(PC) Beckett v. Scalia ( 2023 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MATTHEW H. BECKETT, Case No. 1:20-cv-01468-JLT-CDB (PC) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER VACATING FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO DISMISS 13 v. ACTION FOR PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE TO 14 SCALIA, et al., OBEY COURT ORDERS AND FAILURE TO PROSECUTE 15 Defendants. (Doc. 30) 16 ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 17 APPOINT COUNSEL 18 (Doc. 31) 19 20 21 Plaintiff Matthew H. Beckett is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis 22 in this civil rights action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 23 I. INTRODUCTION 24 On October 31, 2023, the Court issued its Third Screening Order. (Doc. 29.) The Court 25 found Plaintiff plausibly alleged cognizable claims against several named Defendants but had 26 failed to state any other cognizable claim. (Id. at 9-18.) Plaintiff was ordered to respond within 27 21 days of the date of service of the order. (Id. at 18-19.) 28 1 On November 29, 2023, when more than 21 days elapsed without Plaintiff responding to 2 the screening order, the Court issued Findings and Recommendations to dismiss this action for 3 Plaintiff’s failure to obey and failure to prosecute. (Doc. 30.) Plaintiff was to file any objections 4 within 14 days of the date of service. (Id. at 4-5.) 5 Later that same date, the Court received and filed Plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel 6 (Doc. 31) and his response to the Court’s Third Screening Order (Doc. 32). 7 Given Plaintiff’s response to the screening order, the Court will vacate the Findings and 8 Recommendations issued November 29, 2023, and addresses Plaintiff’s motion below. 9 II. DISCUSSION 10 Plaintiff asserts he was admitted to Atascadero State Hospital on June 12, 2022, and was 11 sentenced in Kings County Superior Court pursuant to California Penal Code section 1026.1 (Doc. 12 31.) He contends that he has “not yet received a ‘Restoration of Sanity.’” (Id at 1.) Plaintiff asks 13 the Court to appoint counsel because he is “under an ‘Extreme Circumstance,’ [and] deprived of 14 mental faculties that the average person may possess, due to disability and or mental 15 impairments.” (Id.) He requests appointment of “a forensic team of sorts to determine” his mental 16 state and to “certify [him] fit to proceed.” (Id.) Plaintiff states he cannot afford to retain an 17 attorney and is a developmentally disabled man with a learning disability and “multiple mental 18 health diagnosis” that greatly affect his “capacity and place [him] at an increased place of 19 disadvantage pertaining to a fair ability to achieve justice.” (Id.) He asserts he is “not a stupid 20 man however between the aforementioned challenges and a mental health diagnosis[, it] is 21 definitely a descriminatory effect and perhaps unfair.” (Id. at 1-2.) 22 Plaintiffs do not have a constitutional right to appointed counsel in section 1983 actions. 23 Rand v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997), rev’d in part on other grounds, 154 F.3d 24 952, 954 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998). Nor can the Court require an attorney to represent a party under 28 25 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). See Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 304-05 (1989). However, in 26 27 28 1 California Penal Code section 1026 pertains, in relevant part, to pleas of insanity, commitments to the 1 “exceptional circumstances,” the Court may request the voluntary assistance of counsel pursuant 2 to section 1915(e)(1). Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525. 3 Given that the Court has no reasonable method of securing and compensating counsel, the 4 Court will seek volunteer counsel only in extraordinary cases. In determining whether 5 “exceptional circumstances exist, a district court must evaluate both the likelihood of success on 6 the merits [and] the ability of the [plaintiff] to articulate his claims pro se in light of the 7 complexity of the legal issues involved.” Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525 (internal quotation marks & 8 citations omitted). 9 Likelihood of Success on the Merits 10 At this stage in the proceedings, the Court cannot determine whether Plaintiff is likely to 11 succeed on the merits. Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525. A merits-based determination tests the veracity of 12 the claims based upon evidence adduced during litigation. The issues involved here are not 13 complex. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment excessive force and failure to intervene claims, as well as 14 his First Amendment retaliation claims, will largely involve factual determinations as opposed to 15 more complex legal arguments and determinations. 16 Plaintiff’s Ability to Articulate Claims 17 The Court finds Plaintiff is able to articulate his claims. Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525. Plaintiff 18 has responded appropriately to the Court’s orders and recently stated several cognizable claims in 19 his second amended complaint. Additionally, Plaintiff has filed several motions with the Court 20 and has competently prosecuted this case for more than three years, including during the period 21 involving his commitment to Atascadero State Hospital. 