, the opinion of a treating rheumatologist assessing 11 symptoms of fibromyalgia is especially significant, given “fibromyalgia’s unique symptoms and 12 diagnostic methods[.]” Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 662 9th Cir. 2017), citing Social 13 Security Ruling (“SSR”) 12-2p and Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 589 (9th Cir. 2004). In 14 Benecke, concerning a claimant diagnosed with fibromyalgia, the Ninth Circuit gave treating 15 rheumatologists’ opinions 16 greater weight than those of the other physicians because it is an “opinion of a specialist about medical issues related to his or her area 17 of specialty,” citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(5). Rheumatology is the relevant specialty for fibromyalgia. Specialized knowledge may 18 be particularly important with respect to a disease such as fibromyalgia that is poorly understood within much of the medical 19 community. See Sarchet v. Chater, 78 F.3d 305, 306 (7th Cir.1996) (describing fibromyalgia as an “elusive and mysterious” disease). 20 21 379 F.3d at 594 n.4 (some internal citations omitted). Here, the ALJ did not acknowledge Dr. 22 Nguyen’s area of specialty as it related to the treating source rule that should have been applied. 23 In short, the parties agree that the ALJ’s failure to apply the correct medical opinion 24 standard was harmful error warranting remand. 25 B. Veterans Affairs Disability Rating 26 Defendant further concedes that the ALJ erred in evaluating the VA disability ratings 27 under the applicable old regulations. The VA granted plaintiff a 70% service-connected disability 28 for persistent depressive disorder, moderate to severe with anxious distress, effective October 8, 1 2013. AT 227, 230-232. The VA also granted plaintiff a 100% service-connected disability for 2 chronic fatigue syndrome, effective April 27, 2015, which coincides with the alleged disability 3 onset date. AT 227, 238-241. 4 The ALJ assessed the second VA rating as follows: 5 The claimant has a Veterans Affairs (VA) service-connected disability rating of 100 percent.4 The rating of the VA has been 6 considered in assessing the claimant’s [RFC]. However, the VA and the SSA make determinations of disability based on a different set of 7 laws and regulations. . . . While the VA’s determination is considered, it is not binding. . . . The undersigned has independently 8 weighed the evidence, including the evidence from the VA doctors, and arrives at a different conclusion than that of the VA doctors. 9 10 AT 33. 11 As with medical opinions, VA assessments for applications filed prior to March 27, 2017 12 are governed by different regulations than applications filed afterwards. As a court in this district 13 has explained: 14 Under prior regulations and case law, an ALJ not only was required to consider the VA’s determination in reaching a disability 15 determination, but also was to give it “great weight,” or “less weight ... if he gives persuasive, specific, valid reasons for doing so that are 16 supported by the record.” See McCartey v. Massanari, 298 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2002) . . . . However, under new regulations, which 17 apply to claims filed on or after March 27, 2017, the ALJ is not required to articulate “any analysis in our determination or decision 18 about a decision made by any other governmental agency or a nongovernmental entity about whether you are disabled, blind, 19 employable, or entitled to any benefits.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1504. Thus, the new regulation appears to remove any requirement for an ALJ to 20 discuss another agency’s rating. . . . 21 Instead, the new regulations require the ALJ to consider “all of the supporting evidence underlying the other governmental agency or 22 nongovernmental entity's decision.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1504. This aligns with the requirement from McCartey—as both case law and 23 the regulations direct the analysis away from an agency’s rating and toward the underlying evidence. 24 25 Dubord v. Comm’r, 2:20-cv-634 KJM KJN, 2021 WL 2661879, *3 (E.D. Cal. June 29, 2021), 26 report and recommendation adopted by 2021 WL 4285167 (E.D. Cal., Sep. 21, 2021). 27 28 4 Citing AT 221-287. 1 Here, plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to provide valid and persuasive reasons for 2 rejecting the VA disability ratings and seeks a remand. Defendant agrees that “the ALJ did not 3 fully explain why he had reached a different conclusion than the VA” as required under the 4 previous regulations, and that “remand is warranted in order for the ALJ to further explain his 5 reasons for rejecting the VA disability ratings.” (ECF No. 18 at 13.) As the parties agree that 6 remand is appropriate due to significant errors in evaluating the medical opinions and VA ratings, 7 the court does not reach the remaining claims. 