Ortiz v. County of Trinity ( 2023 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 Jessica Ortiz, et al., No. 2:21-cv-02248-KJM-AC 12 Plaintiffs, ORDER 13 v. County of Trinity, et al., 1S Defendants. 16 17 For the second time, defendants move to dismiss plaintiffs’ Monell and supervisory 18 | liability claims against the County of Trinity and Sheriff Tim Saxon, as well as punitive damages 19 | allegations against Saxon. For the reasons below, the court grants defendants’ motion to dismiss 20 | without leave to amend. 21 | I. BACKGROUND 22 The previous presiding judge summarized plaintiffs’ factual allegations in his prior order. 23 | See Prev. Order at 1-4, ECF No. 24. In brief, Deputy Ben Spencer from Trinity County Sheriff’s 24 | Department agreed to perform a civil standby for Ricardo Ortiz in order to help Ortiz retrieve his 25 | personal items from Joseph Nieves’s residence. /d. at 3. Sgt. Cavalli advised Spencer it was a 26 | crime for a landlord (Nieves) to lock a resident (Ortiz) from a property without an eviction notice. 27 | Jd. When Ortiz and Spencer arrived at Nieves’s residence, Spencer ordered Nieves to unlock the 28 | residence’s gate. Jd. Once Ortiz entered the residence, however, Spencer left the premises 1 without telling Ortiz, leaving Nieves unmonitored. Id. Nieves then confronted Ortiz and fatally 2 shot him. Id. Plaintiffs, surviving family members of Ortiz, brought this lawsuit, asserting claims 3 for: (1) wrongful death against Spencer; (2) wrongful death against the County; (3) a § 1983 4 claim against Spencer for violation of Ortiz’s Fourteenth Amendment rights; (4) a Monell claim 5 against the County; (5) a supervisory liability claim against Saxon; and (6) a request for punitive 6 damages as to Spencer and Saxon. Id. at 4. For their Monell and supervisory liability claims, 7 plaintiffs relied on a failure-to-train theory. Id. at 5. 8 In February 2022, defendants moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ Monell and supervisory liability 9 claims against the County and Saxon, as well as punitive damages allegations against Saxon. See 10 Prev. Mot., ECF No. 13. The court granted the motion because “[p]laintiffs allege[d] no facts 11 regarding the training of officers, just the conclusory allegation that Deputy Spencer ‘was not 12 adequately trained . . . with respect to how to perform civil standbys.’” Prev. Order at 7–8 (citing 13 Hyde v. City of Willcox, 23 F.4th 863, 874–75 (9th Cir. 2022) and Copelan v. Infinity Ins. Co., 14 359 F. Supp. 3d 926, 930 (C.D. Cal. 2019)). Following the Ninth Circuit decision in Hyde, the 15 prior order made clear the County’s inadequate training policy cannot be inferred from a single 16 incident, or the circumstances of this one case. Id. at 7 (citing 23 F.4th at 874–75). 17 In the operative complaint, plaintiffs have added the following allegations. Spencer was 18 hired by the Trinity County Sherriff’s Department with no prior experience as a law enforcement 19 officer. Second Am. Compl. (SAC) ¶ 131, ECF No. 30. But the County and Saxon did not train 20 Spencer about the Department’s policies related to civil standbys, and they never assessed 21 whether Spencer read or understood those policies. Id. ¶¶ 132–34. Despite Spencer’s lack of 22 training or assessment, the County and Saxon permitted Spencer to perform a civil standby for 23 Ortiz. Id. ¶ 138. Spencer left the premises before Ortiz completed retrieving his belongings, 24 which violated the policies, leading to Nieves’s fatal shooting of Ortiz. Id. ¶¶ 84–89. The 25 County and Saxon never reprimanded Spencer for the incident. Id. ¶ 181. For their Monell and 26 supervisory liability claims, plaintiffs now rely on both failure-to-train and ratification theories. 27 Id. ¶¶ 125–89. 1 As noted, defendants move to dismiss plaintiffs’ Monell and supervisory liability claims 2 against the County and Saxon, as well as punitive damages allegations against Saxon. See Mot., 3 ECF No. 34. Plaintiffs oppose. See Opp’n, ECF No. 35. Defendants have replied. Reply, ECF 4 No. 37. The court submitted the matter without a hearing. Min. Order, ECF No. 40. 5 The court requested supplemental briefing from the parties regarding whether defendants 6 violated plaintiffs’ constitutional rights in the first instance. Order, ECF No. 43. The parties have 7 fully briefed this issue. Suppl. Br., ECF No. 44; Am. Suppl. Opp’n, ECF No. 46; Suppl. Reply, 8 ECF No. 47. 9 II. LEGAL STANDARD 10 A party may move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 11 granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The motion may be granted if the complaint lacks a 12 “cognizable legal theory” or if its factual allegations do not support a cognizable legal theory. 