22 To the extent Plaintiff requests a competency hearing, “[a] party proceeding pro se in a 23 civil lawsuit is entitled to a competency determination when substantial evidence of 24 incompetence is presented.” Allen v. Calderon, 408 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005). Exactly 25 what constitutes “substantial evidence” is not specifically denoted in Allen; however, courts may 26 consider evidence such as sworn declarations and letters from treating psychiatrists. Id. at 1151– 27 53. In Allen, the Ninth Circuit found substantial evidence of incompetency where the petitioner 28 submitted his own sworn declaration and another inmate’s declaration explaining petitioner’s 1 mental illness and inability to understand the court's orders, as well as a letter from the 2 petitioner’s psychiatrist detailing his diagnosed schizophrenia and medications. Id. at 1153. An 3 incapacitating mental disability may be grounds for appointment of counsel in some cases, but a 4 plaintiff making that argument must present substantial evidence of incompetence. See McElroy 5 v. Cox, No. 08–1221 JM (AJB), 2009 WL 4895360, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2009). In McElroy, 6 the plaintiff, a pro se prisoner in a section 1983 case, presented documents similar to those 7 provided in Allen to support his mental disability; however, the court found “there is no nexus 8 between his mental disorder and his ability to articulate his claims.” Id. at *3. The court found the 9 plaintiff’s ability to articulate his claim was not affected by his mental disorder. Id. The plaintiff 10 had successfully survived screening, successfully opposed Defendants’ motion to dismiss by 11 presenting legal arguments with documentary support, and his motions for appointment of 12 counsel were drafted with clarity and proper arguments. Id. Medical records also showed that he 13 functioned well when properly medicated. Id. The court denied Plaintiff’s motion to appoint 14 counsel because he had not shown that the interests of justice or exceptional circumstances 15 warranted appointment of counsel. Id. 16 Here, Plaintiff has offered only his vague allegations of a learning disability and “multiple 17 mental health” diagnoses and offers no substantial evidence of incompetence. See also Yocom v. 18 County of Tulare, No. 1:21-cv-00849-HBK (PC), 2023 WL 5723828, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 19 2023); Meeks v. Nunez, No. 13cv973-GPC (BGS), 2017 WL 476425, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 20 2017). 21 Additionally, even assuming Plaintiff is not well versed in the law and has made serious 22 allegations that, if proven, would entitle him to relief, Plaintiff’s case is not exceptional. The 23 Court is faced with similar cases almost daily. While the Court recognizes that Plaintiff is at a 24 disadvantage due to his pro se status and his incarceration, the test is not whether Plaintiff would 25 benefit from the appointment of counsel. See Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th 26 Cir. 1986). The test is whether exceptional circumstances exist; here, they do not. Indeed, 27 circumstances common to most prisoners, such as lack of legal education and limited law library 28 access, do not establish exceptional circumstances that would warrant a request for voluntary 1 assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Faultry v. Saechao, 2020 WL 2561596, at *2 (E.D. Cal., May 20, 2 2020) (stating that “[c]ircumstances common to most prisoners, such as lack of legal education 3 and limited law library access, do not establish exceptional circumstances supporting appointment 4 of counsel”); see also Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525 (finding no abuse of discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 5 1915(e) when district court denied appointment of counsel despite fact that pro se prisoner “may 6 well have fared better-particularly in the realm of discovery and the securing of expert 7 testimony”). 8 Plaintiff is advised the fact an attorney may be better able to perform research, investigate, 9 and represent a plaintiff does not change the analysis. There is little doubt most pro se litigants 10 “find it difficult to articulate [their] claims,” and would be better served with the assistance of 11 counsel. Wilborn, 789 F.2d at 1331; Courtney v. Kandel, No. 2:18-CV-2052-KJM-DMC-P, 2020 12 WL 1432991, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2020) (challenges conducting discovery and preparing for 13 trial “are ordinary for prisoners pursuing civil rights claim” and cannot form the basis for 14 appointment of counsel). For this reason, in the absence of counsel, federal courts employ 15 procedures which are highly protective of a pro se litigant's rights. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 16 519, 520 (1972) (holding pro se complaint to less stringent standard) (per curiam). In fact, where 17 a plaintiff appears pro se in a civil rights case, the court must construe the pleadings liberally and 18 afford the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 19 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). The rule of liberal construction is “particularly important in civil rights 20 cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, where a pro se litigant can 21 “articulate his claims” in light of the relative complexity of the matter, the “exceptional 22 circumstances” which might require the appointment of counsel do not exist. Wilborn, 789 F.2d at 23 1331; accord Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009). 24 Further, indigency does not qualify as an exceptional circumstance. See Callender v. 25 Ramm, No. 2:16-cv-0694 JAM AC P, 2018 WL 6448536, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2018) (“The 26 law is clear: neither plaintiff’s indigence, nor his lack of education, nor his lack of legal expertise 27 warrant the appointment of counsel”). 28 1 In sum, Plaintiff faces challenges and circumstances faced by most pro se prisoner 2 | litigants. Nevertheless, those circumstances are not exceptional and do not warrant the 3 || appointment of counsel. Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525. 4 I. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 5 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 6 1. The Findings and Recommendations issued November 29, 2023 (Doc. 30) are 7 VACATED; and 8 2. Plaintiff's Motion to Appoint Counsel (Doc. 31) is DENIED without prejudice. 9 | ITIS SO ORDERED. '0| Dated: _November 30, 2023 | hr 11 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28