8 C. Remedy on Remand 9 Plaintiff argues that the undersigned should remand for benefits, applying the credit-as- 10 true rule, while defendant seeks remand for further proceedings. 11 With error established, the court has the discretion to remand or reverse and award 12 benefits. McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1989). A case may be remanded 13 under the “credit-as-true” rule for an award of benefits where: 14 (1) the record has been fully developed and further administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose; (2) the ALJ has 15 failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, 16 whether claimant testimony or medical opinion; and (3) if the improperly discredited evidence were credited as true, the ALJ 17 would be required to find the claimant disabled on remand. 18 Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1020 (9th Cir. 2014). Even where all the conditions for the 19 “credit-as-true” rule are met, the court retains “flexibility to remand for further proceedings when 20 the record as a whole creates serious doubt as to whether the claimant is, in fact, disabled within 21 the meaning of the Social Security Act.” Id. at 1021; see also Dominguez v. Colvin, 808 F.3d 22 403, 407 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Unless the district court concludes that further administrative 23 proceedings would serve no useful purpose, it may not remand with a direction to provide 24 benefits.”); Treichler v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1105 (9th Cir. 25 2014) (“Where . . . an ALJ makes a legal error, but the record is uncertain and ambiguous, the 26 proper approach is to remand the case to the agency.”). 27 Here, the record as a whole creates serious doubt as to whether the claimant was, in fact, 28 disabled during the relevant period. The ALJ applied the wrong standard to evaluate several 1 medical opinions that contradicted each other and found plaintiff capable of varying levels of 2 work. The ALJ also failed to explain in any detail why he rejected a 100% disability rating by the 3 VA as of plaintiff’s alleged disability onset date. However, it is not clear whether, had the ALJ 4 applied the correct legal standard when evaluating the medical opinions and VA rating, there was 5 substantial evidence to support a finding of nondisability, as defendant argues. The parties 6 reasonably dispute whether the ALJ erred in finding plaintiff’s statements about the intensity, 7 persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms somewhat inconsistent with the objective 8 medical evidence and other evidence of record. See AT 27-30. In light of the complexity of the 9 evidence of fibromyalgia-related limitations and the need to reassess all medical opinions under 10 the correct standard, the undersigned finds remand for further proceedings would serve a useful 11 purpose in this case.5 12 On remand, the ALJ is free to develop the record as needed, including asking a vocational 13 expert hypothetical questions about available jobs based on a revised RFC. The court expresses 14 no opinion regarding how the evidence should ultimately be weighed, and any ambiguities or 15 inconsistencies resolved, on remand. The court also does not instruct the ALJ to credit any 16 particular opinion or testimony. The ALJ may ultimately find plaintiff disabled during the 17 entirety of the relevant period; may find plaintiff eligible for some type of closed period of 18 disability benefits; or may find that plaintiff was never disabled during the relevant period, 19 provided that the ALJ’s determination complies with applicable legal standards and is supported 20 by the record as a whole. 21 CONCLUSION 22 For the reasons stated herein, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 23 1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 13) be granted, but denied as to 24 remedy; 25 2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion to remand (ECF No. 18) be granted; and 26 3. Judgment be entered for the Plaintiff. 27 5 The parties note that they engaged in good-faith discussions about a voluntary remand, but 28 could not agree on the exact terms. ] These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 2 || assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen days 3 || after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 4 || objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 5 “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections 6 || within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. 7 || Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 8 | Dated: June 17, 2022 / hice ANKE) flo ° CAROLYN K DELANEY? 10 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 1] 12 13 14 || 2/martinez2068.ssi.ckd. f&rs 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 12