13 Godecke v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 937 F.3d 1201, 1208 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Balistreri v. 14 Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988)). The court assumes all factual 15 allegations are true and construes “them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” 16 Steinle v. City & County of San Francisco, 919 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Parks 17 Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995)). If the complaint’s 18 allegations do not “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief,” the motion must be granted. 19 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 20 A complaint need contain only a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 21 pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), not “detailed factual allegations,” Bell Atl. 22 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). But this rule demands more than unadorned 23 accusations; “sufficient factual matter” must make the claim at least plausible. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 24 678. In the same vein, conclusory or formulaic recitations of elements do not alone suffice. Id. 25 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). This evaluation of plausibility is a context-specific task 26 drawing on “judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. 1 III. ANALYSIS 2 Although plaintiffs sufficiently allege a constitutional violation committed by Spencer, 3 their factual allegations still do not support Monell and supervisory liability claims against the 4 County and Saxon. 5 A. Constitutional Violation 6 “[T]he general rule is that the Fourteenth Amendment does not impose a duty on 7 government officers to protect individuals from third parties.” Morgan v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 8 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2007). This is because the “Constitution is a charter of negative liberties; it 9 tells the state to let people alone; it does not [generally] require . . . the state to provide services, 10 even so elementary a service as maintaining law and order.” Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 11 618 (7th Cir. 1982). But there are two exceptions to this general rule. “First, a special 12 relationship between the plaintiff and the state may give rise to a constitutional duty to protect.” 13 Martinez v. City of Clovis, 943 F.3d 1260, 1271 (9th Cir. 2019). “Second, the state may be 14 constitutionally required to protect a plaintiff that it affirmatively places . . . in danger by acting 15 with deliberate indifference to a known or obvious danger.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). 16 Plaintiffs bring their claims under the second exception, i.e., a state-created danger claim. See 17 generally Am. Suppl. Opp’n. 18 For a state-created danger claim, plaintiffs must plead: (1) the officer’s affirmative actions 19 created or exposed them to “an actual, particularized danger” that plaintiffs would not otherwise 20 have faced; (2) the injury plaintiffs suffered was foreseeable; and (3) the officers were 21 “deliberately indifferent to the known danger.” Martinez, 943 F.3d at 1271. Below, the court 22 discusses only the first element, as defendant does not argue plaintiffs insufficiently pled the 23 second and third elements. See generally Suppl. Br. 24 Here, plaintiffs have plausibly pled Spencer’s affirmative action, i.e., his broken promise 25 to perform a civil standby and his command toward Nieves to unlock the gate, which exposed 26 Ortiz to a danger he otherwise would not have faced. According to the operative complaint, Ortiz 27 communicated to Spencer that Ortiz would not enter Nieves’s property alone. SAC ¶¶ 51–52. It 28 was Spencer who ordered Nieves to open the gate so Ortiz could enter the residence. 1 Id. ¶¶ 79, 82. Ortiz then entered Nieves’s residence, even though he knew Nieves was dangerous, 2 because Spencer promised to perform a civil standby. Id. ¶¶ 83–85. Spencer, however, left the 3 premises, allowing Nieves to fatally shoot Ortiz. Id. ¶¶ 85–89. Although defendants argue 4 Spencer never represented he would remain at the scene while Ortiz retrieved his personal items, 5 see Suppl. Reply at 4, plaintiffs allege “Spencer agreed to perform a civil standby to assist [Ortiz] 6 in retrieving his property from the subject property,” SAC ¶ 53. To the extent defendants dispute 7 the scope of the agreed-upon civil standby, that is a factual issue better left for summary 8 judgment. At this motion to dismiss stage, the court assumes all factual allegations to be true; 9 construing those factual allegations in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, they have sufficiently 10 pled that Spencer’s broken promises induced Ortiz to face a danger he otherwise would not have 11 faced. See Steinle, 919 F.3d at 1160. 12 Defendants also argue Spencer’s broken promises are insufficient to establish a state- 13 created danger claim, relying on this court’s decision in Wormuth v. Lammersville Union Sch. 14 Dist. Suppl. Reply at 4 (citing 305 F. Supp. 3d 1108 (E.D. Cal. 2018)). In Wormuth, the court 15 found allegations that a school principal’s failure to help a teacher supervise an aggressive 16 student, despite promising to do so, were “an attempt to redefine passive inaction as action that is 17 affirmative.” 305 F. Supp. 3d at 1122. Wormuth is distinguishable from this case. Unlike here, 18 the principal in Wormuth allegedly made his promise to a third-party, the teacher, and did not 19 induce the plaintiff (student) to act in a way that they would otherwise not have. See id. 20 Rather, this case is more akin to the Ninth Circuit decision in Kennedy v. City of 21 Ridgefield, where the officer promised to notify the plaintiff before contacting an alleged child 22 molester about the plaintiff’s allegations so the plaintiff could have an opportunity to protect her 23 family from the molester’s violent response to the news. 439 F.3d 1055, 1063 (9th Cir. 2006). 24 The officer broke that promise and contacted the molester without notifying the plaintiff. Id. 25 at 1058. The molester then shot the plaintiff and her husband. Id. Kennedy found the officer 26 affirmatively created a danger when he notified the molester of the plaintiff’s allegations without 27 warning her as promised. See id. at 1063. Similarly, Spencer allegedly ordered Nieves to open 28 the gate for Ortiz and induced Ortiz to enter Nieves’s residence without fully performing the civil 1 standby for Ortiz as promised. SAC ¶¶ 50–53, 79, 82–89. Although defendants argue Spencer 2 ordered Nieves to open the gate at Ortiz’s behest, Suppl. Br. at 5, this aspect of what happened 3 does not make a difference in light of Kennedy. Ortiz conditioned his request on Spencer’s 4 promise to perform a civil standby, similarly to the Kennedy plaintiff’s request to investigate the 5 molester on the condition the plaintiff was notified before the officer contacted the molester. 6 Because Spencer allegedly broke his promise and placed Ortiz in danger, plaintiffs have alleged a 7 viable state-created danger claim against Spencer. 8 Finally, defendants argue no constitutional violation occurred because Ortiz voluntarily 9 entered Nieves’s residence even though he knew the potential danger, relying on the Ninth Circuit 10 decision in Johnson v. City of Seattle. Suppl. Br. at 3–4 (citing 474 F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 2007)). 11 But in a subsequent decision, the Ninth Circuit clarified Johnson turned on whether an officer 12 engaged in “affirmative conduct,” not whether a plaintiff knew of the potential danger: “Had the 13 officers in Johnson engaged in affirmative conduct akin to directing someone involuntarily into 14 dangerous conditions (as the Officers did here), they would have been liable under the state- 15 created danger doctrine.” Hernandez v. City of San Jose, 897 F.3d 1125, 1138 (9th Cir. 2018). 16 As discussed above, Spencer’s broken promise to fully perform a civil standby and his order to 17 Nieves to unlock the gate, which actions induced Ortiz to enter Nieves’s residence, were 18 “affirmative conduct akin to directing someone involuntarily into dangerous conditions.” See id. 19 Thus, Johnson also is distinguishable. 20 For the reasons above, defendants have not shown plaintiffs have insufficiently pled a 21 state-created danger claim under § 1983, and the court will not grant defendant’s motion to 22 dismiss on that ground. 23 B. Monell and Supervisory Liability Claims 24 Although plaintiffs allege a constitutional violation under § 1983, as the court discussed in 25 its prior order, municipalities are responsible only for their unlawful “policy or custom” and 26 “cannot be held liable [for the actions of their employees] . . . on a respondeat superior theory.” 27 Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Prev. Order at 5. 28 Relatedly, “[a] supervisor can be liable in his individual capacity for his own culpable action or 1 inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his subordinates; for his acquiescence in the 2 constitutional deprivation . . . ; or for conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the 3 rights of others.” See Watkins v. City of Oakland, 145 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 1998). For both 4 Monell and supervisory liability claims, plaintiffs must show municipal defendants acted in a 5 deliberate or reckless indifference to the rights of others. Prev. Order at 5–6; Hyde, 23 F.4th 6 at 874. As noted, plaintiffs rely on failure-to-train and ratification theories for their Monell and 7 supervisory liability claims against the County and Saxon. SAC ¶¶ 125–89; see also Horton by 8 Horton v. City of Santa Maria, 915 F.3d 592, 602–03 (9th Cir. 2019) (stating municipal “policy or 9 custom” under Monell can be shown through a failure to train or ratification); Watkins, 10 145 F.3d at 1093 (same for supervisory liability claims). For the reasons below, plaintiffs cannot 11 proceed on either theory. 12 For their failure-to-train theory, plaintiffs continue to solely rely on the circumstances of 13 this case, see SAC ¶¶ 147, 149, but as the prior order made clear, the court cannot infer an 14 inadequate training policy from this single incident, see Hyde, 23 F.4th at 875. Indeed, “[t]hat a 15 particular officer may be unsatisfactorily trained will not alone suffice to fasten liability on the 16 city, for the officer’s shortcomings may have resulted from factors other than a faulty training 17 program.” City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390–91 (1989). Plaintiffs argue 18 defendants’ “deliberate indifference” can be inferred from a single incident. Opp’n at 9–13. But 19 “[w]hile deliberate indifference can be inferred from a single incident when ‘the unconstitutional 20 consequences of failing to train’ are ‘patently obvious,’ an inadequate training policy itself cannot 21 be inferred from a single incident.” Hyde, 23 F.4th at 874–75 (internal citations omitted). 22 Accordingly, plaintiffs still have not plausibly pled defendants had an inadequate training policy. 23 Plaintiffs also argue Cavalli’s inadequate supervision of Deputy Spencer’s civil standby 24 was another incident demonstrating the County’s inadequate training policy. Opp’n at 13 n.4. 25 The court disagrees. Accepting plaintiffs’ argument would mean “a plaintiff could effectively 26 shoehorn any single incident with no other facts into a failure-to-train claim against the 27 supervisors and the municipality.” Hyde, 23 F.4th at 875. Plaintiffs concede the applicable 28 training for Spencer and Cavalli would have been different for each, as one is “at the level of a 1 patrol deputy” and the other “at a supervisory level.” SAC ¶ 147. At the same time, plaintiffs 2 argue “[t]he [operative complaint] does not ask the Court to infer that there was inadequate 3 training. On the contrary, [the complaint] now directly alleges Deputy Spencer was not trained 4 and allowed to patrol alone.” Opp’n at 13 (emphasis in original); see also SAC ¶¶ 131–140. But 5 such conclusory allegations alone do not render plaintiffs’ Monell and supervisory liability claims 6 plausible. See AE ex rel. Hernandez v. County of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012) 7 (citing Twombly and Iqbal). 8 Moreover, plaintiffs’ ratification theory cannot proceed. “For there to be ratification, 9 there must be ‘something more’ than a single failure to discipline or the fact that a policymaker 10 concluded that the defendant officer’s actions were in keeping with the applicable policies and 11 procedures.” Kong Meng Xiong v. City of Merced, 2015 WL 4598861, at *29 (E.D. Cal. July 29, 12 2015). Because plaintiffs rely solely on the defendants’ failure to discipline Spencer, see SAC 13 ¶ 181, they have insufficiently pled the County or Saxon ratified Spencer’s conduct. 14 At this point, after two rounds of motion practice, the court concludes plaintiffs do not 15 possess facts sufficient to support their Monell and supervisor liability claims against the County 16 and Saxon. The court thus grants defendants’ motion to dismiss these claims without leave to 17 amend. See DCD Programs, Ltd. V. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186 n.3 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[A] 18 district court’s discretion over amendments is especially broad ‘where the court has already given 19 a plaintiff one or more opportunities to amend his complaint . . . .’”) (quoting Mir v. Fosburg, 20 646 F.2d 342, 347 (9th Cir. 1980)). The court also dismisses without leave to amend the 21 punitive damages allegations against Saxon. See Copelan, 359 F. Supp. 3d at 930. 22 IV. CONCLUSION 23 For the reasons above, the court grants defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ Monell 24 and supervisory liability claims against defendants County of Trinity and Sheriff Saxon, as well 25 as the punitive damages allegations against Sheriff Saxon, without leave to amend. 26 The balance of plaintiffs’ claims may proceed. The Status (Pretrial Scheduling) 27 Conference remains scheduled for February 9, 2023, with the filing of an updated joint status 28 report due fourteen days prior. 1 This order resolves ECF No. 34. 2 IT IS SO ORDERED. 3 DATED: January 10, 2023.